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Introduction

Euro-Turks bridging the gap between Turkey and Europe

Talip Kucukcan and Veyis Gungor

This book is the largest collection of articles in print based on original research on Turks in Europe. More than 4.5 million Turks who have been living and working in numerous European countries since the late 1950s and early 1960s reside in Europe today. Contrary to the expectations of policy-makers in receiving countries, permanent settlement has taken place with unintended consequences in the social, political and cultural landscapes of the host societies.

*Turks in Europe: Culture, Identity and Integration* brings together sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and experts in educational and cultural studies to address current issues, policy options and future trends vis-à-vis Turks in Europe and their role as intermediaries between Turkey and the European Union.

An overwhelming majority of the articles in this book are based on fieldwork, including participant observation and in-depth
interviews that enabled researchers to collect original empirical data on issues such as identity, culture, religion, integration, youth, women and relations between Turkey and the European Union. Contributors to this volume analyze their data in light of recent scholarship and interpret the results on sound theoretical grounds. They not only provide the most comprehensive picture of Turks in Europe up until the present day but also offer accessible and cutting-edge ideas on a wide range of questions to which modern European societies cannot avoid paying closer attention.

This volume has four main parts, each one including insightful articles that take their readers into the world of Turkish migrants, examining their life styles, experiences, emotions, hopes, views and expectations in Europe.

Part I, *Turks as New Citizens of Europe*, includes articles written by Tilman Lanz, Samim Akgönül, Talip Kucukcan, Rana Cakirerk, Johan Wets, Güneş Koç and Ali Chouseinoglou on Turks in Germany, France, Britain, Belgium, Austria and Greece. Contributors to this part of the book invite readers to a fundamental rethinking of the making of Euro-Turks by focusing on the origins of immigration, state policies towards immigrant workers and minority communities, and multiculturalism and its consequences for the re-definition of identities and integration. The authors demonstrate that Turks in Europe face a number of problems such as stereotyping by the media and the prevailing political discourse; nevertheless they are negotiating their identity as a result of constant cultural exchanges in the European public sphere. Contrary to widespread claims coming primarily from Turco-skeptics and anti-immigration groups, case studies presented in Part I illustrate that Turks do not have a hostile attitude towards European values and culture; rather, they would like to become permanent members of the European family while preserving their original identity values, which do not necessarily contradict European cosmopolitanism.
Part II, *Young Turks, Identity Practices and Integration*, contains insightful contributions by Daniel Faas, Pinar Enneli, Tariq Modood, Lise Jönsso, Paul Tkachenko, Gonul Tol and Ilhan Kaya on the articulation of identity of Turkish youth in Germany, Britain, the Netherlands and the US. The authors provide incisive analysis of the myths and realities of challenges to identity construction among Turkish youths, who are experiencing generational and cultural tensions in Europe. Articles in this part of the volume critically examine the role of culture, religion, history, memory, work and music on the construction of identity among Turkish youth and invite readers to consider how social, political and psychological factors influence perception of “self” and “others” in a complex web of relations. The empirical data and carefully chosen examples in Part II demonstrate that not only inculcation of the Turkish cultural legacy and memory but also state policies of the host countries are making a significant impact how young Turks in Europe today are developing a sense of identity and belonging.

Part III, *Turkish Women between Tradition and Modernity*, focuses on gender issues and Turkish women. Contributors Mona Franséhn, Margareta Bäck-Wiklund, Marie Carlson, Nezahat Altuntaş and Seçil Erdoğan candidly explain how Turkish women locate themselves within the family, at school and at work in Sweden, Germany and Britain by taking readers into the world of women who are positioned between tradition and modernity. The authors will appeal to anyone interested in the connections between gender and immigration issues with a focus on how family values, traditional roles, religion, social control and new opportunity spaces are changing the world of women. Contributors to this part of the book tell readers fascinating stories about Turkish women in Europe and demonstrate how they rationalize their positions and cope with social and cultural change. The scope of respondents’ thoughts and views in the case studies presented in Part III serves as an urgent challenge to scholars, thinkers and policy-makers to embrace new ways to address fundamental questions.
of identity and equality that touch on the very lives of Turkish women in Europe.

Part IV, *Turks and Turkey-EU Relations*, draws upon long-needed analytical contributions by Ayhan Kaya, Sven E. O. Hort, Talip Kucukcan, Veyis Gungor, Yusuf Adıgüzel, Gözde İnal, Mustafa F. Özbilgin, Mine Karataş-Özkan, Yusuf Devran and Tim Jacoby. Focusing on the perception of European identity, views on Turkey’s EU membership, the portrayal of Turkey in the media, and the culture of entrepreneurship among Turkish communities, organizations and institutions, the studies in this part of the book demonstrate how Euro-Turks can bridge the gap between Turkey and the European Union. Although Turkey’s journey to Europe has a long history, and both parties have political, cultural and economic exchanges spanning centuries, a culturalist approach has emerged against Turkey’s EU membership in recent years claiming that Turkey belongs to a different cultural and civilizational zone with its largely Muslim population and traditional values. The findings of clearly written articles in Part IV deserve to be widely and carefully read because they make a strong point for Turkey’s membership, as many authors argue that Turks in Europe can play a crucial role if and when their social capital is systematically mobilized. Contributors to Part IV suggest that a rational approach which not only recognizes but also celebrates cultural pluralism and diversity should replace a culturalist approach that tends to be exclusionary.
PART I

TURKS AS NEW CITIZENS OF EUROPE
Behind the Fantasy Screen of Multiculturalism: Turkish Immigrant Comedy in Germany

Tilman Lanz

In the end...there are those...who recite an interminable catechism of unity in diversity, complementarity, and well-tempered differences. This well-intentioned discourse, sometimes welcome in moral and political emergencies, remains a discourse of intentions and exhortations. It does not reach as far as the very thing with which it deals.

Jean-Luc Nancy (2000: 148)

Introduction

The Discursive Value of Multiculturalism Multiculturalism is still, today, the predominant model for the integration of foreigners in Germany. In this text, I critically engage with these two concepts from the perspective of Turkish immigrants. I explore the discursive deployment and meanings of integration and multiculturalism from the point of view of Muhsin Omurca, a Turkish-German migrant comedian. To anticipate my argument: through the case
study of Muhsin Omurca, I show that multiculturalism, in the end, serves as a fantasy screen for indigenous Germans to sustain their libidinal economies around the notion of Turkish alterity. I show how multiculturalism and integration are used by indigenous Germans in a dialectical fashion to conceal their continued hold on power in relationship to immigrant minorities.

The notion of multiculturalism has been criticized from many different perspectives. Benhabib has, for instance, pointed out that any multiculturalist paradigm operates with what she calls a ‘mosaic’ understanding of cultures that assumes an inherent essence present before they come into contact with other cultures in a multiculturalist space (Benhabib 2002: 8). Nederveen Pieterse argues, somewhat more positively, for an understanding of multiculturalism as discursive practice (Nederveen Pieterse 2004). In his reading of the term, multiculturalism, and the specific cultural formations involved in its production, emerge in “intercultural interplay and mingling, a terrain of crisscrossing cultural flows, in the process generating new combinations and options” (Nederveen Pieterse 2004: 36). This perspective allows Nederveen Pieterse to retain the concept of multiculturalism while, simultaneously, foregoing its essentialist undertones in earlier definitions. Block has recently proposed to combine a number of features from these different views of multiculturalism: “I adopt a view of culture and multiculturalism which might variably be qualified as poststructuralist, processual, deliberative democratic and dynamic” (Block 2006: 24). Block thus is very much in agreement with Nederveen Pieterse in wanting to retain multiculturalism as a useful concept for both social analysis and practice.

But even if we accept such a definition of multiculturalism as non-essentialist, discursive and dynamic, problems remain. Fomina, for instance, argues that we must find other ways than multiculturalism for integrating minority populations in Europe because of its inherent Western bias (Fomina 2006). Despite its
seemingly open character, the very concept of multiculturalism is, according to Fomina, laden with Western cultural baggage that is necessarily perceived as confining by people from non-Western backgrounds. Jordan adds to this criticism by showing how multiculturalism easily results in the perception of immigrants as suspended and trapped in a diasporic space while Ewing, in turn, argues much closer to the position taken in this paper when she points out that Muslim immigrants in Germany – and particularly women – defy integrationist multicultural strategies by forming a 'parallel society' (Jordan 2006; Ewing 2006).

It is curious that, despite these salient critiques, multiculturalism remains the most prolific model in Western societies to approach and deal with immigrants. We can see this, just to give one example, in the recent work of Brighton, who argues for a use of multiculturalism in Britain to 'combat' immigrant Muslim terrorism in conjunction with Britain's allegedly tainted international reputation in the wake of the Iraq war (Brighton 2007). Brighton thus maintains that multiculturalism is able to soften tensions between indigenous British and immigrant minorities and that it possibly even provides an avenue to do away with these tensions altogether.

As we can see in these varying approaches to multiculturalism, the concept allows for a multitude of definitions. So we have to, in a preliminary way, define the concept of multiculturalism for our purposes where what is at stake is its function for shaping the relationship between Turkish immigrants and indigenous Germans. In theory multiculturalism affords a great deal of tolerance towards ethnic minorities in a nation-state that is dominated by an ethnic majority (cf. Appadurai 2006). Usually, multiculturalism is invoked as a concept in contexts where immigration has changed the ethnic composition of a society. In these contexts, multiculturalism is supposed to regulate the relationship between indigenous majority populations and immigrant minorities, pro-
viding a multicultural space where minorities and majority share the same rights, based on tolerance and mutual acceptance.

Multiculturalism is perhaps best defined in relationship to two closely interconnected concepts: assimilation and integration. Earlier attempts to conceptualize the relationship between immigrants and indigenous populations especially in Europe and North America operated with the concept of assimilation. Immigrants were, in a word, expected to fully conform to the standards of their new host society. Over the past three decades, rigid assimilation was increasingly replaced by integration that afforded a much greater degree of autonomy to immigrants, leaving them a multicultural space in which they could express their heritage culture freely and with relatively little restrictions.

The difference between assimilation and integration lies in what is claimed to be the more open-minded character of the latter. If assimilation asked of the immigrants to unconditionally blend into the socio-cultural lifestyle of their new home countries, integration allegedly allows for more tolerance towards immigrant cultural, social, religious or ethnic expressions of identity. Assimilation demands (near) full-scale submission to the values of the majority society while integration allows for more diverse individual and minority-group expression of values that differ from those of the majority. Integration is, in this sense, a function of multiculturalism which proposes a politics of diversity that allows for individual and group identities while demanding a minimum of submission to certain laws that are supposed to regulate the relationships between these diverse groups; integration, in short, gives rise to the space of multiculturalism. Integration of all groups is necessary to a certain, minimal extent but the diversity of many different groups is preserved through mutual respect for and tolerance of each other’s rights in conjunction with a commonly shared responsibility for the whole. Multiculturalism thus champions a politics of mutual respect and tolerance while integration, in turn,
serves as its minimally restrictive function. In addition, multiculturalism does not propagate the superiority of any one group in particular (because of majority status, origin, race, or any other marker of identity).

In practice, a discrepancy between multicultural theories and their implementations is, however, hard to ignore and, of course, it is the discursive deployment of a concept that fills it with meaning. The problem lies, as we will see, in the relationship between the open, tolerant multicultural space and requirements for integration as a minimal common ground for all to be shared in an otherwise multicultural society. The problem lies with the question of who defines these minimal standards.

But, surprisingly, this does not detract anything from multiculturalism’s value as a discursive practice. In fact, quite the opposite is the case: Precisely because multiculturalism is a malleable concept, it functions well in bringing under its umbrella ambiguous and otherwise irreconcilable positions. In contemporary Germany, multiculturalism allows those on the left as well as those on the right to discuss immigration policies and the relationship between the German majority and immigrants. While those on the left emphasize the tolerant and open aspects of multiculturalism, those on the right can claim multiculturalism as a way to preserve distinct cultural essences (Carle 2007: 149; Joppke 2004). As a discursive formation, multiculturalism thus makes a sustained debate about immigration and how to approach it possible – particularly in countries like Germany where the majority population stubbornly refuses to accept the fact of ongoing immigration and to consider itself as an immigration country. Multiculturalism remains such a framework of reference despite recent attacks on its validity from liberal and neoliberal perspectives (cf. Barry 2001). Multiculturalism allows Germans both on the right and on the left to continue their discourse about controversial issues such as immigration.
This leads us to the question of what impact multiculturalism as such a discursive formation has on immigrants. I discuss this in the following through the example of Turkish immigrant comedy in Germany and, specifically, the case of Muhsin Omurca as representative of this comedy.

**Turkish Immigrant Comedy in Germany**

German mainstream comedy after World War II has always been very political in character. Unlike in the U.S., where comedy’s main focus is on pure entertainment (if such a thing exists), German comedy has always had the ambitious goal of entertaining and furnishing a political critique of contemporary events. In comparison to Anglophone and, specifically, U.S. comedy, German comedy has traditionally been purposefully political in the sense that it aimed at simultaneously entertaining and educating the audience in proper political conduct. For that reason, comedy was, until recently, called *Kabarett* in Germany.

Even though Turkish immigrants have lived in Germany since the early 1960s, it took until the mid-1980s for some of them to begin to perform as comedians. One of the first Turkish immigrant comedy ensembles was a group called *Knobi-Bonbon*, founded by Şinasi Dikmen and Muhsin Omurca in 1985. The programs of *Knobi-Bonbon* were concerned mostly with the fate and tribulations of first generation Turkish immigrants in Germany and with the relationship between indigenous Germans and those immigrants. Starting with a performance in their hometown of Ulm in southern German in 1985, the group immediately had great success – particularly among a middle-class, indigenous German audience but also among immigrants. *Knobi-Bonbon* stayed together in their original formation until 1996, when Dikmen and Omurca decided to pursue individual careers.
The significance of the success of Dikmen and Omurca’s comedy in the second half of the 1980s can hardly be overestimated. For their largely German audience, Knobi-Bonbon provided a first cultural contact with the Turkish immigrant community in Germany. Knobi-Bonbon were among the first to direct the attention of a wider German public to specific problems of the Turkish immigrant community – in their relationship to indigenous Germans, their relationships to their former homeland, or in their internal relations. Through their work, Knobi-Bonbon also inspired other Turkish immigrants to follow their example. Today, the landscape of German Kabarett would be inconceivable without a multitude of Turkish immigrant voices such as Serdar Somuncu, Django Asül, or Erkan and Stephan. Somuncu, for instance, employs an aggressive style of comedy that is not deeply political but plays on the political implications of discrimination against Turks in Germany. This is, likewise, Asül’s approach although he pursues the goal of making these discriminations obvious in a more politicized manner, akin to more traditional German Kabarett. The duo Erkan and Stephan played, around the turn of the century, with the stereotypes of marginalized Turkish immigrants, often not merely pointing to their political plight but also making fun of their limited educational or social capabilities and their low class status. But while these comedians all have radically different approaches, they share in common a concern with the relationship between Turkish immigrants and Germany’s non-immigrant majority population. As a whole these comedians have, in their work, pointed to important issues for Turkish immigrants through undermining common stereotypes about them.

In what follows, I discuss the specific case of Muhsin Omurca, one of the co-founders of Knobi-Bonbon, to document some of the reasons for his outright rejection of the concept of multiculturalism, particularly as it is employed to regulate the relationship between minorities and the majority population in Germany.
I learned about Muhsin Omurca and his comedy rather by chance in reading an announcement for one of his performances in Esslingen in early October 2000. Some days after visiting his show, I contacted Omurca and asked whether he would be willing to do an interview. He graciously agreed and we set up an appointment for the following week. We met in an artsy café in Ulm, his hometown, where we spoke for more than three hours. Over the course of the interview, we talked about many topics such as the acceptance of Turks in Germany, German and Turkish culture and society, the city of Istanbul, religion, multiculturalism, dual citizenship, etc. In what follows, I summarize the content of Omurca’s programs and then discuss his perspectives on multiculturalism and dual citizenship as expressed in the interview. In my summary, I will focus on his profound criticism of multiculturalism as well as his spirited defense of dual citizenship.

**Omurca’s Programs**

In his programs, Omurca ventures into the mine-field of the cultural encounter between Turks and Germans – no stereotype remains untouched, discriminatory jokes are turned onto their heads, and the audience is left quite frequently puzzled by double or triple meanings in Omurca’s acts on stage. His first solo program in 1997 was entitled *Tagebuch eines Skinheads in Istanbul* (Diary of a Skinhead in Istanbul). Here is the synopsis of Omurca’s fiction in this program: Hansi, a skinhead, has burned down the whole Turkish ghetto of his hometown and is sentenced to spend four weeks with his social worker, Dr. Botho Krauss, in Istanbul. The goal is, as Omurca puts it, ‘Tee trinken und Vorurteile abbauen’ (to drink tea and reduce prejudice). The two unlikely companions in travel experience all kinds of interesting things on their trip. On their first day, a carpet dealer lures them into buying merchandise for a thousand Euros. Botho, for his part, immediately begins lecturing people on the streets of Istanbul that they are supposed to...
stop at red traffic lights and not to throw trash on the street. Meanwhile, Hansi, though scared at first, discovers some rather peculiar ‘pleasures’ of Istanbul: after a soccer match, a street fight between Turks and Kurds ensues which Hansi finds more exciting than the lame fights between skinheads and Turkish immigrant gangs at home. All this produces surprising but inevitable results: Botho Strauss, the politically correct social worker, returns to Germany despising Turks while Hansi excitedly tells his German skinhead friends that Turkey is really cool with all its radical groups and street fighting. What was intended as a pedagogical measure for Hansi has backfired: he is more than ever convinced of his skinhead agenda and has been joined by the former lefty Botho Strauss. It is an interesting twist that Omurca tells the story of *Diary of a Skinhead* from the perspective of Hansi, the skinhead, as he reports back to his comrades (the audience) about his experiences in Turkey.

By the fall of 2000, Omurca had developed a second program, *Kanakmän*, and began playing both programs simultaneously. *Kanakmän* presents the flipside of *Diary of a Skinhead*. Under the slogan ‘Deutscher bei Tag, Türke bei Nacht!’ (A German by day, a Turk by night!), the young German-Turk Hüsnü tells his tale as a son of Turkish immigrants who has just obtained his German passport:

“Although, in the end, Hüsnü gets his much-desired German passport, his Turkish passport is taken away. Now he is a German! Only a German! But what kind of a German! A turked’ German who is ridiculed by everyone – not just in Germany but also in Turkey. A bad copy of a German.

While his brother Ali, the first Prototurk in the German army, serves his stepfatherland, Hüsnü escapes, whenever possible, into his new home, ‘fantasy-Germany,’ where he is the mightiest, coolest, and most respected guy. There, he is the hero of all Turks, the avenger of all foreigners, the nightmare
of all heads of foreigner offices. He is the superman, with his own initial on his chest: ‘K’ for ‘Kanakmän’…” (my translation).

Omurca illustrates his stage performances with his own cartoons, in which Hüsnü alias Kanakmän is depicted as a skinny man in a blue jumpsuit, wearing a red gown and bright green shorts which give the impression of a somewhat color-blind superman; his face is long, serious looking, and brandishes a huge mustache, the remainder of his face being rather unshaven. In his hands, Kanakmän wields the insignia of his power: a cell phone in his left and a prayer chain in his right. These items equip Hüsnü with all the stereotypical markers of a Turkish immigrant, of a Kanake. In the program, Omurca assumes the role of Hüsnü alias Kanakmän and tells the audience about his experiences, mishaps, and insights as a Turkish immigrant while constantly juggling Turkish, German, and Turkish-German stereotypes in a thoroughly entertaining way.

In 2002, Omurca augmented his repertoire with a new piece in Turkish entitled Damsiz Girilmez! (No Entry without a Lady!). This Turkish program tackles the issue of EU membership, or, rather, the eternal denial thereof, for Turkey. It depicts the prospective union between Turkey and the EU as a future marriage and offers useful insights on the topic of marriage among Turks in this context. Omurca has recently developed a German-language version of Damsiz Girilmez!, called Die EUmanen kommen (The EU-maniacs are coming). In this program, he makes the point that a unified Europe would be impossible without the Turks. After all, Omurca points out, the fear of the Turk has, over centuries, ensured that Europe shares something in common, namely that very fear of the Turk. In a strange way, Turks are thus, as Omurca quips, “quasi external co-founders of the European Union.” The trajectory of this program, maybe Omurca’s most openly political yet, takes up the historical trope of the menace of the Turk and shows how it is used today in negatively defining a European identity – if all other
attempts to forge a common European identity fail, there is always the image of the Turk as the eternal Other that will make Europeans come together in shared fear and rejection.

In his selection of topics, Omurca puts his finger on topics of interest to his fellow Turkish immigrants and to the German public. His sensitivity in picking up on these issues turns his opinions into important yardsticks of the general mood among Turkish immigrants in Germany, but particularly among the so-called third generation. Omurca’s following statements illustrate that he identifies a number of very concrete points that need to be addressed to improve both the relations between Turkish immigrants and Germans as well as Turkish immigrant life in Germany.

**Multikulti**

In the following, I will show Omurca’s take on multiculturalism and dual citizenship in reference to some passages from the interview that Omurca gave me. At some point, I brought up the issue of multiculturalism and this is how he responded:

“I have to honestly tell you, that is the shit-word of the last forty years. There is no *multikulti* here. There are different cultures here, yes. But *multikulti* is a word that means that they all live together. But is there even a German culture? That is, again, a topic in itself. Let’s get started with integration, then we will see: How and in which direction shall I integrate myself? Like the guy that is out there”, Omurca pointed to a man sitting on the street outside the café, “shall I sit right next to him then? And if I travel with him through the country for a month, he would tell me: But you are a good German! That’s what he would probably say. But for some shop owner, I wouldn’t just be the bum, I would be the fucking foreigner bum. On the other hand, I could also start to yodel here and nobody would even believe that I do it with all my heart and joy.
So, in what direction? German society itself has problems with integration and that is why, for forty years, they have been talking about integration. As long as that question is not solved in their heads, the almost real – and I have to be careful how I put this – the almost real multikulti factors here will not find a fertile ground on which they could expand and take roots. But these cultures cannot be lived if they are put in one week in which they can celebrate themselves. But the booths or the stages are positioned in such a way that...well, the organization is always done by the Germans. In the multikulti festivals themselves they are not present and from above, from their offices, they observe, like in a zoo, the foreigners how nicely they play and get some airtime. Ayayay, our children! But in their plans, most of the time, the Kurdish booth is next to the Turkish one. Or the Macedonian booth next to the Greek. Serbian against Bosnian.

Omurca clarifies this critique of multicultural festivals by giving an example from his own experience:

“[At a festival] in Düsseldorf, for instance, I realized that a time bomb is ticking here. The Germans have still not realized this. Some Greek children went on stage there, I think that was seven years ago or five, and these Greek children sing songs in Greek and in these songs Macedonia comes up, Macedonia, Macedonia. I had somebody translate it to me: they sing nationalist songs against Macedonia! And Macedonians go on stage and sing against the Greeks and Kurds, in Kurdish, and Turks, in Turkish sing only nationalistic songs. And the Germans sit up there, and observe, and think: Oh, how nice they celebrate and play! How nicely they celebrate! We cannot give them only a week, let’s make it two weeks!”

It is for those reasons that Omurca rejects the concept of multiculturalism. The concept serves, in his view, as a tool to control immi-
grant minorities in Germany – Omurca exemplifies this critique of multiculturalism in reference to very common multicultural festivals where immigrant groups get one or two weeks to ‘play’ among themselves under supervision of the Germans. In the following statement he reinforces these views by making the distinction between neo-Nazis and leftist Germans. He slyly refers to the latter as Türkenfreunde (friends of Turks):

“When one considers the neo-Nazi scene in Germany now: of course, these idiots are very dangerous. Very dangerous! But: I can recognize them – even at a distance of two kilometers. Thank god, they still run around in their little ‘uniforms.’ But the question is: how shall I recognize the others who run around with hair. Most often: the longer the hair, the more intellectual they are. Those are the Türkenfreunde.”

There is, thus, not much difference between the neo-Nazis and the self-declared friends of the Turks. What infuriates Omurca about the Türkenfreunde is that they are, in his opinion, fake and just as untrustworthy as the neo-Nazis – maybe they are even more dangerous because they come in disguise (‘with hair’). This is the reason why Botho Strauss, the prototype of a Türkenfreund, is so negatively portrayed in Diary of a Skinhead. These leftist ‘friends’ of Turks in Germany are, in Omurca’s view, their worst enemy – they are responsible for an ongoing discrimination through multiculturalism. They promote multiculturalism as a concept to help immigrant groups in Germany while, in actual fact, it forecloses any true participation of these groups within German civil discourse. This discourse is instead dominated by the leftists themselves and they show no intention to abandon their power to those they pretend to represent – the immigrants.

Beyond Multiculturalism

But if multiculturalism is no valid concept for Omurca, this begs the question: What could be in its stead? In the following interview
passage, I asked Omurca about such alternatives and this is what he said.

“First of all these *multikulti* festivals need to be done away with. Also, all foreigner councils¹³ need to be done away with. From today on, all foreigners who have lived here for four or five years are allowed to participate in *all* elections. And, after a short time, after five years or so, they should be able to obtain dual citizenship. Then, I see a chance. But even then, I wouldn’t call that *multikulti*; it would just be the society in Germany – finally. With all its advantages and disadvantages and we have to accept it.”

Instead of this ideal, utopian society, we have multiculturalism which, according to Omurca functions like this: “You create a little society outside of the mainstream and you give it some space to play, just like some disabled children or so. And that’s it.” In the following passage, Omurca explains the failure of a multicultural politics through the example of a failed dual citizenship law in Germany. A change in government in 1998 in Germany had given rise to high hopes among immigrants for the passage of such a law. It had been long on the agenda of the two parties – the Social Democrats and the Green Party – that had just come to power. However, a signature campaign by the Conservative Party and a lost state election in 1999 in Hessen quickly put an end to any attempts by the two governing parties to pass such a law. The citizenship law was indeed changed in 2000 but the change did not include the possibility for dual citizenship of immigrants and their descendents. This is how Omurca explains the failure of this legal innovation:

“There are [several] reasons why they reject [the idea of dual citizenship]. But those are self-proclaimed reasons. Those are the reasons that they tell me. […] Loyalty: whoever says that, whoever speaks of loyalty has to be an idiot who doesn’t know history or contemporary society. For, the German con-
stitution says that only certain groups of people [such as civil servants] have to be loyal. [...] A state that demands loyalty from its citizens is stupid. That is dictatorship. That can only be valid in dictatorial systems. In a democracy, loyalty vis-à-vis the state or the country cannot be demanded. It cannot be reconciled with democracy. To be loyal means to serve the state or to support or protect the interests of the state or to stand up for it. One moment: Who is the state? Then there is no democracy any more, for the state is my servant, not my superior. The state has to serve me – it needs to be turned around! If we put the state above us, then it’s shit again, then, at some time, somebody will come again, like back then, perhaps. [...] It has to be finally ingrained into their heads that, in a democracy, loyalty must not even be talked about. In democracies, there have to be thousands of different directions so that they are balanced off. For, as soon as the majority becomes loyal towards the state, then it is fascism. What can the minorities do, then? Those who do not want to or cannot be loyal have to be eliminated.”

In this instance, Omurca verbalizes, regarding the German majority, the same thing that Arjun Appadurai captures with the term ‘predatory identities:’ these identities attempt to purge any minority from the ‘folk body’ to achieve complete national unity – the full identity of the majority with the ideal of a purified nation, a nation purged of any minorities (Appadurai 1998, 2006). Omurca captures this desire of the majority in Germany in pointing to the totalitarian nature of German demands for loyalty of minorities. The demand for loyalty is an attempt to bring or keep in line minorities with the majority in Germany: if the multicultural festivals were the carrots, demands for loyalty are the stick. Omurca identifies these latter demands as inherently fascist:

So, the state and the loyal population collaborate: they talk about nothing else but fascism when they talk about loyalty.
Only the civil servants have to be loyal. Loyalty is expected of them. Otherwise, if somebody demands loyalty of me, oh god, I go up the walls: Should I be, like the masses, obedient? Should I support the interest of the state? What does that mean ‘the interests of the state’? The interests of the minorities are important for me!

Omurca sees such insistence on loyalty closely connected and in tune with indigenous German attitudes towards integration and dual citizenship. He summarizes the mainstream German position as follows:

Well, what happens around us, doesn’t interest us. Yeah, well, as long as it doesn’t interest us, we cannot find a solution to integration or dual citizenship. Even these intellectuals: look, this new government \(^{14}\) comes to power with a grandiose election victory. What do they do first? They renounce their promises for dual citizenship because they are afraid of the masses: What do the masses do?

If we analyze all of his observations, it becomes clear that, for Omurca, multiculturalism is merely a trope put up by indigenous Germans to allow for a minimum of freedom for minorities but to restrict this freedom as much as possible under the guise of a supposed multicultural tolerance. In Omurca’s view, multiculturalism pursues the opposite goal of what it pretends to do – instead of promoting the equality of different cultures side-by-side, minimally integrated with each other, multiculturalism results in the reification of a power hierarchy between powerful indigenous Germans and powerless minorities. But if Omurca claims to have this personal and political interest in the plight of minorities in Germany, what are the solutions he proposes for a radically different kind of minority politics? What are his suggestions for the way minorities should deal with being confronted by the multicultural concept in Germany? He gives the following, fragmentary answer to these questions:
"A generation has been created of foreign cultures. Those are the ones who live multikulti. That’s it. We are only multikulti among us. And that is an island, yes. And we really feel comfortable on this island. The Turks, the Greeks, and so on, we feel comfortable even if we fight with each other. But we always get back together again. In such a context there are, of course, differences – and huge ones! Today, the paper reports that yesterday there was supposed to be a gang fight in an old cemetery. Fifty-six men were arrested. They had planned it, somehow. Turks, Germans, Italians...I don’t know what sides were there. Whether it was Germans and Italians against the Turks or only the Germans against the Turks, I don’t know. The police don’t know either but they’ve arrest- ed fifty-six people for now and they’ve found some weapons. But what do they do? Multikulti gang fight."

For Omurca, left-wing Germans constantly talk about multiculturalism but the real multikulti has long been realized among the minorities in Germany. The real multikulti thus exists outside of the domain and grasp of German mainstream culture; it is a multicultural formation based on equality. It appears somewhat paradoxical, however, that Omurca aims to prove this by referring to a ‘multikulti gang fight’ between different ethnic minorities. What could be the meaning of this example? It is certainly unusual to refer to such an example in making the point of minorities getting along well in Germany. Why would Omurca make a reference to such a seemingly contradictory example? But perhaps, on second thought, the example is not as contradictory to the point Omurca intends to make. Perhaps, the example is intended to signify a marked difference of relationship among the minorities (as compared to the ‘classical’ minority/majority relationship of multiculturalism). Marking this difference is accomplished by referring to the violent nature of the relationships while, at the same time, downplaying the significance of the violence itself. What results, in the end, is not a space of minority relations that is governed by pure
lawless violence. Omurca admits to sometimes violent relations between and among minorities. But he sees that violence merely as just one possible way to regulate relations, i.e. to work out differences, among minorities and that this violence stands, moreover, for a clarity and openness in conduct with each other that is missing in the false and pretentious attitudes of indigenous Germans towards minorities (particularly those on the left such as Botho Strauss). The open violence that is exemplified in the gang fight is still better, or so I read Omurca, than the repressive, structural and hierarchical violence effected by multiculturalism. So what Omurca seems to advocate for is a society of open relationships between diverse groups without a power hierarchy. What he appears to posit is a truly plural society, lacking any majoritarian organizing element such as the indigenous German majority precisely because it results in the fixation on power hierarchies between majority and minorities.

**Multiculturalism: Double-Bind and Fantasy Screen**

It is then a question of how multiculturalism becomes a concept that severely restricts the freedom of immigrant minorities and how this multiculturalism simultaneously serves as a concept that gives majority Germans the illusion that minorities are treated with tolerance and respect. There must be a significant ambiguity within the concept of multiculturalism to allow for such radically different understandings of it. One way this ambiguity can be explained is in reference to the relationship between multiculturalism and integration.

In our preliminary assessment of integration it became clear that it promotes a minimum of conformity to a commonly shared set of values while allowing for a maximum of freedom in the expression of specific group values. While such a model of integration might work well in theory, in practice its feasibility depends on who defines this minimum set of values that everyone has to abide
by. In contemporary Germany, this set of values is, as we have seen, defined by the German majority. The majority decides what is ‘multiculturally’ acceptable and where the line is to secure a minimum of commonly shared values. The impact of this relative position of power for indigenous Germans in defining what is included in this minimum comes out quite clearly in Omurca’s criticism of non-immigrant German attitudes towards dual citizenship. While dual citizenship might be highly desirable for immigrants, indigenous Germans refuse to accept it as valid: questions about loyalty are raised here and single citizenship is defined as a necessary requirement for successful integration of immigrants.

The denial of dual citizenship for immigrants allows us to understand the fundamentally different impact of concepts such as integration and, by extension, multiculturalism on the German majority on the one hand and, on the other hand, immigrant communities. For immigrants, such an understanding of integration confronts them with a formidable double-bind: either they accept only one citizenship but then they loose their legal filiations with their former home country or they reject the idea of becoming German citizens but then they violate the distinction as formulated by the German majority between what is necessary for integration and what is permissible as multicultural (cf. Bateson 1972). It is thus clear that such a model of integration – the Germans, as Omurca puts it, sitting in their offices and watching the different ethnicities at their festivals – does not work in practice for immigrants.

We must look elsewhere, then, to find a purpose for this specific model of integration and its continued application in public German discourse. The reasons for this continuation are to be found among the German majority population itself. But if the model of integration does not work for immigrants, how can it work for majority Germans?

For these Germans, multiculturalism functions as a fantasy screen in allowing them to deny the realities of having to actively
engage with the cultural diversity in Germany today. The complementary concepts of multiculturalism and integration serve indigenous Germans well because they accomplish, in their double-bind nature, precisely what is asked of them. On the one hand, in affirming and promoting multiculturalism, they publicly display and appear to confirm a general openness and tolerance of indigenous Germans. On the other hand, integration allows indigenous Germans to maintain control: they retain the final say in, for instance, multicultural festivals, they maintain control over citizenship laws through their political elite, they can say whether it is permissible to wear a headscarf as a school teacher, etc. Holding on to power, indigenous Germans are thus able to declare any particular topic, at any moment, as a minimum requirement for successful integration. This allows them to define what is multiculturally permissible and integrationally necessary. Specifically, it allows them to introduce shifts in these definitions and to thus exert control over Germany’s immigrant populations.

In its duplicity, its double-bind character, multiculturalism thus becomes a fantasy screen, a screen that separates indigenous Germans from immigrant minorities. It allows indigenous Germans to maintain their self-image of tolerance and openness while, at the same time, concealing the real problems of immigrants; in this multicultural fantasy land, indigenous Germans can continue to imagine themselves as tolerant and open-minded while simultaneously continuing to exercise the power of majority. That is why Omurca vigorously argues for a very different multicultural society in Germany, one that excludes indigenous Germans. It is also the reason why Omurca identifies Germans on the political left, those who propagate multiculturalism most aggressively, as equally dangerous for immigrants as, say, skinheads and neo-Nazis.

Omurca posits, in lieu of the present multicultural regime, a society where no single (ethnic) group occupies a privileged posi-
tion. This is, primarily, the meaning of his example of the multi-ethnic gang fight and his somewhat uncanny celebration of such violence. Clearly, Omurca does not dream of a multicultural world without violence – he leaves such delusions to the leftist Germans in their multicultural fantasy bubble. Omurca champions an egalitarian society where all groups can, under equal conditions, partake in the whole of this society. But is such a society merely a utopian dream without the chance of becoming reality?

In discussing this question, I want to invoke a recent text by Jean-Luc Nancy who wrote, at the height of the conflict in former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s, a short essay of interest for the case at hand. Asked to write a ‘Eulogy for the Mélange’ in celebration of the multicultural city of Sarajevo (at the time under bloody siege by Bosnian Serbs), he somewhat provocatively rejected the proposed title and, instead, wrote a *Eulogy for the Mêlée* (Nancy 2000: 145-158). Subsequently, Nancy reformulated some of the thoughts in this earlier essay and republished a modified version in a collection of essays entitled *In Praise of the Mêlée* (Nancy 2003: 277-288). In what follows, I take recourse to both texts to establish Nancy’s argument.

Mélange, in Nancy’s understanding, constitutes the nominal acknowledgment of a state, a fixation of a multiplicity precisely because such a mélange is opposed to, and thus symmetrical implicated with absolute purity. For this reason, Nancy argues that “confering too much identity on the mélange must be avoided” (Nancy 2000: 147). What Nancy points to in his critique of the concept of mélange is its requirement, ordinarily understood, to have a center that organizes its diversity which is, of course, precisely the situation of multiculturalism’s discursive deployment in contemporary Germany. The mélange, according to Nancy, is in need of a center because it suggests the arrest of incessant movement. From the perspective of mélange, movement is possible but it is always already related to an immovable generic null point, a ground zero if you
will. Nancy explicitly ties his understanding of mélange to the notion of multiculturalism as we have encountered them in the case of German discourses on Turkish immigrants (Nancy 2000: 152). This multicultural understanding of a mélange results in the fixation of Turkish immigrants as the objects of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, in its objectification of immigrants, enables Germans to deploy a social structure in which an imagined essence to German culture and society can be retained while, simultaneously, adding ‘cultural diversity’ by celebrating similar essential traits in other cultures.

Against such an understanding of multiculturalism, Nancy posits his notion of the mêlée, the ceaseless mixing, which emphasizes the continuous movement of different singularities in relationship to each other: “Rather than mixture, therefore, we would be better off speaking of mêlée: of an action rather than a substance” (Nancy 2003: 281). In this mixing, there is no ground, no essence, or immanent substance that gives hold to the whole of the structure and, since there cannot be anything like an immanent ground, there can also not be a structure. There is nothing but incessant mixing because “the gesture of culture is itself a mixed gesture: it is to affront, confront, transform, divert, develop, recompose, combine, rechannel” (Nancy 2000: 152). Curiously, the original trajectory of multiculturalism is perhaps not so far off from what Nancy suggest here and he acknowledges as much in the essay (Nancy 2000: 152-154). For, this is the definition of culture that Nancy gives us in conjunction with his understanding of mêlée: “Every culture is in itself ‘multicultural,’ not only because there is a prior acculturation or because there is no pure and simple provenance, but more importantly because the gesture of culture is itself a gesture of mêlée: of confrontation, transformation, deviation, development, recomposition, combination, cobbled together” (Nancy 2003: 283). The very concept of multiculturalism is thus not too far off, as Nancy points out, from an understanding of culture as a ceaseless mixing.
The problem is thus not so much with concepts or understandings of multiculturalism as such but rather with linking up multiculturalism with integration. For, integration is impossible to reconcile successfully with a notion of culture as mêlée. With integration, we have a concept that aims to establish a ground. It necessarily presupposes a required, minimal and substantial identity in submission to a law and certain rules (e.g. single citizenship) of all that are organized in a multicultural society. In its aim to establish a ground, integration thus delimits multiculturalism; it ties multiculturalism to an immanent and substantial common ground. It is such a common ground that, as Nancy argues, is impossible to achieve without continuously engendering structural violence and oppression of minorities (Nancy 2003: 285-286). Engendering such structural violence and oppression is, however, not an arbitrary or unintentional by-product of the concept of integration. Rather, this violence – and the constant possibility of its discursive deployment – serves a very important function: it is the very practice of structural violence and oppression that allows the majority to conceal that there is, for itself, no substantial ground of an identity with itself. The resistance of the immigrants to the demands of integration and the violence exerted upon them as a consequence of their resistance allows majority Germans to sustain the fantasy screen of multiculturalism. The immigrants’ resistance to structural violence provides, ex negativo, a confirmation to multiculturally oriented Germans of their own identity in enabling them to distinguish themselves from the immigrants and defining the negative traits they observe in the resistant immigrants as the opposite of their own, positive cultural traits. Structural violence, thus deployed, captures the immigrants in an eternal framework of alterity since their own resistance is what gives rise to German claims for their very alterity as the negative defining principle of German identity. It is the German claim for a grounded cultural identity of self that allows them to maintain this framework and to use claims for necessary integration as a tool to keep the immigrants ‘in line.’ What
goes up, as a result, is the fantasy screen of multiculturalism. But the screen conceals nothing except precisely this: that it conceals nothing.

A mêlée of ethnicities in Germany – as propagated by Omurca – would, conversely, result in the actual touching and mixing of its singular elements. It would allow for a mixing of singular elements precisely because they would no longer be kept apart, maintained in an imagined purity through differentiation, by the integrationist claim. Nancy’s mêlée argues for the very kind of movement that Omurca diagnoses as lacking in German multicultural society because it refutes the need for and, ultimately, the possibility of a ground. We should note here that Nancy very clearly states, on several occasions, that his notion of mêlée includes also physical combat (Nancy 2000: 150-151). Mêlée, as combat, would then also enable us to read Omurca’s statement about the gang fight at the cemetery in a different light.

Omurca’s gesture of recounting the gang fight as a good example for true multiculturalism reproduces Nancy’s avowal of mêlée as (also) understood in a combative manner. No celebration of violence is at stake here. Rather, what Omurca points out is that the true mixing of different cultures can also happen in a combative manner, that the mêlée of the gang fight is part of that mixing of culture since, in this melee, touching and mixing occur. It is, in this context, fortuitous that Nancy, in his essay, posits such a mêlée fight deliberately against modern warfare: “But the mêlée [...] is not modern war, which, more often than ever before, involves no mêlée at all: modern war begins by exterminating hand-to-hand combat; it aims to crush and suppress combat, rather than attempting to set it aside; in fact, it has no space for combat. Instead it spreads everywhere and kills, violates, irradiates, gasses, and infects the whole of ‘civil’ space” (Nancy 2000: 150, cf. Nancy 2003: 280-281). We must understand Omurca’s apparent celebration of gang violence against the backdrop of this statement. There is,
indeed, a violent component in the mixing of the mêlée. Mêlée is, at least in part, combative. But such combat is infinitely less destructive than the distanced violence embodied in the structural exclusion through the fantasy screen of multiculturalism as a discursive practice. We must thus read Omurca’s statement about the gang fight as a relative assessment of the situation: such mêlée combat is to be preferred over the structural violence of integrationist multiculturalism. While the former allows for exchange, the latter effectively denies any exchange, any mixing through its distancing and essentializing practices.

Furthermore, Omurca is also engaged in a particular form of mêlée in his own work. In his comedy performances as well as in his cartoons, Omurca engages in a mixing of cultures that happens through the reversal and exchange of seemingly antagonistic positions in discursive representation. He plays a skinhead, his Turkish characters are often more enlightened than their German counterparts, tradition and modernity are collapsed into each other, the EU becomes a family held together only by fear of the Turk, etc. All these playful and flexible engagements with conventional discourses about alterity are mixing culturally mediated stereotypes, subverting and eroding them in the process. This mixing occurs, in Omurca’s work, without any reference to an essence of culture and thus also without any fixed point from which integrationist strategies could be devised. True multiculturalism becomes a mixing without reference to an always necessarily imagined fix point or an essence in cultural substance.

Omurca employs and embodies, in his work, the notion of mêlée as developed by Nancy; through his performances Omurca is able to effectively challenge the German fantasy screen of multiculturalism, a screen that conceals nothing except its own integrationist but empty claim to be grounded within an immanent substance. Through his work, Omurca shows that there is no ‘behind’ of this screen. Behind the fantasy screen of multiculturalism there is no depth that will lead us to the essence of (German) culture.
NOTES

1 The term ‘indigenous’ is used here and in the following to circumscribe Germans who perceive of themselves as from a non-migratory background. I do not intend to use the term to imply any precedence based on a philosophy of origin.

2 I think here, for example, of the Kabarett of Dieter Hildebrandt, Bruno Jonas or Richard Rogler, to name just a few.

3 I will, throughout this essay, continue to speak of ‘Kabarett’, when I want to emphasize its specific political connotations and speak of ‘comedy’ when I want to mark an affinity to U.S.-style comic performance.

4 Josh Schonwald has sensibly discussed Serdar Somuncu’s art, particularly in regards to his use of the German Nazi past in his performances (Schonwald 2006).

5 The Turkish-German pronunciation of the word skinhead gives it a quite funny twist: Turks have a hard time pronouncing ‘s’ and ‘k’ in immediate succession. They tend to insert a vowel. Since Turkish follows the rules of ‘vowel harmony’, it is not just any vowel that can be inserted here – the vowel has to correspond to the other vowels of the word. In this case, it has to correspond with the vowel immediately following the ‘sk’, which is an ‘i.’ The vowel inserted then also must be an ‘i’ (for rather intricate grammatical reasons that I will not go into here). The resulting pronunciation ‘sikinhead’ obtains a quite interesting second meaning.

6 Kanake is a German slur for Turkish immigrants. While it was exclusively used as such until about a decade ago, many younger Turkish immigrants proudly call themselves Kanaken today. Kanakmän is thus the prototypical representative of this generation. Feridun Zaimoglu’s work in the mid-1990s brought the fact that many young Turkish immigrants called themselves Kanaken to the attention of a wider German-speaking audience (Zaimoglu 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998).

7 Omurca plays here with the term ‘getürkt’ which, in German, means something like ‘fake’, ‘not real’, ‘phony’, etc.

8 This text was taken, in German, from Omurca’s website in February 2004. Today, the description for his Kanakmän program is slightly different.

9 I have translated the interview passages from German and Turkish into English. For a more extensive account of the interview see: Lanz 2005.

10 Multikulti is a somewhat dismissive and derogatory German shortcut for multiculturalism.

11 Omurca begins here to talk about the multicultural festivals that are a definitive feature in all major German cities these days: for one week, the Greek,
Turkish, Italian, etc. cultures can celebrate at a festival with parades and ethnic markets and so on.

12 For an extensive discussion of the multicultural festival scene in Germany see: Knecht and Soysal 2005.

13 The German administrative system has created positions – Ausländerbeiräte (foreign councils) – that are supposed to advocate for foreigners in the German administrative system. Leftie intellectuals, who assume the role of ‘foreigner expert’, held many of these positions in the 1970s when they were created. Today, many of these positions are actually filled by foreigners or immigrants.

14 Omurca refers to the change in government in Germany 1998 from a center-right to a center-left government.

15 Note that the English term ‘gang fight’ that I have used in translation for Omurca’s use of the German term ‘Schlaegerei’ is ambiguous. While gang fight might suggest the use of weapons, the German term ‘Schlaegerei’ is clear in stating that only hands were used in the fight, thus making a true melee combat encounter. The importance here is, obviously and in following Nancy’s point, that it is a form of combat with direct combat, allowing for a mixing, a direct exchange of blood, if you will.
Introduction

Studying who the Turks of France are, understanding the stage at which they find themselves in the process of selfhood and measuring the impact of religion in this process generally requires a brief investigation into the Turkish identity. The complex structure of Ottoman society on the one hand, and the diversity and vivacity of the relevant components used in the construction of the Turkish nation on the other creates a multitude of problems in accurately identifying who the Turks, and thus in effect, who the European Turks, really are.

The existence of these problems and confusion may strike the reader as peculiar, as any ordinary person conversant with the Turkish educational system would have learnt by rote and absorbed the answer to “Who is a Turk?” over the years. A checklist (Thiesse 2001: 14) is presented to Turkish students as early as
primary school and is observed throughout the whole course of their education. The criteria of “being a Turk” may appear to be somewhat specific and stern; a unity of language, religion, history, ideals, destiny, so forth. The unbending implementation of these criteria however, naturally germinates in a chain of predicaments, much visible in the definition of outer Turks, or the Turks of Europe, although perceptible in that of inner Turks. In the final analysis, determining the identity of the Turks in France and their level of congruency with the definition of Turk in Turkey hinges on which definition, among the many inextricably intertwined definitions we chose to adopt.

Bringing to the fore the cultural and ethnic dimensions of the definition of Turk at the expense of omitting its legal aspects is without a doubt becoming imperative for the integration of European Turks into the broad definition of Turk; this stems primarily from the fact that nearly 5 million people, of which French Turks are but a component, remain citizens of the countries they inhabit abroad. The constitutional designation of being Turk (Clause 66: All persons attached to the Turkish State through citizenship are Turks) has recently incited an uproar, with concepts like lower identity/upper identity, determined by taking into account those who fall wide, even if slightly, of the above checklist, and has galvanized heated polemics.(Oran 2004)

It goes without saying that the issue of identity is different, austere, uncompromising and jealous to a greater extent in minority communities. Communities that assume themselves to be in the minority and thus under threat tend to interpret the aforementioned criteria in an ambiguous, and sometimes paradoxical, manner.

While the criteria of belonging to a group are tempered to protect the group’s strength and its exterior image, any contravention of the normative actions that compose the group is considered to
mean stepping outside the group per se, a sentiment seldom found in communities that perceive themselves to be in the majority. *This rule*, applicable to the preponderance of minorities, is also valid, to an extent, for the Turks of France. Notwithstanding the unreliability of statistical data, this group, assumed to number approximately 400,000, has an awareness of the internal dynamics, clashes and rivalries that take place in Turkey. But it is not extremely difficult to discern that being a minority community considerably strengthens feelings of affinity and belonging. As the word ‘feeling’ suggests, the sentiments of belonging and identicalness are feelings, and in the same way that the feeling of belonging to a nation engenders a visualization of a community, (Anderson 2000) in a similar way, the sentiment of belonging to a minority and the instinct of maintaining that minority occasions a vital community. It is for this reason that minority groups place a strong emphasis on their common aspects, believing the conveyance of societal memory to be crucial. (Halbwachs 1994: 178)

Reduced to its simplest level, an observation of the Turks of France produces two types of strategies. The first is the group’s strategy to safeguard, at all costs, the Turkish character, comprising, at once, the protection and ossification of religion, and immigrant spouses. The second, the exact opposite, involves the more lucid manifestation in France of the entirety of ethnic, religious and political cleavages peculiar to the inner affairs of Turkey. This article appraises the role of religion in the Turks’ strategy of protecting their identity in France. The first section will investigate the general panorama of the religious infrastructure, while the second part will deal more with the relations between various religious formations, finally touching upon the approach of Turkish-based religious formations to the concept of *French Islam* that prevails in France.
The Turkish Expatriates in France: Who is from where?
a) Motherland, Fatherland, Babyland, Fosterland: Portable Land?

Societal memory attempts to transmit a unity, essentially an amalgamation of three forms of resistance identities: loyalty to the motherland, the imparting of the Turkish language to posterity, and the perpetuation of religious traditions. The gist of these points of resistance is to ensure Turkish children born on French soil are cultivated with the same sentiments nurtured by their parents pertaining to Turkey and being Turkish. We must immediately note that a constellation of strategies is endorsed for the realization of this three-way transmittal, the most important of which emerges as the strategy of a perpetual first generation, which is fundamentally makes up all the criteria (Gökalp 2005) of spouse-selection that is embraced by the Turks in France. Not only do Turks in France evade marriage with the French, on a similar note they rarely contract marriages amongst themselves. A great majority of Turkish youths, even those who are French citizens, choose their spouses from Turkey, and they then bring them to France. It is unnecessary here to inquire into the social or cultural reasons for this phenomenon. In the last analysis, it would be preposterous to use concepts of second or third generation for the Turks of France. The objective outcome of this strategy is that children of Turkish origin born in France have at least one parent who has only recently come from Turkey, a circumstance that inevitably instigates vital consequences in the sphere of loyalty to the motherland, and the conveyance of religion and the language.

The issue of loyalty to the motherland is unquestionably important. If the two pedestals of Turkish identity are the Turkish language and being Sunni or Alevite, the podium on which these pedestals rest is a physical and mental attachment to Turkey. By physical attachment is meant the frequent visits to Turkey, being equipped to continuously receive visual news from Turkey, and the ability to regularly communicate with Turkey. It would be redun-
dant to restate the enormous difference between the 70’s, or even the 90’s, with the new millennium insofar as these three bonds are concerned. Charter flights, the innumerable number of TV channels, communication via the Internet, the plummeting of call costs, and the like, has now made uninterrupted contact with Turkey easy, and moreover imperative.

The sentimental bond with the motherland is more difficult to explain. The concept comprises two aspects; namely, greater interest in Turkish politics than that given in France and a longing for a change in Turkey or for her to remain as she is. Thus from this vantage point, it is easy to make sense of the efforts of the Turks in France for Turkey’s induction into the European Union. This integration is desired for two reasons: The love and affection nurtured for Turkey and her future, and belief that Turkey’s induction will equivalently compensate for their prestige, which is bereaved or on the verge of being so, in current French society. Alternatively, this emotional bond could be construed in the classical sense as attachment to the imaginary nation, or more precisely, thanks to this bond, the success of any ordinary Turk in any field gives joy to the Turks in Europe.

Apart from the physical and emotional bond from the attachment to the motherland delineated above, the judicial bond, until very recently, bore a considerable importance. Indeed over many years, Turkish governments perceived the European Turks’ shift to the citizenship of their countries of residence as a threat, assuming judicial affiliation would be a hindrance to emotional connection. The nonexistence of dual citizenship particularly in Germany undeniably played a pivotal role. The chief reason for this is that national identity is a monopolizing identity. Plural affiliation has no place within the paradigm of nationalism, in that, as amply enunciated by Max Weber, nationalism is above all a matter of faith. And because nationalism, like monotheistic religions, is a jealous paradigm, its acceptance of plurality is well nigh impossible, although
the observation of a recent shift in Turkish politics pertaining to the matter is not difficult. Certainly, Turkish officials are encouraging the Turks of Europe to acquire citizenships of the countries where they reside. We can ultimately assert that the plurality of judicial affiliation has been accepted, although it would not be an exaggeration to assert that there more time is still needed before the acceptance of the plurality of cultural affiliation.

We have spoken of the two props of cultural belonging, to be more exact religion and language. Language is a component of identity the imparting of which is difficult in a minority ambiance, in that the majority’s language more often than not prevails. Moreover, in the discourse of integration, assimilated by the majority in France and accepted, albeit reluctantly, by those of migrant origin, command of the French language, even at the risk of relinquishing the native tongue, is now regarded as an imperative; to put it another way, prowess in Turkish, for the Turks of France, is no longer a necessary element of being a Turk.

But in a minority ambiance, owing to the sacredness or the untouchable status of religion, religious belonging is invigorated, and thus religion occupies the area left by language. This maxim, applicable in minority communities, constitutes a more peculiar form in the case of the Turks in France, and is an exceptional circumstance that stems from both the perception of secularism in France and the sociological, cultural and political structure of the Turks of France.

**b) Solidarity and Religious Infrastructure**

It is possible to assert that the pattern of solidarity of French Turks—and this could be expanded to cover all European Turks—evolved in the 60’s and 70’s around two typical ideological currents. The precise incentive behind the formation of preliminary NGOs was the relevant country’s perception of the direction in which the migrations were directed (Germany, France, etc.), and that of
Turkey, which envisioned the migrations as purely temporary, and thus assumed that any association of solidarity was redundant. Thus, European Turks, left high and dry in such a scenario, were compelled to develop substructures of solidarity through their own means; it would not be incorrect to assert that the initial framework of these associations was bequeathed by leftist and extreme leftist factions. Undeniably, at the crossroads of the powerful unionist movements of the 60’s and 70’s in Europe, the Turks also became organized in an attempt to avoid exploitation in their working lives.

As the second ideological framework is religion, although, if truth be told, it would be wrong to talk in the early years of an ideological organization, in the most accurate meaning. The ultimate spur in the first ten tears of migration appears to be an attempt to cover the bases as far as religious needs were concerned. The Turkish immigrants made do, for instance, with the use of some rooms in hostels as prayer rooms. During the 1970’s however, these small prayer rooms or mesjids were incorporated into a number of networks, guided not by official Islam, but by dissident Islam. It was these mesjids which in fact paved the way for the organization of the Milli Gorus, first in Germany and then in France. In actual fact, the first ten years of religious organization for European Turks remained under the monopoly of the Milli Gorus, the very reason behind the current muscle of the Milli Gorus networks in Germany, France, and even in the Benelux countries, which occupies first place in many countries for representation of Turkish-based Islam (Akgönül 2006).

A noticeable increase in the Turkish government’s interest in the Turks of Europe followed the army coup of 1980; there are two reasons for this, internal and external. Internally, we may allude to the reinforcement, within the Turkish identity, of the status of Sunni Islam, by virtue of the conceptualization of the Turkish-Islam discourse post-1980, a decisive moment after which the number of
mosques, Qur’an schools and *imam-hatip* schools rapidly increased, reinstating political Islam as one of the most significant political currents, to the effect that it even became seated in the very core of other political movements.

The modification of temporary migration into permanent residence, an upshot of a change of politics by the countries of residence, could be identified as the external cause. In the 80’s, the Turkish Republic also felt the need to organize European Turks from the perspective of religion under state patronage, thus inducing, as it were, the 1982 constitution to include a special clause (clause 62), rendering the care of expatriate Turks among the constitutional responsibilities of the State.

“The State takes the necessary precautions to maintain the family unity, the education of children, cultural needs and social security of Turkish citizens working abroad, preserving their ties with the motherland and assisting them in their return home”.

Hence accordingly, Turkey has taken recourse to many formations to protect especially the European Turks against *dangerous* ideas and political movements. Doubtless, the most important of these organizations is the *Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği* (DITIB) (Akgönül 2002: 77-99), inaugurated in 1983 within the body of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs. After this date, hundreds of mosques and mesjids in Germany, as well as in France (where the inauguration took place in 1985), were either included in the DITIB, or were founded at the outset under their roof. The attachment of a Turkish union to DITIB does not ipso facto signify their affiliation with official Islam. Close relations and proximity with the consulate aside, being a DITIB mosque entails the services of a free imam, and sometimes, of a Qur’an teacher. The ultimate aim of a preponderance of Turkish organizations, furthermore, could be construed as donating the buildings in which they conducted their activities to the Directorate of Religious Affairs, thus freeing them-
selves from all expenses. More precisely, a society belonging to the Milli Gorus network requires a greater ideological proximity, as compared to connection with the network of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs.

Putting aside ideological compatibility, we can further touch upon three essential functions regarding the enlistment of an individual who feels themselves to be among a minority in such an association. These are achieving inner satisfaction by believing in the perpetuation of the group and sensing continually that they are not alone, resisting other groups or individuals in the belief that they constitute a threat to the group by contributing towards the development of collective behavior, and imparting a message of strength and legitimacy to the majority. For this reason, when investigating the religious formations of French Turks, it must be borne in mind that religious organizations among the minorities are not just religious organizations (Acquaviva 1994: 123) To state this in another way, when scrutinizing the Turkish religious societies in France listed below, it is worth noting that in particular the affiliates of the DITIB do not possess a powerful religious affiliation. In addition, societies associated with the DITIB do not engage in solely religious activities; the other sections, and even the directors of these societies, are far from having an organic tie to the Turkish State.

In other words, the fact that an overwhelming majority of Turkish associations in France are shared between the Milli Gorus and DITIB does not indicate that they have the same ideological concepts; such a comparison would be rather difficult. The relationship between DITIB associations and their Milli Gorus counterparts will be examined a little further on in this article.

c) Religious Orders, Communities and Associations

Undoubtedly, as is the case throughout Europe, the religious infrastructure of the Turks in France is not merely confined to the Milli Gorus or the DITIB. In contrast, more marginal and ideological net-
works, which for a long time could find no opportunity to develop or expand in Turkey, found an opening in the free ambiance of France, to the point of even strengthening their ideological foundations with the addition of new members.

Observing the formations apart from these two essential networks reveals three distinct groups, which can be listed, without any hierarchical significance, as the Suleymanites, the Ulkucu or the Turkish Hearths, and the Alevites.

Sheikh Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, who died in 1959, founded the Suleymanci movement, whose members, beginning from 1959 gained prominent places in Turkey’s internal politics with this phenomenon coming to its zenith in the 1980’s. It is a well-known fact that many current politicians are affiliates of the order, the founder of which connected the lineage of the tariqah (order), notwithstanding its proximity to the Nurcu movement, to the Naqshbendis, and effectively to Central Asia, particularly to the Indian sub-branch of the Naqshbendi Order.

Despite lacking official locations for prayer in Turkey, the Suleymanites are well-known for their vigor in many Official mosques, and especially for having a regimented web of student dormitories. As for Europe, with a nucleus in Cologne, they enjoy a dense network of mosques, and even kulliyahs. Over and above classical mosques and mesjids, this network also comprises formations like Qur’an and summer boarding schools, plus annual pilgrimage organizations. Frankly speaking, until very recently displaying an externally closed appearance, the Suleymanite group has endorsed, in the past few years, a more open policy, instituting congenial relations with other Turkish societies, as well as commencing participation in the inter-religious dialogue organizations, albeit tentatively. A predominance of these societies operate under the epithet of either Turkish Cultural Center or Turkish-Islamic Cultural Center, and are establishments in which profound attention is diverted to the area of the religious education of children.
The Suleymanites in France abide by stringent regulations in communal structuring, and are particularly concerned with the conveyance of religious and ethical values to the disciples, a mentality which underpins the belief, in concordance with the order’s views, of regulating the entirety of the individual’s social, private and religious life within the rules of the order, a belief uniformly transparent in other dogmatic religious formations. (Hervieu-Léger Danièle 1992: 98-105)

While the Suleymanite order, which has been attributed for many years, rather preposterously, as part of the dissident Islam category (Çakır 1997: 33-38), gradually draws nearer political power in Turkey and procures itself a place among the elites, its expansion abroad is also continuing.

This internal and external rapprochement can be observed from two perspectives. On the one hand, the stance of the Suleymanci group, at least insofar as discourse is concerned, has been toned down, attracting Kemalist incriminations of pretense; while on the other hand, due to the fact some of the new conservative elites are graduates of Suleymanci boarding schools, the standpoint of the upper political strata vis-à-vis the Suleymanci order over the last few years has undergone a significant change.

The Ulkucu or the Hearths associations must be apprised separately from other religious and national societies, as the Ulkucu tends to prefer remaining distant from other formations. Having united in France under the banner of Fédération des Familles Turques Unies de France, the Ulkucu associations prefer to remain aloof from both official Islam and the Milli Gorus, exhibiting a relatively closed appearance. Maintaining close proximity to Turkish nationalism, in contrast to other groups, they do not opt for espousing approaches like ‘one needs to pay greater attention to the politics of France than that of Turkey’. A vast majority of the imams in the mesjids of the associations are from the Ulkucu support networks of Turkey, and lack knowledge of France. However, it ought
to be stressed that these associations remain marginal in comparison to others.

One can definitely mention additional minor formations which fall outside the periphery of the four aforementioned networks. (DITIB, Millî Görüş, Suleymanite, Ülkücü). The Naqshbendi Order, for instance, controls a few religious centers across France, and while despite being an extremely closed society that has all but paled into insignificance, there still remain some active Kaplanite mosques operating in France.

The below graph illustrates the distribution of the societies which we have been able to track down. As can be easily seen, societies of the Milli Gorus and Diyanet, i.e. Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, pave the way in the representation of Turkish-based Islam in France, as they do in other European countries.

**Turkish Associations**

![Pie chart showing distribution of Turkish associations]

**Recognition and Market Strategy**

**a) Mitosis and Umbrella**

Observing the Turkish religious institutions in France makes it possible to discern three different strategies, the first of which is conflicts that evolve within the domain of representing the minority

46
group, a phenomenon prevalent among minorities in general. The importance of this is tremendous, especially in France, as since the beginning of the new millennium French authorities have been putting pressure for the regulation recognition and representation of Islam. Claiming that the Turks took an initial interest in these structuring projects would be an exaggeration; indeed, believing the pertinent venture to be pertaining to issues between Muslims of Arab origin and the French government, the Turkish leaders showed a paucity of interest. Later down the track however, when the magnitude of institutionalization was finally comprehended as inevitable for continuing to live in France as Muslims, the network of Turkish societies, headed first and foremost by the DITIB and Milli Gorus, began to take heed of the issue and endeavored to become part of it. Participation in these attempts at institutionalization can be defined as synonymous with a desire to be recognized by two focal points. The first of these is the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM- French Council of the Islamic Religion), which represents Turkish Islam vis-à-vis the French authorities, and the second is *Conseils Regionaux du Culte Musulman* (CRCM – Regional Councils for the Islamic Religion), which is made up of members elected from various regions in France; the Turks have a say in this second group, thus it warrants recognition within the Turkish group.

Perceived from this angle, the concept of *market strategy* referred to at the beginning of the chapter, requires some elaboration. Most certainly, all associations and currents desire a continuous increase in the number of members and supporters, although as far as Turkish religious societies in France are concerned, the transference of members or supporters from one group to another is simply out of the question. The market strategy in question here should therefore be understood to be an attempt to take control of market of representation, or at least to seize a slice of the representation cake. Although this rivalry has special currency between the DITIB and Milli Gorus, the Suleymanites have also recently entered the scuffle.
Following the elections in 2005, held in mosques Haydar Demiryurek of the DITIB was elected to be the general secretary of CFCM, while of the 26 Turkish members of CRCM, 20 were from the ranks of the DITIB, 5 from Milli Gorus and 1 from the Suleymanite faction.

We may distinguish two types of paradoxical outcomes from the conflicts that arise from the desire for political-social recognition and representation. The foremost is a division that is perceptible in Europe overall, although it is clearer in France, and there are at least three examples of this division. The most well known case in Turkey is indisputably the Kaplanite movement. The faction, after having operated for many years as part of the Directorate for Religious Affairs, was inaugurated in 1983 in Cologne by Cemalettin Kaplan, a Turkish expatriate who had fled to Germany following the army coup of 1980 and joined the Milli Gorus, only to soon become disillusioned with the supposed meekness of the group, which was the impetus behind his founding of the radical community in question. There are two vital points that have been perceptible since the 1980’s. To begin with, communities and networks that are acknowledged as rivals or even complete opposites of one another are not as different as they seem; indeed, taking into account just the case of France is enough to reveal that most imams of the Milli Gorus in fact hail from the ranks of the Diyanet. The Imams regularly provided with duties in France generally do not desire to return to Turkey once their service is completed, and thus take recourse, as a solution, to other networks of mosques, in particular assuming duty in the mosques of the Milli Gorus. Sentient of this danger, the Directorate of Religious Affairs does not encourage imams taking their wives and children abroad, as their return from France would be very difficult, especially if the children have begun receiving formal education. Alternatively, considering that the current Kaplanite mosques in Mulhouse and Metz were originally localities of Milli Gorus, it is possible to maintain that the gap between the two, at least at the outset, was not as deep as it was thought to be.
In hindsight, it would be wrong to claim that the relevant strategy of mitosis contains clear-cut borders as far as the community is concerned. Certainly, a community that frequents a certain mosque for prayers has no problem switching mosques, and this is not deemed to be incorrect.

For instance, in the second division, the subject of our next example, the imam of the Metz Suleymanite association instituted, within the framework of general Suleymanite divisions across Europe, a separate Suleymanite mosque, and many members of the community continued frequenting both mosques.

To conclude, we can mention the young Turks who seceded from Milli Gorus. With the support of Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the then incumbent premier of the region of Belfort East of France and a prominent French politician, a football club called the “Genc Turkler Dernegi”, (Young Turks Association) was founded in the city of Belford in 1985. Under the auspices of the local administration, the association was able to unite with other conservative youth societies under a federal structure, initiating in 1992 the Conseil de la Jeunesse Pluriculturelle de France, or the French Council of Multicultural Youth. If truth be told, far from being an actual phenomenon, the attribute of multicultural, from the outset, has represented an ideal, in that the societies that make up the council are all Turkish, and they are inclined towards a conservative Muslim world view.

Thus, this stance brought COJEP closer to the Milli Gorus line, and it became the latter’s youth wing from that date. However, there is a two-pronged development that should be emphasized. From the second half of the 90’s, the forerunners of COJEP attempted to increase their say within the Milli Gorus, only to stumble into the block of their ultra conservative administration, which had strong Turkish connections. The difference in discourse, as well as the internal causes of the discourse, should be examined, as from the end of the 90’s, the youth of COJEP tended to curb their Turkey-
oriented activities, espousing a discourse that focused on empowering the Turks of France in the intended society. But due to political rivalries in Turkey neither the Milli Gorus movement at home nor the leaders of the movement in France were particularly supportive of the idea of secession from Turkey.

The initial signs of this division which arouse from a difference in activities and discourse occurred with the relocation in 1996 of the COJEP headquarters to Strasbourg. Despite the traditionally entrenched and powerful Milli Gorus organization there, the COJEP of Strasbourg was able to remain separate from the Milli Gorus and protect its autonomy, although perhaps most importantly, rather than starting a mosque, it diverted its concentration to cultural activities.

The decisive split from Milli Gorus occurred in 2000 with the COJEP opting to head their separate way. Although Milli Gorus reiterated their distaste for the secession on many later occasions, in particular giving signals of a fervent wish to reunite after witnessing the great energy of COJEP, the two societies have.

Again after that date the European Turks became the target mass for COJEP, to the extent of becoming the sole Turkish society to be incorporated first into the European Muslim and then into the French Muslim discourse. In November 2002, nonetheless, with the rise to power in Turkish politics of the AKP, who had seceded from Milli Gorus for similar reasons, the COJEP turned its sights once again to Turkey, establishing close relations with the government and converging its activities on Turkey’s bid for EU membership. It is worth mentioning that some of these activities are carried out with financial aid provided from the advertisement fund of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. All things considered, even though the discourse in France may carry traces of multiculturalism and French Islam, it would be a mistake to allege that COJEP has entirely severed its ties with Turkish domestic politics.
The hostile debate in France regarding Turkey’s EU membership has quite interestingly created a similar reactionary discourse in Turkish associations. Within the framework of this unusual debate, the unprecedented effort of many diverse, even opposing movements to unite, albeit hypothetically, is quite discernible. For instance, even in the debates enshrouding the headscarf, ultimately a matter of concern for nearly all French Turks, a collectively joint stance has not been accomplished, with all movements voicing, albeit feebly, their own disenchantment by their own means. The efforts undertaken by Suleymanite associations could be singled out as exceptions of this circumstance. The relevant associations, by virtue of providing advice to students with headscarves and their families as regards the appropriate steps to be taken in the face of the prohibition, have diverted their campaign internally, rather than showing external bravado.

On the other hand, since the time when the Turkey issue became a paramount concern of France’s domestic politics, particularly during the campaign for the referendum of the EU constitution, even the most severely divergent associations began holding joint meetings and organizing joint activities, and even though there was no institutional unity, endeavored to propound a united stance. Many umbrella organizations in the regions that boasted a large Turkish population, like Alsace and Ile de France, were instituted, although innovations like Rassemblement des Associations Citoyennes de Turquie (Assembly of Non-Government Organizations of Turkish Origin) could not succeed to mend the wounds within the networks of associations that had been inflicted by diverging views regarding Turkish politics.

b) **Official Islam/Dissident Islam: Who is dissenting from whom?**

Such an approach appears to be supporting the Official Islam-Dissident Islam dialectic, although as is the case with all dialectics, clarification is necessary.
Both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish republic have often been replete with dissident Islamic movements whose outright opposition has become more discernible with the entrenchment of the Jacobin laicity of Kemalism, and thus have consequently moved underground as the State becomes the representative of religion. While subsisting, until the 1960’s, within existing political parties, the Dissident Political Islam created an autonomous current in the 1970’s, assisted by the liberal air brought about by the army coup in 1960; it was at this time that Milli Gorus became the stronghold of Dissident Political Islam. Although one aspect needs particular emphasis, namely opposition to Milli Gorus, opposition remained politically oriented, and discounting, of course, some extreme factions, refrained from dogmatic radicalism. In addition, from the 1970’s on, the movement became integrated into the Turkish political system, and gained representation, intermittently in various governments, and constantly in parliaments, apart from times of martial control.

The difficulty, at this juncture, of inundating the concepts of Official Islam and Dissident Islam, from the standpoint of Turkish-based Islam in Europe and France, can be easily comprehended. If Islam is evaluated as a belief system that affects all areas of a person’s life, it is possible to assert that the individuals and social groups who identify with Dissident Islam desire a greater existence of Islam in their social life. Examined from this vantage point, it is an understandable phenomenon that Europeans of Turkish origin put a greater accent on religious behavioral patterns, as this is derived from their identity problems as well as being a part of their general minority theories. It must be borne in mind that being part of a political group of the caliber of Milli Gorus, which has especially acquired strength in Europe, carries a binary meaning. Much as it constitutes a posture vis-à-vis the political smorgasbord in Turkey, it is also tantamount to occupying a certain, and to an extent a unique, place in European Turkish society.
In the ultimate analysis, the concepts of Official Islam-Dissident Islam although still carrying considerable currency on Turkish soil, have all but gradually been bereaved of their validity. Indisputably, the role of the German counterpart in the development and reinforcement of Milli Gorus as a dissident movement cannot be ignored; the movement, however, even though it does not own mosques in Turkey, has been active within the political system in Turkey through various institutions. Moreover, the fact that a political party has emerged from the ranks of Milli Gorus and held seats in the government hypothetically renders the pertinent concepts obsolete. Corroborative of this is the fact that whereas until a few years ago Turkish consulates refrained from entering into relations with Milli Gorus the relations have now become quite warm since 2002. Moreover, AKP members of parliament, who visit Strasbourg, do not depart without paying a visit to the city’s Milli Gorus association. Thus, it would not be incorrect to state that Milli Gorus has now acquired respectability and recognition; this is a far cry from the proposals of the 90s that called for their inclusion on the list of terrorist organizations.

The same could be said of religious orders, albeit on lower scale, with the likes of Suleymanite, Fethullahite and even Naqshibendi groups enjoying success in becoming part of the “system” of Turkish Islam in France.

c) The Alevites: Real Turks?

The genuine stance in defiance of Official Islam, in my opinion, comes not from the Milli Gorus association or the Suleymanite order, but from the Alevite group. Nowadays, it is possible to observe that the Alevites have acquired, albeit partially, a degree of religiosity, and through this the Alevites of France can be classified into two groups. First are the associations, with active members of Alevi origin, that carry no religious objectives, which are active in cultural and social pursuits, and thus have no relations with reli-
gious associations, and in addition which perceive Sunni religious associations as backward. Opposed to these are those who by embracing Alevity as the association’s sphere of activity oppose Official Islam from a religious standpoint. To these two groups, one must certainly add the other associations formed by Alevites due to ethnic (Kurdish) or political (leftist/extreme leftist) incentives.

Hence it would be erroneous to indiscriminately dub associations whose members are entirely or mostly of Alevite origin as religious formations. Without a doubt, since the beginning of the workers migration, particularly during the 1980’s, the Alevites have instituted many political and social support groups, most of which, however, lack a religious structure. Such associations may more appropriately be labeled associations that engage in activities on the left side of the political sphere and/or with workers with the impetus of social and cultural support. It is quite noticeable that in recent years however many Alevite oriented associations have begun to bring their religious characteristics to the fore, becoming transformed from social and cultural associations into religious ones; in this a metamorphosis the debates concerning the official recognition of Alevity in Turkey hold as much currency as the Alevity debates within the group itself. The process, in France, of imbuing all social and economic problems with a religious or ethnic flavor is moreover dragging the Alevites into an inescapable search for identity.

Yet, there is benefit in drawing attention to Alevity appearing more and more as a religion, in France as much as in Turkey, rather than a culture or a source of identity. Thus, from this angle, it would not be wrong to talk of an awakening of a religious identity in France, (Çamuroğlu 1997: 25-34) which, however, has so far gone unnoticed, of an unawareness that stems from the perception in French society of Turks being Islam per se, and of Islam becoming identified, particularly in recent years, with the headscarf, beard and the subordinate status of women, a phenomenon inconspicu-
ous in Alevite society. The inundating requests from the *jem evi*, i.e., an Alevite religious center, the knocking on the doors of municipalities across France however have been conducive towards enhancing the image of Alevity as a religion.

Parallel with the debates that surround Islam in France, a reactionary discourse opposed to Sunni Islam has emerged in the ranks of the Turkish Alevites in France, which has expanded around the accentuation of the difference between Turkish-based Islam (namely, Alevite Islam!) and Arabian Islam, and endorsing the contention that the “real” Turks have nothing to do with issues like the headscarf or the status of women.

**The Context of France and Those of Turkish Origin**

**a) The Laicity of France: A Process of Becoming Turkey**

The relationships between religion-state-society in France inevitably influence the approach of French Turks toward Islam and in general towards religion.

Which of the following best describes you? (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany Frequency</th>
<th>France Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Citizen</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Turk</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevite</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German or French Citizen</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turk-German / Turk-French</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Turk</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Citizen</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union Citizen</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1065</strong></td>
<td><strong>600</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The study undertaken by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel in France and Germany respectively, illustrates the degree of difference of religion in the identities of Turks in both countries. (Kentel and Kaya 2005: 59) As can be seen, nearly 33% of the Turks in Germany identify themselves as Muslims per se, while only about 16% of the respondents expressed this sentiment in France; this is perhaps due to the influence of the French Secular model on the Turks. On the other hand, the proportion of those who define themselves as Muslim-Turks is the same in both countries. (40%) Religious identity in minorities is no less important than ethnic or national identities. Therefore, the correspondence of the ethnic (Turk) response with the religious-ethnic (Muslim Turk) response should be emphasized. Again, in a minority ambiance, the ethnic identity and religious identity can easily take the place of one another, reminiscent of the Ottoman millet system.

Which of the below best describes your religious belief?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany Frequency</th>
<th>Germany %</th>
<th>France Frequency</th>
<th>France %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I’m a religious person who fulfills all religious obligations</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to fulfill all religious obligations</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>53,6</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>46,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe though I don’t perform my religious obligations</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>35,4</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>32,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not believe</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m an atheist</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No comment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1065</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,0</strong></td>
<td><strong>600</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidently, the ratio in France or Germany of those who profess they follow the religion either fully or partially consists of a signif-
icant majority (61% in Germany, 56% in France). Adhering to reli-

_**Religious and State Affairs Should be Separated**_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany Frequency %</th>
<th>France Frequency%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I agree</td>
<td>483 / 45,4</td>
<td>466 / 77,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t agree</td>
<td>424 / 39,8</td>
<td>96 / 16,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No idea</td>
<td>158 / 14,8</td>
<td>38 / 6,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1065 / 100,0</td>
<td>600 / 100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses to the question concerning the concept of laicity underline the importance of the context. Residing in a constitutionally secular state, yet coming from a society not entirely secular, the Turks of Europe come under the sphere of influence of the Religion/State relations of their countries. While the rate in Germany, wherein these affairs are strict in the juridical sense, of Turks advocating for the separation religious and state affairs is 45%, the ratio is 77% in France, a state which has separated both institutions with the 1905 constitution. What this denotes is that the opinion of the majority is assimilated even by Turks, who are considerably religious.

**b) The Localization of Religion: A Nation-State Classic**

The French State’s notion of laicity, and even the conception of secularity in French society, began undergoing a significant mutation at the close of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, a transformation that carries two direct implications insofar as Islam in France is concerned; these are structural and conjectural, respectively. The chief structural implication is the increasingly escalating
desire of a cultural Muslim society of 5 million strong, who have incidentally taken to heart being French, irrespective of passing unrecognized, towards the acknowledgement of Islam as being among the acclaimed and established mainstream religions of France. The relevant demand instigates contradictory scuffles, as on the one hand a number of French political authorities toil for governmental representation of Islam, while public opinion insists that such a representation is at loggerheads with the raison d’être of France’s existence, that is individualism.

At the head of the list of conjectural causes comes no doubt the enshrouding of the concept Islam after the 1990’s, but which especially intensified with the September 11 attacks, in the image of evil or even an enemy in the sight of the West. Although the thesis of the clash of civilizations could not find official supporters in the French arena, the number of those insisting that the very existence of Muslims in France necessitated the revision of France’s principles of establishment, are indeed not few. Thus, the arising panorama is the belief that French laicity, that is the complete separation of religious and state affairs and the consequent demotion of religion into the individual spectrum, is inexorably incompatible with Islam, and is procuring daily vogue; consequently the French notion of laicity draws near to the conception held by Turkey. In other words, the necessity of Islam’s consignment to direct state control, as is the case in Turkey, has now achieved inherence, both in the State and public opinion.

It is at this point that we may realize Islam’s incorporation into the process in France of the localization of religion. After the crushing of French Protestantism under the pretext of not being “local”, the “liberation” of French Catholics from Vatican hegemony with the edict of 1905 and finally the incrimination of French Jews for nurturing dual loyalties, it is now time to create a French Islam (not Islam in France) that is free of foreign influences. This line of thought is absolutely compatible with the debates of ummet and

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millet that were in circulation during the foundation of the Turkish Republic. France, equally, is advocating for the liberation of French Muslims from foreign influence, which she deems dangerous, and is the very reason for the structuring, albeit lamely, of the aforementioned representative institutions, (Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman, Conseils Regionaux du Culte Musulman), alongside of which those of Turkish origin have for many years, have coincidentally, found a place.

The most heated debates concerning the localization of Islam, ensuing as we speak, concern the issue of religious officials or imams. It is possible to maintain there are three types of clerics functioning in the mosques or mesjids in France. The first and perhaps the most controversial are the imams sent by Muslim countries, who continue to administer them. In the case of Turks, this occurs within the sphere of the Turkish Islamic Union of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği), launched in 1983; imams dispatched by Turkey complete 4 years of service in affiliated associations of the DITIB, beneath the Attaché of Social Works in the applicable Turkish Consulates. The reason for the insistence by the associations for such imams is incredibly simple; one the one hand the belief that Turkish imams possess a better command of Turkish Islam and the Turkish language dominates, and thus they will institute healthier relations with Turkey, and on the other, the ushering in of economic comfort by virtue of the fact that the associations will not crumble under the weight of providing salaries. Many associations, moreover, bequeath the association buildings to the Turkish Religious Affairs, thus setting themselves free of the entailed expenses.

These imams are equally well received by the French government, not so much in the sense of financial relief, but more due to the lack of French infrastructure in educating imams; but above all, the fact that the imams who come are under the supervision, albeit relative, of their countries, assuages the French government. The
greatest criticism of these imams, of course, is their lack of command in the French language.

The second type are the imams who lend their services to unofficial networks of mosques like the Milli Gorus, whose salaries are paid for by the pertinent associations, although once again, most of them come from the countries of origin. A significant part of the imams active in association networks such as Milli Gorus or the Suleymanites are former Religious Affairs imams who have not wanted to return home following the completion of their terms. It is worthwhile repeating that these imams also suffer language related problems.

In associations of Arabian origin, in an exceptional scenario, it is possible for a member of the congregation to assume the role of imam and for the association to refuse giving allegiance to any movement. In such cases, the imam is usually a French-speaking elder of the French-Muslim society, who more often than not voluntarily leads the prayers, free of charge. The other two types of imams mentioned earlier, alternatively, assume duties of religious education, as well as leading prayers. Such “independent” associations are uncommon among Turkish expatriates. The process of Islamic localization in France places its greatest focus on the education of local imams. (Cf. Frégosi Franck 1999) The suspicion felt by public opinion of imams from abroad is undeniable. France, which is well acquainted with the transition from Latin rites to French rites, now demands a similar shift from Arabic or Turkish sermons to French sermons. Let’s not forget that Turkey also underwent the same process, with debates involving the recital of the call to prayer in Turkish playing a major role in the localization of Islam.

Ultimately, the concept of French laicity is undergoing a change with Islam, although reciprocally French Islam is also experiencing a similar change. It seems certain that Turks will also, sooner or later, conform to this change, which in particular is echoed in the debates surrounding the headscarf and sacrifice (of
animals). Provided they are in the minority, all religions cross the threshold of two contradictory processes. The first threshold is the process of ossifying certain fleeting values by closing in due to a protective instinct, while the second is the inevitable process of adaptation, which irrespective of rejection, nevertheless imposes itself. Both can be found in the Turkish-based Islam in France. But from the moment belief begins to act upon religious (and thus national) identity, individuals begin working towards the authentication of their religious behavior (Deconchy 1980). This process of “authentication” is articulated by providing a rational explanation for all behavior (‘Not eating pork is good for the health’), in addition to supposing religious behavior to be an indispensable, moreover, a normal part of every day life. And in hindsight, institutionalization guarantees the perpetuation of the group in space and time, as well as imparting a message of existence for the majority from a minority standpoint.

Conclusions

Despite celebrating their 40th year of migration, there are still remain many hindrances preventing the Turks in France to see themselves as ‘French Turks’ or ‘Franco-Turks’; these encumbrances can be scrutinized from structural and conjectural standpoints. Structurally speaking, both France and Turkey are based on a national Unitarian principle, regardless of their discourse of multiculturalism. To put it more simply, both societies display a strict abidance of national belonging, which stems from an experience of national construction. As stated above, national belonging and even further, nationalism, are entirely inhospitable to plural belonging, and looking at the issue from this perspective, the ‘fundamental’ French struggle in accepting the Frenchness of immigrants, whether they be French citizens, or even if they were born on French soil. Then again, while the French of Moroccan origin break into a sweat to prove their Frenchness, Turks, quite contrarily, eschew being French, alternatively emphasizing their Turkish
identities. The author was among the jury at high school graduation exams for the Turkish language for students of Turkish origin that took place in May and June 2006. Of the approximately 200 teenagers, of whom around 95% were probably born in France, upon being asked where they were from, not even one specified the region or the city of their birth, opting instead to cite the region or the city where their parents had come from. Hence, it seems that neither the majority nor the minority has accepted the concept of dual belonging; dual citizenship is far from being an assurance of dual identity.

A way of explaining this circumstance may be elicited from the general minority theory. Minorities create socializations that are uncongenial to individualization. Even if an individual procures, as an individual, the freedom of self-definition, he/she is nonetheless defined, by the majority and the minority alike, as a member of the minority, and is thus treated accordingly. The implementation, in minority societies, of Max Weber’s methodological individualization theory is fairly difficult. Most certainly holism, the eventual antithesis of the above theory promulgated by Durkheim, could be artificial in the analysis of socializations. An escape from this paradigm could be achieved through complex individualism, conceptualized by Jean Pierre Dupuy, and the only way to surmount the individual-minority-majority triangle in a minority society. Plural belonging is rendered all the more difficult particularly if the pertinent minority group has not yet completed the course of recognition, and adheres to a religion deemed by the majority as “foreign”. (Sutter 1991: 2) While the majority demands that the minority conform their religious practices to the new environs, the minority assumes even a slight change in religion to be acculturation; though in fact, religion, like other aspects of culture, similarly undergoes a perennial process of conformation, which however fails to be accepted by members of the minority. In the final analysis, the fact that the Turks of France are also subject to a religious, behavioral appropriation that evenly influences their worldview is
undeniable, even though the fear of acculturation has yet convinced neither Turkish public opinion nor that of the minority that this conformation is a positive development. The individual who belongs to Turkish society in France, as in the reciprocal interaction theory, aims the utilized religious symbols towards both the Turkish community and the French majority, thus, while collective behavior governs individual postures, individual discourses in turn create the concept of collectivity. (Mead 1934)
NOTES


4 For an investigation of these types of strategies see Remy J., Voyé L, "produire ou reproduire", Bruxelles : vie ouvrière, 1978.


8 This development, however, is not discernible as yet. For an examination of the degree of attachment of immigrants to Turkey see Caymaz Birol, "Les mouvements islamiques turcs à Paris", Paris : L'Harmattan, 2002.

9 On this subject, for an account of a significant transformation of the headscarf in young women in particular see Weibel Nadine, "Par-delà le Voile : femmes d’Islam en Europe", Paris : Complexe, 2000.

The Socio-Economic Position of the Turkish Community in Belgium: The challenge of Integration

Rana Cakirerk and Johan West

Introduction

European societies have been experiencing immigration for nearly half a century but issues of integration did not appear on the political and research agenda until the early 1990s. The concept of immigrant integration is fairly new and continuously evolving. A significant part of Europe’s recent immigration has been generated by requirements of the labour market, dominated by a capitalist demand-supply nature, and been defined as temporary. While labour market requirements may continue to play a major role, immigration into these societies have mostly lost their temporary nature.

European societies are now confronted with the problems that have been ignored or overseen for decades. The prevailing integration problems in European States are due to weak or non-existent integration policies during the 1970s. Guest-worker programs all
focused on the fact that migrants were to leave on completion of their contracts. Even though many departed, a large number stayed and continued to be active in the market. Member states were not prepared for such outcomes and were not able to adapt to the changing agenda of the settling of permanent migrants. Migration policies are generally of a short-term nature where as migration processes are of a long-term cycle. It is for this reason that there are such disparities between the intention and outcome of certain policies. This was also the case in Belgium.

Turkish migrant workers represent a significant percentage of the immigrant population of Belgium. The first arrivals of Turkish migrant workers were part of the wave of Turkish immigration that began in the early 1960s in response to a labour shortage in the Federal Republic of Germany, which signed a bilateral agreement with Turkey in October 1961, regulating the short-term immigration of Turkish workers. The economic situation in many other European countries was similar to the German one and many bilateral agreements were signed. Belgium followed suit in 1964.

The 40th anniversary of the bilateral agreement has recently been celebrated, a celebration of 40 years of a settled Turkish Community. Turkish immigrants have established themselves in various European countries for many years, but have they accepted the society they have settled in? Has the society they live in accepted them? Do they actively participate in this society? In short, how integrated are they? This paper attempts to understand these questions by providing an overview of migration to Belgium and the development of immigration policy. The objective is to present a general introduction to the topic.

Belgium is a highly developed “corporatist welfare state”. Similar to other countries of the so-called “continental regime type”, Belgium has well-developed social security schemes, but they are not as universalistic as in the Nordic countries. In general, there is a strong relationship between previous occupation and
entitlement to provisions, and generous income protection for families with children. Employees are well protected against dismissal. The number of special schemes for occupational groups is high, and there is extensive collective coverage for civil servants. Pension benefits in the continental regime are slightly above the European average. The continental welfare system is an expensive system, with broad coverage that might attract immigrants, and consequently bring about anti-immigrant sentiments. On the other hand, the system might need immigrant labour power to sustain itself in the future.

Strengthening political reaction with anti-immigrant sentiments can be seen in many Member States. Vlaams Belang, a political party in Belgium, campaigns on an anti-immigration platform. They oppose the entry of new immigrants and demand that settled immigrants assimilate or leave. This political context is far from unique and a similar political discourse can be found in countries such as Denmark, France, Italy, and Switzerland and observed even in countries that traditionally accommodated a more tolerant attitude, such as The Netherlands. The impressive electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in the city of Antwerp in the 1989 elections (the first in a series of electoral victories that seems to be a never ending story) led to the creation of a government service that would monitor the position of the immigrant population, the Royal Commissioner for the Policy on Immigrants. This task is taken up since 1990 by the successor organization, the Center for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism. Some researchers see this as the turning point for the establishment of integration policies.

The position of the Turkish population in West European countries is significant in the discussion of problems associated with the integration of immigrants as they represent a large share of the non-EU foreigners living in these countries. The largest groups of non-EU foreigners in Belgium are nationals from Turkey.
and Morocco. To be more exact, figures showed 81,279 Moroccans and 39,885 Turks residing in Belgium in 2004. These figures project the number of foreigners who reside in the country without Belgian citizenship.

One of the first questions that arise when addressing the issue of how well Turkish migrants are integrated within their host societies is “what is meant by integration?” Integration can be defined as a continuous long-term two-way process. The two-way process implies the involvement of the immigrant (the individuals, institutions and organizations) and the individuals, institutions and organizations of the receiving society. Successful integration can be determined by how well migrants participate in the social, economic and political life of the host community. Nonetheless, there is no generally accepted theory of integration. Research approaches differ both between and within disciplines. An often used distinction is the one between social integration, cultural integration and structural integrations.

Social integration refers to the degree of interaction between immigrant and native population groups. The policy concern here is about segregation versus mixing. Cultural integration relates to the degree to which various population groups share the same norms, values and preferences. Examples given here are, for instance, ideas and attitudes towards gender equality or on the role of religion in the organization of society. Structural integration implies here that immigrants and their descendants have equal access to the major institutions of society, such as education, the labour and housing markets, the political system, health care services, and so on. The obvious policy goal here is the elimination of differences between immigrant and native population groups.

Integration definitions vary from country to country and Belgium is unique in the sense that definitions may also vary within the country. The formal definition of integration, as it was approved in 1991, holds a middle ground between French-style
assimilationism and Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism, with notably different policy practices and vocabularies in the South and North of the country (Martiniello & Swyngedouw 1999). The common definition accentuates protection from discrimination, social inclusion and cultural adaptation in the public domain of the host country, while allowing for (and often actively supporting) diverse ethnic cultures and identities in the private domain of family and community life (Martiniello & Swyngedouw 1999). Favell and Martiniello claim, that in practice, the intricate institutional architecture of Belgium as a bi-national state complicates the effective negotiation and coordination of integration policies. Typically, policymaking is bogged down by fragmentation and competition between political agenda’s, actors and competences across multiple local, regional, communal, national and European levels of governance (Favell & Martiniello 1998).

Taking all this into consideration it is very difficult to identify the degree of integration of foreigners in host societies, as measures vary drastically. Another important factor is the level of government intervention and its success at implementing integration policies. Do problems arise due to the fact that migrants are unwilling to receive support to integrate or are governments struggling to implement their policies?

The purpose of this contribution is to examine some of the challenges associated with the structural integration of Turkish immigrants in Belgium. The primary focus will be on integration into the labour market and in the area of education. Other important issues like access to health care and housing will not be covered. The objective is to present a general introduction to the topic.

**Turkish immigrants and the challenges of Integration in Belgium**

An Overview

Immigration into Belgium was and is mainly European. The European Institutions and representatives of other international
organisations and non-governmental organisations play a major role in attracting EU citizens, especially the French and the Dutch. Approximately 63 percent of foreigners in Belgium are EU nationals. Non-EU immigration to Belgium began first with Southern European migrants and later with Moroccans and Turks who were recruited in the 1960s to work in the coalmines. The Belgian government signed up several bilateral agreements to bring in foreign labour to compensate for the declining workforce. These agreements were first signed with Italy in 1946, followed by Spain in 1956, Greece in 1957, Morocco and Turkey in 1964, Tunisia in 1969, Algeria in 1970 and Yugoslavia in 1970. As stated earlier, the Moroccan and Turkish communities are the most numerous migrant communities who are Non-EU citizens. More than 8.8 percent of Belgium’s population is of foreign origin. However, if one considers the total number of persons who at birth did not have Belgian nationality, it is found that the population of foreign origin is much higher, reaching almost 13 percent of the Belgian population. Many foreigners have obtained Belgian nationality. Thirty-six percent of the 202,786 persons who received Belgian nationality between 1995 and 2000 were Moroccans; 24 percent of them had a Turkish background. 4,467 Turks obtained Belgian citizenship in the year 2004 alone.

The economic recession and the crisis that struck the coal industry, in the early 1970’s, left many of the guest workers who were in the country unemployed. Soaring unemployment rates led to an increasing feeling of resentment among the public and policies began to shape in accordance, taking on a restrictive nature. It was difficult for the Turkish mine workers to adapt to the labour market after the mines closed down for they were not able to speak Flemish or French. However, despite the fact that work opportunities ceased to exist and there seemed to be no future prospects due to the new restrictive policy, immigration did not come to a halt. Immigration instead changed course by changing modes of entry, number of entry, profile and origin of those entering. New immi-
grants from Morocco and Turkey continued to arrive through family reunification and family formation.

In the mid-1980s, in a period the country suffered from a high and persistent level of unemployment, the government implemented, with not too much success, a policy to encourage immigrants to return home. This is the same period in which the Belgian government started to digest the fact that the temporary guest worker scheme had in fact a more permanent character and reacted by developing policies to integrate immigrants who had the intention to settle. The law on the entrance, residence, settlement, and return of foreigners, which is still in force, was passed in December 1980. This law provided more legal security regarding residence and it introduced a legal process for foreigners to contest measures questioning the legality of their stay. In 1981 an anti-racism law was passed. At that time, the political class still refused to grant voting rights on a community level to foreigners. (Martiniello & Rea 2003; Sonia, Martiniello & Wets 2003)

In 1984 the Nationality Code, which was almost 50 years old, was replaced by a new one. The new Nationality code introduced the principle of *jus soli* and simplified the procedure for naturalization. Children born on Belgian soil to foreign parents who themselves were born in Belgium became Belgian citizens. Although simplified, the naturalization process still required individuals to demonstrate a "desire to integrate" measured arbitrarily by the administration. The right to political participation of the migrant communities was heavily debated. The government decided not to grant political rights, but to loosen the conditions to acquire Belgian nationality. This had a non-negligible impact over this period. The nationality code was revised again and passed in its new form on March 1, 2000. Since then, any foreigner legally residing in Belgium for at least seven years who has a permanent residence permit can become Belgian with a simple declaration, without a check on his or her "desire to integrate." Between 1990 and 2002, over 400,000 foreigners have become Belgians under this provision.
Challenges of Integration

Turkish migrants mainly originate from a cluster of central Anatolian provinces. Nearly 60 percent of first generation Turkish migrants living in Belgium were born in the countryside or in a small village. (Reniers 1997) According to data on migrants from the State Institute of Statistics, Ankara, the three provinces that provided the most Turkish immigrants are Afyon, Eskisehir and Kayseri. Almost one third of the Turkish immigrants in Belgium originate from Afyon, in particular Emirdag. (Reniers 1997)

Contrary to some other immigrant groups, Turks settled just about everywhere and are distributed equally over the urban areas of the country, in Brussels and in Antwerp, but especially in Ghent and Limburg. The Turkish community in Belgium is composed of persons of diverse ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds, including Turks of Kurdish origin, Christians, Sunnis, and Alevis.

Thirty percent of the first wave of Turkish immigrants was illiterate. This percentage has dropped in the second generation and the number of Turkish students has doubled since the 1970s. Technical and vocational schools are not popular among Belgian students: approximately ten percent attend these schools. In comparison, 70 percent of Turkish students attend technical and vocational schools. Second generation students show a stronger preference for these schools and they often leave after completing higher secondary education (Neels & Stoop 1998). Data on the qualification of newcomers are hard to find and are often incomplete, but ongoing research shows that the Turkish newcomers in Flanders are still lower skilled than the people arriving from other countries (Manco 2000).

The level of education among the second generation, especially compared to other groups, is quite low and many of them have turned to trade (Manco 2000). The third generation deviates from the previous ones with a higher rate of university graduates. The number of students who attend university have increased over the
decades and approximately 40 percent of them are female. Even though they are concentrated in Flemish regions success rates are higher in French speaking universities. Nearly half of the Turkish females who study at this level prefer to study medicine while the male population who study at this level prefer economics, international trade, political science, and etcetera. 70 percent of those who begin university are able to graduate (Manco 2000). One reason for the poor level of education among Turkish migrants is the fact that the children do not master the language of education sufficiently. Preschool attendance is still quite low amongst Turkish children, and this directly affects school performance later. A large percentage of women are unemployed, those with housewife status tend to refuse to send their children to preschool and prefer to keep their children at home with them. This has a tremendously negative affect on children as they are not able to grasp the language or socialize with Belgian children thus causing frustration and learning problems once they start primary school. However the situation seems to be changing in the third generation.

The direct consequence of poor schooling is the lack of vocational qualifications. Europe’s Turks suffer greatly from this. As a result the majority of Europe’s working Turks have insecure low-paid unskilled jobs. These socio-professional characteristics marginalise the Turkish community on the labour market. (Verhoeven 2000) Turkish immigrants in Belgium are more likely than any other group to be blue-collar workers, earning less than Belgian or other migrant groups (Verhoeven 2000). They are mainly situated in industry and the service sector, and are heavily represented in agriculture and horticulture, metallurgy and the waste processing industry. Male Turks have a much lower employment rate than the male Belgian population. Also Turkish women are less active in the labour market (Martens, Ouali et all 200). And yet research by Martens and others found that Turks with a Belgian nationality do slightly better than Turkish nationals working in Belgium (Manco 2000).
The first generation unskilled labour force was relatively less affected by unemployment or the problems it incurred. Nevertheless, the second generation was affected by the multiple crises the Belgian markets suffered since the 1970s. Hence, they experience higher unemployment rates (Manco 2000). In the year 2000, nearly half of the active Turks living in the Walloon region were unemployed. This percentage was only 25 percent in the Flemish region. It reached 35 percent in Brussels. Turkish Women account for 40 percent of the unemployed Turkish population.

The average unemployment rate of Turks in Belgium is much higher than the overall unemployment rate. An analysis of some labour market data for 2003 in Flanders illustrates the poor position of the Turkish population in the labour market. The Turkish population represents only 0.5 percent of the labour population in Flanders, but represents 1.9 percent of the unemployed. The overall unemployment rate was eight percent. For people with a Belgian nationality 7 percent, for non-Belgians it was 15 percent, for the Moroccan population it was 27 percent and for the Turkish population it was 29 percent (Manco 2000). The pressure of unemployment and the increasing difficulty of getting work have played a critical role in the initiative taken by some immigrant to set up their own businesses. The number of these businesses has doubled in the last 25 years. The preferred businesses are grocery stores, fruit and vegetable stores, bakeries, döner takeaway shops, restaurants and cafes. These account for 75 percent of preferred businesses, in which sector Turkish immigrants are heavily represented.

**Conclusion**

Non-EU immigrants in Belgium have difficulties integrating into the labour market and lag significantly behind the host society in respect of educational performance, which in turn aggravates their employment situation. The difficulties that immigrants face regarding integration have played a critical role in fueling anti-immigrant
feelings. The rise of the Right in domestic politics impacted on the evolution of immigration polices in respect of employment and especially citizenship rights. Often these polices have caused the challenges of integration that immigrants face to become even greater.

Immigration policy was (and is) to a large extent a labour market policy. Immigration is a topic high on the political agenda and leads to strong political reaction. The labour market is not one big market, but a layered, a segmented market. The migrant communities can be found mostly in the lower layers of the labour market. In Belgium, we see an *ethnic stratification* of the labour market, with the non EU-migrant population being over-represented in less attractive sectors, doing blue collar jobs, earning substantially less than the national population and less than European migrants.

On the labour market Turkish migrants fare slightly worse than other migrant communities and the Turkish population participates less in the labour market than the Belgian Population. In Belgium, there is no limit to the duration of unemployment benefits for breadwinners and single persons. There is no link between any benefit entitlement and the right to stay in the country. Belgian unemployment insurance lead to what is called the unemployment trap, since it discourages the labour force from re-entering the labour market. This is one of the factors accounting for the high unemployment rate of the Turkish population in Belgium.

Major immigrant communities in Belgium are marked by persistent educational disadvantage. Though Turkish men, as well as Turkish women, are observed as having a low level of education, even if compared with other migrant groups; they have a poor labour market position, often unemployed, occupying positions in the least favourable sectors and earning less than other labourers. The second generation is generally not doing much better than their parents. Turks, who naturalized and acquired the nationality of the host country, occupy apparently slightly better positions, but it is hard to prove any causality.
An important fact that has to be taken into consideration is that when these statistics are evaluated we are not able to count those Turkish nationals who have obtained Belgian Nationality and it is important to say that the number is quite significant. The naturalisation process is a relatively simple administrative process. Acquiring the nationality of the country of residence improves the legal situation of the immigrants. For instance, foreigners enjoy social and civil rights, although no political rights. This is, in the Belgian case, the reason why foreigners remain excluded from national and regional elections. The logic behind it is that if once wishes to integrate and to participate actively in political life, once can easily apply for Belgian citizenship. In the year 2000, with the revision of legislation which made obtaining Belgian nationality easier, many foreigners applied for Belgian citizenship. Between May 2000 the time the new law came into force and January 2001, 60,000 applications were submitted. In the year 2000, Turkish and Moroccan residents alone amounted to 63.1% of all people who obtained Belgian nationality that year.

It can be argued that a significant number of non-EU nationals are not integrated and that they live in a state close to social exclusion. The Turkish Community in Belgium has formed a closed network society with very strong ties with their own associations and limited links with the community they live in. If structural integration implies that immigrants and their descendants have equal access to the major institutions of society, such as education, the labour and housing markets, health care services, etcetera, it can be concluded that the integration of the Turkish population was not a complete success story in Belgium. Do these findings imply the unmitigated failure of the Belgian integration policy? To answer this question, it is useful to go back to the question raised in our introduction: how can we define integration. Should we rely on the definition given today or on the definition society used one, two, three or four decades ago? What sort of indicators can measure successful integration? Which sorts of policy measures introduced in
different countries have been successful and why? For which groups and in what domain were they successful?

There is need for further research to answer these questions and the key question why? Why do many Turkish immigrants have difficulty integrating? We require a more comprehensive approach to answer this, it is necessary to go beyond the structural elements of integration and also look at social and cultural integration. Structural elements like the integration of immigrants into the labour market are relatively easy to measure and compare. But the other aspects should not be overlooked. Social integration, the level of social interaction between immigrants or ethnic minorities and the wider society is crucial, as well as cultural integration, the degree of identification with various norms and values of the host country. These dimensions of integration are clearly more difficult to measure than labour market participation and school enrolment.

Regardless of the differences and similarities between other European countries studied and the particularities within each country, it can be stated as a general conclusion that the European Union, as a whole, has still to learn how to handle immigration and how to deal with the question of integration. A better integration of the migrant population, however it is defined, can only be achieved within a society that tolerates and respects all groups it is composed of, whatever their ethnic origin, cultural background or religious affiliation. Immigration, especially through family reunification, without extensive integration procedures has created generations that are less contributory to society due to the lack of language skills and levels of education and qualifications. According to Tampere and Lisbon agendas it is important to provide integration procedures for both established and future immigrants. The successful integration of immigrants is both a matter of social cohesion and a prerequisite for economic efficiency. The receiving countries have to offer the structural setting that allows newcomers to find their place in the host society. But, as already stated, integration is
a two-way process that necessitates the involvement of the migrant population and their descendants as well. Integration is not a matter of adaptation or assimilation, but a matter of respect, mutual acceptance and participation. This also means the willingness of immigrants to accept responsibility for this process, participate actively and take up their roles and responsibilities in a permanent dialogue.

NOTIES
1 This paper is based on a similar paper by Johan Wets, published in Turkish Studies Volume 7, Number 1 / March 2006
4 Jus sanguinis (“right of blood”) is the Latin concept determining that a child’s citizenship is determined by that of his or her parents. This is in contrast to Jus soli (“right of the territory”) which refers to rights which are acquired as a result of ones place of birth.
5 Data National Institute of Statistics.
6 Data: Statistics Belgium (Nationaal Instituut voor de statistiek), The National Employment Office (RVA) and the Flemish Public Employment Service (VDAB). Calculations by Steunpunt WAV (www.steunpuntwav.be).
Turks in Britain: Religion and Identity

Talip Kucukcan

Introduction
There has been a constant flow of human beings throughout the centuries. Movements of individuals and groups from one location to another have been taking place since the origin of man for various reasons and especially over the last three or four decades, immigration has emerged as a major force the the world. Transition from rural to urban life style, processes of industrialization and globalization, and communication and transportation technologies along with the rise of knowledge economies have all created new opportunities for human mobility. Thus, it is observed that the World’s migrant population has been gradually increasing over the years (Koslowski 2000). United Nations’ estimates indicate that the number of people living outside the country of their birth and citizenship has more than doubled since 1975. Today, Around 175 million people reside outside the country of their birth or their state of nationality which is about three per cent of world population. International migration has had many destinations including Europe which received millions of immigrants over the years. On
the other hand, the number of refugees in the world at the end of 2000 stood at 16 million (IMR 2002).

Immigration to West European countries resulted in the settlement of foreigners in the receiving countries in increasing proportions against expectations of return to the country of origin. Despite the widespread attempt in 1973-1974, to control or prevent further migration, the proportion of foreign workers continued to rise (Gross 1986). Family reunion and the growth of the young generation led to the establishment of organisations and institutions that addressed the welfare, and cultural and religious needs of the ethnic communities. Further developments, such as economic investments and demand for political participation in the receiving countries, suggest that immigrant workers, as they were once called, are becoming rooted in the host societies and becoming a part of these societies with their distinct cultural characteristics and religious values, thus changing the cultural and religious landscape of Western cities. It has been observed that ‘the foreign workers, migrant workers or guestworkers of the 1950s and 1960s have become permanent or at least quasi-permanent settlers in the 1980s’ (Heisler 1986) and many of these settled migrants are opting for the citizenship of receiving countries where second and third generations are already a part of the social fabric, contributing to the emergence of multicultural public spheres in Europe. The arrival of foreigners with their own social customs and cultural characteristics such as different language, religion, food and dress, as well as organisations such as mosques, temples, synagogues and gurdwaras, entered the public domain alongside the churches. A large flow of immigrant workers as well as an influx of refugees in recent years and their settlement established heterogeneous and multicultural communities across Western Europe.

Muslims in Europe

Muslims constitute a significant community with an estimated number of 6.8 million who live in the European Union countries
among these new communities (Glebe 1995) In Western Europe however, it is estimated that there are 12.5 million Muslims. In Europe at large, an estimated 23 million Muslims live (Vertovec & Peach 1997) Although the presence of Muslims in Europe is not a new phenomenon, it could be argued that the expression of Islamic identity has become more pronounced and Muslims have become more visible in recent years. The growth of Western-educated young generations and the rise of global/transnational Islamic movements are important sources of motivation for Muslims in Europe to express their identity in Western public spheres. For example, in recent years, Muslims in Europe have become more concerned with the religious education of their children and have shown strong reactions against the prohibition of headscarves in schools and demanded legal recognition on local levels. Expression of Islamic identity has also taken place more strongly in the face of international struggles involving Muslims such as in Bosnia, Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and currently in Iraq. The marginalisation of Muslims on local levels and their victimisation on a global level mobilised Muslims in Europe and strengthened their sense of belonging to the Muslim ummah. However, despite this universal sense of belonging, Muslims in Europe display a great deal of diversity. Even a cursory look at the Muslim communities such as Pakistanis, Turks, Algerians, Moroccans and Bangladeshis in the West would reveal that all these communities have diversities of Islamic movements within themselves.

The existence of a large number of migrants with different cultures, religious affiliations and languages, who are increasingly becoming “naturalised citizens” in European societies, raises many questions regarding cultural belonging, political loyalty, allegiance, group identity and changing meaning of citizenship. The unfortunate attacks on US targets in 2001 and discussions following 9/11 highlighted the demarcation lines on civilisational levels. Samuel Huntington’s widely read article and his book (Huntington 1993, 1996) on the clash of civilisations were circulated once more and
some important figures in Europe and elsewhere such as the Italian Prime Minister S. Berlusconi made unexpected comments suggesting that the Western civilisation is superior and thus its roots should be revived. Speaking at a news conference in Berlin, Mr. Berlusconi is quoted to have said, “We must be aware of the superiority of our civilization, a system that has guaranteed well-being, respect for human rights and – in contrast with Islamic countries – respect for religious and political rights” (*Independent*, 22 October 2001). Migrants who belonged to other faiths and civilisations are subjected to implicit and explicit condemnation by ill-informed people. Moreover, misperceptions about Islam and Muslims in particular give rise to the essentialist views of this faith and its followers as fundamentalist, pro-violence, uncompromising and anti-Western. However, drawing upon a pool of long-term research on Muslims in Europe I argue in this article that Turkish Muslims constitute a changing diasporic community defying clichés and common stereotypes about Muslims.

Today, many Western European countries have a sizeable immigrant population of different ethnic, racial, religious and national origins, including Turkish Muslims, as a result of transnational migration and settlement. The estimated number of Turkish Muslims in European countries is more than 4.5 million. Contrary to the expectations of the policy makers, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish immigrants decided to settle in the host countries rather than return to Turkey.

The Turkish community in Europe is part of the emerging ‘European Islam’ and has its own diversity in the expression of Turkish-Muslim identity. Therefore a proper understanding of Muslim communities in Europe depends upon the analysis of multiple ‘Islams’ as perception and interpretation of a universal religion rather than looking at ‘Islam’ as a static, fixed and monolithic faith which is resistant to social change. As this article suggests, the Muslims in diaspora display a great diversity in their perceptions.
and practices of Islam as well as the ways in which they relate their faith to the larger society. Turkish Muslim community in this context can play a positive role in bridging the ‘imagined civilisational gap’ between Muslims and the West through the expression and institutionalisation of their tolerant, pluralist and embracing understanding of moderate Islamic faith which emerged in Turkey under the influence of Sufi interpretation in interaction with local customs and religious traditions in a frontier state throughout the centuries.

Turkish Presence in Europe

The presence of Turks in Europe is not a new phenomenon. Their presence can be traced to the arrival of Turkish workers to West European countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A review of the movement of Turkish people towards Europe will reveal that, although in a different nature, several thousand Turks came to Europe as early as the thirteenth century. The advent of the Anatolian Turks in the Balkans dates back to the 1260s (Inalcıkh 1993). The expansion of the Ottomans extended to Thrace in the reign of Orhan Gazi (1324-1359) whose son Suleyman managed to establish the first permanent Ottoman base at Gallipoli in Europe from which the initial conquests of the Balkans were made in the following years. Settlements of Turkoman nomads in large numbers from Anatolia followed Orhan's conquests in Europe. Ottoman expansion in the Balkans continued gradually and the Ottoman state encouraged immigration to the newly conquered territories.

Historically speaking the conquest of Istanbul (Constantinople) by the Ottoman forces in 1453 during the reign of Mehmet II (1451-1481) was a historical turning point with regard to the Turkish presence in Europe and the consequent relations between the Turks and the Europeans. Nevertheless, like many empires in the past, the Ottoman Empire has also lost its military and political powers. The rise of nationalism in the Balkans in the nineteenth century opened a new phase in the region. The weak-
Turks in Europe

ened Ottomans were forced to retreat from Europe, leaving a sub-
stantial number of Turkish-Muslims behind, some of whom later
emigrated to Turkey either forcefully or by bilateral agreements.
Bulgaria and Greece still have a significant number of Turkish-
Muslim minority populations (Küçükcan 1999). There are also
smaller Turkish communities in Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

Turkish Migration to Europe

A large-scale labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe
started in the late 1950s and early 1960s predominantly for econom-
ic reasons. The beginning of organised labour migration from
Turkey goes back to October 1961 when Turkey and Germany
signed a bilateral agreement for the recruitment of Turkish workers
in Germany. Before 1961, participation of Turkish workers in post-
war labour migration to Western Europe had, at least officially, not
taken place.

The initial wave of Turkish labour migration was mainly
directed to West Germany. However, labour migration from
Turkey was not confined to Germany. Several other West European
countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and
Britain also received Turkish labour migrants. It should be noted
here that, in contrast to several other manpower-supplying coun-
tries, labour migration was a rather new phenomenon for Turkey.
There was a colonial background of immigration to France, Britain
and the Netherlands, as they received a significant number of
migrant workers from their former colonies. Turkey differs in this
respect in that, as a labour-sending country it had no colonial links
with countries where a large Turkish migrant population was accu-
mulating. Whereas, for example, Britain received immigrants from
the West Indies, India and Pakistan; France turned to Algeria; and
the Netherlands hosted migrants from Indonesia as colonial or ex-
colonial territories, Turkey had no direct colonial relationship with
any of the receiving countries. Therefore, this fact should be taken
into account when drawing any general conclusions about labour-exporting experiences on the one hand and the social and cultural characteristics of migrants which have important bearings on their relations with the host society and its values on the other hand.

As shown in Table 1, the migration and settlement of Turks in European countries steadily increased over the years and their number exceeded three millions in 2003. In addition to Europe, according to the official figures, there are 130,000 Turks in USA, 30,000 in the Russian Federation, 100,000 in Saudi Arabia and 52,000 in Australia.

Table 1. Distribution of Turks in European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>615,827</td>
<td>1,552,328</td>
<td>1,965,577</td>
<td>2,653,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>33,892</td>
<td>144,790</td>
<td>254,000</td>
<td>311,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>30,091</td>
<td>154,201</td>
<td>252,450</td>
<td>299,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>30,527</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>134,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>14,029</td>
<td>63,587</td>
<td>90,425</td>
<td>70,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6,250</td>
<td>17,240</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td>35,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>28,480</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td>5,577</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,061</td>
<td>20,900</td>
<td>36,001</td>
<td>38,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>19,710</td>
<td>48,485</td>
<td>76,662</td>
<td>79,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>777,727</td>
<td>2,108,097</td>
<td>2,930,392</td>
<td>4,660,691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SOPEMI, 1995; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur die Belange der Auslander, 1995; Annual Report, Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 1984, 1992, 1993; 2003 Statistics on Turkish Migrant: Online report of the Turkish Ministry of Employment and Social Security
Turkish Presence in Britain: Migration from Cyprus and Turkey

Migration from Cyprus to Britain started as early as the 1920s and, by the 1930s almost 1,000 Cypriot immigrants had settled in Britain. However, early immigrants from Cyprus were exclusively Greek-Cypriots. (Oakley 1987) The annexation of Cyprus by Britain took place in 1914 and, thereafter, residents of Cyprus acquired a new status as subjects of the British Crown. The migration continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s until the Second World War. The immigration of Cypriots was regulated through the issuance of affidavits and passports (Geroge & Millerson 1967). The outbreak of war in 1939 halted Cypriot migration and the issuance of affidavits was suspended to prevent further population movement. Hence no further migration was observed until 1945. There were only a few Turks among these early immigrants. According to Home Office statistics, for example, the number of Turkish-Cypriots recorded between 1933 and 1934 was only three and, in 1936, only four. (Oakley 1989)

The independence of Cyprus in 1959 and its joining with Commonwealth countries was a turning point in facilitating a significant number of immigrants from Cyprus until the Immigration Act of 1962. Within a short space of time, a significant number of Cypriots had left for Britain and the estimated number of Cypriots in Britain had risen to 78,486 by 1964. Although the Immigration Act of 1962 prevented large-scale migration from Cyprus, migration of Cypriots still took place to Britain, but on a much smaller scale, in the form of family union until 1974-75 when ethnic tension in Cyprus turned to open confrontation. It is reported that, following the 1974 war in Cyprus ‘several thousands of Cypriots entered Britain on a short stay basis as unofficial “refugees” from the fighting and territorial displacement (Oakley 1979). The number of Cypriots, regardless of their ethnic origin was 160,000 in the 1980s, of which 20-25 per cent are said to be Turkish-Cypriots (Ring 1982).
Table 2. Number of Mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots: Various estimates, dating from 1977 to 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Sources and Estimated Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainland Turks</td>
<td>a- 26,597, b- 65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots</td>
<td>c- 60,000, d- 45,000, e- 40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Turks</td>
<td>86,597, 110,000, f- 115,000, g- 300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As seen in Table 2, it is very difficult to make an accurate estimate regarding the total number of Turks living in Britain. The above figures, for example, may not include Turks with British citizenship who have not registered with the Turkish Consulate. It should also be remembered that current estimates on Turks do not take asylum-seekers from Turkey into account. It is estimated that there are more than 13,000 asylum-seekers from Turkey. This seems to be a significant figure in proportion to all Turks living in Britain. Therefore, the recent trend in asylum applications from Turkey should also be examined in order to reach a reliable statistical estimation about Turks in Britain. In contrast to migration to other European countries, Turkish migration from both Turkey and Cyprus to Britain was neither organised nor regulated by the government. This means that emigration centres were not chosen by the Turkish government policy, as was the case with immigration to other European countries. Instead, they were largely determined by individual initiatives which were followed by a chain migration by using social networks. It is difficult to single out particular centres of migration to Britain especially in the early stages of migration. However, social networks such as family and kinship ties, village connections and friendship influenced the migration flow in the later stages.
Settlement Pattern

The overwhelming majority of the Turks live in Greater London area although one can see the opening of Turkish-owned businesses elsewhere in the country. The settlement pattern of Turkish immigrants to Britain is similar to that of Greek-Cypriots. Social networks, kinship relations and patronage seem to have perpetuated the concentration of Turkish people in the same quarters of the city. Research findings indicate that at least 54 per cent of the respondents in London preferred living with Turkish neighbours (Dokur-Gryskiewicz 1979) which partly explains the concentration of Turkish people in particular locations of London.

A similar phenomenon exits in Berlin where Turks have created particular neighbourhoods. For its large numbers of Turkish residents, Kreuzberg in Berlin is also called Mandel “the Little Istanbul”, a nickname that reflects the origins of its inhabitants and its ethnic features marked by Turkish lifestyles, shops, cafés and mosques. In addition, the underground line passing through this district is named ‘Orient Express’ which echoes the image of Little Istanbul, a common joke that Berlin is another province of Turkey’ (Mandel 1989).

Research published by the London Borough of Hackney suggests that some 10 to 15 per cent of Turkish Cypriots and 20 to 30 per cent of the Turks from Turkey are self-employed workers. The same report indicates that the unemployment rate among the Turkish community in Hackney is 35 to 45 per cent. The data on housing conditions of Turks in London is also insufficient. The above-cited report notes that, ‘some 80 per cent of Turkish mainlanders live in council housing, 20 per cent of Turkish-Cypriots are owner occupiers’ (Avni & Koumarji 1994). However, one speculates that the number of self-employed Turks is increasing especially in catering, food and textile industries.
Reproducing Traditional Values, Social Structures and Cultural Practices in Britain

Traditional family structure was revived and conventional roles and inter-family relations were reproduced once the families joined together in Britain. Within the traditional Turkish family, its members assumed different responsibilities and duties reflected in the hierarchy of authority which was rooted in Turkish customs and practices.

The early immigrants in particular seemed to have preserved the traditional structure of the Turkish family. Traditional family values are still very important for older members of the Turkish community in Britain. Nevertheless, spatial movements of Turkish immigrants and the reconstruction of traditional family structures in a culturally different atmosphere have inevitably challenged the resistance of the underlying family composition of the Turkish community. On the one hand, immigration to another country where there are no or only a few relatives made women more dependent on their husbands in the public sphere in the early period of settlement. Women who joined their husbands were mostly confined to the home and deprived of kin relations which are very important as a source of help and assistance in times of difficulties. The dependence of women on their men was further exacerbated by the lack of socialising among the Turkish community.

Women have continued to carry out their traditional roles such as taking responsibility within the internal domains of the home. In addition to this traditional role, women found more space in economic and political life in Britain in recent years. Some migrant Turkish women are also entering public life in Britain more often than before and the number of women professionals is increasing. The entrance of women to professions such as teaching, social work, interpretation, law and journalism, among others, indicate that the status of Turkish women in Britain is changing. The Turkish women who were elected as local councillors in Hackney
and Enfield may also be seen as clear signs of changes in the role of women.

The establishment of family and marriage practices in the Turkish community informs us that traditional values are constantly reproduced as an expression of Turkish identity. First of all, marriage is still seen as an important institution for socialisation. Therefore considerable social pressure is brought on single individuals to get married. Parents who would like to arrange a marriage for their son, for example, are still seeking for intact ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ of the prospective bride. Therefore, girls are encouraged to avoid situations which may damage their honour and family reputation. However, the meaning of ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ is changing for the young generation. In contrast to parental attitudes they do not see, for example, social outings with unrelated male friends as damaging their honour and reputation. And increasingly they want to make their own choices for marriage. This article argues that ‘control’ over the girls, in contrast to boys, has much to do with the cultural practices, not necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification for parental control can not be based totally on religious grounds. Had it been so, they should have developed the same attitudes spontaneously for their sons because religious principles apply to both sexes equally.

The generational differences are not confined to the issue of marriage. One can argue that migration experience might cause a ‘paradigm shift’. This means that traditionally-loaded meanings of some concepts and symbols may loose their importance with the fusion of novel ideas through acculturation, social interaction and schooling in Britain. Such a paradigm shift is taking place between generations in the multicultural context where young people interact with the new cultural codes and social practices. Therefore, Turkish parents are deeply concerned with the transmission of traditional values to the young generation in order to protect their identity from ‘cultural contamination’. Thus, parents consistently
put pressure on them to ‘absorb’ and ‘internalise’ the cultural values of the Turkish community.

Although there is no total rejection of traditional values, it appears that the young generation are developing different attitudes towards parental values. Although most of the Turkish young people agree with the preservation of parental culture, they seem to attribute different meanings to some of the elements of traditional values. There is a tendency among young Turks to see marriage, social relations and sexuality in a somewhat different way than that of their parents. The overwhelming majority of young people claim that they have disagreements with their parents over ‘meeting and socialising with the opposite sex’, ‘type of clothing’, ‘spending time outside the house’, ‘restriction of freedom’, ‘friendship with non-Turks and non-Muslims’ and ‘the way marriages are arranged’.

The development of different attitudes towards these issues may be attributed to the socialisation experience of the younger generation in Britain. In contrast to their parents, young people have to deal with multiple identity choices. Parents as the first generation maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host society’s social and cultural values. Young Turks, on the other hand, as a ‘bridge generation’, seem to have ambiguous tendencies towards some of the values and habits of their community. They have a desire, on the one hand, to preserve parental values at home, and on the other, to adopt some elements of the host culture outside. This means that there is an emergent identity construction taking place among the young generation. This emergent identity is not exclusively shaped by ‘Turkey/Cypriot inspired perceptions’, but rather it is increasingly based on ‘local/British inspired perceptions’.

It can be argued that there is a constant identity negotiation among the Turkish youth. On the one hand they accept and desire to have
British citizenship as an umbrella identity, on the other hand, they do not want to see a conflict in being Turkish as well as being British. For them, Britishness does not require them to get rid of their national, ethnic and cultural identity. While Scots, Welsh and English identities are becoming more detached from 'British identity', Turks as well as others in diaspora are increasingly embracing British identity and calling themselves by hyphenated identities. 'Do not call me Black, I am a British' is just one example of having a hyphenated identity in multiethnic and multiracial British society. Being a British-Pakistani, a British-Asian, a British-Muslim or a British-Turk is not seen as odd. Rather, they exist under the wider umbrella of British identity as forms of being British. These hybrid and hyphenated identities are not only self-ascribed. These communities are also seen and described by politicians, the media and the general public as British citizens, giving legitimacy to their claim for Britishness (Küçükcan 2003).

Religion as a Source of Group Identity

As Table 3 shows, Britain has more than 1.5 million Muslim residents with various ethnic, racial and national backgrounds. However, British Muslims should not be seen as a monolithic social entity. There is a great deal of diversity among the Muslim communities in Britain as elsewhere in the West and the Muslim world. Turkish Muslims are part of the larger Muslim community in Britain and religion is one of the significant markers of Turkish collective identity. Therefore, the first generation of the Turkish community established Islamic institutions as soon as they acquired sufficient resources. These institutions were meant to facilitate the transmission of religious values to young Turks. However, attitudes of young people towards religion are changing. Although the majority of young Turks still believe in the basic principles of Islam, it seems that religion is becoming a symbolic attachment for many of them. Intellectual dimension of religious commitment among young Turks clearly indicates that young people know very little
about Islam. The lack of knowledge about the basic principles of Islam might be attributed to several factors. It can be argued, for example, that they do not learn much about their religion in the schools because there seem to be no special provisions for the teaching of Islam and Turkish culture. Another reason may be the failure of Islamic institutions to address a larger young audience because of their mostly out-dated teaching curriculum and methods.

Table 3. Faith Communities in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>37,338,486</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1,546,626</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>552,421</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>329,358</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>259,927</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>144,453</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>150,720</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>7,709,267</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion not stated</td>
<td>4,010,658</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,041,916</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As far as the performance of rituals is concerned, only a small number of young people observe prescribed Islamic practices. Young Turks know little about their religion and they generally do not fulfill the required religious duties. Yet, most of them still believe in Islam. This means that a symbolic religiosity is developing among the Turkish youth who seem to be increasingly feeling the tension generated by the continuity of traditional values and changes in social and cultural environments. It appears that young Turks will experience this tension at least for the foreseeable future. Parents
and religious organisations will continue to teach the young generation the importance of religion and will try to inculcate an Islamic belief in their sense of belonging to the Turkish-Muslim community. However, social and cultural effects of the British context will also influence the young generation throughout their life which will inevitably induce changes in the emergent Turkish identity among the young generation to a certain extent, which would enable them to accommodate a sense of belonging to the multicultural community in Britain (Küçükcan 1999).

**Associational Life and Collective Identity Mobilization**

Cultural, religious and religio-political organisations also play a role in the construction and maintenance of Turkish identity in the British context. Organisations and associations of various kinds were established and used by the Turkish community in Britain as elsewhere as a response to changing social and cultural conditions. These organisations have different membership and clientele profiles, different administrative structures, strategies and purposes.

Turkish/Cypriot associations in Britain display diversity in terms of their foundational purposes and subsequent activities. The activities and services made available by the existing organisations address various issues such as welfare, education, social and cultural challenges and the religious needs of the Turkish community in Britain. These associations cluster around a set of ideals and purposes. The names of the organisations usually indicate their priorities and orientation, and the clientele/membership structure of Turkish/Cypriot organisations. The classification and categorisation of the organisations according to their functions, such as welfare, cultural, educational, political and religious would be of little use since there is no clear-cut differentiation between ethnic-based formations. There is juxtaposition and proximity across the interests and activities of Turkish/Cypriot associations.
The foundational aspirations and priorities of Turkish organisations, reflected in their activities and functions, reveal that there are overlapping as well as dissimilar, and even conflicting concerns among the Turkish community. This means that the institutionalisation of identity politics assumes diverse meanings according to the cultural, religious and political orientations of Turkish organisations. In the Turkish immigrant community, the process of community formation with its own ‘cultural boundaries’ from that of fragmented individuals through family unions and marriages, was accompanied by the process of institutionalisation in various areas.

The *raison d'être* of Turkish organisations lies in the fact that settlement and post-settlement processes generated numerous problems for the community and these challenging problems needed to be addressed. The issues around culture, language, religion, welfare and education of the young generation preoccupied parental and familial concerns. It can be argued that Turkish organisations emerged in response to these concerns which are related to the expression of ethnicity and identity.

**Education of Turkish Minority**

Almost all Turkish/Cypriot associations place a special emphasis on education because education is seen as a key to transmit traditional values to the young generation and to generate a sense of belonging to the ideals of Turkish community. It is a widely held view among the first generation that their children are exposed to the cultural influences of the larger society. Schooling, peer-group relations and media are constantly exerting cultural influences on young people and presenting new identity choices in conflict with the Turkish culture and Islamic values. Turkish/Cypriot organisations with few exceptions are devising policies and strategies to counterbalance the acculturation of young Turks in order to prevent their assimilation because assimilation would mean the loss of Turkish identity. However, although the meaning of Turkish iden-
tity is the same in principle, Turkish/Cypriot organisations seem to emphasise different components of their identity as the most basic and indispensable element. Some organisations, for example, place priority on teaching the Turkish language as it is perceived to be the most effective means of communication with the culture which defines Turkish/Cypriot identity.

The Turkish Educational Attaché and some Turkish organisations in Britain claim that the number of young Turkish students at the supplementary weekend schools has reached 2,500 and it is estimated that their size will grow steadily. Increasing attendance in classes on Turkish ‘language’, ‘culture’, ‘music’ and ‘folklore’ indicates that parental concern about the future of their children is growing. They do not want to see young Turks lose their ‘Turkish identity’, therefore the first generation is trying to mobilise Turkish community to prevent ‘cultural contamination’ of children. It seems that institutionalisation of education is regarded as one of the most effective ways of reproducing Turkish culture and instilling an identity among the young generation by transmitting ‘reproduced values’ within the British context. However, despite parental pressure and organisational efforts, the meaning of Turkish identity is changing for the young generation as mentioned earlier.

Turkish/Cypriot organisations sometimes resort to political mobilisation of the community to revive the ‘collective identity’. The rationale behind such a strategy seems to be the expression of political identity which is considered to be a prerequisite to becoming a ‘politically conscious community’ rather than that of a ‘silent ethnic community’. Therefore, some organisations keep the issue of Cyprus alive because it is expected that such issues reawaken nationalist feelings and aspirations as sources of political identity. Political mobilisation inevitably requires involvement in the politics of the country of origin. Involvement in the politics of the country of origin in the diaspora reproduces attachments, alliances and hostilities which crystallise ‘identity boundaries’.
Cyprus has been a divided island between Greek-Cypriots in the south and Turkish-Cypriots in the north since 1974. Both sides engaged negotiations under the auspices of UN to reach a sustainable solution. End of the cold war and acceleration of Turkey’s efforts for full membership in EU led to a gradual shift in attitudes towards the situation in Cyprus. The Turkish government persuaded the Turkish-Cypriot side to accept the UN plan, crafted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan, to reunify the island. Except ultra nationalists and hardliners, Turkish/Cypriot organizations in Britain and elsewhere supported UN plans. A referendum took place on 24 April 2004. The results were disappointing for the Turkish-Cypriot side where 64.9% said “yes” to the UN plan whereas in the Greek-Cypriot side 75.8% said “no”. Cyprus joined EU on 1st May 2004, leaving Turkish side outside the Union. However, Turkish/Cypriot civil organisations in diaspora launched a policy of lobbying EU states to put pressure on Greek-Cypriots as a sign of Turks’ desire to be a part of Europe.

Varied Religious Trends: Faces of Islam among the Turkish Community

As mentioned earlier Islam is one of the indispensable components of Turkish/Cypriot identity. Even those who defined themselves as ‘not religious’ or ‘nominal’ Muslims, feel that religion has had public and private influence on the formation of Turkish identity. Institutionalisation of Islam and the growth of Islamic movements among the Turkish community confirm that this perception is widely held. This means that Turkish ethnicity, identity and Islam are closely intertwined and can not be readily separated from one another. Therefore, it is almost impossible to analyse Turkish identity without reference to Islam. However, it should be borne in mind that Turkish Islam is as diversified as Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Arab Islam. This means that national and religious identities influenced each other throughout history and it is this factor that lies at the heart of the non-monolithic nature of Islamic movements.
Even within Turkish Islam there is a wide diversity of expression of Islamic identity in Britain. Almost all Turkish Islamic organisations were off-shoots of umbrella organisations/groups in Turkey or Cyprus and that they implicitly, and more often explicitly, claim allegiance to the ‘national-model’ organisations.

As far as the Islamic organisations in Britain are concerned, it appears that rivalry, competition and conflict rather than negotiation and co-operation are prevalent features of their politics. It seems that such a state of affairs is inherited from the conflicts among the Islamic groups in Turkey and reproduced in Europe. The influence of the ‘model’ organisations is very well documented on the institutionalisation of religious groups among Turks in Europe and in Britain. Therefore, it would not be possible to analyse the diversity of approaches to Islamic identity and politics among Turks in Britain without understanding the current developments in Turkey. However, the focus of Islamic politics for the young Turkish generation seems to be changing. The young generation are increasingly becoming disillusioned by the priorities of organizations established and run by their elders. They want to see more novel and diverse activities inspired by the local conditions. No longer do they want to see these organizations as the extension of mainland Turkish organizations, but too see them to be European organizations.

The Role of the Mosques

The establishment of the mosques has always been a priority for the Turks as they are considered to be traditional centres of Islamic learning, religious socialisation and education which contribute to the construction of Turkish-Islamic identity. Activities held in mosques are designed to reawaken Islamic identity among the group and pass the traditional values onto the young generation. The growth of the young generation especially seems to be causing some changes in the traditional politics of the mosques. Some of the
Islamic organisations, for example, seem to have recognised that classical teaching methods were not very fruitful within the British context. Therefore, they introduced new strategies for teaching, recruiting and appealing to a wider audience. For example one of the mosques opened an independent primary school in London despite its ongoing insistence on traditional teaching methods (Küçükcan 1998). Another mosque, on the other hand, had negotiated with the Local Council and was granted permission to register weddings in the mosque. The novelty was even extended to allow the formation of small market places in one of the Turkish mosques. It should be pointed out that these are significant changes in the politics of mosques compared to Turkey or Cyprus where mosques are only used for prayers under the strict control of the state apparatus. This also suggests that Islamic groups in Europe enjoy more freedom of expression since they do not challenge the state system in the public sphere, whereas many of the Islamic movements are seen as a threat to the establishment in Muslim countries.

The development of new strategies indicates that Islamic groups in Britain are aware of the social and cultural influences of the wider society. Nevertheless, new policies and strategies also carry the imprint of particular groups who have different approaches to Islamic issues. This means that Turkish Islamic organisations in Britain have more differences than convergence in terms of their methods of teaching, ideological standpoints, expression of Islamic identity and participation in the public sphere. Three main Turkish-Islamic groups as represented by Aziziye, Suleymanci and Sheikh Nazim groups differ in their interpretations of what Islamic behaviour really is and what an authentic Islamic identity means. The Nur movement with its study circles (dershane) and courses open to public and the Alevi interpretation of Islam are also taking root in Britain after the establishment of a Cemevi in London. In addition to these groups, The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, a governmental institution, also
provides religious services to Turkish community throughout Europe by appointing attachés for religious affairs and by sending imams to many cities. The long-term competition among Turkish religious associations, institutions, and Islamic groups in the religious market still continues in several forms.

Transnational Islamic Networks

One of the overlooked aspects of Islamic organisations among Turks in Britain and Europe in general is their contribution to the development of ‘Islamic networks’. Religious communities are among the oldest transnational movements that are not confined to territorial boundaries of nation-states. In today’s post-modern era, religious communities have become vigorous creators of an emergent transnational civil society (Rudolph 1997). The development of transnational Islamic networks seems to be taking place on two levels. The first level relates to Turks as a micro-Muslim community. Almost all Islamic organisations among Turks in Europe have their origins in Turkey. Islamic groups such as Suleymanci, National Vision (Milli Gorus) and the Nur movements are widening their networks in Europe. These movements use the transnational space and the European public sphere to strengthen religious collective identity on the one hand and try to increase their clientele by addressing a larger audience through the mass media, internet, group studies, weekend schools and numerous publications, on the other hand. The second area of network development relates to non-Turkish Muslim communities in Europe. Some of the Turkish Islamic organisations are also contributing to the widening of transnational Islam. Political and mystical Islam especially do not confine their appeal to one ethnic/national group, rather they try to recruit Muslims and win converts from all national origins. Sheikh Nazim group, for example, is comprised of Muslims who have different racial, ethnic and national origins. The National Vision, on the other hand, is increasingly trying to get involved in the affairs of Muslims in a wider context. All of these groups have already
opened branches in major European and American cities to widen their sphere of influence.

**Conclusion**

Population movements have been a permanent feature of human history. In many quarters of the globe, one can observe the emergence of multicultural societies as a result of voluntary migration, population exchange or flow of refugees which involved a massive volume of human groups throughout history. These migratory waves are conditioned by varying forces such as wars and ethnic clashes, economic demise or industrial development, and political pressures which determined the direction and nature of population movements. Whether it is voluntary or forced, migration has become a global phenomenon with a wide range of social, cultural, economic and political consequences. Globalisation, migration, widening democracy, rapid developments in communication technology and improved access to education provided new channels for religious movements to articulate and disseminate their ideas. Settlement of immigrants with transnational political and religious connections raises important questions regarding state, citizenship, civil society and political participation as well as for security and conflict in the post-cold war era.

European societies are predominantly secular and there is a growing Muslim population in the very heart of secular Europe. Secularised European social life, political culture and public sphere are all facing an enormous challenge of accommodating a relatively religious population of around 7 million from different Muslims countries. Despite settling in Europe many Muslims attach great importance to their sacred and religious values, trying to express their demands and identities in the public spheres. Unlike America, there is not a great wall of separation between religion and state in most European countries where the church either enjoys a partnership status or is recognised as an important actor. While Europe
tries to integrate Muslims in the secular culture, 9/11 has once more drawn our attention to the secular-religious divide and more importantly transnational religious networks and Muslim diasporas in various parts of the world.

It should be noted that there is significant diversity among the Muslim diaspora communities and religious movements regarding their approaches to the problems of Muslim communities and current crisis involving Muslims. Their structures, membership, clientele, and language in articulating their collective identity discourses also differ from each other\(^2\). Therefore, one should not essentialize Muslim identity by having a monolithic approach to current developments and Muslim diaspora in Europe and beyond because this will strengthen stereotypes and lead to misguided judgements about Islam and its followers.

Turkish Muslim community in Britain is part of the World Muslim diaspora communities with its own diversity accommodating different Islamic trends. Turkish Muslim diaspora in Britain and elsewhere in Europe is now a permanent social and cultural reality. They should not be viewed as immigrants anymore because they are citizens of European countries. Existence of Turkish and other Muslim diasporic communities should be seen as an opportunity to establish a bridge between Europe and the Muslim world. Moderate Islam as represented by the overwhelming majority of the Turks in Europe can be a source of dialogue, mutual understanding and communication between Muslims and the West.
Turks in Austria and Germany: Stereotypes and Xenophobia

Güneş Koç

Introduction

This article critically examines the prevalent images of Turks in Austria and Germany with a view to highlight their social and popular roots. Widely circulated photographs of Turks in Germany and Austria are examined to analyse how images of Turks are constructed. The common photographs depict Muslims women with heardscarves and long coats and with their children in the parks. Although these photographs could be also pictures of Muslim women from other ethnicities, it is usually assumed these are Turkish women because the majority of Muslim in these countries is usually Turkish Muslims. It is for this reason that these kinds of photographs have been associated with Turkish Muslim migrants.

Photographs representing Turkish women with headscarf and long dress with some children around are frequently used in right-wing populist campaigns. Behind these pictures are prejudices about Turkish migrants, also called as Turkish “foreign workers”, who came to Germany and Austria in the late 1960s and early
1970s. At the beginning of the migration the “foreign workers” were welcomed by the state. These days however, it is not possible to observe the same open-minded policy toward migrants. Not only the conservative and right-wing political parties in Europe, but also the social-democratic and green party policies on immigration and immigrants are becoming more conservative. Political programs and the political awareness of society are both developing in the direction of greater hostility towards foreigners. This tendency has existed in Europe’s multicultural societies since the 1990’s.

Julia Czarnowski (2006) compares stereotypes about the Iranian and Turkish migrants in Austria in her unpublished PhD study entitled as “Dynamiken und Aushandlung kultureller Identitäten am Beispiel der IranerInnen in Wien” (Iranians in Vienna. An analysis of the various levels of discourse regarding Iranian ethnic categories and their potential for transforming into ethnic identifications). In her comparison she analyses the images of Turkish and Iranian migrants on TV and in the print media in Austria. According to her research results, the Iranian migrants have the image of being integrated and moderate migrants, while the Turkish migrants are represented as the opposite. In public opinion moderate means the transformation of the life style of the migrants and the adaptation of their awareness to the values of Western society. Liberal and tolerant attitude towards religion and nonreligious values, such as the non-traditional world and Western living style, are also important criteria in the definition of “moderate”. These supposed differences between Iranian and Turkish migrants in Austria are some images that are influencing the perception of the majority. The Turkish migrants, especially in Austria and Germany, are attributed as having a rural life, marked by patriarchal masculinity and traditionalism. Islam has also been seen as a reason for this traditionalism and masculinity.

Germany and Austria have the largest number of Turkish migrants, which make them the largest Muslim migrant group in
the migrant community of these countries, in contrast to, for example England or France. The percentage of immigrants in Austria is 9%. Of this, 5% are Turkish migrants (Statistical Report Austria 2006). The Turks are the second biggest migrant group in Austria. In Germany there are about 6.1 million foreigners. The Turks are the largest foreign group in Germany. There are about 2.1 million Turks and they make up 28% of the foreigners in Germany. The second group is the people from the former Yugoslavia (18%), then the Italians with 8% and the Greeks with 5% (Münz & Ralf 2000). In France, England, and in Spain, the biggest Muslim migrant groups are from the Middle East, African countries and from the subcontinent. Since the Turks are the greatest Muslim majority in Germany and Austria, they play a more important role there than in other European countries.

**Origins of Images about Turks in Europe**

In Austria and Germany images of Turkish women are normally ones of suppressed women who have to practice a traditional role in the Turkish community. Her main missions are connected with the family and with her position and role in the family. In this traditional role system the central duty of women is to protect and save the continuity of the honour of the family in the community. The men have another function and duty in the traditional codex of the community. The function of the men can be described in terms of the usual and traditional roles of the patriarchal system, but they are also responsible for protecting the culture of their own community. The men are also strongly controlled and influenced by the migrant community, which has its own rules and principles. For example, whom you are marrying can be important for your reputation in the community. It is often the case that a Turkish and Muslim woman as a wife has more validity and acceptance than a “foreign” woman.
The men also have to follow certain unwritten rules of the community. In contrast to women the men have a huge amount of freedom. They are relatively free in their sexual life and in the organization of their free time, whereas the women will be strictly controlled by the community. The common attribute of the Turkish migrant community is its family and group responsibility, which does not allow individualism. In this culture of Turkish migrants we can observe the role of tradition as well as the influence of religion. This generalisation of some wholesale attributes is instrumentalized and generalized with the aim of building up prejudices. These prejudices can be used for the construction of public opinion and for policy making.

The effect of the “other” can cause irritation. In the codex about the other which appears with associations of commonly transported images, a headscarf can stand for repressed women and the patriarchal culture of Muslims. It can irritate the majority and can be understood as a fundamental antagonism of the European modern culture, whose roots are found in the European Enlightenment. “The domination over the women because of God’s word and a non-tolerant and non-democratic culture” of this community is how the Turkish Muslim migrants are perceived in European public opinion. The insistence on tradition and the rigidity on the traditional roles of Turkish migrants seem to go against the dynamism of democratic society and European modernity.

An assumption about the basic principles of European culture is individualism. Individualism and being a free person are seen as a necessary combination. Openness in forming gender roles and individual decisions is very important, and to be free is a very important value in the self-definition of European identity. This mentality differs from the self-definition in cultural identities and causes an “othering” of the migrant culture (Balibar, & Wallerstein 1998) The ghettoization of the migrant culture and the self-ghettoization by the migrant groups are based on the encounter of two
‘others’ in the confrontation of the cultural self. Othering occurs on the level of work and class, which is manifested by the view of “foreign workers” as the proletariat of unqualified workers who should return to their home countries. The description “foreign worker” and the existence of this status of migrants is a dimension of “othering” in itself. Another dimension of othering of the migrant culture is to create a border between the cultural identities and to highlight the differences. Intolerance towards differences and the exclusion of the other can be remarked in both these groups, for the migrants as well as for the majority society.

The “foreign workers” did not go back and they had children, who went to school with the European children. They stayed in Europe and they built up an existence and a future in Europe. But the futures of these migrant children and the ways of life of the second and third generation migrants are different from the majority society in many areas. The politicians and social scientists are discussing integration. They list many reasons such as cultural diversity etc., but the main point about the reasons for the formation of a ghetto and for the failure of integration policies is not given. It is the fact that the majority society sees the migrants as “foreign workers” who will go back, and this has an influence on the perception of the migrants preventing them from seeing themselves as a constant part of society. It has the effect of making them foreigners forever. Their children and the children of their children will experience a similar destiny.

They also have to fight against this othering and to be accepted as a part of society. If they are do not manage to do this, either because of unsuccessful education or due to a lack of integration into the working life, then they remain within the invisible part of society. The othering of the majority of the migrant group is not the only reality about the non-successful integration of the migrant group. The Turkish migrants are usually seen as less integrated than the migrants from the former Yugoslavia in Austria and

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Germany. Migrants from the former Yugoslavia also make up a large part of the migrants in these societies. The better integration of the migrants from the former Yugoslavia could be explained by the cultural closeness of this group and the majority culture. In any case, they are classified as European and moderate. The Turks, however, are described as more traditional and as culturally more different.

The ethnographical comparison above focuses not only on the religion, but also on Turkish culture, which has the image of a closed and traditional structure and which is seen as a backward culture. The Bosnian Muslims, however, are not known as a problematic migrant group in Austria or Germany. It is the Turkish migrants in particular that are perceived as a non-integrated group.

In this part of my article I will deal with the “Turks in Europe”, in particular with how “these Turks”, especially those in Germany and in Austria, can be described in typologies and can be differentiated. If I speak of the Turkish migrants and of the ghettoization of this group, this is only describing a reality for a part of the Turkish migrants in Europe, in this case those in Germany and Austria. This is why I will try to give a rough outline of the typology of the Turkish migrants in Europe, which will help me describe the different ways of self-definition and the identity building processes of Turkish migrants. In producing the typology and defining the groups I will make a generalization. The scientific basis of this work is orientation towards my own observations and the incorporation of literature, spoken words and news in these topics. I will try to produce a reliable description of this topic.

**Categories of Turks: Gender, Generation and Culture**

In this chapter the ghettoized group and the clichés and stereotypes about this group will be described. Even the language problem of the Turkish migrants plays a role in integration problems. There are
many Turkish migrants who live in Germany and Austria but do not speak much German. They have never really tried to learn this language well and do not see any reason why they should improve their language skills. They have built a wall for themselves which provides a barrier between the majority society and themselves. The lack of language competence leads to a development of a separated society that does not have the necessary shared language to enable an exchange. The language barrier also plays a large role in the othering of the migrant culture.

Among the first generation there are many people, especially women, who do not know a word of German. Such poor language skill is mainly seen among women. In particular women are not motivated to learn the foreign language because their traditional role in the family does not make it “necessary”. There are many examples of women who live in Austria or Germany but do not speak a word of German. It would not be unfair if I said that they did not even try to learn this language. That means that these migrants had no ambition to be a part of the major society. The othering of the migrants took place according to the same logic. They even saw themselves as guests in these countries for a while. Getting used to the language and to the cultural attributes of the foreign country causes a split of identity in the migrants because they are partly sharing the same world with the majority society but they are also living in a different social context and reality. The ghettoization happens at the language level and also at the level of housing. The working class lives in the cheaper and poorer areas. The migrant workers also live close to each other due to three main reasons: The first reason can be traced back to the state policy that settled the migrants in the same locations at the beginning of the migration phase of the Turkish “foreign workers”. It was part of state policy to keep the “foreigners” at a manageable distance and to keep the “aliens” outside of the centres.
The living conditions

At the beginning of the regular migration from Turkey, the Austrian and German governments put the migrants into blocks of flats where they lived together. Today, it is no longer possible to talk about a policy of this kind, but the dynamics of the living conditions for the migrants by themselves have developed the dynamics of choosing to live and stay close to each other. In particular, the Turkish migrants prefer to live together and close to each other. This choice is heavily influenced by language problems. To have Turkish food shops, clothes shops, Turkish doctors, Turkish coffee houses and so forth means that everyday life is easier and more uncomplicated. They do not have to feel that they are foreigners and do not have to be afraid of the foreign society; they also do not have to be aware of the “othering”. The spaces in the houses can be enlarged to include the streets, which create an atmosphere similar to that of being at “home”. This feeling gives the migrants “a little bit of feeling at home (Heimat!)”, on the other hand it works as a protection against the “foreign” culture and against discrimination or racist attacks in their everyday life.

In the Turkish non-urbanized culture maintaining close relationships with relatives and also with people from the same town in the home country is very important. These relationships give the migrants protection and an orientation in the foreign city and culture. This is an important reason for living in the same locations. Independent of state policy or of foreignness, these cultural particularities also play a role in the formation of migrant culture and living spaces.

In Berlin the Kreuzberg, known as “little Istanbul” is a good example of Turkish migrant locations. In Vienna (Austria) the Brunnenmarkt area is another example of the living conditions of the Turkish migrants. Compared to Kreuzberg, Brunnenmarkt represents only a small migrant “town” of Turkish migrants (Fassmann 2002). In Paris and London you can also see lots of
migrant “towns” of this kind. There are Arabs, Africans, Indians and Pakistanis etc. who are living in ghettoized locations of the European cities. In multicultural cities like Paris and London, the migrant spaces are much more distinct than in Germany or Austria, where you can see the ethnical and class splits in the city housing. In the suburbs of Paris you can see mainly migrants and working class or unemployed people. This factor determines a definitive distinction from the city centres. The rich, clean and well-structured city centres do not evoke a sense of poorness and “othering” of the migrants that exists in the suburbs.

In Germany and in Austria we cannot observe a ghettoization to the extent of other European cities or like that in the US. During the time of when there was the East and West Berlin, Kreuzberg was an unpopular place in West Berlin, being at the periphery of the city and outside the centre. Kreuzberg was close to the Berlin Wall and therefore an unsafe and “ugly” place. The German state settled the Turkish “foreign workers” in Kreuzberg, as it was not attractive to the majority society. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall the facts changed because Kreuzberg was suddenly in the centre of the city, and was now unavoidable for the public. The Turks became visible and the Turkish infrastructure there, which had been built in the previous 15 years, was all of a sudden in the middle of the city centre. Today lots of artists and Bohemians from all over Germany and Europe are moving to Kreuzberg because Kreuzberg and its surroundings have become the heart of Berlin, and are places where you can live cheaply and which are “a little bit exotic”.

Violence against women

Another integration problem is located in the violence against women practiced by certain Turkish and Kurdish migrant group from Turkey. There are also cases of forcing women to marry Turkish or Kurdish men in Turkey. Young girls will be brought to

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the home country during the holidays, and they will be forced to marry. The motivation behind this is to get the women under control at an early age and to prevent a potential rebellion or inappropriate relationships with men. The protection of the continuity of the patriarchal tradition, which is associated with ethnic and religious identity, is an important factor in these practices. According to women organizations in Austria that are working with these topics the largest number of forced marriages take place among Turkish and Kurdish migrants. According to the Austrian daily newspapers “derStandard” and “diePresse” one fifth of girls with Turkish (and even Kurdish) origin are exposed to forced marriage by their families. There are no reliable statistics about the forced marriage but the “forced marriage organisation / Zwangsheirat” and an other women organisation Orientexpress Wien which are intervening in these topics, argue that after the Turkish community there are also some other communities where you find the same perception. They report about women from other ethnicities that are coming to look for help whose origin are Middle Eastern, from Pakistan, India, from Bosnia, China, Sri Lanka and even from Roma.

These occurrences are only the reality of a marginal group of Turkish and Kurdish migrants from Turkey but the effects of these incidents are greater than some may think. In the public opinion these images play an important role and have an influence on the perception of Turkish culture. The Turkish migrants and Turkish culture are trivialized and differences and positive examples become less prominent.

The Muslim religion is given as one of the main reasons for violence being practiced against women in Turkish culture. Along these lines of argument the prevailing opinions of Muslim culture since September 11 and the rise of the Muslim phobia in Europe have played a big role. Similar acts against women can be observed in different Muslim migrant groups. The reasons for this behaviour
are connected to the role of women in Islam. On the other side, the Turkish culture and the Turkish migrants are also seen as an “archaic” and underdeveloped people. The description “archaic” refers at the same time to the non-modernized culture of the Turks and to the Turkish migrants who do not want to integrate themselves.

*The “lost” generation*

The so-called second and third generation migrants are children of the first generation migrants who were born in Germany or in Austria or who came to Europe with their parents as children. The main difference in the description of second or third generation migrants is the fact that this group’s roots exist more or less on European territory. They are from Europe and in many cases have European citizenship. Their identity is traced back to the migrant culture in Europe and to their own meeting with European culture. They go to school in the host country, they probably learn the language of this country and they encounter the “foreign” European.

The children of this generation live in the “closed” society and they grow up in a split society atmosphere between the majority culture and the Turkish migrant culture. The first painful meeting with the majority society happens with the start of educational life. The first problem results from language difficulties. They do not learn German in the family and in some cases they do not get sent to kindergarten, where they could start to learn German. These children start to learn German very late and have many difficulties because of language deficiencies.

The large majority of these children are not successful at school. Because of the language problems they are unsuccessful in their schoolwork, which is why they are sent to “special schools” (*Sonderschule*) where they will be educated together with mentally disabled children. In this way, they lose the chance to follow the usual educational path, which would offer the possibility of a
Matura (high school leaving exam) and a university education. Some of these children, who manage to stay in the normal schools, do not finish high school and do not attempt to go to university. The conclusion is that only a few of the second or third generation migrants are able to receive some higher education.

The spiral of low education and poverty continues with the second generation migrants. The main integration problem is the identity problem of the children of this second migrant generation. Their identity problems occur because of the parallel society in which they are living. The reality at home looks different from the reality outside. The cultural diversities let these children grow up with a split identity. It is difficult to develop a synthesis of both cultures. In many cases what follow are the closed society structure and the ghettoized identity of the second and third generation migrants. Even at school and in their free time they remain among themselves and do not come in touch with the majority society.

The tendency for the second and third generation to develop a self-contained “new!“ culture has several reasons. Behind the factors that I listed above, there is an important reason for being discriminated from the majority society: the children’s experience of being the children of disliked “foreign workers“. They are treated by the “others“ as people from a backward and undeveloped culture. Even language difficulties are a large factor that creates disrespect to be shown by the native environment. They are strangers and they are made to feel strangers. Even if the children of the second or third generation are seen as natives, they are not seen as a part of common society. These factors make them feel like strangers and they develop a separate culture and carry on the cultural differentiation of the parents’ generation.

The reciprocal exclusion causes different kinds of tendencies such as strengthening nationalism in the migrant community. In this sense, it is either the Turkish nationalism of this group or it can be the emphasis of Muslim identity. The nationalist and religious
differences can appear stronger than in the parents’ generation. The knowledge about Turkey is reduced to the relation with the parents, to some visits to Turkey and to the medial images. But this is not a barrier preventing them from being for example Turkish nationalists. The self-identification not only with the Turkish ethnicity but also with the Turkish nation creates a Turkish nationalism in migration. This generation is more German and Austrian than Turkish, but the developed culture and self-identification link them very strongly to Turkey as the home country. The feeling of being homeless (heimatlos) depends on the feeling that they belong to the emigrate country, but in this case the second or third generations have the feeling of being heimatlos.

The difference between the first generation and the second or third generations is that their home is Germany or Austria, where they were born or where they grew up. We see that this fact does not play any role in the conception of their identity. The strangeness carries on in other forms. The greatest problem and the real homelessness are created when encountering the Turkish culture in Turkey. The name almanci!, which refers to people who are from Germany but are neither German nor Turks anymore, rather something between, describes the migrant generations in Europe. The strangeness also happens in encounters with Turks in Turkey. The changing dynamics and the speed of the social changes in Turkey are strange phenomena for the second and third migrant generations. Their ideas about Turkish culture and Turkey, which they learn from their parents, will in many cases turn out to be an unrealized reality in encounters with Turkey. In the changed new Turkish cultural world they are also the “foreign worker!” in Turkish public opinion. They realize that even in Turkey they are strangers and have everywhere the feeling of being the “other”.

Virtual identity and rebellion

The one real space where this generation belongs is their “own” culture, which is built in the migration story and history of their
parents and their socializing in the parallel society. If there is a feeling of home, then their own ghetto culture can be described as “their home” for this generation. The Turkish nationalism, the emphasis of the Muslim identity, or the idealization of the assumed Turkish culture and of Turkey happen in spite of the disappointment which they experience in Turkey and are related to the desire to keep alive ties to the Turkish nation and reality that exists in Turkey.

In my opinion the main reason for the conservative tendency of the new migrant generation is the wish to find a new reality in which they will be respected and which can be the means for self-protection while a common identity is built for the group dynamics. The Turkish community builds all kinds and forms of associations, like clubs that are concerned with topics of the state, city and local community relations in Turkey or political associations that take in different kinds of political opinions as well as mosque communities. These groups are there to keep their original identity and are important procurers of the intercession of cultural belonging.

There are some famous examples for migrant ghettoized cultural groupings. The male ghettoized culture is an important part at the symbolic level in the self-othering. In the music scene the music group “Kartel” is a good example of this appellation of the self-othering. The nationalism, self-defence in Turkish ethnicity, self-acceptance and self-confidence are the motives of these songs in which you can see male-dominated symbols in practice. The emphasis on masculinity, on nationalism and on ethnicity is part of this culture which is presented in the music of “Kartel” (Martin 2000). At this point I would like to point out another dynamic process in the building of identities among new generation migrants. The media play a large role in the formation of cultural ties with Turkish migrants. The visual media and the internet make the development of a virtual identity possible. The effect of pictures arranged by the media is very important for establishing associa-
tions and ties. The popular culture, which is procured by the media, is the cause of a dynamic change of understanding cultural modifications and identities. Turkish migrants in Germany watch much more Turkish television than German television. In Germany, this is seen as one of the factors that makes the integration of the Turkish migrants more difficult. It is argued that the cultural consumption of the Turkish migrant community in Germany deepens the cultural differences between the parallel societies (Güntürk 2000).

Television series, films and the pop music culture make a new kind of identification with the modern Turkish culture possible and let new ties be formed. Pop music and popular culture make the Turkish migrants feel free and modern. Many pop music writers and singers from Turkey also give concerts in European countries for the “Euro-Turks”. There are also some pop musicians who have their roots in Germany and elsewhere and communicate between the two countries on the music scene. I think the new images and concepts that are developing in this virtual cultural context have a “rebellion” effect. This is, for example, the case with the new discovery of popular culture in Turkey, which has more modern elements than the traditional conservative culture of the parents’ generation. The images, but also the words that are transported through pop music, films and television series, give this generation the permission to be different from the traditional culture. The virtual identity leaves behind borders and enables new ties to be developed between ethnicity, migrant culture and the country of origin. With the expansion of popular culture in Turkey, the influence and effect of this culture on the Turkish migrant culture has grown greater. The “new” migrant generation is growing up with these images, which are presented to them by popular culture, and they use these images in their rebellion against the majority culture and against their origin, in terms of their parents’ culture.
Now, I want to point out a different strand in the migrant culture than that which has been described until now. There is also a different migrant group in this generation that has another link with the majority culture. This group has a strong identification with and has more contact with the majority culture. They describe themselves as Germans or Austrians and are not in touch with the migrant “ghettoized” culture. They are people who have managed to go further in the education system and have well-respected jobs. They are getting used to the Western style of life through their jobs and their standards of living. Usually the parents and family background of these “integrated” next generation people come from urbanized areas and they themselves do not move in the closed Turkish migrant community. Their children grow up as part of European society and belong to European society. It frequently happens that these children do not speak Turkish or do not identify themselves with the Turkish culture and with the migrant culture. For this group, to be a European Turk can mean two different ways of positioning themselves with respect to the migrant culture, to their ethnical origin and to the majority culture. On the one hand, one can observe a rejection of Turkish or Muslim culture and an othering of the migrant culture or one can see a process of orientalizing Turkish culture and a fondness of and interest in Turkish culture as a foreign culture.

The description of “white Turks” is also something that concerns this group of migrants. They do not identify with the “foreign worker” migrant in Europe and have a good social status in comparison to the other migrants. But the members of the group fitting the description “white Turks” are the children of middle and upper class Turks who came to Europe for educational purposes or for performing qualified jobs in Europe and do not live in a traditional or closed culture. They are urbanized Turks with a westernized life style and have a different relationship with the foreign culture. To
be foreign is a different mental concept for them than it is for the “foreign worker” migrant. The foreignness of this group can be traced back to religious or cultural differences. Their self-perception is also as European, but in order to describe the difference in mentality they indicate a mental affiliation with the Mediterranean cultural field.

New migrant girls with headscarf

I would like to add a concluding comment about the typology I have tried to give for the Turks in European countries. It concerns the women who come for educational purposes, to study in Germany or in Austria. Because of the migrant tradition from Turkey and because of the university system, these two countries are destination countries for Turkish students who do not manage to receive a good place at universities in Turkey. From this group I would like to select the female students from Turkey who immigrate to Europe because of the headscarf problem in Turkey. They do not want to abandon their headscarves so come to Europe to get the chance to study.

In contrast to the women who carry their headscarves because of traditional reasons, these women do not represent women who live in traditional gender roles. Usually they come to Europe alone, live without their families and want to study in order to follow a profession. Their ambition for emigration is to practice their religion without renouncing education and a professional life. This is a modern kind of understanding and self-perception.

From a European perspective, these women are no different from the “Turkish foreign worker” women who are traditional and are perceived as the “second” sex. A differentiated perception of migrants does not exist. The lumping together of “foreigners” is an ideological dimension of “othering”. In the comparison of the Iranian and Turkish migrants, othering happens along the same lines. Eurocentrism and the mechanical perception of moderniza-
tion allows for a superficial categorization of migrants to develop. Even ideological motives play a role in focusing on migrant groups and in pushing the differences among the foreigners into the back-ground. The exploitation of clichés helps the policy makers legit-imize decisions about legal changes, for example in immigration law.

The Iranians, who are shown as positive examples, are mostly Iranians from the upper classes who have had a good education and are not “foreign workers” in Europe. They have usually left Iran and gone into exile after the Islamic revolution. The Iranians who came before the Islamic revolution are people from the upper class who came to Europe for education; some of them were politi-cians. The Iranian Diaspora in many aspects has a totally different orientation and social context than the Turkish “foreign worker” generation. They were educated people who were usually very westernized and had a modern mentality. The comparison between this migrant Iranian group and between the “foreign workers” is another kind of broad generalization. The integration problem that exists is the cultural, educational and mentality problem which can be seen only in the context of a part of the Turkish migrant group.

Generalizations about the Turks and Turkish migrants are made in order to achieve the othering of specific migrant ethnicities in the social and political context. Germany and Austria have the “biggest problems” with “their Turks” and these problems are labelled “Kreuzberg” in Germany and “Brunnenmarkt” in Austria, referring to the Turkish non-integrated migrant communities which are well-known as being associated with these places. Other European countries have problems with other migrant groups such as Arabs, Africans etc. In Europe there are of course many Iranians who are also “foreign workers”, badly educated or not educated, who are traditional and have different society models, but this group is not representative in the migrant milieu for the Germans or Austrians because they are not in the majority. The Turkish com-
community has been seen as the problem group since the 90’s because Germany and Austria have no need for these people any more.

**Integration or Discrimination?**

The integration, asylum and foreign policy of the European countries are on the whole getting stricter. The main future policy project of the European countries and European Union is to have regulated migration. Regulated migration also means stopping or reducing illegal migration and choosing migrants according to their educational and family situation or their ages and in line with the existing demands.

It is a fact that Europe will experience migration in the future and should therefore have a united migration policy. The structural reasons for international demographic moves and migrant fluctuation can be traced back to the push factors like economic reasons, to natural catastrophes or to wars. Even the family reunification plays an important role as a pull factor for the migration reasons (Straubhaar 1995) There is another structural reason that does not emanate from outside alone, but also comes from the inside. Europe also needs migrants. In countries like Austria, Germany, France or Scandinavia the birth rate is continuously dropping (Lanzieri 2007). The consequence of this is that the number of young people is decreasing and the number of old people is increasing. In the future it will be necessary for the European population to regulate the amount of young people through migration. Another important aspect of demographic regulation in Europe concerns the maintenance of the social system. In order to maintain the social system in Europe it is necessary to have young people who work and pay for the pensions of the older population (Schmid 1994).

The migration and integration policies are an imperatively political concept of European politics. The migrants and the integration question are a very important part of local and national pol-
icymaking for European parties. For the European right-wing, conservative and liberal conservative parties the national migration and integration policies link the social problems with the non-integrated migrants and unemployment with an incorrect migrant policy by the state. The right-wing parties, especially the radical and populist right-wing conservative parties, blame the migrants and make them responsible for several kinds of social and economic problems. Another tendency of the right-wing populist parties in Europe is their political positioning against the European Union.

In these two populist articulations in the discussion about migration and migrants the rejection of the European Union finds a large acceptance among the population. Even the social democrats in Europe are taking a right-wing and nationalist stance. Xenophobia is increasing among the European population. Conservative policies are readily accepted by the public. The migrants are made scapegoats for violence, unemployment, housing problems in the cities and social problems such as criminality etc. In fact, the real reasons for the migrants’ readiness to violence, like in the example of Paris, are difficult to determine. Among the young migrants who took part were Africans, Arabs, Turks or former Yugoslavians. One cannot say that the Muslims, the Blacks or any specific ethnic group was the cause of the violence. The reason for the violence can, in this case, not be reduced to ethnicity or to a migrant group from a specific ethnicity.

Migrants are normally much more affected by poverty, unemployment and violent attacks from the outside; these can be in the form of racist attacks or in the form of indirect state violence through discriminating laws. Even the police are in the habit of behaving differently towards migrants than to their “real” fellow countrymen. The discrimination also goes on at the administrative level (Balibar 2003). In Paris people who have a residence address in the suburbs of Paris cannot find any proper jobs. This is a simple example of discrimination against migrants. There is an open rela-
tionship between ethnicity, skin colour, migrant identity and socio-economic status. It is thus not surprising that the “readiness” to be violent or criminal is higher among migrants. Focusing one’s attention on these migrants in the questions is a selective reception by European society, because criminality and violence are just as likely to be found among members of the majority society.

The migrants are the “McJob” workers who are in many cases not even members of the labour union or, in the case of illegal migrants or non-naturalized migrants, are forced to work for a salary below the minimum wage and without social insurance. They are easy to control for the employer when their language competence is bad. They do not know very much about their rights and have difficulties in protecting themselves because of the precarious employment situation. They can easily be fired and replaced, which has the effect that they do not have any long-term job prospects or developing a feeling of identifying themselves with a profession.

In Austria the rate of unemployed foreign workers is three times higher than the rate of unemployed Austrians (13.4% to 4.6%). This makes the relationship between race, ethnicity, migrant identity and poverty clear. The same proportion can certainly be found in other European countries. The answer to the question why the migrants are troublemakers and badly educated and not integrated in society can partly be found in these numbers. I would not say, as far as integration problems, where the development of parallel societies is concerned, that a class-based society and the discrimination of migrants are the only factors, but they are a reality that cannot be ignored.

To conclude, I would like to demonstrate the conservative populist policy of a European party by using the Austrian right-wing populist party “FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs / Freedom Party of Austria)” as an example. This can help to illustrate the racism and right-wing populist policy in European right-wing conservative parties.
The Right-Wing Populism: The Case of the Austrian right Populist Party - “FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs” (the Freedom Party of Austria)

Focusing on the election propaganda and on the policy arguments and program of this right-wing populist Austrian party would be enough to understand the attitude of this party towards migrants, especially towards Turkish migrants. The racist tone in the policy making of this party is a very good example for understanding the political positioning of a right-wing populist party.

In this article I mentioned the different images of Turks in Austria and Germany. It is exactly these clichés and stereotypes concerning Turkish migrants that are used to exploit the prejudices of the population. This party identifies itself with the rejection of new migration, the rejection of the EU, with nationalism, racist and ethnical preferences and advocating a very restrictive and strict foreign law and integration program. Such attributes of this party are similar to those of other European right-wing populist parties. In the Austrian case, this party focuses on Turkish migrants, Islam as the construction of the enemy picture and Turkey joining the European Union. Its main election propaganda was also focused on the integration problems of Turkish migrants. It will be shown here by means of some election slogans and election propaganda of the “FPÖ” how it uses xenophobia und how its policy is constructed.

In the election on 1 October 2006 FPÖ offered three central propaganda motives in its policy program:

1. Turks in Austria are not integrated.

2. The Turks are “archaic” people and represent backwardness. The Muslim faith plays a great role in this.

3. Turkey cannot be a member of the EU because in that case a wave of unacceptable immigration would sweep over Austria and Europe.
The FPÖ presented these topics on a very trivial level in their election campaign posters and slogans. In the poster the first point was presented with the phrase: “German instead of not understanding anything!” The poor language skills of the migrants are being indicated here. Another poster was produced to illustrate the second point: a picture of a woman with a headscarf. The main effect of this poster was the comment under this picture. It said: “Freedom instead of pressure to wear a headscarf!” In this poster the right-wing conservative party wants to play the role of the enlightener and be the progressive and democratic face of Europe. In this picture we see that the Muslim migrant woman, particularly the association of the Turkish woman, is the image of a repressed woman and is shown as a non-autonomous person and as a person who cannot make her own decisions. She has to be rescued by the European democratic man! “The oriental oppressor is criticized by the European democratic man.” In truth, the FPÖ represents a very conservative policy, which cannot be described as having a women-friendly policy. The FPÖ is one of the last parties in Austria that could be thought of as being “pro women”. In this case the stereotypes about Muslims and Turks are activated and the statement that it should be the role of the European man to “civilize” them finds acceptance in Austrian public opinion. The orientalization of the migrants and their original culture also attributes it with a culture of backwardness is another factor that is brought out in public opinion.

The third point that was demonstrated in the posters was represented by two pictures. In one picture there was a photo of Michael Häupl, a candidate for the social democratic party of Austria (SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs / The social democratic party of Austria), the mayor of Vienna. In this picture Häupl is seen standing in front of a mosque in Istanbul. In the other picture there was a photo of the FPÖ candidate and party leader Heinz Christian Strache, who was shown in front of a picture of the Stephansdom, which is a very important church in the centre of
Vienna. Strache represents in this comparison the good one who represents the Christian culture and the SPÖ candidate who should support immigration and via this should support the expansion of the muslim migrants and Islam in Austria. In another election poster from FPÖ you see Strache and with a big writ the campaign slogan “Vienna must not be Istanbul!” This poster let think that it was also a reaction of FPÖ against the art performance of “Kanak Attack” by the artist Feridun Zaimoglu. During 07. März - 28. März 2005 was the museum building in the centre of Vienna in the museum quarter covered with Turkish flags. The title of this performance was “the third siege of Vienna!”

The creative party FPÖ created election propaganda from this art performance and presented the posters described above. The main message of these poster’s was to stop migration and to declare the policy position of the FPÖ against Turkey joining the European Union and against the “Islam danger”. The fears of the Austrian population of an immigration wave of Turks if Turkey joins the European Union is exploited in these policy arguments by the FPÖ. Another action of the FPÖ was the initiation in March 2006 of a petition for a referendum on EU-membership for Turkey. With their posters “No to the EU-membership of Turkey!” its xenophobia and nationalist position was shown in public. Even in some other election posters the points migration and especially the muslim migrants inclusive Islam were visible and the election had been conducted by the propaganda mainly against these topics. In the elections the FPÖ did not get as many votes as it would have liked, but it cannot be described as a marginal party, garnering in 11.21% of the votes.

What Feridun Zaimoğlu initiated in his performance was not an inappropriate metaphor for the Austrian fears of the Turks. First, this former monarchy is afraid of the large country of Turkey and its demographic dynamics, secondly the two sieges of Vienna have not been forgotten by the Austrians. You can still hear older
Austrians talk about migration, saying, “This time the Turks are besieging Austria from the inside!” The point here is not what a genuine belief is and what is an unreal fear, but it is a reality that the Turks are not a popular migrant group in Austria and Germany. The unpopular migrants of Europe will remain a part of this society and will participate in many social contexts in Europe, changing European society despite any rejections.
NOTES

1 The definition of “group” and “typology” is intended to simplify the description of the differences in the diversity daily style of Turkish migrants.


3 http://www.zwangsheirat.ch

4 http://www.orientexpress-wien.com

5 http://www.zwangsheirat.ch/was_tun_andere/internation.php

6 In any kind of public discourse it is not difficult to find these kind of metaphors about the Turkish migrants and the Turkish culture in Europe.


10 The election posters with the slogans can be found at the homepage of Heinz Christian Strache: http://www.hcstrache.at/index.php?style=7.

Turkish Muslims in Greece: Identity Construction among Muslim Turks of Western Thrace

Ali Chouseinoglou

Introduction

Western Thrace is a region of Greece bordering with Bulgaria and Turkey. It is 8,200 km² and it has been inhabited since 2000 B.C. Western Thrace, which has been a Greek territory since 1923, is composed of the Rhodopi, Xanthi and Evros prefectures. The region takes its name from ancient Thracians, the earliest community living on this region. The roots of the Muslim Turks go back to the fourteenth century. When this region came under the control of the Ottoman Empire in 1364, Muslim Turkish communities from Anatolia started to be settled in this region. By the Ottoman conquerors towards the Balkans, the number of these people gradually increased throughout the Balkan Peninsula. Indeed, there had also been some Turkish communities, who migrated from Central Asia, living in this region before the 14th century.

The Muslim Turks of Western Thrace, whose number is around 130,000 today, is the only minority within the Greek
national borders that is officially recognized by the Greek state and its rights are protected with bilateral and international agreements that Greece signed and ratified. There are a number of problems that the members of the Minority continue to face in their everyday life but this article focuses, only, on the denial of the ethnic ‘Turkish’ identity of the Minority by the Greek state. It is one of the most fundamental problems of the Minority that started in 1960s and hasn’t been solved yet.

This article is composed of three main sections. Firstly, I will stress the concept of minority, its meaning and its implications. Secondly, I will dwell on the denial of ‘Turkish’ identity by the Greek state, its possible reasons as well as its relation with the international treaties that Greece signed and ratified. Thirdly, I will focus on the link between the denial of ethnic identity and the violations against the freedom of ‘Turkish’ associations in Western Thrace. And finally, I will present my concluding remarks and prospects for the future.

**Definition of the ‘Minority’ Concept**

The lack of a common definition for the term ‘minority’ has been a problematic issue in both national and international level for a long time. Although there are definitions for this term there is not a universally-agreed definition of ‘minority’ within the domain of social sciences and international law. However, the definition of F. Capotorti, the ex-special rapporteur of the UN-Sub Commission, is, still, widely accepted (Capotorti 1999: 43):

“A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members -being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.”
What can be derived from this definition is as follows: Minority is a group of people who are citizenship of a state. In relation to the majority population of the country, they are numerically fewer in number. Also, they share a number of common characteristics like religion, ethnicity, culture and language by which they are differentiated from the majority of the state. Thus, there are different kinds of minorities, like national, ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, etc. Moreover, they, usually, struggle to preserve these characteristics by displaying a sense of solidarity among themselves. Furthermore, they, mostly, have a non-dominant position within the country.

In an international system based on the logic of national states, minorities are viewed with suspicion. Nation states tend to treat minorities, particularly the national and ethnic ones, as a group of people who are likely to claim for secessionist movements whenever they get the chance to do so. Indeed, there are some examples in the contemporary world history that increases the suspicion of states towards minorities living within their own territories. For example, states had drawn some lessons from the Nazi Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, in 1930s. The Nazi regime invaded this country on the basis of the plight of the Sudeten Germans living in Czechoslovakia. Such a reason for invasion of another country implied to the international community that minorities, especially the national and ethnic ones, could be used as a tool for the policies of their motherland countries. Since the Westphalian order of 1648, nation states have generally accepted minorities with more skepticism and as potential threats to the state unity and sovereignty. Thus, states, usually, tend to have an effective control on the minorities living within their boundaries and refrain from giving autonomy to the minority groups.

By the end of the Cold War regime, process of globalization intensified in national, regional and international level. The borders between the national and international domains became blurred.
and different governmental, regional and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) started to intervene in the domestic affairs of nation states. Since then, the sovereignty of nation states has greatly been reduced and the nature of it has been reformulated. Besides, minorities, also, started to complain with a stronger voice about the injustice and discrimination against themselves and they precipitated their struggle to regain rights which had been denied to them for years by their own countries. But, despite the cliché arguments on today’s world being a ‘global village’, globalization processes, actually, have been contributing to increasing ethnic and cultural diversity in modern societies. (Zagar 2001: 326)

After explaining the concept of minority, in the coming section, I will focus on one of the most fundamental problems of the Muslim Turkish minority of Western Thrace, which is the denial of ethnic ‘Turkish’ identity in Western Thrace. And, I will question to what extent the denial of ethnic identity is interrelated with the violation of the right of freedom of association in Western Thrace.

The Denial of Ethnic Identity in Western Thrace-Greece

Before analyzing the denial of ethnic identity in Western Thrace I want to underline that the beginning of the post-Cold War era marks a watershed in the modern history of the Western Thrace Minority. During his visit to the region on 13-14 May 1991, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Mitsotakis stressed that the Greek state had followed a discriminatory policy towards the Minority of Western Thrace in the past and announced the official change in the traditional Greek minority policy of Western Thrace based on the principles of *Isonomia* (equality before the law) and *Isopolitia* (equality in civic rights). These two policies, actually, aim to protect the rights of the Muslim Turkish minority and to increase their living standards in political, economic and social terms. However, in practice, one can observe that such changes cannot be seen in every sphere of the Minority life. It is mainly the economic and social
domains where changes have still been observed. But, regarding the educational and political issues, like the denial of ethic identity, almost nothing has changed since 1990.

**Ethnic Identification in the pre-1990 period**

The 1923 Lausanne Treaty refers to a ‘Muslim’ minority in Western Thrace. However, from 1923 until 1960s, the official usage of the term “Turkish” while attributing for the Minority was not a problematic issue in Greece. Such a reference could be seen in the official *état* (settled) documents that started to be given to the Greeks of Istanbul and Turks of Western Thrace after 1923 to prove that they were exempted from the 1923 Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey. In the official *état* that were in French, people were identified not as ‘Muslims’ or ‘non-Muslims’ but as ‘Turks’ and ‘Greeks’ (Oran 1986: 85).

Moreover, one of the most prominent examples for such an application was the order sent by the Chief Administrator of Thrace to majors and other government bodies in the region on December 1954 to change of all signs using the term “Muslim-of Muslim” to “Turk-Turkish” (Whitman 1990: 51)

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KINGDOM OF GREECE
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THRACE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTRY
Komotini, 28/1/1954
URGENT

TO: The Mayors and Presidents of the Communes of the Prefecture of Rodope

Following the order of the President of the Government we ask you that from now on and all occasions the terms “Turk-Turkish” are used instead of the terms “Muslim-of Muslim”

The General Administrator of Thrace
G. Fessopoulos
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This order, widely known as “Fessopoulos Order”, marks a very significant point in the Greek approach towards the ethnic identification of the Minority. Until the advent of the 1967 Junta regime, all the institutions belonging to the Minority, like schools or associations, had the term ‘Turkish’ in their titles.

Some scholars note two reasons for such a compulsory usage of ethnic identification; as an ‘indication of Turco-Greek friendship’ in 1950s and the ‘Communist threat coming from the North’ (Soltaridis 1990: 21). Whatever the actual reason is history shows that the years 1950-1955, widely interpreted also as the ‘golden years’ of Greek-Turkish relations, marks one of the unique periods in the contemporary Greek history during which the Muslim Turkish minority highly enjoyed the positive atmosphere of the Turco-Greek relations in both social and political terms. The ethnic ‘Turkish’ identity in Western Thrace was promoted and secured by the Greek state.

However, starting from the 6/7 September 1955 events against the Orthodox Greek minority in Istanbul (Bağcı 2001 & Güven 2005), the Greek state started to question the ethnic identity of the Minority and by the advent of the military regime in 1967 she started to apply discriminatory policies against the Minority in Western Thrace. One of the main reasons to do so was the principle of reciprocity lying at the core of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty; whenever there was discrimination or violation of minority rights against the Orthodox Greek minority in Istanbul, the Greek state applied similar discriminatory policies against the Muslim Turkish minority in Western Thrace, and vice versa (Akgönül 2008).

The official rejection of the term ‘Turkish Minority of Western Thrace’ goes back to the 1967-1974 Colonel’s regime. Before 1967, the Greek state never disputed the ‘Turkish’ identity of the Minority in Western Thrace². The Junta regime of 1967 refused to recognize the Minority as ‘Turkish’. After prohibiting the word ‘Turk/Turkish’, the Colonel’s regime started officially to use the
term ‘Muslim’ when referring to the Western Thrace Minority. The signs in the minority primary schools were changed from “Turkish” to “Muslim”. And, with Turkey’s intervention of Cyprus, in 1974, the situation deteriorated in Western Thrace (Hatipoğlu 1999).

Although the military regime ended in 1974 the denial of ethnic identity in Western Thrace continued with one noteworthy exception; the archives of the Konstantinos Karamanlis, the first Greek Prime Minister after the Colonels Regime of 1967-1974, shows that he referred to a ‘Turkish’ Minority of Western Thrace in his speech during his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit in Switzerland in 1978. This shows us the usage of the term ‘Turkish minority’ of Western Thrace even at the highest political level of the contemporary Greek politics during the Cold War era. But, putting aside this exception, from the return of democracy to Greece in 1974 and onwards the Greek state have continuously denied the existence of a ‘Turkish’ minority of Western Thrace in official terms.

The decade of 1980s marks the struggle of the Muslim Turks against denial of their ethnic identity. The following paragraphs are going to highlight both the Greek and European phase of the denial of ethnic Turkish identity in the southeast margins of the European Union.

*The Dissolution of ‘Turkish’ Associations*

The banning of civic organizations bearing the adjective ‘Turkish’ in their titles has been one of the main issues related with the denial of ethnic identity in Western Thrace. The “Xanthi Turkish Union”, the first association of the Western Thrace Minority, was established in 1927 under the name of the “Home of Xanthi Turkish Youth”. Then, in 1936, it was renamed as “Xanthi Turkish Union”. The “Komotini Turkish Youth Union” was founded in 1928 and the “Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace” in 1936. These
three associations functioned without having any problem with the Greek state until the beginning of 1980s. However, after starting of their trials in 1983 at the local courts in Western Thrace, the Greek Supreme Court, in November 1987, gave its final decision as a result of which the Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace and the Komotini Turkish Youth Union were officially dissolved while the trial Xanthi Turkish Union continued and lasted in 2005. As for its judgment in 1987, the Greek Supreme Court stated that the word ‘Turkish’ referred to citizens of Turkey and could not be used to describe citizens of Greece. Also, the use of the word ‘Turkish’ jeopardized the public order.

In order to protest the decision of the Supreme Court and the continuous denial of their ethnic ‘Turkish’ identity by the Greek state administrations, the Muslim Turks gathered in the streets of Komotini on 29 January 1988. The reason for the choice of this date was mainly to attract the attention of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, who would meet in Davos on 29 January 1988, for the first time after 40 years. (Kelahmet 2001)

For the first time in the history of the Minority since 1923, around 10,000 members of the Turkish Muslim minority rallied altogether against the decision of the Greek Supreme Court that had declared the non-existence of a ‘Turkish’ minority in Western Thrace. The main reason of this protest, the denial of ethnic identity of the Minority by the Greek administrations, was also highlighted by the local Minority newspapers of those days. Actually, the continuous sufferings of the Turks from the discriminative policies of the Greek state since mid-1950s ha significantly contributed to this protest. That’s why this protest can also be interpreted as a means for the overall Minority who wanted their voices as well as their social, political and economic sufferings to be heard by the larger regional and international community. By this protest, they had the chance to stipulate that they were ‘Turks’ in ethnic terms, ‘Muslims’ in terms of religion and citizens of Greece that had
become a member of the European Community in 1981. It is for this reason that this protest, as had been expected, became one of the most significant events in enabling the regional and international community to become aware of the human and minority rights violations in Western Thrace-Greece.

**The Trials of Sadik Ahmet and Ibrahim Serif**

Parallel to the 29 January 1988 events in Komotini, another significant example for the denial of ethnic identity were the cases of Dr. Sadik Ahmet and Ibrahim Serif, in January 1990. Before the elections, in October 1989, S. Ahmet and I. Serif, as independent candidates for the Parliament, distributed campaign leaflets in which the minority voters were referred as ‘Turks’. After the elections both Ahmet and Serif received subpoenas for a trial to be held on 25 January 1990. They were accused of violating Article 192 of the Penal Code and disrupting the public order. On the day of their trial, more than 5,000 Turks gathered in front of the Court in Komotini in order to support them and to show that the two MPs were not alone in their struggle for the denial of the ‘Turkish’ ethnic identity of the Western Thrace Minority.

Leaving the courtroom, Sadik Ahmet shouted: “I am being taken into prison just because I am a Turk. If being a Turk is a crime, I repeat here that I am a Turk and I will remain so. My message to the Minority in Western Thrace is that they should not forget they are Turks”. As a result of the trial, both Ahmet and Serif were sentenced with eighteen months of imprisonments. They spent sixty-four days in prison and they were released after paying fines (about $2800 for Ahmet, about $1875 for Serif) in place of the remainder of their prison terms.

Putting these two top figures of the Minority on trial simply for having referred to the Minority as ‘Turks’ was another significant event revealing out the intolerance of the Greek state institutions against the ethnic ‘Turkish’ existence in the region in 1980s.
Moreover, such decisions of the Greek administrations had not only precipitated the widening of gap between the Muslim Turkish minority and the Greek majority in Western Thrace but, ironically, had also facilitated the strengthening of the ethnic ‘Turkish’ and ‘Greek’ feelings of both minority and majority communities in the region.

**Events of 29 January 1990: Violence in Komotini**

Two days after the trial of Ahmet and Serif, a religious ceremony (mevlit) was organized in the Old Mosque (Eski Camii) in Komotini for the anniversary of 29 January 1988 protest. However, on the day of the ceremony, violence erupted in Komotini. A number of Greek groups protesting this ceremony ran through the streets, beating Muslim Turks and smashing windows of the shops and offices of the Muslim Turks. Most of the shops belonging to the Minority were damaged and more than thirty people were injured. However, at this point, it should be noted, in contrast to the violence directed against Minority shops, those owned by majority Greeks remained untouched without damage reminding that “the Greek shops were labeled as the Nazis labeled the shops belonging to the Jews. The difference was that in Western Thrace that the labeled shops represented the ones that should not be damaged. After these events in Komotini, which is also interpreted by Oran as a ‘mini Greek 6-7 September 1955’ (Oran 1999: 27), the Greek governmental officials declared that the Greek state would compensate the shopkeepers for their loss. Only five people from the Minority have applied for the compensation, and as of 2008, none of them have yet been given compensation by the Greek state.

Related to the denial of ethnic identity in Western Thrace in the Interwar and Cold War periods, history indicates that while on the one hand the Greek state officially determined the Western Thrace Minority as ‘Turkish’ until 1960s on the other hand it prohibited the word ‘Turkish’ by 1967 and rather it started, officially, to use the
term ‘Muslim’ when referring to the Western Thrace Minority. However, the aforementioned events clearly indicate that different policies of the Greek state regarding the denial of ethnic identity of such a long-standing and deep-rooted minority is not such an easy process to be effectively put into practice.

From a broader framework, it can be argued that any kind of rejection of ethnicity of minority cultures is likely to result in a reaction from within the minority against the ‘outsider’ like the events in Western Thrace in 1980s. Such a strong reaction from within the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace was likely to be one of the main reasons that enabled a change in the Greek minority policy of Western Thrace by which the word ‘Turk’ started to be accepted but with some major exceptions that I will explain now.

The ethnic identification since 1990s

As I mentioned above, from the beginning of the 1960s until the beginning of 1990s the Greek administrations continuously repeated the existence of a “Muslim” minority in Western Thrace. But, starting from the beginning of 1990s until today, Greece officially stipulates that the minority of Western Thrace is not a ‘Turkish minority’. Rather, she officially defines the minority of Western Thrace not just as a ‘Muslim’ minority, as it used to in the pre-1990 period, but as a ‘Muslim minority’ composed of three different ethnic groups; Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies.

Regarding the continuity to the Greek denial of the ethnic ‘Turkish’ identity in Western Thrace in the post-1990 period, one can put forward different reasons. The most significant one seems to be related with the security of Greece: (Meinardus 2002: 81)

“The great majority of Greeks see the minority issue mainly as an issue of national security…they fear this area might one day become a second Cyprus, subject to invasion, and possible annexation, by Turkey.”
Most of the Greeks, even today, continue to accept Turkey as a possible threat to the Greek security and unity. The Greek anxiety of a possible westward expansion has usually been taken into consideration by Greek academicians and decision makers (Athanasios Platias 1991: 92-93; Alexis Heraclides 2002). Another reason for the denial of ethnic identity may be the Greek aim for the assimilation of the Minority within the Greek majority. By dividing the Minority, officially, into three different ethnic groups the assimilation of the members of the Minority within the Greek majority may become an easier process.

Contrary to such Greek anxieties, the unique statement regarding the acceptance of the ‘Turkish’ ethnic identity in Western Thrace at the governmental level came from George Papandreou, the Greek Foreign Minister in 1999. In his interviews with one of the Greek magazines he stated as follows:

“It is probable for some to feel that they have a Turkish origin as others state that they are Pomaks or Romas. What is worth is that all of them to feel that they are Greek Citizens... No one contests that there are many Muslims of Turkish origin. Of course, treaties refer to Muslims. From time to time, the minority issues are related to territorial adjustments. If the borders are not disputed, I really don’t care at all if one calls himself a Turk, Bulgarian or Pomak. The Balkans will be calm if we secure our borders parallel with protection of the rights of minorities. However, if the term ‘Turkish Minority’ is used by a country in order to create unrest, or change the borders, then this term definitely causes a big problem.”

The initial reactions against the statement of Papandreou from the Greek political sphere were quite negative mainly because until that day, it had been a ‘taboo’ within the Greek political circles to mention for the existence of a Turkish minority in Western Thrace. While many leading Greek political figures called for his resigna-
tion there were also some voices calling him ‘the Minister of the Turkish Republic/Bulent Ecevit’. In spite of the criticisms, Papandreou did not retract his remarks. In his response to the reactions, he mentioned that Greece had nothing to fear on the issue of ethnic identification of minorities living in Greece. Also, he stressed that he felt glad that he became the pioneer for the beginning of a fertile new debate on the issue of ethnic identification of minorities living in Greece.

Besides the statements of Papandreou, the same year, another event occurred in Western Thrace regarding the official ban on calling the Minority as ‘Turkish’. On 23 July 1999, the day of the 25th anniversary of restoration of democracy in Greece, Galip Galip (PASOK), Birol Akifoğlu (ND) and Mustafa Mustafa (SINASPIS-MOS), the three MPs of the Minority, and thirteen NGOs based in Western Thrace sent a public appeal to the Speaker of the Greek Parliament and the party leaders for the recognition of the existence of the ‘Turkish’ and ‘Macedonian’ national minorities in Greece, the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities without any conditions and the implementation of the principles of the Convention, as well as those in the OSCE documents, so that all forms of discrimination or persecution against members of these minorities cease and their rights would be respected. However, the appeal was generally labeled as ‘artificial constructs’ or ‘groundless and vacuous positions’ in Athens and was sharply rejected by almost all Greek political figures who repeated the existence of only a ‘Muslim’ minority in Thrace but not a ‘Turkish’ one.

From a broader framework, the reader can observe that the official identification of the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace have changed in an inconsistent manner since 1923. As I referred above, from 1923 until the beginning of 1960s, the Greek state did not even contest the ethnic identity of the Minority. The Minority was, even, officially referred as ‘Turkish’. However, from
1960s until 1990s, the term ‘Turkish’ was banned and the existence of a ‘Muslim Minority’ in Western Thrace started officially to be used. And, since the beginning of 1990s the Greek state, as well as most of the Greek scholars, refers to a ‘Muslim Minority’ composed of three different ethnic groups.

Such changes in the official identification of a minority by the Greek state clearly depict an inconsistency in the Greek minority policy of Western Thrace while referring to the identity of the Muslim Turkish Minority. The official Greek declaration of a ‘Turkish minority’ in Western Thrace in the pre-1967 period actually contrasts both with the official rejection of the overall ‘Turkish’ identity and her declaration of a ‘Muslim minority composed of Turks, Pomaks and Roma’ in Western Thrace since 1990s. If such division within the Minority had had existed, then, we would not have observed, on 29 January 1988, Turks, Pomaks and Roma protesting, altogether, against the Greek Supreme Court’s decision denying the existence of a ‘Turkish’ minority in Western Thrace.

In the light of the denied and disputed ethnicities, one thing seems quite blatant in Western Thrace in the 21st century; the individual and collective identification of the members of the Minority hasn’t changed in lines with the change in the Greek denial of ethnic ‘Turkish’ identity in the region. In an EU member country where each person has the right to identify himself/herself both individually and collectively with other members, researchers can clearly observe that, with some exceptions, almost all of the Minority members, today, continue to identify themselves with their ‘Turkish’ and ‘Muslim’ identities as well as their ‘Greek’ citizenship in Western Thrace.

**Denial of Ethnic Identity and Freedom of Association in Thrace**

In Western Thrace, restrictions on the freedom of association, started in 1980s, are highly interrelated with the denial of the Turkish identity by the Greek administrations. With the dissolution of the
two associations bearing the term ‘Turkish’ in their titles the denial of a Turkish identity in Western Thrace was officially affirmed by the Greek state. As a response to the denial of their ethnic identity, the aforementioned protest on 29 January 1988 took place in Komotini.

In 2005, the dissolution of the Xanthi Turkish Union by the Greek Supreme Court (Arios Pagos) put the debates about the ethnic identification of the Western Thrace Minority once more to the forefront. Unlike the cases of the Komotini Turkish Youth Union and the Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace, the trial of the Xanthi Turkish Union started in 1980s continued up until 2005, when it was dissolved by the Greek Supreme Court\textsuperscript{10}. Given that all local remedies were exhausted with the latest decision of the Greek High Court, as the next step, the Xanthi Turkish Union, unlike the other two dissolved unions, made the necessary application for the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on 15 July 2005\textsuperscript{11}.

At this point, I want to recall that Greece, in 1998, was sentenced at ECHR for not allowing the establishment of the ‘Home of Macedonian Civilization’ in the city of Florina. In its decision, the Court stated that those Greek citizens who feel that they are a member of an ethnic minority have every right to establish associations in order to protect the cultural and spiritual heritage, according to the Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights that Greece signed in 1990\textsuperscript{12}.

In addition to the abolition of the Xanthi Turkish Union, the case of the establishment of the Cultural Association of Turkish Women of Rhodopi in 2001 is another example for the denial of ethnic identity in Western Thrace. Because of its use of the term ‘Turkish’ in its title, the Greek Supreme Court did not give the necessary permission for the establishment of this union. The trial of this association started in 2003 and ended on 1 April 2005 with the refusal of its establishment. Given that all local remedies had been
pursued, the founding members of the Cultural Association of Turkish Women of Rhodopi applied to the ECHR in 2005.

In the light of the fact that the Komotini Turkish Youth Union, the Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace and the Xanthi Turkish Union had functioned quite properly for almost sixty years and never opted for policies and actions that would fragment the Greek public and the unity of Greece they were dissolved by the Greek Supreme Court mainly for political reasons\(^\text{13}\). However, on the other hand, the Greek state condones the existence of associations with other ethnic, national and religious identifications in their titles in Western Thrace, like the ‘Cultural and Educational Association of Armenians in Komotini’ and ‘Association of Orthodox Armenians, Saint Grigorios in Komotini’. Such a double-standard policy of the Greek state in Western Thrace shows that the denial of ethnic identity as well as the violation of the right of freedom of association is applied only those who identify themselves with their ‘Turkish’ ethnic identities. As the former MP of the Muslim Turkish minority in the Greek Parliament, İlhan Ahmet, noted\(^\text{14}\):

“In Thrace, the so-widely used term ‘multiculturalism’ would never be applied in practice, if on the one hand associations of Armenians, of Greeks and others function freely, but, on the other hand, members of the minority do not have the right to express and develop cultural activity through similar institution and associations.”

The Final Decision of the ECHR against the Denial of Ethnic Identity in Western Thrace

In two years time period, the ECHR gave its final decision regarding the applications of Xanthi Turkish Union (App. no. 26698/05) and the Cultural Association of Turkish Women of Rhodopi (Application no. 34144/05)\(^\text{15}\). According to the press release of the ECHR released on 27 March 2008, in these two cases, Tourkiki
Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece and Emin and Others v. Greece, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights regarding the freedom of assembly and association. Also, it stipulated that in the case of Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others there had, also, been a violation of Article 6 Paragraph 1 which is about the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time of the European Convention on Human Rights. Taking into consideration that the questionable proceedings of Xanthi Turkish Union at the Greek courts lasted for more than 20 years (1983-2005) the ECHR declared that the Union was, also, awarded 8.000 euros from the Greek state\textsuperscript{16}.

Furthermore, according to the official judgment of the ECHR regarding these two cases, the existence of an ethnic minority in Greece could not constitute a threat to the democratic society of Greece. It highlighted that the existence of different ethnicities and cultures should be protected by democratic societies according to main principles of the international law\textsuperscript{17}. The judgment of the ECHR, moreover, stipulated that minority communities in today’s Greece have the right to identify themselves collectively in ethnic terms, like ‘the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace’ and it is not such an easy issue to dissolve Minority unions bearing the term ‘Turkish’ in their titles or prevent establishment of new ones.

For ECHR, unions can be dissolved in case the union applies for use of violence or undemocratic actions that will endanger the state integrity, public order and principles of democracy in a given state. In one way or another, the decision of the ECHR actually marks the end of the continuous stipulations of the Greek legal and judicial authorities since 1980s who unabatedly stressed that the term ‘Turkish’ referred to the Turkish citizens and the usage of this term was endangering the Greek public order. Finally, I want to underline that such a significant decision of the ECHR against applications of the Greek state in Western Thrace was taken by a Chamber of seven judges one of whom from Greece and the other one from Cyprus.
For the time being, by May 2008, the Greek state hasn’t opted yet for an immediate policy change regarding the denial of Turkish identity in Western Thrace. It might take some time for the Greek state officials to make some amendment in the Greek Minority policy of Western Thrace. However, given that Greece is not only a democratic society but also the cradle of democracy, then, any impediments for being united under ‘Turkish’ associations in today’s Western Thrace need to be totally eliminated by the Greek state.

The Importance of Collective Usage of Some Minority Rights

There are some individual rights, like the right of association, which can only be used collectively with other members of the minority. In order to be united under a union, members of the minority have to come together and use their individual right of association in a collective manner. This is also called as an ‘individual right with collective usage only.’

The essence of freedom of association increases when we talk about a minority community in a given state. The functioning of minority associations is vital for the continuity and survival of minority cultures, traditions and socio-economic life as well as the strengthening of the democratic society. (Geoff Gilbert 2007: 172)

And, the freedom of association is one the most significant rights of minority groups, as it sustains the internal cohesion of these groups and thus, actually impedes minority groups from being assimilated within the majority communities.

In the light of the vitality of freedom of association for minority regimes, a minority member in Western Thrace, today, has the right individually to identify himself/herself as a ‘Turk’ and this right for self-identification is protected under a number of international treaties that Greece signed and ratified. But, in since 1980s, a group of people cannot come together and collectively identify themselves as ‘Turks’. Such an attitude is identified as a potential
challenge to the unity of Greece and to the Greek nationhood. (Triandafyllidou and Paraskevapolou 2002: 93) Dissolution of the ‘Turkish’ unions that I focused on is one of the examples of denial of the ethnic ‘Turkish’ identity of the Western Thrace Minority.

Collective Usage of Minority Rights under the International Law

From the beginning of 1990s, the Greek administrations as well as a number of Greek scholars and academicians have continuously stipulated that the Minority is defined as a ‘Muslim’ minority but not as ‘Turkish’. It is true that the Lausanne Treaty refers to a ‘Muslim’ minority in Western Thrace and does not emphasize the ethnicity of the minorities in Western Thrace and Istanbul. However, this should not be interpreted as the Lausanne Treaty prevents the ethnic identification of the Minority and used as a basis for the denial of a collective ‘Turkish’ identity in Western Thrace.

As it is argued in one of the popular Greek newspapers, it seems that by using the term ‘Muslim’ the Lausanne Treaty actually does not forbid the ethnic identification of the minority members in Western Thrace. Rather, it lets open the door for self-identification on ethnic terms either individually or collectively. On this debate, Christos Rozakis, who is one of the leading figures of the Greek Law and the current Vice-President of the European Court of Human Rights, comments that (Rozakis 1996: 100-103):

“Reference to the religious elements of these minorities did not automatically reduce them to religious minorities which deserved protection of their religion and only that...The complex elements of origin, religion and linguistic opinions, as well as of cultural and political ties make this minority an ethnic minority, and not solely a religious or linguistic one.”

From a legal point of view, the Greek prevention of the right of collective identification seems to work against the Article 3 Paragraph 2 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, the Paragraph 32 of the 1990 Copenhagen Document of the CSCE/OSCE, the Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities which stipulate that persons belonging to the minorities can exercise their rights both individually and collectively.

Actually, the documents of the EU, UN and OSCE reveal that these international organizations emphasize, also, the collective character of the individual minority rights, which contributes to the integration but not to the assimilation of the minority groups who are trying to preserve their own distinctive cultural, ethnic and religious characteristics within the majority communities. Moreover, the willingness of states is, also, needed in order to protect the rights of the minorities. Despite the obligations arising from the aforementioned treaties, the Greek state, which is a party to most of these treaties, still rejects the right of association under the name of ‘Turkish’ and insists on denying the existence of a ‘Turkish’ minority in Western Thrace. As it is stated, such an attitude of the Greek state against the Turkish associations, actually, resembles to one of the most prominent practices of the 1967 Colonels regime; in case more than three Greek citizens were coming together, they were forcefully dissolved by the military forces on the basis that they could be a potential threat against the Colonels regime. Likely, the Greek state, in the 21st century, still refrains from granting the right of the freedom of association to the Turkish minority of Western Thrace in Greece.

Conclusions

As a result of the official minority policy change, one can observe that things have been changing in Western Thrace in the post-Cold War period. The Greek state started to work for the solution of the problems of the Muslim Turks in Western Thrace. It is applying dif-
ifferent economic policies in the region. Also, by the year 2000, almost all of most the basic individual rights violations in Western Thrace came to an end. As a result of changes especially in economic and social fields, Muslim Turks have started slowly to adapt themselves to the changing conditions of Western Thrace.

Throughout 1990s, it was predicted among the members of the Muslim Turkish minority that the changes in the economic and social fields would have a spillover effect on the solution of the remaining political and educational problems of the Muslim Turks. However, up to now, the attitude of the Greek state has not changed very much regarding certain fundamental problems of the Muslim Turks. In addition to the denial of a ‘Turkish’ ethnic identity and violation of the right of freedom association that I explained above, the problems concerning the minority control on their charitable organizations (wakfs), the appointment of the religious leaders (muftis) by the Greek administration, and especially the education of the Minority still remain unresolved.

In the era of globalization, Greece still fears from the secession of the region and its possible unification with the motherland Turkey. However, history of the Minority from 1920s until today demonstrates that the Muslim Turks have never opted for secessionist policies from Greece. Instead, they fought with the enemies of Greece for the unity of the Greek state, as in the Second World War. Even during the most harsh and dark years of the modern Greek history, 1946-1949 Civil War, the members of the Muslim Turkish minority demonstrated their loyalty to the Athens and fought against the communist threat in Western Thrace. Since 1923, they haven’t formed even a military or paramilitary organization to jeopardize the Greek public order.

In spite of such historical realities, the Greek state continues to see the Muslim Turks as the ‘Trojan Horse’ of Turkey and a threat to its national unity. These are some of the most significant reasons why Greece, even today, continues not only to deny the ethnic
'Turkish' identity of the Western Thrace Minority but also sees the unification of the members of the Minority under a 'Turkish' union as a threat to its unity. By doing so, Greece, also, acts against the provisions of the bilateral and international agreements that she signed and ratified.

To conclude, I believe that a better future awaits the Muslim Turkish minority of Western Thrace to the extent that Greece stops considering the Muslim Turks as 'agents' of the Turkish state or a threat to its unity. Leaving aside other minority rights violations in Western Thrace, the official denial of the ethnic 'Turkish' identity as well as the violation of the freedom of association under 'Turkish' unions is just one of the main issues that contribute to widening of gaps not only between the Greek state and Minority but also between the minority and majority communities in Western Thrace. Rather than turning a blind eye on the existing violations against the Minority, Greece should opt for new policies and affirmative actions aiming to solve the remaining problems of the Minority with 'good will' and consultation with the members of the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace.

NOTES
* I wish to thank Prof. Jane Cowan at the University of Sussex, for valuable comments and criticisms she raised to an earlier draft of this article.

2 The existence of the term 'Turkish' at the title of the Minority schools were quite obvious from the pictures taken in 1960s some of which are published in one of the monthly magazines of the Muslim Turkish minority. For these pictures see, İbrahim Baltalı, “Bati Trakya Eğitim Tarihinde İz Brakanlar: Öğr.Yusuf İbrahim”, Rodop Ruzgarı, Vol.8, March 2008, pp .4-7

3 The Kostas Karamalis archives, Volume 10, pp.134-135, quoted in O İos tis Kyriakis, Elefterotipia, 4 March 2007

4 For more information on Xanthi Turkish Union, see Riza Kırlıdökme, Çetin Mandacı, et.al., History of Western Thrace Turkish Civil Societies-1: Xanthi Turkish Union, 1927-2003, July 2003

5 In the final decision for the Xanthi Turkish Union, the Public Prosecutor of this trial, Dimitrios Linos stated that the relevant agreements and treaties that Greece signed acknowledge only the existence of a 'Muslim' minority.

6 In the local Minority newspapers published before this rally, it was stated as follows: “En Nihayet Beklenen Gün Geldi. ‘Bat› Trakya’da Türk Yoktur’ Diyenlere Meriç kadar Kadın-Erkek 120 bin Şoydaşlarınız 29 Ocak Cuma Günü ‘Türküz Müslüman’ Diye Cevap Verecek”, Akn, 27 January 1988

7 George Papandreou, “∞Ó ¢ÂÓ ∂›ÌÔ˘Ó ¶· ·Ó‰ÚÂÔ˘ £· ¢Ô‡Ï’· Û °Î¤ÙÔª¿˘ÚˆÓ” (If I was not Papandreou I Would Work in the Ghetto of Blacks”, Klik, vol.148


10 The reason for the dissolution was based on the conclusion of the Public Prosecutor, Dimitrios Linos: “The union seeks quite openly to demonstrate the existence in Greece of a national Turkish minority, while the relevant agreements and treaties acknowledge only the existence on Greek soil of a Muslim religious minority… The use of the term Turkish in Greece means the recognition of minorities which are not defined by the Lausanne Treaty…According to article 8 of the union’s founding legislation it is intended the promotion on Greek soil of the objectives of a foreign state, namely Turkey.” Dimitrios Linos quoted in The Written Statement of Ilhan Ahmet about the Dissolution of the Xanthi Turkish Union, 21-02-2005 available at www.ilhanahmet.com, (2/3/2005)

11 “‹.T.B Davas› A.‹.H.Mahkemesi’nde”, Gündem, 22-07-2005. Unlike the application of the Xanthi Turkish Union to the ECHR, the other two ‘Turkish’ unions, today, do not have any chance to apply to the ECHR because quite a long time had passed since their dissolutions in 1987.

12 “ÎyAıÔÄÈ Ê ÐÖ’ÜÏÈÍI ßÖ’ÜÊ •ßÔiÈ” (The Xanthi Turkish Union is Closing), Ípogevmatini, 14.1.2005, reprinted in Elefterotipia, 22-01-2005.

13 Gündem, 25-02-2005

14 Ibid. The Written Statement of Ilhan Ahmet about the Dissolution of the Xanthi Turkish Union, 21-02-2005, p.4


16 Ibid.
Ibid.

Nikos Alivizatos, “Rights without Discounts” (Rights without Discounts), Ta Nea, 23 September 2006


Here, it is useful to note that the people in the Ottoman ‘millet’ system were separated as ‘Muslims’ and ‘non-Muslims’. The ethnicity hadn’t played a role in the Ottoman system.

Due to the Ottoman ‘millet’ system, religion was the main distinguisher of communities under the Ottoman rule and being a ‘Muslim’ was closely correlated with being a ‘Turk’ within the Lausanne spirit or vice versa, which should be taken into account while referring to the terminology and language of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.


According to this article “Persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present Framework Convention individually as well as in community with others”. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, available at www.conventions.coe.int Here, it is useful to note that although Greece signed the Framework Convention on 22 September 1997, it has not ratified it yet.

According to this Article, minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own educational, cultural and religious institutions, organizations or associations... in conformity with national legislation. The 1990 Copenhagen Document of OSCE available at www.osce.org

The article 11 of the European Convention for Human Rights is as follows: Paragraph 1: Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. The European Convention of Human Rights and its Five Protocols available at www.hri.org

According to this article, persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own associations. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities available at www.unhchr.ch

O Ios Tis Kyriakis, “Bombs in Logic”, Elefterotipia, 14 June 2001
PART 2

YOUNG TURKS, IDENTITY PRACTICES AND INTEGRATION
Europe is undergoing considerable demographic, economic, cultural and socio-political change. Many European countries have become culturally diverse societies and, at the same time, the increasingly supranational context in which political and educational systems are operating has challenged national identities. As Turkey gets politically closer to Europe and entered membership negotiations on 3 October 2005, the debate where the eastern boundaries of the continent of Europe lie has intensified and is likely to impact on the ways in which Turkish youth negotiate their identities. In Germany, for instance, the Social Democratic-Green government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) argued strongly in favour of full Turkish EU membership whereas the new grand coalition government under Chancellor Angela Merkel has adopted a more pragmatic approach given that the conservative Christian Democrats prefer a so-called ‘privileged partnership’. The Turkish Muslims are also a particularly under-researched and disadvantaged community. Enneli, Modood and
Bradley (2005), for instance, argue that England’s young Turkish Muslims are even more disadvantaged in housing, employment and education than the Bangladeshis, who were hitherto often regarded as the least integrated community in England (Modood et al., 1997).

This article explores how Turkish youth in Germany and England relate to Europe; and analyses how their identities are shaped by macro-level policies, school dynamics (e.g. ethos) and social class. The Turkish community within Europe has always had a very complex history. The Turkish Muslims were physically brought into the European project as ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter) by the Germans who increasingly needed labour after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The 31 October 1961 bilateral agreement between Germany and Turkey stated that Turkish workers should return to their home country within two years (Sen and Goldberg, 1994). However, because of the need of workers beyond the initially agreed date, many of these young men continued to stay in Germany and were joined by their families in subsequent decades (Sen, 2002). By 1980, the Turkish Muslims formed the largest minority ethnic community in Germany (1,462,000) and, because of family reunions, their number increased to more than two million by the late 1990s (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002). Many fifteen-year-old Turkish youth in Germany are now in their second generation.

In England, however, it was mainly for political reasons that mainland Turkish people, Turkish Cypriots and Kurds sought refuge. As a result of the British occupation of Cyprus between 1878 and 1959, the Turkish community is much more heterogeneous here and some of the refugees had British passports. The first wave of mainly male Turkish Cypriots fled their increasingly politically unstable island to seek refuge in England in the 1950s and 60s, when the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters fought for union with Greece (Sonyel 1988). The wave of migration from
mainland Turkey only gained momentum after the military coup by General Evren in 1980 (Mehmet Ali 2001). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most of the Kurds arrived in England as refugees. As a result of this migration, many young Turkish Cypriots are now in their second generation whereas most first-generation mainland Turkish people were born in Turkey. Despite different histories of migration, Turkish Muslims have faced enormous conflict and marginalisation in both European countries in terms of employment and education (e.g. Kagitçibasi 1991) and have often been the victims of racism and Islamo-phobia (e.g. Archer 2003; Dodd 2005; Wilpert 2003).

**Theorising and Researching Identity**

This paper draws upon post-structuralist notions of a fragmented society, in which identities are multidimensional, hybrid and shifting (e.g. Hall 1992; Caglar 1997; Mac an Ghaill 1999; Dolby 2001; Tizard and Phoenix 2002) to explore how contemporary Turkish youth in Germany and England perceive Europe and how they negotiate their identities. The advantages of a post-structuralist approach to the study of youth identities were that it opened up the possibility of a non-unitary subject with multidimensional identities and also reflected the shifting nature of society. Crucially, in a post-structuralist framework, identities are not fixed, static and of a binary nature (e.g. white/black) but discursively negotiated and renegotiated. The notion of performativity (Butler 1997) was important for the design of the broader study because, from a deconstructionist position, performative suggests that ethnic and political identities are a continual establishment and articulation of binaries. The linking of techniques of the self (Foucault 1988) and performance opens up an exploration of the ways in which the social context (e.g. schools, governmental policies) mediates how subjects deal with the lived realities of specific institutional locations (Mac an Ghaill 1999).
The concept of identity/identities, meaning the communities young people felt they belong to, was also crucial for the conceptualisation of this study. In contrast, the notion of identification refers to the reasons and discourses students employed to identify with a particular community (e.g. Europe). It is also important to differentiate between hybrid (e.g. Hall 1992; Mercer 2000; Tizard and Phoenix 2002) and hyphenated identities (e.g. Caglar 1997). Hybrid identities, according to Bhabha (1990), can be understood as ‘mixed’ identities which emerge as a result of the interconnections between diasporic or ethnic affiliations and political identities such as ‘being European’. In contrast, the notion of hyphenated identities, as understood by Caglar (1997), relates more to territorial or political identities, such as African American, rather than the emergence of a new identity. The fact that many young people in this study constructed their identities along ethnic and political dimensions, rather than mediating between two territories, suggests that the notion of hybrid identities is perhaps more accurate when analysing contemporary youth identities. One of the theoretical implications of this article is thus the need for researchers to reconceptualise the way we think about identity formation and to consider the interconnections between ethnic and political identities.

The empirical data this article draws upon derives from a larger comparative case study of fifteen-year-old native youth and youth of Turkish descent, located in two English and two German secondary schools (Faas, 2007). The main part of the fieldwork was carried out in 2004 in London and Stuttgart. In each school, I distributed a questionnaire to about 100 students to obtain broad insights into their identities. Then, I conducted six focus groups of four to five students (single-sex and mixed-sex groups) and I interviewed eight students (four boys and four girls) to listen to the discourses students employed when talking about Europe and their identities. The main reason for including single-sex groups in the research design was to explore whether or not the topics and group dynamics between the two sexes were different. However, the data
analysis revealed that many of the student discourses around identity cut across gender divisions, unless specifically stated in the article. Additional interviews with the Head, the Citizenship Education coordinator, Head of Geography and Religious Education were conducted to gain insights into the role schools play in shaping identities. The names of all schools, teachers and students were protected from outsiders by using pseudonyms.

In this article, I draw mainly on the qualitative data obtained from student focus groups and semi-structured interviews with students and teachers. I chose four schools (two inner-city multi-ethnic secondary schools in Stuttgart and two comprehensives in an Inner London borough) that had some attempt to relate to the European project. The schools had some similarities and differences in relating to Europe, as summarised in Table 1 below:

**Table 1:** A summary of the school profiles of the two German and English secondary schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GERMANY</th>
<th>ENGLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tannberg Hauptschule</strong></td>
<td>Goethe Gymnasium</td>
<td>Millroad School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School population</td>
<td>320 students</td>
<td>564 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18% Turkish</td>
<td>5% Turkish</td>
<td>26% Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Working-class inner-city</td>
<td>Middle-class inner-city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural issues</td>
<td>Turkish mother-tongue teaching</td>
<td>Intercultural tolerance, displays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European issues</td>
<td>English, French</td>
<td>French, Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Languages</td>
<td>English only</td>
<td>Entire Year 6 Geography, half of Year 6 History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Geography and History</td>
<td>Entire Year 7 Geography, half of Year 7 History</td>
<td>One unit in Years 7 and 8 Geography and History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School approach</td>
<td>Eurocentric Education</td>
<td>Multicultural Europeanness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The Turkish youth therefore will have experienced quite contradictory and different messages about multiculturalism and Europe in the four secondary schools. The school approaches emphasise either diversity or commonality. Not only is the history of migration different between Germany and England, but so too are the school approaches as a result of the different prioritisation of European and multicultural agendas at national government level.

**Young Turks in German Schools**

Germany was a founding member of the European integration project and, as a result, schools and the curriculum throughout the 1980s and 1990s were used to construct a ‘Europeanised national identity’ (Risse and Engelmann-Martin 2002). Building on various earlier initiatives to implement a European dimension in German schools (e.g. the 1978 ‘Europe in the Classroom’ document), in 1990 the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education (KMK) published the revised document ‘Europe in the Classroom’ (*Europa im Unterricht*). The document stated that the goal of education must be ‘to awaken in young people the consciousness of a European identity; to prepare them to be aware of their responsibilities as citizens of the European Community; and to promote mutual learning with young foreigners to foster the ability to feel mutual solidarity’ (KMK 1990). In 1992, the KMK published a further review of progress and recommendations. The particular areas for development were identified as foreign languages as part of vocational qualifications; political and cultural education; school exchanges; school links; and teacher exchanges. Several German federal states subsequently overhauled their curricula to implement a European dimension.

At the same time, Germany was reluctant to respond to the presence of ‘guest workers’ and fitting minority ethnic communities like the Turkish Muslims into its Europeanised concept of nationhood. ‘Integrating guest worker children’ into the German
school system while preparing them for a possible return to their country of origin, known as ‘foreigner pedagogy’ (Ausländerpädagogik), was the guiding principle of education in the 1960s and early 1970s (Luchtenberg 1997). Despite mass immigration, it was not until the 1980s that a concept of multicultural education was developed in response to the presence of ‘guest worker children’ and it was only in 1996 that the KMK published the guideline ‘Intercultural Education at School’ (Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule), stating that the federal states should ‘overhaul and further develop their curricula and guidelines of all subjects with regard to an intercultural dimension; develop teaching materials which address intercultural aspects as an integral part of school and education; and only allow school textbooks that do not marginalise or discriminate against other cultures’ (KMK 1996). However, during the past ten years, schools like Tannberg Hauptschule and Goethe Gymnasium in Stuttgart continued to promote Europeanness over and above German identities and multicultural agendas, albeit with different emphases. This sets the context for the responses of Turkish youth.

Goethe Gymnasium, located in a predominantly middle-class area with 54 per cent of students having professional middle-class and routine non-manual parents, promoted European values alongside multicultural values. The school prospectus stated that ‘the ethos of our school is characterised by mutual respect and tolerance towards other people. Our students learn the manifoldness of European languages, cultures and mentalities and can thus develop their own identities within our school. (...) Europe as a cultural area is one of our guiding principles’. The teachers I interviewed had a deeply ambivalent relationship towards German national identity and referred to Germany’s Europeanised national identity. The concept of ‘multicultural Europeanness’ shaped Turkish students’ political discourses and the ways in which they perceived their identities. Unlike in the other three schools, where young people preferred national governments, a majority of
Turkish respondents argued for more European integration. Nerhim alluded to the notion of a family arguing that ‘I find the EU, the unification of all these countries, a good thing. It’s just the same within a family; for example, when you have a problem then you discuss that amongst four or five people and so; and I find it good that Europe is doing the same generally speaking’. Other examples which were suggestive of Turkish students’ positioning within national and European discourses emerged from the discussions I had with Melik and the group of four Turkish boys. Melik argued that if there was further European integration, ‘the language would have to be the same too’, thus alluding to the status of English as a ‘lingua franca’ for Europe. When asked about Germany’s relationship with Europe and the EU, the group of Turkish boys argued from a German perspective that Germany is at the heart of Europe and an important and powerful country:

DF: How would you describe Germany’s relationship with Europe and the EU?

ZAFER: Well, I’d say Germany is a very powerful country; one of the big countries. You can see that with the European Central Bank which is in Frankfurt. It’s just in the middle of Europe.

YENER: Germany is the driving force in Europe and the EU was founded by Germany and the European Central Bank’s in Germany. They’ve close political ties with other European countries, like France.

SEVILIN: I think that if Hitler hadn’t existed, Germany would today lead Europe and so. They had a few historical problems but I think they’d lead Europe, although it would still be called Europe. Germany would have the say, but now they have to be cautious and hold back. Germany is at the heart of Europe and without Germany today’s Europe wouldn’t be what it is.
The school’s interpretation of ‘Europeanness’ to include multiculturalism and students’ privileged backgrounds allowed many Turkish students to relate positively to Europe, to think of Europe as being part of their multidimensional identities. Many students I interviewed engaged in a discussion about Europe rather than just listing concepts that came to their mind when they heard the word Europe. For example, Semra alluded to the European Union’s official motto *United in Diversity* and the girls also compared and contrasted the current political structure of Europe with that of America, thus referring to the decade-long debate amongst policymakers and politicians about the future structure of Europe:

DF: What comes to your mind when you hear the word ‘Europe’?

SEMRA: Well, Europe consists of countries that have got together, a community with the same currency. But you can’t say that that’s a giant country cos there are different languages and you can’t say that Europe is one culture. The people are kind of similar but there are nevertheless other cultures and France isn’t like Germany and it’s different in England. Europe just has the same currency but not the same language and culture.

NILGÜN: For me, Europe is more geographical. It’s also more simple that you can move from one country to another. There’s the Euro, but I don’t really like it. I mean, people think that all Europeans are the same but, in reality, there are quite different cultures. I’ve got relatives in France and when we crossed the border it looked quite different. It’s not one country.

SEVILIN: You can’t change the cultures, only the laws. I don’t think there’ll ever be something like a United States of Europe. That’s somehow not possible. Maybe it’s just a term cos in America each state has its own laws too but the language and culture is the same, and that’s not the case in Europe.

ZEYNEP: They all see themselves as Americans.
Despite engaging in European political discourses, most students made identification with Europe dependent on stays abroad (e.g. ‘I only know Germany; if I was living in Spain for a few years, then I’d more say that I’m European cos I’d be familiar with different countries’), parental influence (e.g. ‘my parents experienced a lot and tell me a lot about other countries and culture; Europe plays an important role for me too cos I’m interested in getting to know these other countries’), and the school curriculum (e.g. ‘we learn a lot of European languages here in school and talking in Italian, English and French makes me feel partly European’). The following excerpts indicate that the young people felt positive about Europe:

DF: To what extent do you see yourself as European?

ALI: Erm, of course I’m European. Europe is very big and is getting bigger and bigger. And when Turkey joins the EU it’ll be even bigger. Europe is getting more and more important to me cos of Turkey. […]

MARIAM: I feel European because of the Euro. The Euro impacts on your life and that’s why Europe is important. I mean, in the newspaper they always talk about the Euro, Eurozone, Europe and I’ve noticed that the countries are getting closer and closer and not every country has its own policy. And the economy has grown together too. And you can travel to other countries without any problems at the borders.

Whilst Europe was part of young people’s multidimensional and hybrid identities at Goethe, a majority of Turkish students I interviewed emphasised their German identities over and above Turkishness. They based their national identification upon notions of birth and residence. Zeynep (a Turkish girl) thought that ‘I’d say more German than Turkish. My dad works here, I plan to study here after school and work here as well’ and Nilgün (another Turkish girl) also prioritised her German identity saying that ‘I was born here and that’s why I feel more German’. Melik’s remark in the fol-
lowing excerpt that he feels like a Turkish Stuttgarter, a German-European Turk or a Turkish German was suggestive of the multidimensional and hybrid nature of young people’s identities at Goethe:

DF: Where do you feel you belong to?

MELIK: I feel as a Turkish Stuttgarter so to speak, a German-European Turk or a Turkish German, but not Swabian. I don’t know the Swabian culture and, I think, I’d have to be German for that with my ancestors being Swabians too.

NURHAN: You’d have to experience the culture at home but we can only see our Turkish culture and, I mean, I wouldn’t want to lose that. I don’t really know the Swabian way of life. Sometimes, teachers make Swabian jokes and stuff.

ISMET: (imitating the Swabian dialect) Gel.

NURHAN: We don’t really know much Swabian stuff.

ISMET: I’d like to add that I don’t see myself as a Swabian either, more as a Stuttgarter. It’s also easier to get to know the German culture, just here generally by living here, but the Swabian culture is more at home and I’m not around that. Sometimes I don’t really know whether something is particularly Swabian.

NURHAN: Perhaps Stuttgart is the Swabian world and it appears to me like a German world but maybe I don’t fully grasp the contrast; I should go to Berlin or so for a while and see what the differences are.

Time and again, Turkish students such as Nurhan also spoke of being afraid of losing their Turkish identity as a result of integrating (or assimilating) into the German society. Their Europeanised German identities had become so prevalent in the lives of these Turkish boys and girls that they felt their Turkishness was marginalised.
In contrast with the Gymnasium, Tannberg Hauptschule, located in a predominantly working-class residential area of Stuttgart with 57 per cent of students having skilled and unskilled parents, mediated national and citizenship agendas through a dominantly European and arguably, at times, a Eurocentric approach. For example, while eating with the students in the canteen, I witnessed cultural insensitivity amongst some Tannberg Hauptschule teachers towards Turkish Muslim students. On that particular day, there was pork and beef sauce available for the students and the teachers on duty told a male German student who wanted to help himself to some beef sauce that this is ‘Muslim sauce’ (Moslemsoße) and that he should rather take some ‘non-Muslim sauce’ and when the German student asked why he shouldn’t eat beef sauce the supervising teacher replied that ‘you will get impotent from that’. Besides this lunchtime remark, I sat in some lessons where teachers occasionally spoke German with a foreign accent (Ausländerdeutsch), and thus either intentionally or unintentionally ridiculed some minority ethnic, particularly Turkish, students in class. In addition, during an interview, Miss Klein (the Head of Religious Education) referred to the white Christian roots of Germany and Europe and established a racial/religious hierarchy which privileged the Christian cross over the Muslim hijab (‘I think that we are still Christian Occidental [i.e. white and European] here with our basic values. I am of the opinion that if a religious symbol was allowed in class then it should be the cross and not the hijab’). These examples indicated the ways in which some teachers marginalised and oppressed Turkish students.

Arguably, the Eurocentric approach of some of the teachers and the predominantly working-class background of Tannberg students made it very difficult for Turkish teenagers to relate positively to Europe. The Turkish interviewees mostly adopted a German perspective when talking about the possibility of a Turkish EU membership, which was not only suggestive of their familiarity with national socio-political debates but also indicated the ways in
which they brought together ethnic identities with national identities. A similarly distant approach was adopted by both Sema and Zerrin, who thought of Turkey as a largely backward country and not only distanced themselves from those Turkish people who live in Turkey and who, according to them, know little about life in Germany, but also rejected some of the customs associated with the Muslim religion, as shown in the following passage:

DF: How do you feel about Turkey joining the EU?
SEMA: I don’t want Turkey to join the EU.
ZERRIN: Me neither.
SEMA: Germany, Turkey is bankrupt anyway. What do they want in the EU? In Turkey, they think that everything is fine in Germany. There, Turkish people approach me and ask me where I was from and when I say ‘from Germany’ they...
ZERRIN: (interrupting) They want to marry you, want to follow you to Germany and lead a better life here. That was the case with my brother-in-law too. Well some things are better here (…)
SEMA: Some Germans also think that the Muslim religion is a bit stupid. I find it stupid too. The fact that you can’t eat pork or have a boyfriend, which is the case amongst Turks, I mean you are only allowed to have a boyfriend when you’re engaged. That’s just nonsense.

Although Turkish students engaged in a discussion about the possibilities of a Turkish EU membership, their general knowledge about Europe seemed rather limited despite the school’s promotion of strong European agendas and identities. The young people in this school listed some concepts including ‘the euro’, ‘the EU’, ‘western world’ and ‘advanced rich countries’, but were unable to engage in a wider discussion about Europe. Tamer alluded to the ‘united in diversity’ motto of the EU and Ugur referred to the EU’s peace-keeping role:
Given Germany’s commitment to Europe and European politics, it was not surprising that nearly all Turkish students I interviewed in Tannberg Hauptschule thought that Germany should get closer to Europe. For example, Tamer thought that ‘Germany belongs to Europe, we are the EU, Europe, I think’ whereas Cari was slightly less emphatic saying that ‘the US is fierce. I think it’s ok the way it’s right now’. Tamer used the inclusive first person plural form we to describe Germany’s relationship with Europe, thus revealing his level of integration and the extent to which he adapted to the German way of life and thinking.

Paradoxically, despite having some knowledge about Europe and being able to talk about Germany’s role in Europe and the possibilities of a Turkish EU membership, the Turkish students I interviewed did not see themselves as ‘European’. Most Turkish youth seemed to identify with Germany, which was more important for them than Turkey. It was fascinating to listen to the ways in which the group of Turkish girls balanced their identities. The following quotation shows the dilemma Sema and Zerrin face as a result of
their hybridised ethnonational (i.e. Turkish German) identities. In Germany, they are positioned as ‘foreigners’ and in Turkey people refer to them as Germans, which is precisely what Auernheimer (1990: 201) referred to as individuals acquiring a marginal identity and positioning in relation to both cultures of reference:

DF: Where do you feel you belong to?
SEMA: As a citizen I feel I belong to Germany. But when people ask me, I mean, when I am here then people call me ‘foreigner’. When I go to Turkey, they call me ‘German’ there.

ZERRIN: Yes, I don’t feel I belong to anything. I don’t think that I am German and I don’t think that I am Turkish. I don’t know. When I go to Turkey, then they say ‘Oh, look at the German’; and here I am a foreigner. Great. So, who am I? Where do I belong to?
SEMA: As a citizen, I can say I belong to Germany.
ZERRIN: I can say that I’m a German citizen but I’m not German. German citizen, I think, means that I have to adapt to this country, I try to adapt myself, and then I think about the laws and everything. I know a lot more about Germany so that I’m a German citizen, but I’m not German. But, I’m not Turk-ish either.
SEMA: I know Germany better than Turkey. I could never ever imagine living in Turkey.

Zerrin’s questions ‘Who am I? Where do I belong to?’ highlight the ongoing processes of identity formation, the struggle between ‘being a German citizen’ which is based on residence and ‘being German’ which is based on blood and ‘race’. Other Turkish interviewees also had hybrid identities. For example, the group of boys argued that they felt slightly more Turkish than German because ‘although we were born in Germany, our origin and family background is in Turkey’. Arguably, the tendency that some boys iden-
tified more strongly with Turkey than girls might have to do with their different roles in the Turkish society where women of-ten have a more domestic role while men carry on their family name, and thus their honour and identity. These findings suggest that Turkish students who privileged their Turkishness over German national identity had no connection to Europe whereas those who prioritised the German part of their hybrid identities were able to feel European.

Young Turks in English Schools

Turning now to the English example, where multicultural agendas are strong and the concept of Europe is marginalised in political and educational discourses, it seems unlikely that (middle-class) Turkish youth have the same access to Europe. There was little reason why the country should reconceptualise her national identity in European terms and the processes of European integration have not seriously affected policymakers. The Europeanisation of British national identity was undercut by the special relationship with the United States; the geo-graphical detachedment from continental Europe; and England’s post-war role in the Commonwealth (Geddes 1999). Europe did not appear amongst the cross-curricular themes of the 1988 National Curriculum. The Department of Education and Science (DES) responded to the 1988 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Education on the European dimension in edu-cation (Council of Ministers of Education 1988), stating that the government’s policies were aimed at ‘promoting a sense of European identity; encouraging interest in and improving competence in other European languages; and helping students to acquire a view of Europe as a multicultural, multilingual community which includes the UK’ (DES 1991). However, advice and curriculum guidance on precisely what content and form the European dimen-sion should assume has not matched official British concerns with multicultural issues.
Unlike Germany, England had to develop approaches to migration-related diversity after the 1948 arrival of the Empire Windrush from the Caribbean because it recruited labourers on who initially had the right to reside permanently in the host country. Although both countries initially developed assimilationist approaches (i.e. ‘foreigner’ pedagogy in Germany; assimilation and integration in England), the integrationist approach in England attempted to recognize, albeit to a limited extent, cultural and ethnic differences within the concept of Britishness. In 1988, multicultural education (unlike European education) became one of three cross-curricular dimensions of the English National Curriculum. The anti-racist movement was also far stronger in England where schools, particularly in inner-city areas, were deeply implicated in the development of multicultural and anti-racist initiatives. The murder of the black teen-ager Stephen Lawrence in 1993 marked a new stage in the already decade-long anti-racist movement. The Race Relations Amendment Act required all schools, colleges and local education authorities to draw up a race equality policy before May 2002, exemplifying the Blair government’s aim to achieve equal access to knowledge and opportunity. Unlike in Germany, the concept of nationhood mediated through multicultural values was primary in England.

The ethos of Darwin School in London, for example, suggested that young people were encouraged to think of themselves as liberal democratic British citizens living in a multi-ethnic international community. ‘The school strives to be a high-performing inclusive community school, fully committed to active citizenship and academic excellence; we value all who learn and work here; promoting a strong sense of community within and beyond the school’ (School prospectus). The promotion of national agendas (i.e. Britishness) in a school which celebrates similarity made it difficult for most Turkish students to relate to the European agenda. Consequently, Turkish students, particularly second-generation Turkish Cypriots but also first-generation mainland Turks, identified with both Britain and their country of origin:
DF: What role would you say does your Turkish Cypriot background play in your life today?

SAFAK: Well, it plays a big part cos that’s my origin, but I don’t think of it as a big part where everything I do is revolved around that. I think cos, you know, I don’t live there and I don’t know people - I do know some people but they’re not like the people I know here, that I like, all my friends are here, and my close family’s here, so obviously I care more about them than I do distant family who I only see once a year. But it plays a big part as to who I am, because of the way, cos that’s just who I am, cos I am Turkish-Cypriot, but I don’t make my whole life go around that. I kind of just, I just try to stay in between and care about both things just as much, like, just as equally, but obviously that’s harder cos I do a lot of things here, like watch British TV, that makes me learn more about England and London, than I do about Turkish, because, well, I watch Turkish TV less.

Safak tried to balance her various identities by attempting to stay ‘in-between’ and care about both societies. She tried hard to keep herself equally well-informed about the two countries by watching television but she had to realise just how difficult it is ‘to care about both things’. Also, Safak directly referred to notions of proximity and distance, arguing that she cares more about her close friends and family in England than about distant family members in the Turk-ish part of Cyprus whom she only sees once a year. This new hybridised Turkish British identity was also clearly expressed by the first-generation mainland Turks at Darwin School although they still saw their ethnic background to be more important to them than Britain.

In contrast, despite the mild pro-European approach of the Blair government in recent years, the processes of Europeanisation continued to receive little, if any, attention in schools. Consequently, in their discussions about Europe and the EU, many Turkish
youth had difficulties to engage in European political discourses. Some students referred to ‘power’, ‘opposition to America’ and ‘community of countries’. Typically, however, Turkish interviewees neither knew the purpose of the EU nor how European institutions work. This can be seen in the following quotation from the discussion with a group of male and female students:

DF: What do you know about the European Union or Europe actually?
ADEM: It happened after World War Two; France and Germany, they like made an agreement, and then loads of other countries joined or something.
NEYLAN: What happens when you’re in the EU anyway?
AFET: Nothing, you’re just
ADEM: No, you get to, the United Nations.
NEYLAN: What do you get?
NEYLAN: So what, who cares? Why can’t the whole world be in it? That’s not fair.
ADEM: Cos they’re not.
[one of them speaks indecipherably]
NEYLAN: It’s just stupid!

Arguably, the limited coverage of European issues in the British mass media as well as the ignorance of British educationalists and schools to promote a European dimension in the National Curriculum were all responsible for this partial and confused political view of students. In contrast, Turkish students I talked to frequently drew on national political discourses when talking about England’s role in Europe and within the wider world. In the following excerpts, both Mustafa and Mehmet (Turkish Cypriots) talked
about monetary issues while Safak (Turkish Cypriot) focused upon England’s geo-political relation with Europe:

MEHMET: Britain should be in the EU but I don’t think they should change the currencies, cos that would affect Britain dramatically, you know, because the British pound is, you know, really valuable and if this happened, yeah, the economy of Britain’s going to drop, so it’s not going to be good for us. […]

MUSTAFA: Yeah, I think they’re more distant cos, erm, like firstly they wanted to keep the pound here. Everyone wants to keep the pound. But if we did actually take like, the Euro, our economy would be stronger, and it would help other countries as well because it would make our economy work because we’ll have a stronger force, because the whole of Europe is our working force. […]

SAFAK: I think they’re kind of part of it, but in a way they’re not they’re just kind of ‘are’ with Europe as in, because, they’re like, they’re in the EU and stuff, and you know, Britain is in the continent of Europe, so they should be involved with their own continent instead of going off somewhere else.

As a result of England’s lukewarm approach to the EU, young people’s Turkish British identities did not easily fit with Europe so that this political identity played a less important role in the lives of students I interviewed. However, (first-generation) mainland Turkish and (second-generation) Turkish Cypriot students were able to identify with Europe so long as Turkey was included in the notion of Europe. Typically, respondents argued that ‘if Turkey was in the European Union, then I would see myself as more of a European’ and ‘I see myself wherever Turkey belongs in Asia or whatever’. A number of Turkish Cypriot interviewees, such as Mustafa and Safak, referred to British insularity and separateness from Europe
arguing that ‘I am European ‘cos I’m in Europe, and I’m in Britain which is in Europe and part of the Euro-pean society; but I don’t see myself as a European because Britain is separate from Europe’. Here, Mustafa and Safak tried to position themselves within the British national discourse. These discourses were suggestive of students’ Turkish British identities.

Mustafa analysed fully England’s position within Europe, alluding to the referenda on the single currency and the proposed Constitution and evaluating the consequences of a ‘no’ vote for England. His explanations could just as easily come from a British student:

DF: To what extent would you see yourself as European?

MUSTAFA: I don’t really see myself as European, because, erm, I don’t know, I just, erm, I’m not sure because I’d sort of be like failing my argument now if I said that, erm, I don’t count myself as European because if I was born in Europe, I’d count myself as European, but I’m not born there so I guess I call myself British, cos I was born here and, like growing up here, since day 1. That’s it.

DF: That’s interesting that you are saying that, because you were born in England, and England has been part of the EU for decades, and now you were just saying “I’m not born in Europe”?

MUSTAFA: But the thing is, I don’t see England being a strong … I know they’re quite strong in Europe, but I guess like I think like Europe’s sort of latching onto England, and I think England’s more distant from Europe, even though they’re quite strong contenders in the European Union. Now if you’ve seen the news, they’re actually thinking to vote not to be key contenders in the European Union, so they’ll be more of the people that’s on the marginal lines of Europe, instead of the core players like Germany or France.
The fact that first- and second-generation Turkish students at Darwin (especially compared with the other London school in the study, Millroad School) appeared to be receptive of the notion of Europe may have to do with their socio-economic background which enabled them to travel much more within Europe. Other evidence for this came, for instance, from the Head of Geography at Darwin, who argued that ‘we’re a bit more privileged in terms of the [travel-ling] experiences some of our kids have had’.

In contrast with Darwin School, Millroad School mediated national identities through the politics of cultural and ethnic diversity whilst offering only limited acknowledgement of the processes of Europeanisation. The school prospectus reveals that the school ‘recognises that the social, cultural and linguistic diversity in our community is an important resource and an aspect of our ethos we seek to promote and celebrate. (...) We give our young people the knowledge and personal strength to be good citizens in a multicultural world’. Although the Modern Foreign Languages Department displayed a number of posters with the different languages the school teaches (i.e. French, German, Turkish, Spanish) and posters regarding the eastern enlargement of the EU, the multicultural agenda is the dominant one in Millroad School and favoured over the concept of a European educational dimension. Nevertheless, some teachers were more receptive of the need to educate for, and about, Europe. The Head of Geography was keen to stress that ‘I’m actually developing a change in the schemes of work that we teach and the structure I’ve had, (...) it needs a European dimension’ but so far ‘well, we’ve [only] touched on Europe’. The challenge for Millroad School thus appears to be how to combine the politics of cultural diversity with the new European agenda.

The Turkish youth faced substantial conflict at Millroad and were subject to verbal (e.g. ‘fucking Turk’) and physical abuse including gang fights with the African Caribbean community in their struggle for power and control of the school. When I observed some of the lessons, I noticed that students sat along ethnic lines in
almost all classrooms, with some tables of only African Caribbean students and other tables with only Turkish students. The Turkish students had few cross-ethnic friendships and formed an ethnic solidarity group on the basis of common religion, language, culture and physical appearance. The identity formation processes were deeply affected by the ethnic experience. Many Turkish respondents deployed concepts of birth and pride to identify with their ethnic background, arguing that ‘I feel I belong to Turkey, but, because of the economy of Turkey, it forces us to come to England’ and ‘your background’s there [in Turkey] and all your grandparents, and, grandmas have been living there, so you have to follow’. In contrast, the sample of Turkish Cypriot students, in addition to their ethnic identity, drew upon the concept of residence to partially also identify with Britain. For example, Harika and Jihan seemed to have developed hybrid identities although the following discussion shows that they, too, privilege their Turkishness:

DF: So you would say you feel you belong to both Turkey and England?

HARIKA: Yeah.

TULIP: No, I don’t think so.

JIHAN: But still isn’t it, cos you were born here, yeah, and you been living here, yeah, and you go over to like Turkey and Cyprus once in your life, yeah, you don’t know nothing.

TULIP: But if you’re someone and your parents are Turkish, that’s what you are.

NAGIHAN: No, I’m Turkish but-

JIHAN: I didn’t say you’re not, but-

HARIKA: But you shouldn’t say “oh, I’ve got nothing to do with England”

TULIP: No, like my stepparents are English that’s it, you can’t say you’re English or half-English.
JIHAN: Or you can say - you were born there, innit?

HARIKA: No but when someone asks you you’re not going to say “I’m English”, it’s just that you’re go-ing to able when something happens, when there’s a war, when there’s a football match, and lets say England’s playing against Brazil or something then you would have to support England but when England’s playing against Turkey you can support Turkey cos that’s your race.

The ethnically charged school context thus made it extremely difficult for first- and second-generation Turkish students to identify with England or Britain, let alone Europe. Consequently, Turkish respondents struggled to talk about Europe and the EU in political terms, as the following quotation from the discussion with four boys and girls underlines:

DF: What do you know about the European Union or Europe?

BARIS: European Union, what’s that?

SARILA: Well, nobody knows nothing about it basically.

BARIS: What’s the European Union?

SARILA: You think I know?

BARIS: I heard about it, but I don’t know what it is.

SARILA: Me neither.

HALIL: Is it the power?

BARIS: I’m asking you.

SARILA: I don’t really know, no.

BARIS: The Union’s a bunch of people that decides something, but I don’t know.

HALIL: It’s the only power.
Other students in the sample, such as Olcay, referred to the Turkish EU membership bid when asked what they know about Europe in political terms, thus seeing Europe through a Turkish national (i.e. familiar) lens. Those who argued against membership typically said that Tur-key’s laws and morals do not meet European standards and that the country is very poor with a great deal of people being homeless. Also, respondents pointed towards the financial costs, saying that a membership would mean ‘improving their [Turkey’s] economic conditions at the expense of the rest’. Those students who wanted Turkey to join the EU pointed towards the societal changes that have taken place in Turkey (e.g. more rights) or the fact that a large number of Turkish people already live in Europe.

The concept of Europe as a political identity did not easily fit with Turkish national identities at Millroad School. The group of four Turkish boys construed the notion of Europe in monocultural terms, arguing that Europeans are essentially white Christian people:

YILDIRAN: Let’s say I go to India or something, or I don’t know, I’m just giving Egypt or America or any other Canada, Canada or something then I would say “ah, I’m coming from Europe”, basically that’s about “I’m coming from Europe” but I’m not like, you know European or anything.

MUHAMMAD: I wouldn’t even say Europe, you can’t say I’m European.

DF: Why not?

MUHAMMAD: Unless your races country is a European country as well … like where you’re from, whether your first country is in Europe cos basically we’re used to seeing white people, white people as European, so basically-

YILDIRAN: English people.
MUHAMMAD: I would say I live in Europe but I’m not European.

ONAN: Yeah same, because you’re not living all around Europe, you’re just living in one country.

KHAN: Erm, the thing is that if you was Europe, yeah, you’d like understand that, you know, I come from Europe, cos you know yeah, but I can’t say I’m European cos I’m not Christian.

MUHAMMAD: I don’t say I’m Christian, I say I believe in Christianity but I don’t say I’m Christian, that’s the same as saying I’m from Europe but I’m not European.

The notion of ‘being European’ did not sit comfortably with any of the Turkish boys in this group, most notably Muhammad, for whom identification is based upon the concept of ‘race’ rather than residence. The use of the word ‘race’ is particularly interesting here as it underlines that the students were aware of the racial differences in society. The explicit use ‘race’ as a means of distancing themselves from white Christians might be linked to the school dynamics and the ethnic conflict there; it was not used by any of the Darwinian students.

**The Hybrid Identities of Turkish Youth in Europe**

This article suggests that Turkish youth had no singular identity but employed hybrid ethno-national, ethno-local and national-European identities as a result of their national location and, especially, schooling and social class positioning (rather than migration histories). By looking at four different school settings in two European countries, we have also learnt that there were far greater tensions and frictions in the two working-class localities, which contributed to students’ privileging the ethnic dimensions (e.g. Turkishness) over and above the political dimensions (e.g. Britishness) of hybridity. In contrast, there was much greater homo-
Geneity in the two middle-class schools. The Turkish youth in the two higher-achieving schools benefited to a greater extent from their privileged environment than their counterparts at Tannberg and Millroad. The labour market chances of those students in the two working-class dominated schools are likely to be much worse due to their relatively lower educational qualifications (Hauptschule and GCSE) compared to Goethe and Darwinian students. Because of their socio-ethnic marginalisation, they were more likely to be caught up in ethnic tensions and, in the case of Millroad, tended to have their own ethnic solidarity groups. Table 2 summarises what was learnt about the ways in which Turkish youth forged their identities:

**Table 2: The identities of Turkish youth in different school contexts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIDDLE-CLASS LOCALITIES</th>
<th>WORKING-CLASS LOCALITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goethe Gymnasium</td>
<td>Darwin School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tannberg Hauptschule</td>
<td>Millroad School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School approach</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural Europeanness</td>
<td>Multicultural Britishness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurocentric Education</td>
<td>Celebrating Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Youth identities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-European</td>
<td>Ethno-national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish students:</td>
<td>Turkish students:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart or German-European</td>
<td>Turkish British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-national and local</td>
<td>Turkish students:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish German/</td>
<td>Turkish Stuttgarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish British</td>
<td>Turkishishness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ways in which social class worked within these different school contexts could also be seen in the extent to which students related positively to the political dimensions of the concept of hybridity, including Europe, rather than the ethnic dimensions. Turkish youth at Goethe Gymnasium in Stuttgart, which promoted European alongside multicultural values, had the best opportunities of relating to Europe as a political identity. Their privileged socio-economic background allowed them to take part in European school exchanges and to travel across Europe and thus benefit from the opportunities associated with Europe. Turkish students at Darwin
School in London also benefited from their socio-economically advantaged background and the school’s promotion of an inclusive multi-ethnic national identity. However, as a result of England’s lukewarm approach to Europe, the Turkish middle-class students I interviewed had much more limited opportunities than their German counterparts. In contrast, as a result of their predominantly working-class backgrounds, Turkish youth at Tannberg Hauptschule did not seem to gain the same access to the opportunities associated with Europe than their peers at Goethe despite a similar curriculum emphasis on Europe. Turkish youth at Millroad seem to have lost out on both the European and multicultural agendas and as a result, the students I interviewed privileged their Turkishness.

The article also showed that when schools constructed an inclusive multi-ethnic concept of Europe, like Goethe Gymnasium, Turkish youth engaged with Europe as a political identity and developed national-European identities. If however, Europe is conceptualised as an exclusionary monocultural (i.e. white, Christian) concept, as it was the case in Tannberg Hauptschule, then Turkish students will struggle to relate positively to Europe as a political identity. Politicians, policy-makers and educators are therefore presented with the challenge of constructing and promoting an inclusive, multi-religious model of Europe – one which addresses the issue of marginalised Muslim communities and promotes multicultural alongside traditional European values. Given that the regional (Swabian and English) identities were not favoured by any of the Turkish students (with Germanness being considered as problematic by many native German students), there is potential not only for the nation-state but particularly for the concept of Europe to act as a common bond holding together the ethnically different school communities if, and only if, Europe is reconceptualised in multicultural terms.
NOTES

1 This article was originally published in a different form and under the title ‘Turkish Youth in the European Knowledge Economy: an exploration of their responses to Europe and the role of social class and school dynamics for their identities’ in European Societies.

2 To get an idea of the socio-economic status or class of each of the four schools, I looked at the percentages of pupils eligible for free school meals, compared the achievement levels in terms of five or more A* to C in the GCSE examinations and, most importantly, asked students in the survey to classify their parents’ occupations.
Young Turkish-speaking People in UK: Early Employment Experiences and Dependency on Ethnic Enclave

Pinar Enneli and Tariq Modood

Introduction

Migrant labour is engaged in particular kinds of jobs in the labour market (Sassen 1996: 588). The first generation migrants come to developed countries with hopes for economic prosperity (Anthias 1983: 79; Wilson 1997: 140-46). In relation to the second generation young people, it is important to study what might be their place in the labour market and how it might differ from that of their parents.

Several studies of second generation migrant children show that their aspirations for the future might be higher than their parents (Waldinger and Perlmann 1998; Hoffmann-Nowotny 1985; Dex 1983; Penn and Scattergood 1992). However, generational upward mobility is not easy and it certainly does not depend upon merely the ability or aspirations of individuals (Piore 1979). As Borjas (1994: 572) finds, by comparing skill differentials of the chil-
children and grand-children of migrants of 32 national origin groups in the USA, for some ethnic groups, this mobility takes not decades, but centuries. In France, Lebon (1985: 145-46) pointed to a certain reproduction of the foreign labour force from one generation to the next, especially in the textile industry. Mushaben (2006: 206) also observed in Germany that the next generation is likely to experience more downward than upward mobility. So, it could be argued that a generational upward mobility might not be achievable for the second generation young people.

At that point, some researchers discussed the role of ethnic enclaves in relation to upward mobility of second generation migrants. For instance, Modood (2004) discussed how social capital created by ethnic ties help some of the second generation young people to be successful academically. Portes (1996) and Portes et al. (2005) argued that ethnic community (e.g. social networks, ethnic jobs, and values) can protect some second-generation Americans from experiencing downward mobility. This is similar to the premise that the ‘ethnic enclave’ (Fernandez-Kelly and Konczal 2005; Zhou 2004) facilitates alternative economic opportunities for immigrants and their children. As Zhou (2004: 1044) puts:

“The central idea of the enclave economy concept is that the enclave is more than just a shelter for the disadvantaged who are forced to take on either self-employment or marginal wage work in small business. Rather, the ethnic enclave possesses the potential to develop a distinct structure of economic opportunities as an effective alternative path to social mobility.”

They highlight that ethnicity fosters upward mobility, or retards assimilation into the poverty culture of one’s surroundings. Much of this positive image of the enclave and ethnic communities may not always be the case, since others see the enclave as an ethnic mobility trap (Avci 2006; Blackburny and Ramz 2006; Mushaben 2006; Peisker and Tilbury 2006; Wets 2006). In the case of the second generation in Germany, Mushaben (2006: 209) argues that:
"Denied the benefits of socio-political integration in Germany, successor cohorts fall prey to an insidious mobility trap: semi-skilled jobs in established ethnic enterprises appear inviting at first glance, especially in times of high unemployment. When coupled with a rigidly regulated labour market, however, they ultimately limit workers to the ethnic track and thus decrease career options and hopes for social mobility."

Furthermore, some claims that there is no ultimate connection between ethnic enclave and upward mobility of the second generation. For instance, by focusing on comparing patterns of intergenerational mobility across two samples of natives and second-generation immigrants in Denmark, Grönqvist (2006) found that ethnic clustering does not seem to affect the school-to-work transition rates of second-generation immigrants.

In this context, this paper will analyse Turkish-speaking young people’s early employment experiences in relation to ethnic enclave and upward mobility. More precisely, it will focus on opportunities or restrictions in the ethnic enclave for young Turkish-speaking people in order to achieve an upward mobility. Of course, both terms are complicated and we are aware of the fact that in order to understand their relationship thoroughly, any employment experiences stretch just a couple of years in the labour market could not be enough. However, we believe that the young people’s successful transition to employment could create a firm or a solid base for a possible second generation upward mobility and in this respect the existence of an enclave labour market should be addressed. Beside, this attempt would give us some clues on how these two complicated phenomenon are interrelated in the case of these young people.

This paper is based on a research about the Turkish-speaking young people living in London. Our research was small-scale and qualitative. We began with a questionnaire survey covering our three target groups and tried to include the most vulnerable and
disadvantaged young people. The fieldwork was conducted with 250 responses. The sample consisted of 99 Turkish, 68 Kurdish, 54 Cypriot and 29 young people of mixed origin. The mixed group consisted of six of Turkish and Kurdish origins, six of Turkish and Cypriot origins, four of Kurdish and Cypriot origins and 13 where only one parent was of Turkish-speaking origins. In terms of age composition of the sample, there were 30 people aged between 16-17, 172 aged between 18-20 and the rest aged between 21-23. The survey then provided us with a base for obtaining a targeted sub-sample for in-depth interviewing. At the second stage, we interviewed eight young Kurds and eight Cypriots (four females and four males in each group), seven Turks (three females and four males) and seven mixed origin young people (four females and three males).

It will be argued that the young people’s dependency on the ethnic enclave during their transition to adulthood might help them to escape unemployment and its possible consequences, while at the same time it would reduce their chances for an upward mobility. The first part of the paper will concentrate on the Turkish-speaking community and the socio-economic backgrounds of the young people’s families. This part gives a general socio-economic background of the community. In the second part, the young people’s employment experiences in the ethnic enclave will be discussed in relation to upward mobility.

**Turkish-speaking Groups in Britain**

According to the 2001 Census, 45 per cent of Britain’s minority ethnic people live in London, where they comprise 29 per cent of all residents (www.statistics.gov.uk). In this sense, Britain’s capital could be referred as a multicultural city at the centre of a new nexus of global movements.

London’s Turkish speakers are concentrated particularly in the boroughs of Hackney and Haringey. This community is itself frag-
mented, comprising of three main groups: Cypriot Turks, mainland Turks and Kurdish refugees. However, there is a degree of inter-marriage between these three groups and also with majority ethnic groups.

Officially 3 million (unofficially 5 million) Turkish people live in various countries in the EU (Uras 2002). There are 80,000 Turkish people living in Britain alone, of whom 60,000 live in London; in addition, there are about 120,000 Turkish Cypriots living in Britain (Onal 2003). The Turkish community in Europe has a very young population. According to Manco (2001: 2), 18 year olds and under constitute a third of the Turkish community in Europe. Eight out of 10 of these young people were born and educated in Europe. A substantial number of Turkish-speaking people in Europe are struggling with economic problems. Regardless of their country of residence, many Turkish-speaking communities are concentrated in deprived neighbourhoods that are ethnically clustered (Wets 2006; Avci 2006). This is true for the community living in Britain as well.

The long street called Green Lane in North London is a snapshot of all of these variations within the community. Turkish Cypriots are an additional variation in Britain, as this group is not present in other European countries. In fact, they were here long before the others, since they had a colonial connection with Britain, unlike other Turkish-speakers. Kurds are the latest edition to the Turkish-speaking community and most of them are refugees. They suffer the highest levels of disadvantage in their lives, in part linked to the refugee status of many of them; while the longest settled group, the Turkish Cypriots, are the least disadvantaged. This pattern is transmitting itself to the next generation.

The Turkish, Kurdish and Cypriot communities are working and living in the same areas of London (Mehmet Ali 2001). A Kurdish taxi driver informed us that, in his opinion, North London was not a part of Britain; he felt himself ‘in Britain’ only when he left North London and visited other places. In North London, he...
believed that Turkish people have everything they might expect to find in Turkey, apart from some family members. This may not be an exaggeration. In fact, the Turkish-speaking community is probably one of the most self-sufficient communities in London with half a dozen local community-based newspapers, together with Turkish television channels and countless digital radio channels. Community members can provide any service within the community ranging from mortgages to a quit-smoking help line, driving instructions to massage parlours. It could be christened ‘Little Turkey’.

However, there are now less favourable economic conditions for all these communities. While there is clearly a Turkish economic enclave, the main industry, textiles, has almost vanished. The main economic unit are shops (such as kebab houses and coffee shops), whose numbers have increased considerably. This makes employment opportunities more restricted and less appealing because of the low wages and long hours characteristic of these shops.

According to the conventional measures of neighbourhood deprivation, in 2000, Haringey was one of the most deprived areas in England (37th out of 354 where 1 is the most deprived) (Neighbourhood Statistics website). According to the 2001 Census, 35 per cent of Haringey’s total population of 216,507 comes from ethnic minority communities.

Moreover, the percentage of unemployment in Haringey is 5.8 per cent, compared to the England and Wales average of 3.4 per cent. In addition, three in every ten households in Haringey live in rented social housing (renting from the Council, a Housing Association or a Registered Social Landlord), whilst less than half of the households own their homes. The remainder of the households rent privately or live rent free (Neighbourhood Statistics website).
The Turkish-Speaking Families in the Sample

Turkish-speaking families in Haringey are worse off than the average. Free School Meal (FSM) entitlement for pupils in English schools is an indicator for measuring poverty. In 2002, four out of ten Haringey GCSE cohort students required a free meal, whilst nearly eight out of ten Kurdish students, 65 per cent of Turkish students and half of the Turkish Cypriot students did so (Haringey Local Education Authority website).

The families in our sample have also many disadvantages. As can be seen in Table 1, the unemployment rate is very high among the fathers of our survey respondents. More than half of the young people have an unemployed or retired father, while 21 per cent of them have unskilled or semiskilled fathers. Eight out of ten mothers are housewives, unemployed or retired, which is quite disproportionate for mothers of teenage children in this country with the exception of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Modood et al. 1997). Moreover, more than half of the mothers who are housewives have unemployed husbands. In other words, more than half of the Turkish-speaking households in our survey were without a breadwinner at home. However, there is also a minority of better-off families, which have two parents holding professional jobs or having self-employment. Kurdish fathers were more likely to be unemployed, compared to Cypriot and Turkish fathers. Besides, no Kurdish fathers had professional jobs, while no Kurdish mothers had their own shops or were in a professional employment.

Table 1. Mother’s Economic Status by Fathers’ Economic Status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father’s Economic Status</th>
<th>Unemployed/Retired</th>
<th>Unskilled/Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housewife/Unemp/Retired</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled/Semi-skilled Jobs</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed/Professional</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Economic disadvantages are also evident in the families’ home ownership. Table 2 shows that half of the Turkish-speaking families live in social rented houses. Kurdish families are even the worse-off. Eighty four per cent of Kurdish families were either in temporary accommodation or in council houses, while seventy four per cent of Cypriot families owned their homes. The number of Turkish families in temporary accommodation or council houses is also high (49 per cent of all Turkish families), while only 17 per cent of Cypriot families are in these accommodations.

Table 2. Types of Living Arrangements by Ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Social Rented Housing</th>
<th>Privately Rented</th>
<th>Owned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cypriot</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data missing in three cases.

In addition to type of accommodation, another indicator of the Turkish-speaking families’ economic disadvantaged is their experiences of homelessness. As you can see at Table 3, nearly two out of ten Turkish speaking families experienced homelessness. The Kurdish families are the worst off, and then Turkish families followed them. Cypriot families seem quite better off compared to others.

Table 3. Homelessness by Ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Yes.</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turk</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cypriot</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data missing in three cases.
The young people are aware of their economic disadvantages, though they might not be familiar with the terms such as working class or middle class. Kurdish young people usually think that they are at the bottom of society. For instance Bengi identified herself as:

“All somebody who is everybody’s enemy - bloody refugee and unemployed? I suspect I’m at the bottom somewhere.”

The Turkish-speaking community and the families do not have many opportunities in offer to the next generation. So when these young people enter to the labour market, they will bring their families economic disadvantages with them. At this stage, ethnic network became handy in order to find jobs. In fact, the ethnic economy might become the only feasible way to enter in adulthood for majority of the young people. And the working condition in ethnic enclave gives no promising signs for an easy transition and for a possible upward mobility. It is probably the way of transferring disadvantages to the second generation. Next section will analyse all these in details.

Entering the Labour Market by Using the Community Network

In this part, we will discuss the young people’s dependency on the ethnic enclave during the transition process to adulthood. In this way, we will try to find out the barriers and opportunities offered in the community employment for an upward mobility of the second generation young people. Of course, transitions from school to work are becoming more risky, fragmented and extended for all young people (Roberts 1995; Furlong and Cartmel 1997). Yet, Turkish speaking families’ economic disadvantages as discussed above seems to increase the risks.

There are the effects of the families’ economic conditions on the young people’s employment experiences and the employment patterns change due to various needs of the families. It seems that the young people with disadvantaged families are more likely engaging in employment. In other words, their families’ economic
backgrounds affect whether they have paid employment. They were asked if they had ever been in paid employment since leaving school. In general, sixty three per cent of the young people answered this question positively, while almost 70 per cent of the young people with unemployed or retired fathers have had paid employment since leaving school (Table 4). Bearing in mind that mothers who are housewives are more likely to have unemployed husbands, the young people’s employment therefore can be important for the household. Leyla, whose mother and father are both unemployed, was working in a coffee shop five days a week from nine to six and earned £130 a week. Although she did not give all of her pay to her family, she still bought food, and from time to time clothes, for her family.

Table 4. Ever in Paid Employment Since Leaving School by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/Retired</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled/Semi-Skilled Jobs</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data missing in two cases.

On the other hand, it might be not as much as the young people with unemployed or retired fathers, more than half of those with self-employed parents, also have been in paid employment since leaving school. Bearing in mind that maintaining a small business needs to work for long hours with little money. So, it is not unusual for the shop owners to receive their family members, especially their children’s help in the shop. The young people help their families in their businesses. That often was their main source of income during their education, or in these early years of transition. This is not just in relation to one’s parents’ businesses but in the family more broadly. Doruk, a Cypriot male at university and living away from his family explains:
“I’m currently working for my cousin in a shop... The money I earn there pays my rent and my student loans help support my other financial needs.”

In other words, the Turkish speaking young people need to work in their transition period to adulthood, while their parents’ economic needs were various. Yet, it is clear that regardless of their families’ economic demands or expectations, these young people find their jobs within the ethnic economy. In this sense, both Leyla’s and Doruk’s experiences is not an unusual one in terms of finding employment within the community.

As seen at Table 5, six out of ten young people managed to find some kind of employment within the Turkish-speaking economic enclave or through the community network. Even the young people do not work for a relative; they overwhelmingly work for another Turkish-speaking person. Overall, it can be argued that the young people’s dependency on community network for employment seems strong, even though it does not necessarily mean a close family network.

The kind of employment is usually unskilled or semi-skilled. A quite number of young people also worked very long hours in these unskilled or semi-skilled community jobs. Table 5 shows that twenty one percent of them worked more than 45 hours a week and forty four percent of them worked between 21 and 45 hours. It seems that the longer hours of working might not match with the earnings. Thirty one per cent of them earns £400 or less per month. It could be said that the employers undervalue the young people’s work. For example, Avni, a Turkish male, in the first year of his arrival, he worked in a kebab shop. He described the conditions there:

“Every newcomer has to work in a kebab shop once. There is no escape from this. Believe me or not, I worked 84 hours a week and only earned £115.”
Table 5. Employment Conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer’s Origin in the Last or Current Job.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-speaking including the relatives</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of the Last or Current Job</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Year or Less</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 2 Years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 Years</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Hours in the Last or Current Job</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Hours or Less a week</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 – 45 Hours a week</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Than 45 Hours a week</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Earnings in the Last or Current Job</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 00 or Less</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 01 – 800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Than 8 00</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data missing in nine cases.

It is evident that almost all the young people even with relatively advantaged economic backgrounds rely on their community networks in order to find employment. However, they do not think that the employment opportunities provided within the community could put them into a right path towards upward mobility. It is clear that young people set themselves goals and have benchmarks, which are different from those of their parents. This is reflected in this passage from Ogun:

“I think the success is what our parents achieved, when they came to this country. If we go on with their business, it is not success for us. I think you must be better than them. You should put more on what ever they achieved. At least, getting good education and finding a job in an English firm.”

In order to realise their ideals, these young people tried to improve their employment conditions. That’s why the young people do not
think of these jobs as being permanent. In fact, most of the young people change their jobs very frequently. They spend less time in each job. As can be seen from Table 5, more than half of them have been in their last or current job for a year or less.

The young people, especially with relatively advantaged ones feel that their employment in the ethnic enclave should be temporary. For instance, Sinem with three A-Levels worked as a receptionist in a dentist’s practice, as an office worker in a local newspaper and finally acquired another office job:

“When I went to work, it wasn’t the work. Because I always thought I’ve got to go back to studying, which was my plan. That’s why I didn’t wanna settle into a job... when I was working in the newspaper or others, they were just pass the time jobs. You know, just passing time.”

In fact, the young people would prefer to work outside the community. Most of the negative employment conditions were attributed to the Turkish-speaking employers. They were less valued compared to other employers. Avni said:

“I prefer to work for an English employer, because then you know how much money you get and how long you work. I mean after five you can leave the job, whatever you do. But with a Turkish employer, he says go on let's finish this. Then you realised, the time is 8 o’clock in the evening.”

However, it seems that the young people could not find employment outside the community, even if they tried. There is one obvious channel to find jobs which is Job Centres, though few used formal job search methods such as Job Centres. A couple of young Cypriots and Turks actually applied to a Job Centre for help, but none of them were satisfied with the service they received. As we mentioned, Sinem with her three A levels changed couple of jobs and during that period she also tried to find employment outside community through Job Centre channel. But she failed:
“It’s so mechanised you know. It’s not personal. You just go to there and look at the computer screen, if any available jobs match with your qualifications. And if there isn’t any, there is no chance for you to see somebody and talk about yourself. It’s useless really.”

Some of them even choose direct approach and give their CV to the places where they wished to work. But this way is not the most preferable one, because they often do not hear from these shops. They believed their applications are less likely considered. Duygu who is working in a well-known retail shop where her friends are already working:

“The shop managers just eliminate some applications before even considering them according to the names on them. They just threw them into the rubbish bin. I saw it with my eyes... It’s true for especially high street retailers, big names.”

So, almost all of the young people found employment through their relatives and friends. For instance, Leyla explained how she usually fined an employment:

“Jobs I usually worked are not advertised in the Job Centre or in the Internet. Have you ever seen Waiters Wanted for a coffee shop in the Internet? They don’t need to anyway. They just let their friends or relatives know that they need a waiter, and problem solved.”

It seems that these patterns of labour market behaviour are in part voluntary and heavily influenced by the resources and practices of families and communities. The young Turks, Kurds and Turkish-Cypriots clearly use, indeed rely on family and kin links to help them through risky and extended transitions. This dependency on the ethnic enclave seems to create a structural restriction on the young people’s choices. The structural restriction creates risks that could reduce any chances for an upward mobility.
Conclusions

In this paper, we analysed young people’s early employment experiences in relation to ethnic enclave economy. In this context, we focused on the degree of dependency of the young people to this network in terms of employment opportunities. We also tried to find out the possibility of an upward mobility for these young people within the given labour market situation.

The Turkish speaking people in general lived in deprived areas. They are also struggling with many disadvantages ranging from unemployment to homelessness. Although some of the families are better off, compared to others in the community, all the members depend on the community network to support themselves. In other words, there is definitely an ethnic enclave present, consisting not just of sandwich and kebab shops but other family businesses providing extensive services. In many ways this is operating as a parallel micro-economy and is clearly a resource that is not available to all disadvantaged groups.

However, it has to be stressed that this resource comes at a price. Its existence may be a contributing factor to the young people’s relative reluctance to engage with the broader structure of labour market opportunities and can lead to them being trapped in an ethnic enclave. And in the longer term, it might prevent these young people’s upward mobility, since most of the jobs are unskilled or semi-skilled. Beside, even if they may open their own jobs, it still means long working hours and unsecured future prospects.

As we mentioned at the beginning, the theorists discussed possible influences of the ethnic enclave on the second generation’s upward mobility. Some of them seem to bless ethnic enclave to offer a valuable opportunity for an upward mobility, while others claim that there is no direct relation between two. In fact, the ethnic enclave which the Turkish-speaking young people depend on, does not offer favourable conditions. Furthermore, employment condi-
tions such as working hours and earnings did not show any sign of a possible upward mobility. The young people in our research seems to aware of this fact. That’s why they tried to find alternative employment outside the community. However, the formal channels did not help them to achieve their aim.

In the end, Turkish-speaking young people experience that strong ethnic inclusion in the current labour market is pushing them to make a choice: whether to accept the jobs which their parents already do or attempt to improve their future life-chances. The transition to adulthood would be no doubt an uneasy one for these young people. And it would be not so wrong to say that the ethnic economy might not serve the majority of these young people for an upward mobility, though with these coming from relatively advantaged backgrounds could use the ethnic enclave to jump up to broader labour market.

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NOTES

1 This research was sponsored by Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the fieldwork was conducted on 2002.

2 It is difficult to find a suitable terminology to encompass the groups. ‘Turkish-origin’ is not quite right, because it does not cover those who are from Cyprus; nor is ‘Turkish-speaking’ because for many Kurds, it is Kurdish, not Turkish, that is their primary language. If we use ‘Turks and Kurds’, this will omit the Cypriots. We do in fact use all three of these terms because no single term itself is satisfactory and nor is any other term. We mostly use ‘Turkish-speaking’ for the majority of the people studied, as their families do indeed speak some Turkish.
Identifying Ethnicity: “I’m Turkish”!

Lise Jönsson

The statement in the title of this article “I am Turkish!” belongs to Emine, aged 11. Emine is born in Denmark to Turkish immigrants and is absolutely clear about her ethnicity; she is Turkish and neither a guest worker, a foreigner, a refugee, an immigrant, a bilingual, a new Dane nor any other term ascribed to her by the public. She is a citizen of Denmark, albeit a particular kind of citizen; one who is Turkish in comparison to the majority who are Danish. But how did Emine come to identify with the Turkish group? How did Emine come to hold this particular idea of difference? Why isn’t she Danish?

Turkish Migration to Denmark

The first Turkish migrants arrived in Denmark in the middle of the 1960s. They were skilled workers and very few in numbers. However, in 1968 and 1969 as Sweden and West Germany tightened up the rules for work and residence permits, unskilled Turkish workers had to look elsewhere for work and began to travel to Denmark in greater numbers as the Danish iron and metal
industry was in rapid development and in shortage of workers (Sørensen 1988: 6-17). Most new workers came through relatives and friends who were already in Denmark and chain migration was further developed when the law changed and a written work offer from an employer in Denmark was necessary in order to come to Denmark (Østergaard 1983: 234-235, Andersen 2003: 12). This meant that it was necessary for new workers to Denmark to already know somebody working in Denmark who could have an employer send a written offer. Therefore, though the Turkish workers to Denmark did not arrive together as a group most of them came from the same area in Turkey since they through chain migration came to Denmark through relatives and friends (Andersen 2003: 12).

Because of the late participation in the import of labour, workers from less developed provinces came to Denmark as The Turkish Employment Service put out a priority and rotation system in the late 1960s in order to change migration so workers from the less educated areas to a greater extent could send their workers and, thus, not “drain” Turkey for skilled workers (Paine 1974: 66). This meant that many Turkish workers came to Aarhus from the Sivas province in East Central Anatolia, particularly from the Şarkışla area (Sane 2000: 296-297, Andersen 2003: 11).

In 1972, a drastic stop put an end to immigration when it was politically decided to close the borders for new immigrants. Denmark’s work force, like that of other Western countries, was sufficient to meet work demands. This meant that the migrants no longer were permitted to travel back and forth between Denmark and Turkey and that many, as a result, decided to prolong their stay (Schierup et al 2006: 38). Many applied for entry permits for spouses and children under the age of 20 (Østergaard 1983: 234-235). Others travelled to Denmark and obtained a residence permit by marriage. In 1989, some 80% of marriages between 30-35 year-old Turkish citizens in Denmark were to Turks from Turkey (Jeppesen
1989: 12). This number had risen to 91% of marriages in 1999 (Schmidt & Jacobsen 2000: 144) and because of the financial upturn in the 1980s where the dowry rose sky high, the people descending from the Sivas region began to marry acquaintances or within certain families in Turkey without a dowry (Diken 1989: 19). Thus, strengthening the ties with Sivas. As a result, most families with children today consist of a parent who was born in Turkey but brought up in Denmark and a parent who was brought up in Turkey and came to Denmark upon marriage.

In 2002, new family reunification legislations meant that the conditions of getting a husband/wife or partner to Denmark were highly restricted. Besides those regulations found in neighbouring countries such as certain financial security and suitable housing, both applicants needed now to be 24 years of age and together have closer ties with Denmark than to any other country. Evidently, these requirements have had significant influence on the number of family reunifications ever since and a drastic drop in both applying (58%) and being granted family reunification (72%) occurred after the introduction of the new legislation (by comparing 2001 to 2004). This means that Turks in Denmark today to greater extent marry Turks living in Denmark.

**Research Site: Gellerup**

Fieldwork was carried out in Aarhus, the second largest city in Denmark. The city has a population of approximately 295,000 people of which some 12% are minorities (immigrants/descendants). The Turkish population mainly lives in the Western part of the city collectively referred to as Gellerup along with people originating from Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq etc. This neighbourhood consists of blocks of flats which were built during the golden years of the 1960s and early 1970s to house the rapid growth in the foreign work force. However, today unemployment is high and the area has gained a bad reputation as the social authorities also placed families with
social problems in Gellerup. There are several schools in the Gellerup area. One of these is Linde School which was my main fieldwork site. Linde School has a broad pupil body with many different minority backgrounds (20% Turkish/20% Danish/60% others) and along with their parents its 55 Turkish children (aged 5-16) became my key informants. 20 months of participant observation (2004-2006) was also carried out in the Turkish community (at home, in the playground, during spare time activities and on holiday in Turkey) along with supplementary methods such as the use of drawings and photography as mediating devices for interviews with children.

**Speaking Identification**

“Are you Danish?” the girl asks me as I enter the classroom. Nine children from year 0 and year 1 are gathered to receive language support in Turkish and all eyes gaze at me as I sit down, smile and say “yes.” It’s my first day at fieldwork in Linde School and I place myself next to the girl who asked me. The teacher, whom I previously met to arrange my taking part in the Turkish language lessons, writes my name on the black board Lise Jönsson. “But,” the girl next to me says to the teacher, “you wrote it wrong, you put son in the end.” She knows that most Danish surnames, such as Nielsen, Petersen or Andersen end on sen and looks confused. The teacher, who himself had asked about my surname, explains that my surname is Swedish and therefore has son and not sen in the end. I listen carefully to the conversation, but it’s not until another child wants to know why Jönsson is my surname that I understand the significance of the conversation. I listen to myself explain how my great granddad was Swedish and came to Denmark while he was young, and I realise that the story I expected them to tell, the story of immigrants, I am telling myself. To my surprise, I have turned into a descendant myself.

*Excerpt from field notes, 06.02.04*
Throughout my fieldwork children’s categorisation and emphasis on ethnicity was of outmost importance. As the new children in year 0 and I shared common ground as newcomers, we were both in the early stages of being categorised within the space of Linde School and there is no doubt that my newly revived Swedish affiliation was an icebreaker at the beginning of my fieldwork. The children discussed my origin amongst themselves in Turkish and though I was not able to understand everything, I understood that they related to me. Like them, I had family ties abroad. My first contact with Turkish adults also revolved around my origin. The Turkish teacher assumed that I had visited Sweden several times and put me forward as an expert on Swedish culture and language. The Turkish professional educationalist in the SFO (after school activity centre) asked me to help with a job in Malmö, Sweden and Turkish parents asked about my foreign surname. As time passed by, it became obvious to Turkish people, however, that I had no more knowledge about Sweden than everybody else did and that I was not able to help with language anecdotes, contacts or other information about the country. My lack of information about Sweden contributed to a gradual disassociation from my being Swedish, but, as I demonstrate below in connection to the Turkish language, it was the fact that I could not speak my Swedish origin that excluded me from the category.

The Power of Language

I failed miserable in my first identifying category as a Swede. The idea, however, was shortly after replaced by an idea of my being Turkish. Children of all origins noticed my presence in the Turkish classroom and they continually asked me who I was and whether I was Turkish or Danish. Especially inside the Turkish classroom, the children explicitly engaged in the categorisation process by direct questions:
Zeki (8/03): “Lise, do you speak Turkish?”
Lise: “A little.”
Zeki: “Ok, for real, what are you? Are you Danish?”
Lise: “Yes.”
Zeki: “…and then you speak Turkish?” He laughs.

Excerpt from field notes, 21.09.04

Language was a powerful parameter in the children’s categorisation of people into ethnicities. The children were used to people speaking two languages, but these people were of Turkish, Arab or Somali origin – not Danish. Therefore, the Turkish children carried with them an idea of Turkish speaking people as Turkish in origin. This idea was widely held by the adult Turkish population too and confirmed that the Turkish children in their everyday life at home and in school learnt that the use of Turkish language entailed identification with Turkish ethnicity. Indeed, there was an imagined community (Anderson 1999 [1983]), where language bound people together as a group and so marked the personal and cultural feeling of belonging to a nation as a shared idea, and, where even partial knowledge of Turkish categorised one as Turkish.

Indeed, the Turkish children came over time to understand that I spoke a little Turkish and so had to be a bit Turkish too. This meant that I was categorised as both Turkish and Danish and that the children wondered, for example, whether I supported Turkey or Denmark in the Euro 2006 football qualifying matches. Only very few of the children came over time to hold the idea that I was in fact Danish – a particular kind of Dane, who also spoke some Turkish.

It’s Not What You Say, It’s the Language You Speak

Turkish lessons for the children in year 0-3, aged 5-9, were held after normal school hours and the majority of the children found them dull. The little children in year 0 looked forward to Turkish in
the beginning, but as soon as they found out that the older children did not appreciate Turkish, they too lost interest. At the same time, however, the children who attended Turkish lessons were eager to ask each other and I when Turkish lessons were held, though they were held at the same time on the same days of the week throughout the school year. They also questioned those Turkish children who did not attend Turkish as to why this was so and never revealed to “outsiders” that they thought the lessons were dull and that they would rather play in the SFO. In other words, the Turkish children manifested themselves as Turkish by taking part in Turkish lessons, but it was not what was being said and done in these lessons that mattered, it was the membership of a community of Turkish speakers that proved a powerful parameter among the children. A parameter that was so influential that I had the privilege of being considered a competent and capable person beyond my proficiency in Turkish and was asked for help with various Turkish assignments. Even, my look and appearance was interpreted in light of my language skills:

We are in Turkish class. I sit next to Kezban (6/05) and Nilgül (6/0), both from year 0. Kezban looks at me.
Kezban: “Are you a Turk?”
Lise: “No.”
Kezban: “What are you then?”
Lise: “I’m a Dane.”
Kezban: “How come you speak Turkish then? You look like a Turk.”
Lise: “I do?” I’m surprised.
Nilgül: “You have your hair coloured.”

Excerpt from field notes, 03.12.04

Kezban’s perception of me as a Turk because of my looks was not foreign to me, as did both Turkish children and adults. However, my eyes are blue and though my hair, as Nilgül points out, has
highlights, its darkest parts are still light brown. I am far from the much darker Turkish look and have never before been believed to descend from outside Northern Europe. Therefore, as the example above illustrates, Turkish children’s ideas of language use spill over into ideas about looks, for example. In short, the children categorise people as Turkish because they speak Turkish and not because they look or act that way. At the same time, however, it was clear that identification with various levels of being Danish and Turkish was carried out.

It’s free time for play in year 0. The three Turkish girls Nilgün (5/09), Kezban (6/03) and Cansu (6/04) have pulled up their chairs and are drawing. They talk about a Danish children’s song contest shown the week before on television. Suddenly:

Nilgün: “I’m a Turk.”
Kezban: “But you don’t know this one … [Kezban sings in Turkish], you are lying, you don’t know.”
Nilgün looks at her, she says nothing.
Kezban: “…and if I say fuck to this boy, then he tells his Dad and also his Mum. You didn’t even know that.”
Nilgün: “I knew it. I can … [Nilgün sings in Turkish]. I can more than you.”
Kezban: “Du-du [she sings a line from the Du-du song by Tarkan, a famous Turkish singer]. Do you know this? You don’t know it.”
Nilgün says nothing.
Kezban: “Who knows this? [She continues the Tarkan song].”
Nilgün: “My Mum loves him.”
Kezban: “She loves him?” Her tone is unfriendly.
Nilgün: “She loves his song.”
Kezban continues testing Nilgün’s knowledge of various Turkish songs for some time until the conversation turns into one about pets.

Excerpt from field notes, 05.10.04
The children in year 0 were learning to be part of Linde School and so episodes like the one above occurred regularly as they were in the early process of manifesting themselves as Turkish children. In this case, Kezban questions Nilgün’s “Turkishness” by trying to find gaps in Nilgün’s knowledge of music. By showing off her knowledge of Turkish music and her insights into what will happen if they, as Turkish children, were to say bad words to other children, she touches upon the fact that she is a true Turk in comparison to the less well-informed Nilgün. Kezban stresses that she is different from those who do not know Turkish music and customs.

An Imagined Community
So far, it has been demonstrated how the children in year 0 spoke identification with an ethnicity and how this distinction was widespread among both Turkish children and adults. However, this distinction is not a distinction taken out of context. It is a distinction in relation to everything that is not Turkish - a way of othering everything that does not fit into the Turkish category. This othering was also present in the daily activities in the classroom.

Excerpt from field notes, 14.12.04
It’s break time. Memet (7/03) is standing by the door waiting for the other children to tidy up. They are not allowed to go outside before everybody has finished. After a while, a group of children is standing around Memet. Memet raises his hand and says: “Those who are Turkish raise your hand.” Cansu (6/06) raises her hand and repeats Memet’s request. Ibrahim (6/06), also Turkish, is talking to another boy and does not hear. However, Cansu and Memet jointly raise his hand too.

Most of the children in year 0 knew each other from kindergarten and quickly found out who was Danish, Arab, Turkish etc. but they still engaged in little games like the one above. The game illustrates how all children take part in the identification with ethnicity, but it also carries with it a dimension of difference. The raising of hands
is the not the result of Memet’s wish to know which children are Turkish. He already knows this as he along with Cansu raise Ibrahim’s hand when Ibrahim fails to do so. Rather, the game is an attempt to make visible the difference between us, Turkish people and them, the non-Turkish, in order to manifest his own idea of being Turkish and of an imagined community of Turkish speakers in the social context called Denmark.

One may wonder then, what happens if the social context changes. During a visit to Turkey, I experienced the following:

We’re inside Kezban’s (6/0) and Metin’s (8/08) grandparents’ house in a village in the Sivas region. Kezban, Metin and two of their cousins are present. Kezban and I are playing a game. Kezban’s cousin looks as if she wants to join in.

Kezban: “Let’s play one more time.”
Lise: “Why don’t you play with your friend?” I have previously heard one of the cousins speak in Danish and assume that the girl next to us is a younger sibling. Thus, I turn to Kezban’s cousin and continue speaking in Danish.
Lise: “It’s not so difficult; you just need to put these pieces into this.”
Kezban: “She’s not Danish. Let’s play.”
The cousin is quiet. Kezban and I play one more game.

Excerpt from field notes, 25.07.04

The fact that Kezban is Turkish in Denmark does not mean that she is Turkish the same way as Turks in Turkey. In Denmark, the Turkish language distinguishes who is Turkish and who is not. In Turkey, however, where everybody speaks Turkish, the Turkish language is taken for granted because it does not distinguish people from one another. Even so, language continues to loom large in children’s perceptions of themselves and others. In the example above, Kezban implies that she is Danish by stressing that her cousin is not. This is striking when compared with Kezban’s efforts
to constitute herself as Turkish in Denmark by showing off her knowledge of Turkish music (see above). Kezban’s mother also focused on a non-Turkish ethnicity while in Turkey. Her brother and his family were living in the Netherlands and were visiting the village for the summer too. Introducing them to me, she emphasized that they were from the Netherlands. Indeed both children and adults felt somewhat different from the Turks in Turkey.

Lise: “Do you feel like a Turk in Turkey?”
Efendi (29): “No, I’m like an immigrant. I don’t feel Turkish in Turkey or like a Dane here. All Turks who live abroad feel like that.”
Lise: “So if someone asks you where you are from, what do you say?”
Efendi: “I say that I was born in Sivas, and that I live abroad, but when it comes to buying goods, I don’t say that [he laughs]. It’s good to be able to bargain about the price. It’s fun, in a shop for example, where they ask five kroner and I say that I won’t give more than four. I do it here too. Clothes, for example, I buy three pieces and I ask if I can have a discount, and I succeed.”

Excerpt from field notes, June 2005

Turks in Denmark were, like Efendi, neither Turks in Turkey nor Danes in Denmark. Rather they were particular kinds of Turks living in the context called Denmark and were able to be part of both. They played with the identification to their advantage so that discount could be obtained. In line with this, I was never asked whether I was Danish or Turkish while in Turkey, everyone knew I was Danish. Nevertheless, five months after the episode in Turkey, Kezban asks me if I am in fact Turkish (see above).

School Culture

The particular intersubjective relationships in Linde School meant that children spoke their ethnicity and thereby constituted them-
selves as Turkish, Arab, Danish and so on. This leads me to consider the notion of school culture where culture is taken to be the sum of the intersubjective relationships and so a notion whose content is ever-changing. As demonstrated above, this particular Linde School culture was primarily apparent in year 0 and upon the arrival of newcomers such as myself. We were categorised as we entered the space called Linde School. Therefore, children in year 1 and above did not speak their ethnicity as expressively as the children in year 0 did as the categories came into place during year 0. However, they still expressively did so when new children or teachers arrived. For example, two substitute teaches of Danish origin were questioned about their background; one because of his Southern European look and the other because of her English first name.

The significance of this school culture came into perspective when I visited other schools in the Aarhus area. During my fieldwork, quite a few of the children changed school. Two of these were Abidin and Hatice.

I visit Abidin (9/02) and Hatice (9/10). Both children have changed school after the summer holiday and I have come to see how they are doing in the new school, which has a large majority of Danish children. During class, I speak to Abidin’s teacher and she tells me that Abidin is the only Turkish child in the classroom. One of the Danish children overhears the conversation and asks the teacher: “Is Abidin Turkish?”

Later I ask Abidin how he likes his new school.

Abidin: “I like it. I got new friends. …[I’ve got]…Jacob, he is also new [in class].”

Excerpt from field notes, 14.11.05

In the example, it is striking how Abidin no longer speaks his Turkish ethnicity in school and how his new classmates do not know that he is indeed Turkish. Rather Abidin identifies with the
other newcomer in class, Jacob – a Danish boy. Also during my visit in Hatice’s classroom, I found that she did not join up with the other Turkish girl, but was making friends with the Danish girls. In other words, speaking one’s ethnicity was not part of the new school’s school culture. However, surely Abidin and Hatice are still Turkish as their ideas of ethnicity and of the imagined community do not vanish because they do not express themselves as they did in Linde School. We shall now see this demonstrated in relation with Turkish children in another school. During my research, I occasionally substituted at a school in another suburb of Aarhus. This school had a majority of Danish children, but also a good share of minority children. One day in a year 5 the following happened:

I arrive in the classroom and go around the tables to give them some work sheets. As I arrive at the cluster of tables in the back, I can tell that a Danish boy and a Turkish girl, Emine (11), have had a heated discussion.

Boy: “Lise, is it possible for a person born in Denmark to be Turkish?”
Emine: “It is, it is. I’m born here and my Mum and Dad are from Turkey.”
Boy: “Yeah, but then you must be Turkish-Danish or something.”
Emine: “I’m Turkish!”
They both look at me in anticipation of my decision of who is right and who is wrong. January 2006

As put forward in the beginning of the article, Emine strongly argues that she is Turkish. However, the Danish boy does not believe that Emine can be Turkish since she is born in Denmark and speaks Danish; the least she must be is “Turkish-Danish or something.” This illustrates how the school culture in my work place did not entail the same categories as found in Linde School. The children’s space-making meant that the school culture at this school
did not include ethnic categories such as the Turkish, thus, the children did not speak Turkish with each other; neither did the Arab children speak Arabic or the Somali children Somali. Instead, all children spoke Danish. The use of the Danish language did not let the children consider each other’s backgrounds since this was not apparent in every day life in the school. Everybody spoke Danish and so had to be Danish (or at least Danish-Turkish/Arab/Somali). However, though Turkish, Arab and Somali categories were not part of the everyday life at this school, the children of these origins still had ideas about ethnicity. In the example above, Emine insists that she is Turkish because her parents are from Turkey and because she is evidently a member of an imagined community of Turkish speakers. However, because her Turkish language is not disclosed to her classmates, the Danish boy categorises her as Danish because she speaks Danish in the school setting. This example corresponds to the example above with Abidin, whose classmates do not know that he is Turkish since he never speaks Turkish. This discrepancy between the conceptions of Turkish children in Linde School and the two other schools underlines the importance of language with regards to identification. In Linde School where the children have many different ethnicities, their mother tongue is often used by children who identify with the same ethnicity and marks them as Turkish, Danish, Arab etc. However, in other schools where the ratio of minority children is low, the minority children do not speak their ethnicity because the school culture entails that they speak Danish. Yet, these children still consider themselves Turkish, for example, because they speak their mother tongue in other settings such as at home or with friends. Abidin, Hatice, Emine and the other Turkish children in the examples above are indeed Turkish, also in the new setting. They are particular kinds of Turkish children who speak Turkish and Danish.

As seen above, language is as a marker of ethnicity in all three schools in the Aarhus area. Yet, it is only in Linde School that
Turkish is part of the school culture. Stephen May (2001) writes about the relationship between minority and majority languages:

“Language decline and language death always occur in bilingual or multilingual contexts, in which ‘majority’ language – that is, a language with greater political power, privilege and social prestige – comes to replace the range and functions of a minority language” (Language and Minority Rights, p. 1).

Considering the ratio of children speaking Danish as a mother tongue in Linde School compared to the two other schools is striking. In Linde School less than 25% of the children are Danish while more than 70% and 85% are Danish on the two other schools, respectively. In other words, the intersubjective relations in Linde School are informed by many different languages and the diversity in the pupil body is acknowledged by the school as they offer language support classes and parents’ meetings in the appropriate languages. In contrast, the intersubjective relations in the two other schools are largely informed by the Danish language and there is no community of Turkish speakers who receive language instruction or whose parents are invited to Turkish parents’ meetings. Therefore, the Danish language because of its majority of speakers is part of the school culture in these two schools and the Turkish children have replaced Turkish with Danish in the school setting and are much more competent speakers of Danish in comparison to children in Linde School. On one hand, one may argue that the children in the two other schools get the benefits of learning the nuances of Danish while the children in Linde School do not get the same proficiency. At the same time, however, one may argue that the children in Linde School are much more well-balanced about their Turkishness as they are “allowed” to speak their ethnicity in the school setting and not only consigned to speak ethnicity in the home setting or with friends, for example.
The Importance of Language

Considering the argument so far, it is striking how children speak identification with an ethnicity. It has been demonstrated how perception of ethnicity emerges as the product of children’s embodied ideas of how particular children speak. Turkish children verbally make use of the categories of “us” and “them” by continually emphasising their Turkishness and other ethnic groups’ lack thereof. But why is language important in identification? Why does language create an imagined community? Benedict Anderson’s book on Imagined Communities, originally from 1983, gives a useful explanation:

“What the eye is to the lover – that particular, ordinary eye he or she is born with – language – whatever language history has made his or her mother-tongue – is to the patriot. Through that language, encountered at mother’s knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed” (Imagined Communities, p. 154)

Experiences with language are, as here, powerful since they are learnt throughout life. Growing up with a Turkish mother tongue, for example, means that the first knowledge is learnt in Turkish and that following experiences are experienced in light of this - making the Turkish language the informer and mediator of ideas and an obvious marker of ethnicity in an imagined community of Turks. The significance of the Turkish language becomes even clearer when investigating the Turkish language in a historical perspective as prior to the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, Ottoman Turkish was a mix of Turkish, Arabic and Persian combined with words of Italian, Greek, Armenian and other European languages. Atatürk’s multiple reforms meant, however, that the Latin alphabet replaced Arabic writing in 1928 and that the Turkish Language Institute (Türk Dil Kurumu) was established in 1932. The purpose of the language institute was to replace non-Turkish
words with new “authentic” ones (Aytürk 2004: 1) and through campaigns such as Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş (Citizen! Speak Turkish), the media and the school system aimed to establish a homogeneous national community with a common language (öz Türkçe) where any citizen could take part in the democratic decision-making process (Çolak 2004: 81). Claiming an authentic language, it was anticipated, should provide Turkey with a historical and national pride, which would enable Turkey to be part of the West (Aytürk 2004: 19). In other words, historically, language has since the establishment of the republic been an important way of identifying with being Turkish. By way of speculating, the creation of an imagined community of Turkish speaking people in Denmark may be strengthened further because language has held much significance in Turkish identification for years.

**Language as Differentiation**

In order to grasp the importance of language in Turkish identification, one should also consider Danish society in general as identifying with Turkish ethnicity mean differentiating oneself from everything that is not. In Denmark as a whole, notions such as Turkish, Arab and Somali people were held but in practice distinctions were only between Danes and non-Danes. The importance of this distinction was seen in the on-going debate about the number of minority pupils in Danish schools. When embarking on fieldwork in 2003, there were 65% minority children in Linde School; this number had risen to 80% when leaving the school in 2006. This development was the outcome of a new act of “free choice of school” introduced to the Danish folkeskole in August 2005. The new act entailed that parents now had the right to choose freely a school for their children and as described by the head teacher, this led Danish parents to “panic” and take their children out of Linde School (and other schools with more than 50% minority children) placing them in the neighbouring schools with fewer minority children such as was done by Abidin’s and Hatice’s parents (see
above). To compensate for this, language screening was introduced in 2006 in order to distribute minority children with insufficient Danish equally between all Aarhus schools.

The head teacher speaks about the act’s consequences for Linde School at the annual Turkish parents’ meeting, 2005.

Head Teacher: “The act meant that we have said goodbye to 60 children in three months, but also that we have said hello to 30 children. There are 2/3 Danish children who have left the school and 1/3 bilingual [minority]. The 30 children who have come to our school are from Gellerup and from private schools such as the Turkish.”

Döne (29): “When I enrolled my daughter [2004] there were 50% bilinguals, now 75% and in a few years 100%.”

Head Teacher: “The aim [of language screening] is for ethnic Danes to choose our school. 80% of the children in the new year 0s [2006] will speak the Danish language as an ordinary Danish child. There is a maximum of 20% who do not have this [ability]. We will probably be a small school for a while, and then it will change.”

Döne: “But this is an aim, not a reality. This is not gonna happen while my children are here.”

Fatih: “…The politicians are making it difficult for us. Why does my child need to move school to a completely different place? It hurts.”

Excerpt from field notes, 14.11.05

Non-Danes were throughout society seen as less competent to Danish children and adults. Above, the head teacher stresses the importance of language in this regard as the ability to speak the Danish language is seen as the determining parameter in creating a good school. Parents too were very upset with the recent development in Linde School and Fatih’s statement expresses the disappointment with having to transfer his son from school to school in
order to provide schooling for his child together with Danish children. The statements by Turkish parents above show the recognition of themselves in a category of non-Danes. However, while the parents knew that they were, the children were only learning to be and around age nine began to identify with the other minority children and not only with the Turkish children.

Fulya (12/03) speaks to me about her drawing of break time. She tells me that she swings and does different kinds of ball games.

Lise: “Who are you with?”
Fulya: “The girls from my class, the Muslim girls.”
Lise: “How about the other girls in class [the Danish]?”
Fulya: “I don’t know if they want to, they are with the other year.”
Lise: “They are with the other Danish girls?”
Fulya: “Yes, they are.”

Excerpt from field notes, 18.04.05

As demonstrated earlier, Turkish children identify with Turkish children and further to this, their families have very little contact with other ethnicities. Therefore, identifying with the Muslim girls as Fulya does above is learnt through the intersubjective relations in school where minority children and Danish children are set apart. Islam becomes the common feature for minority children at school since the school had very few non-Muslim minority children. Thus, minority children are a community of Muslims in themselves; a group of people who are believed to share common features by outsiders. This is also seen in the case of Fulya above. Fulya does not know why the Danish girls isolate themselves from the Muslim girls. The main point being that it is not Islam which unites the Muslim girls rather it is the exclusion, the fact that they are “the other,” which sets them apart from Danes. Their being set apart as non-Danes makes the girls recognise that they are Muslim girls. Indeed, it so happened that due to the free choice of school,
all the Danish girls (and boys) from Fulya’s class transferred to a new school leaving only Muslim children in her class.

In Fulya’s case, she recognises the difference between Muslim girls and Danish girls, the same distinction as that of Danish society as a whole. Indeed, it seemed that the two groups of girls did not communicate, they just separated as if this was a given. Acknowledgement of this distinction got more powerful as the children got older and parents expressed frustration.

Furat (34): “They [the Danes] make no difference between Arabs, Palestinians etc. They just see that we have black hair and that we are foreigners… …The Arabs make trouble and the Turks pay for this too. It’s the Danes own fault because they have let in too many refugees. All black haired are foreigners. We are trapped. They [the Danes] can’t see that I attended school here all the time. [The Arabs] just go to their doctor and say that they have a bad back, are diabetic or see snakes from the war and then they are given their pensions. I understand that many people [Danes] are racist, so am I. You become that eventually. They [the Arabs] sell drugs. Look out there [he points outside the window], he’s got a BMW.”

Excerpt from field notes, April 2005

The lack of recognition of Turks as different from the Arabs and other ethnic groups upset the Turks. Here Furat vividly demonstrates how he perceives himself as non-Dane in the eyes of Danish people and show why being Turkish becomes important to the Turks in Denmark. The fact that Danes see Turkish people first and foremost as generic ‘non-Danes’ means that Turkish people identify with an imagined community of Turks where people speak identification with a Turkish ethnicity as this marks them as a distinct group. Therefore, as demonstrated, speaking Turkish and manifesting oneself as Turkish is of outmost importance and explains why Emine in the title of this article strongly argues “I’m Turkish.”
Indeed, she comes over time to hold particular ideas of difference with respect to her relations with native Danes and with people of other ethnicities. She is Turkish because she can not be Danish and do not want to be a non-Dane.
NOTES

1 The other larger cities in Denmark also received Turkish immigrants. However, though the Turks migrating to these cities also were from the Anatolian highlands, because of chain migration these were usually from the Northern part of the province of Konya (mainly Kurds) and from Çorum (Andersen 1990: 61).

2 Public pressure on politicians meant that the legislation was moderated in 2004. It was added that the attachment requirement was to be excluded if the person in Denmark has had Danish citizenship for 28 years or had legally been in the country for 28 years, provided that he or she was either born and brought up or arrived as a young child to Denmark (Ministeriet for flygtninge, indvandrere og integration 2005: 82).

3 Linde School is a so-called Folkeskole. The folkeskole is the municipal primary and lower secondary school in Denmark which takes children aged 5-16.

4 I prepared myself for fieldwork by attending a Turkish night course and by spending two months on a language course in Istanbul.

5 The expression of Turkishness through language is rather similar to findings by Quist in relation to minority children’s Danish skills. She argues that minority children’s knowledge and use of Danish categorised them on a scale of very Danish to less Danish (see Quist 1998).

6 Prior to the school year 2006/2007, all minority children’s Danish language abilities were tested so that at least 80% of children in year 0 spoke Danish comparable to a Danish 5 year-old child’s. Children who were not able to meet the requirements were either enrolled in Linde School as some of the 20% who were less capable speakers or transferred to other Aarhus schools which had not yet met their 20% quota. For Linde School this meant that only 16 children were enrolled; 10 Danish children and 6 minority children (38%) compared to 33 children in the school year 2005/2006. 25 of these were minority children (75%). According to human rights, it would be illegal to distribute the children according to ethnicity, but the use of language screening mean that the distribution is carried out on academic terms, i.e. insufficient language skills, and is then legal (Gitz-Johansen 2006: 93). Studies show that the spread of minority children to schools with fewer minority pupils does not improve children’s learning of Danish. Rather it fails to recognize the children’s ethnic background and their mother tongue and makes the children insecure, thus, hampering the children’s learning (Ejrnæs & Tireli 1997: 66, Holmen 2006: 210).
Turkish Youth in England: Music, Identity and Nationalism

Paul Tkachenko

Introduction

Recent research carried out in London secondary schools shows overwhelmingly that young Turkish-speaking students are performing academically worse than their peers (Mehmet Ali 2001; Küçükcan 1999; Enneli, Modood & Bradley 2005). This poor performance spans the whole curriculum and includes music. Whilst completing a teaching placement at Islington Green School (Summer 2004), I discovered that many Turkish-speaking students were taking part in group instrumental music lessons out of school and had a relatively high level of musical knowledge compared to their peers yet were still underachieving in classroom music. Perhaps because of peer pressure and desire to conform, these students were reluctant to reveal this music making in a school situation. This prompted me to investigate such activities and to pose questions about the usefulness of such segregated or ‘community’ teaching. Also implicit in the study is a comparison with the music making of similar aged people in Turkey. This comparison raises
questions about the development of the Turkish Republic that was founded on the enduring Westernising ideologies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, usually referred to as Kemalism. The London Turks’ reception of such Kemalist ideas is, as I demonstrate, implicit in the identity that they maintain and this is manifest in their musical activities.

Images of ‘Turkishness’ are set against a complex historical background. These images range from the enduring exoticism of Cadbury’s advertising of Fry’s Turkish Delight to the horror of Istanbul prisons in Alan Parker’s film Midnight Express. Current impressions seem to stem predominantly from cheap package holidays taken on the South coast of Turkey and also from experiences with diaspora Turks. In this study the nationalism that I refer to is the afffinity of Turkish nationals living in London to the current Turkish Republic. It is worthy of note that in Turkish there exists the word ‘Türkiyeli’, which is used to refer to inhabitants of the Turkish Republic who are not necessarily Turkish and stands apart from the more generic türk meaning simply Turkish. Another term that requires further consideration is ‘ethnic’. I acknowledge the connotations of the word with regards to race and nation, indeed the origin of the word lies in the Greek ‘ethnos’ meaning ‘nation’ in the sense of ‘ethnic group’. Here I use the word to differentiate between Cypriotturks, Kurds and the Mainland Turks upon which I focus. That all three of these ethnic groups share many musical activities in London is in itself significant. As I have discussed in my previous work on the expression of cultural identity in London Turks (Tkachenko 2004b), ethnicity appears to be a much more contentious issue amongst Turkish-speaking communities than perceptions of race although the latter appears to bind them together socially and perhaps musically.

As well as examining the well-documented secondary school evidence I detail lessons given in the bağlama saz at the Londra Saz School in Stoke Newington, East London; Londra being the Turkish
word for London. Based on personal experiences at the Arif Sağ saz school in Istanbul, I shall compare the lessons given in both schools and the function they serve as part of general music education.

I analyse the fan-base that Turkish pop stars maintain in London, especially amongst young Turkish-speaking groups. This has resulted in music management companies being set up, such as Star Productions UK, who specialise in the Turkish-speaking market in London. I observed Turkish pop star Mustafa Sandal performing at the Leicester Square Hippodrome for around five thousand people. I investigate the efforts of such singers as Mustafa Sandal and the more commercially successful Tarkan to break into the international, particularly English-speaking, market. I show how this appears to reveal much about how Turkish youngsters perceive themselves in London.

**The Londra Saz School**

The focus group is young people of secondary school age, that is 11-18. I shall allude to the influence that the Turkish government has, however implicit, over the students and how this may shape their sense of identity. I also discuss music that appears to be popular amongst such children and how this asserts their nationalistic pride. As part of this I draw comparisons with observations made at the Arif Sağ Saz School in Istanbul. I consider research carried out in Germany and cite cases of Turkish pop stars that have influenced the diaspora community. I outline the music provision for Turkish-speaking pupils in three London secondary schools and suggest weaknesses in the system.

The current study is written from an almost exclusively outsider perspective. By this I mean that I speak very little Turkish, have no personal attachment to the issues discussed and have no ongoing professional involvement with either the Londra Saz School or the teaching of Turkish-speaking children. Perhaps my
own upbringing in a diaspora setting in Germany may have some bearing on my affinity with the Turkish-speaking community in London. Here, however, I refer mostly to the academic writings of those with an insider perspective.

The Londra Saz School is a music school that teaches the bağlama. Lessons are given in groups of between 10-15 and they happen in the evenings and at weekends. I observed two lessons, the first of which was for those who had been playing for about one year. The second was for more intermediate players, some who had been playing for four years. The pupils receive two, two-hour lessons per week, the cost of which is £40 per month representing considerably better value for money than the music tuition service offered by the majority of surrounding LEAs. The pupil base is fairly wide and spans Hackney, Haringey, Islington and Waltham Forest.

The Londra Saz School is situated on Stoke Newington High Street and occupies the basement level of an internet café that also has a small music shop selling mostly CDs, books and a few bağlama. There are a number of tables set out where Turkish-speaking young people clearly meet and socialise before and after their lessons. There is one large classroom on the basement level with another similar sized room containing a piano that can also serve as a classroom. There is a large whiteboard at one end and the students are seated in rows on chairs. They do not use music stands as pupils are expected to either read the music from the board, or to have memorized the music beforehand.

Each lesson starts with warm-up exercises that are initiated by the teacher in a call and response manner. Such exercises get progressively faster and the emphasis is on finger dexterity and mızrap control. One pupil is expected to copy the music onto the whiteboard from a book before the lesson. This pupil tended to be one of the better achieving pupils musically and was therefore able to bypass some of the warm-up exercises. This notation, based on the
Western model, was then corrected by the teacher before proceeding with the lesson. Mostly an already learnt piece was then played. The main focus piece of the lesson was then attempted and was practised a bar at a time and was also sung using solfege. Whilst the focus was clearly on bağlama technique, each piece was also sung by all the pupils. The majority were able to do everything from memory and all showed signs of familiarity with the music.

The lessons were conducted entirely in Turkish. Some pupils did, however, talk to each other in English during the lesson. Whilst, in my own experience, many pupils in Inner London secondary schools speak English with many errors, these pupils were speaking a mixture of English and Turkish. This combined use up of the two languages has been dubbed Londraşı (Londoner) Turkish by the London Turkish-speaking community and has been widely commented on.

Earlier studies suggest that children prefer to speak Turkish amongst their peers in mainstream schools (Ulug 1981). However, more recent findings suggest that the younger generations mainly use English in peer group interactions. Turkish is used to interact with their parents, grandparents or with their teachers in supplementary schools (Issa 1993). The speech patterns also suggest a mixing of Turkish and English, creating a distinctive Londraşı (Londoner) Turkish (Adalar 1997). It is argued that mixed codes are indicative of a changing purpose where language is increasingly used to reflect a particular social cultural experience (Issa 2005: 16).

It was particularly interesting to note, although not entirely surprising, that the majority of the pupils knew Turkish musical terms but not their English equivalents. In a mainstream school setting, however, I quickly realised the danger of finding English equivalents for many Turkish musical concepts. My initial thought was that such pupils were clearly working at a much higher musical level than the majority of their peers in mainstream schooling and that they were not being adequately catered for in curriculum
music lessons. Much has been written, notably by Mehmet Ali (2001), Issa (2005) and Küçükcan (1999) on the failings of mainstream teachers to adequately accommodate such pupils. However, the reality and implementation of such requirements are, as I will demonstrate later, less than successful.

The bağlama teacher had been in England for five years and his grasp of English was still rudimentary; he was, for instance, not able to talk to me even about basic things such as the timing of lessons in English. There is such a concentration of Turkish speakers around the Green Lanes area of London that it is clearly possible to live on a day-to-day basis only speaking Turkish. This area of London is referred to by the Turkish-speaking community as the Capitol (Issa 2005). It is significant that the teacher comes from Izmir and does not have the same background as the pupils. The lesson was mostly demonstrative and it was very easy to follow. Any words that were not understood were explained by other pupils. The pupils were nearly all born in London although their families came from either eastern Turkey, Cyprus or were of Kurdish origin. I therefore expected a noticeably different approach, particularly regarding their affinity to the Turkish Republic. This was, however, difficult to define. The majority, representative of the wider Turkish-speaking community in London, were Alevi and this appears to be somewhat reflective of the music that they listen to and play.

Of the two groups that I focused on, the more novice group were studying a piece made popular by Tarkan, Uzun İnce Bir Yoldayım (I am on a long and narrow road), the success of which is worth detailing. The son of Turkish emigrants Tarkan was born in 1972 in Germany, where he remained until he was sixteen. It appears that the fact he has an emigrant background is particularly endearing to for the students at Londra. The fact that Tarkan yearned to return to his ‘roots’ in Turkey and study Turkish art music did much for his popularity and his album sales, particular-
ly in Germany, have reflected this. His 1999 album Ölürüm Sana (I die for you) reached number one in the German and Belgium album charts; this was no doubt abetted by the large Turkish population in these countries. Tarkan’s most successful songs internationally are Hepsi Senin Mi? (Is everything yours?) from the 1994 album Aacayipsin (you are sensational) and Şımarık (Spoiled) from Ölürüm Sana. Hepsi Senin Mi? was covered by Russian singer Philip Kirkorov (1998) as Oi Mama Shika Dam! (not translatable) and Şımarık, with original English lyrics as Kiss Kiss, was a UK number one for soap-opera star Holly Valance in 2002. This was significant, as it represented a widespread acceptance of Turkish music amongst UK teenagers. More significant, at least for the Turkish-speaking teenagers who attended Londra, was that Kiss Kiss/Şımarık (and Hepsi Senin Mi?) were both written by Sezen Aksu who appeared to be overwhelmingly the most popular Turkish pop singer amongst the young Turkish-speaking community (Tkachenko 2004a).

That the song Uzun İnce Bir Yoldayım proved a popular choice amongst the pupils was unsurprising, but worthy of discussion. The song was written by Aşık Veysel Şatıroğlu and has become an established, well recognised song. An Aşık is a bard originating largely from central and eastern Anatolia. They are traditionally wandering artists and ‘may be forced to travel as a result of war, feud, or poverty’ (Stokes 1992: 159). The songs are often melancholy and there is a tradition of blind Aşık (Baumann 1985), which is similar to early Blues musicians or Ukrainian Kobzari (Kononenko 1998). Also worthy of note is the fact that many, although by no means all, Aşık are Alevi Muslims which is also the dominant religious group amongst the London Turkish-speaking community. That Tarkan should choose such a song to cover promotes pride amongst the London Alevi. It is also significant because the Aşık were central in the development of Atatürk’s idea of Halk Evleri (Folk Houses) in which folk arts, in a carefully controlled way, could be practiced and nurtured. This is not to suggest
that the Londra Saz School is a Halk Evi although such establish-
ments are numerous in London, especially the Cemevi (lit. Houses
of Cem) which are dedicated Alevi centres.

Also worthy of note is the fact that the song Uzun İnce Bir
Yoldayım is performed together with Arif Sağ. Sağ is one of the
most legendary bağlama players in Turkey and is held in high
regard by all of the pupils at the Londra Saz School. He rose to fame
as part of the folk group Muhabbet (friendship) and his virtuoso
and extrovert style of playing did much to popularize the instru-
ment (Markoff 1986: 204). What I did notice was that very few of the
pupils had much understanding of the political activities of Arif
Sağ, that have become inseparable from his music. Stokes (1992)
assesses the inseparability of Aşık singers and the Alevi:

The recent popularity of their music owes something to the
current perceived political affiliations of the Alevi who express a
history of oppression and social protest in their music from the time
of Pir Sultan Abdal, an Alevi musician and pir (saint) hanged by the
Ottoman state in the sixteenth century. The social injustice of every
age provides a new context for old texts and inspires the creation of
new ones. In the political climate of Turkey in 1987, dominated by
the free-market policies of the Anavatan (Motherland) Party, this
style of music was associated unshakably with leftist politics. It
came as no surprise to anyone when Arif Sağ, bağlama virtuoso
and one of the foremost proponents of this style, became a candi-
date and was duly elected as deputy for the left-of-centre Sosyal
Halkçı Partisi (Social Populist Party) in Ankara at the beginning of
1988. Bağlama düzen is rapidly becoming known as “Arif düzeni”.
(pp.79-80)

It might appear initially unsurprising that teenagers would be
ignorant of political events from nearly twenty years ago. The par-
ents are acutely aware of such political activity; this can also be seen
in the influence that the diaspora Turks hold over change in
Turkey. This is particularly pertinent with regard to the British
Cypriotturkish population who, it is estimated, outnumber those living in the North of Cyprus. Another example of this can be seen in the recent inclusion of some Kurdish language programs in mainstream Turkish terrestrial television. That such political thought is not transmitted to the younger generation is perhaps significant that, in this case, cultural aspects (Sağ’s music) endure more than the deeper political meaning.

The Londra Saz School is an example of a dershane, that is an establishment offering evening and weekend classes in folk arts of which the Halkevleri and Cemevleri are also examples but with wider social aspects. The focus, as Stokes (1992) points out lies ‘not so much in providing an opportunity to learn and participate in reformed, state-endorsed traditional music and dance, but in membership of what is in effect a youth club’ (p.46). Seen from this angle it makes perfect sense that the lessons take place under an internet café, the perfect place for young people to meet and also, via the internet, to connect with Turkey. Thus, the Londra Saz School is essentially performing a similar function socially to a Halkev.

The influence that the Turkish state holds over these youngsters is strong, yet in a subtle way. An example of this is in the teachers at such schools, of which the teacher at the Londra Saz School is no exception. I was surprised at how direct the teacher could be in response to the pupil’s musical interests. During one lesson, a girl questioned the teacher about arabesk, a style of music not often listened to by teenagers in mainland Turkey (See Tekman & Hortaçsu 2002; Stokes 1992). The teacher spent a considerable amount of time in the lesson explaining how arabesk was kötü (bad) and was unsuitable listening material. As musical styles converge and more and more artists experiment with arabesk this seemed to be a rather prescriptive approach. The origins of arabesk stem from the music popular amongst Turks and Kurds migrating from the eastern part of Turkey to the larger cities, particularly Istanbul, in search of work. This influx exceeded the demand and
resulted in squatter settlements, or gece kondu, around the peripheries of cities especially Istanbul. Arabesk is inextricably linked to the gece kondu and, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, a stigma was attached to arabesk. As many Turkish weekend schools in London receive funding from the Turkish government the teachers do not promote arabesk, just as it is not promoted in schools in Turkey. Without conforming to the approach as it is in Turkey, such weekend schools are in danger of losing their Turkish government funding. The teacher performed at the end of the lesson, which served to inspire the pupils and appeared to invoke a sense of national pride. It is interesting to note that the Turkish Education Group in London, chaired in 2005 by Önder Bicer, does not receive funding from the Turkish government because of their ‘left-wing politics’ (Bicer 2005).

In a survey of musical listening trends that I carried out amongst fifty Turkish-speaking secondary school children (Summer 2004) where they had to rate five styles of Turkish music and Western pop, arabesk received a 15% popularity vote. Although this was the lowest score, all the other styles (Turkish Folk/Türkü, Turkish Art, Turkish Pop and Western/Pop) received similarly weighted scores. Whilst such surveys can be misleading it concurs with an online poll conducted on the London Turkish Radio website where arabesk received a similar amount of votes to both Turkish Folk and Classical music. This does, however, reveal that it is likely that arabesk has a following in London amongst Turkish-speaking youngsters. I noticed that those children who listened to arabesk did so more or less exclusively; they were reluctant to acknowledge listening to any other style of music. This gives weight to the findings that I mentioned earlier by Tekman & Hortaçsu (2002) and suggestions by Stokes (1992) that those listening to arabesk differ from their peers.

From my observations of a similar type of dershane, the Arif Sağ saz school in Istanbul, it appears that the teaching methods and
approach are very similar to the Londra Saz School. I did notice, however, some discrepancies. The age range of the school in Istanbul was far wider and concurred with Stoke’s (1992) findings of about 16-35 whereas the London school was almost exclusively Key Stage 3 (11-16) with the noticeable absence of anyone of sixth-form age. Whilst difficult to affirm, it appeared that the males in the Istanbul school were far more ambitious in their playing than the females, who viewed it purely as a hobby. The opposite was true in London, where the females appeared to take it much more seriously than the males for whom it seemed to assert self-importance. The age-range differences also represent the differences in approach to learning an instrument between Turkey and the UK. The material used in both schools was analogous as was the style of demonstrative teaching. The teaching rooms were almost the same as was the social function of the school.

Much has been written (Mehmet Ali 2001; Rutter 2003; Issa 2005) about the mistreatment of Turkish-speaking pupils in the British education system and my own experience initially concurred with such work. During a teaching placement at Islington Green School (Summer 2004), I noticed that a number of pupils were underachieving in music, even though I knew them to be able bağlama players. There was no provision for such pupils, in terms of learning the bağlama in school, even though other ethnic ensembles existed such as a Steel Pan group. Mehmet Ali (2001) has labelled such neglect of Turkish speakers as ‘educational genocide’. This prompted me to investigate how other schools with large numbers of Turkish speakers in the area dealt with the issue.

The first school I visited was Park View Academy in Haringey, where as many as 40% of the pupils speak Turkish as their first language. They had recently employed a bağlama teacher to come and teach in much the same way as the rest of the peripatetic music teachers. From a whole-school musical perspective, this appeared to have been successful insomuch as it provided material for school
concerts; the Head of Music could also liaise with the bağlama teacher. The bağlama teacher was, however, dismissed because of work permit problems and I was not able to speak with him directly. I was, however, able to assess the impact that such lessons had brought to the school. It appeared that there existed a great tension between the Turkish-speaking and the Afro-Caribbean pupils and that this had erupted into fairly large-scale violence within the school with pupils on both sides calling for adult, mostly ‘gang’ based, backup. Students appeared to rally together in racial rather than ethnic groups and whilst there were minor altercations between Turks and Kurds the larger clashes were between Afro-Caribbean and those of Pan-Turkic extraction; the carrying of a bağlama serves as an additional marker.

It was intriguing to see a classroom music teacher, a Cypriot-Turk who went to University in Istanbul, address the class in English and write on the board with several spelling mistakes. He was, however, able to offer specialised help to the sizable Turkish-speaking portion of the class; this seemed to be, however, to the frustration and detriment of the rest of the class. It is perhaps ironic that Mehmet Ali criticises the British education system, not without justification:

It forces us into a subservient position creating a substrata of semi-skilled or unskilled workers in areas of employment with low levels of pay and extremes of insecurity compounded by the recent immigration and nationality legislation and institutional racism as confirmed by the MacPherson Report (1999). (Mehmet Ali, 2001: 197)

This demonstrates, although the report was mostly critical of the Police service, that there is a danger of going too far. There is a current shortage of teachers, particularly in Inner London schools, that provides an attractive prospect for many Turkish speakers living in London. There is a large section on a Cemevi website that details how to obtain work as a teacher. This shortage of teachers
coupled with a keen interest in community languages can result in, as I have witnessed in this case, teachers who do not speak English very well and there is a debate around whether this is detrimental to the education of native speakers of English.

Another school that I visited was White Hart Lane School, also in Haringey, where as many as 70% of all pupils speak Turkish as a first language. There exists a project where some classes are taught and English terms explained in Turkish in order to prepare for GCSE examinations to be taken in the English language. This has been commended by OFSTED (2002. paragraph 40) as a success, particularly with regard to the teaching of Science. Classroom music lessons are delivered exclusively in English but a bağlama teacher comes in to offer group lessons, to about ten pupils, directly after school for one hour on a weekly basis.

I was surprised at the stark difference between these lessons and those given at the Londra Saz School. At White Hart Lane the lessons took place in one of the music classrooms where the teacher went around the pupils and helped them with their playing. There was a considerable amount of low-level disruption, such as chatting, affecting concentration and it was difficult to see how any of the pupils learnt a great deal in the confusion. Perhaps there exists a negative association amongst the Turkish pupils with learning the bağlama in mainstream school, albeit extra-curricula, in the light of the underachievement highlighted by Mehmet Ali (2001). When the pupils attend a dedicated evening class this indicates a certain level of self-selection and adherence to a code of conduct that was clearly lacking in the bağlama lessons at White Hart Lane. This is pertinent with regard to location as several of the pupils travelled some distance to the Londra Saz School, whereas the lessons at White Hart Lane were more convenient to attend. The teacher, from Adana on the southern coast near Syria and had studied in Istanbul, spoke English very well and expressed his frustration with the behaviour of the pupils to me. I also noticed such bad
behaviour amongst Turkish-speaking children whilst teaching at Islington Green School (Summer 2004) and found them to be considerably better behaved at the Londra Saz School. This bad behaviour in school was confirmed by several music teachers who taught pupils who attended the Londra Saz School.

It is noteworthy that the boys in particular were keen to learn advanced techniques before they had apparently learnt the basics. The technique of ‘tapping’ the strings with the right, picking, hand on the fretboard seemed to be popular. One student had performed solo in the school concert showcasing this technique. This seemed to have boosted his popularity immensely. Such flamboyance did not follow the accepted course of progress and seemed not to be in keeping with the normal modus operandi. Whilst such advanced techniques are used on the bağlama, particularly by Arif Sağ, it appears that the wider positive reception is perhaps analogous with the promotion of the tapping technique by Eddie Van Halen, popularized by the ‘air guitar’ solos in the film Bill and Ted’s Excellent Adventure although the two may not necessarily be linked. Many pupils expressed a keen interest in the electric guitar and sought to recreate electric guitar patterns on the bağlama. This appeared to be an interesting example of how the bağlama, often seen as an instrument representing pride in the Republic, was used in this manner; a manner not in keeping with traditional learning patterns.

Pro-Western Kemalist music reforms have perhaps served as a barrier to originality. This highlights one adverse side to the prescriptive nature of reforms such as the standardisation of the repertoire and the method of acquiring it. Whilst seemingly open to outside influence, progress and development have been slow particularly with regard to folk music. An example of this can be seen in the work of Englishmen Andy Clayburn and Paul Dwyer who in 1997, as Endi-Pol (The Graduates) released the album Belki Yes! Belki No! (Could be Yes! Could be No!) in Turkey. This was an
album of Turkish folk music sung mostly in Turkish that was well received, but for all its innovation in terms of non-natives performing Turkish music, still remained fairly true to its roots despite being aided by Turkish pop singer Mustafa Sandal about whom I will expand later. Stokes (1996) has noted ‘this recent vogue for “nostalji” has been promoted on commercial cassettes and CDs with titles which draw attention to fact - such as, for example, “Ud ile Nostalji”, “Kanun ile Nostalji” (“Nostalgia with the Ud”, etc.)’ (accessed online). That Turkish folk music is so firmly established in its methodology appears to have had, however, positive implications for the training of bağlama students, for whom the path is clear. There is therefore considerable pressure from traditionalists in Turkey to resist innovations and this makes learning the music more straightforward.

It can be seen therefore that the most effective learning of the bağlama takes place in a dedicated dershane, operated in the traditional Turkish manner, not placing the responsibility into the hands of the local secondary school. This is not to suggest that integrating bağlama lessons into mainstream school is in any way damaging but it appears that the manner in which learning the instrument is approached is so tied up with the development of the Republic and community spirit that the Londra Saz School provided the most effective and appropriate environment. The Londra Saz School is, as I have demonstrated in my comparisons with the Arif Sağ School in Istanbul, running along very similar lines to those on the Turkish mainland and because of this a certain constant level of cultural homogeny and therefore identity will be maintained.

The Role of Transnational Mass Media in Shaping Allegiance to Turkey

I shall now focus on Turkish language television, radio and music that are followed by Turkish-speaking communities in London. I examine scholarly interest in Turkish hip-hop/urban styles and
assess its validity compared to mainstream pop music. I demonstrate how hip-hop serves the purpose of expressing alienation and estrangement in the diaspora community but also as a commercial means of marginalizing Turkish-speaking communities. I discuss the popularity of two of Turkey’s biggest male stars, Tarkan and Mustafa Sandal and demonstrate how they define young Turkish speakers’ attitudes to the East-West dichotomy of Turkish pop music. As part of this debate I refer to a live concert by Sandal and the distribution of such music, much of it informally and/or illegally. Regarding access to music, I focus on Turkish satellite television and radio in London and assess the role that it plays in building national identity.

Recently there has been considerable interest, particularly in Germany, in Turkish rap and hip-hop groups (Burul 2003; Kaya 2002; Soysal 2002; Bennett 1999; Elflein 1998). The interest stems from the assumption that such groups were voicing their discontent and rebelling against the host society and, to a certain extent snubbing their own musical heritage by adopting the music of American sub-culture. This is described by Tan and Waldhoff (1996):

These young Turks are rebelling against both their country of origin and the majority culture of the host society, and they articulate this rebellion musically in their ‘rap’ giving it force and shape. Accordingly, ‘rap’ is for the most part sung in two languages, Turkish and German, with a rich dose of intrinsically Turkish themes and tunes. (p. 148)

I was therefore expecting these styles of music to be popular amongst young Turkish speakers in London. This was not the case. It is however worth examining why this is so and what styles of music, if any, take its place. Kaya (2002), discussing the situation in Berlin in the early 1990s asserts that ‘German-Turkish hip-hop youngsters, like many other minority youth groups, also tend to express themselves by means of protest music, break-dance and
There is a danger of assuming that such styles represent a reaction to repression. This is a view shared by Kosnick:

Instead of assuming that young postmigrants are simply naturally drawn to these genres because they best express their authentic marginalized urban experiences, it is worth asking to what extent such assumptions structure cultural policies, market opportunities and media interest, making Rap and Hip-hop the sensible choice for young aspiring artists who aim for public success. (2004, p. 11)

An example of this can be seen in the Cartel project. This was a compilation album released in Berlin in 1995 and represented acts under contract to Spyce Records, owned by producer Ozan Sinan. The album was jointly released by Mercury/PolyGram in Germany and by RAKS/PolyGram in Turkey selling over 300,000 copies in Turkey and 20,000 in Germany. The ‘Turkish’ identity presented by the Cartel project was ‘a mythological one, standing as pars pro toto for the identity of all immigrants or foreigners’ (Elflein 1998: 260); Da Crime Posse, as an example, consist of two Turks, one German and a Cuban. The target audience was the Turkish-speaking immigrant population in Berlin yet the supposedly genuine notion of rebellion against repression in the music no doubt contributed to the massive album sales in Turkey. This demonstrates the commercial power of such music in the global market; it maintains an exotic appeal in the host countries (perhaps demonstrating ‘oriental’ tendencies) and transmits a sympathetic feeling of ethnic repression and alienation amongst homeland Turks.

It could be argued that the popularity of Turkish hip-hop in Germany and Turkey was an inevitability given the commercial success of French Raï and British Bhangra music. Whilst it would seem that Bhangra may have the monopoly in London in terms of ethnic popular music, India’s postcolonial status has evaded the staunch nationalistic draw of Cartel as Robbins and Morely (1996) point out:
What the ultra-nationalist youths were seeing and identifying with was the tough and angry mood of rap culture. There were young people who were insecure, often in a paranoid way and consequently aggressive, in the expression of their Turkish identity. These were the ones who were prepared to come to Cartel, drawn by its talk of bonding and belonging. (p. 252)

There does not appear to be this level of reaction, certainly within music, in London and whilst rap is a style listened to by many Turkish-speaking secondary school children they appear to be content with fashionable American artists such as 50 cents and Usher.

This gives rise to the question of what music is popular and why amongst the young Turkish-speaking community in London? If only for the lack of sales statistics, these are unanswerable questions. It is possible, however, to gain a better understanding through the work of Star Productions UK. Star Productions is a small promotions company specialising in bringing Turkish pop stars to London to perform for the young Turkish-speaking community. The company started out around eight years ago originating from the Turkish import retail industry in London (Palaz 2005). In November 2004 they became a limited company and have recently started organizing large-scale events, of the type only previously seen in the German Turkish-speaking community.

The most recent large-scale concert to be organized by Star Productions UK was Mustafa Sandal who, promoting his recent maxi-CD İşte (look!/thus!/behold!/here!), performed at the Leicester Square Hippodrome to a sell-out audience of over five thousand. In discussion with the mangers of Star Productions UK, it became clear that they were optimistic that this would be the recording that would allow Sandal to break into the wider, that is non-Turkish-speaking, British market. Two of the tracks on İşte are in English and there is an Oryantal (oriental) remix of the single İsyankar (rebellious) perhaps appealing to the Western fascination
with eastern charm as described by Said (1979). This single stresses the Arabic features of the music such as the use of Arabic-sounding instruments. Sandal, who spent 3 years in London, was educated in Switzerland and the USA, has spent the larger part of his career attempting to promote his music internationally. It was interesting to see the singer speak to the audience in Turkish but forced to address one individual in English ‘you don’t understand me, do you? You’ve got to learn Turkish: we’ve got a Turkish vibe kinda thing going on’. Most people appeared to be conversing in English although the overwhelming majority were of various Turkish origins.

Whilst his concert in London was well attended, his popularity is dwarfed by that of Tarkan, whose first English language album, Come Closer, was released in 2006 with Star Productions working on a London appearance. That Tarkan has achieved international success by singing in Turkish is worthy of note. It seems to have enhanced his popularity amongst young Turkish speakers in London. There is a certain irony here that amongst the London Turkish-speaking community, it is the singer who has consciously promoted Turkish music in the English language who has been less successful commercially than the singer who remained unassertive. Tarkan’s recent album release has yet to achieve the success of his earlier Turkish language recordings.

There is another reason for the increase in popularity of such Turkish pop stars. Illegal home taping is common in Turkey and such was the impact on the music industry that every recording must now display a holographic stamp, or bandrole, showing that tax has been paid (see Stokes 1992: 166; Frith 1995: 2). Even though CDs are readily available and a large selection was available for purchase at the Londra Saz School, the majority either copied the CDs (many onto tape) or downloaded them illegally from the internet. As Turkish pop stars become more internationally famous, their record companies opt for mainstream distribution that push-
es the price up considerably. Kosnick (2004) highlights this: ‘used to paying about eight Euros for CDs imported from Turkey, they would now have to pay twice that amount to buy [Sezen] Aksu’s Yaz Bitmeden (Before the Summer Ends)’. It would seem that such mainstream distribution would serve to drive the immigrant community to increase illegal distribution therefore making popularity even more difficult to judge. It is ironic that this reluctance on the part of diaspora Turks to buy from mainstream distributors restricts, on one level, the international spread of Turkish music.

The model presented by German hip-hop does not seem to pertain in London; it appears that, commercially at least, the Turkish-speaking communities are content to listen to the music from Turkey and/or other mainstream popular music. The fact that Star Productions UK is currently attempting to organize a collaboration between Mustafa Sandal and the R’n’B star Usher in Istanbul is testament to this. There does, however, exist an allegiance to certain DJs who are of Turkish origin but whose music does not necessarily make particular use of any Turkish elements although they may play/mix popular hits from Turkey as part of their sets. An example of this is the British born Cypriot turk DJ Memzee who appears to have a particularly large following amongst the young Turkish-speaking community. A number of other Turkish-speaking, British-born DJs, such as DJ Celil and DJ Armagan also perform gigs in Cyprus helping to promote the burgeoning club scene there. Such DJs, as well as club appearances, perform regularly on the London-based radio station Xtreme 101.7fm.

London Turkish Radio (LTR) began broadcasting in 1991 for one hour a day and in 1995 was granted a license for 24-hour broadcasting. Its ‘coverage extends over most of the London Boroughs where large numbers of Turkish and Turkish-speaking communities reside’. It is also possible to listen to the station by live audio streaming via the internet and, as I have already shown, online polls are conducted. The site boasts that ‘according to Ofcom (Office of Communications), LTR has over 80,000 listeners just in
the London borough of Haringey’ (ibid.). The radio seems to be more popular with first generation immigrants, the majority of younger people either watching Turkish TV or listening to other more mainstream stations, such as Xtreme 101.7fm.

The most significant difference between the first generation of Turkish-speaking emigrants and their children is the availability of Turkish satellite television in the United Kingdom. This evolution happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the majority of the focus teenagers were born, ‘as a result of the combination of the de-regulation of national broadcasting regimes, introducing the notion of markets, and the changes in broadcasting technologies opening the national frontiers’ (Aksoy 2001: 13). The first significant development was the launch of TRT INT in 1992 that targeted Turkish-speaking communities in Europe.

Prior to the introduction of Turkish television the main source of information about ‘back home’ came from the various Turkish language newspapers. One danger of this was an overly romantic view and a yearning for the homeland that resulted in ‘outdated and culturally imprisoning notions of Turkishness, which had survived in the isolation of migration’ (Milikowski 2000: 444). Whilst I have hinted that as young Turkish-speaking children strive to establish their Turkish identity they become in one sense more Turkish than homeland Turks, Turkish satellite television serves to redress this imbalance:

Now, what we regard as significant about transnational television is that, as a consequence of bringing the mundane, everyday reality of Turkey ‘closer’, it is undermining this false polarizing logic. The ‘here and now’ reality of Turkish media culture disturbs the imagination of a ‘there and then’ Turkey – thereby working against the romance of diaspora-as-exile, against the tendency to false idealization of the ‘homeland’. We might say, then that transnational Turkish television is an agent of cultural de-mythologisation. (Aksoy & Robins 2003: 10)
Indeed, much as been made of ‘transnational imagined communities’ (Aksoy & Robins 2003: 1) or ‘third culture kids’ (Pollock & Van Reken 1999) insomuch as their differing sense of cultural identity. It is my view that such transnational media connect Turkish-speaking migrants with Turkey and gives them a sense of cohesion with the Republic, not necessarily an allegiance. This feeling of national hegemony is central in instilling nationally defined values and the desire to engage with such media is ‘entirely social, and not at all ethno-cultural or “diasporic”, in its motivation’ (Aksoy & Robins 2003: 16). Turkish television is responsible, therefore, for underming the nostaligic dream and replacing it with the banal and, although there exists a discrepancy between television reality and street reality, it is the mundane aspect that maintains a stable identity concurrent with the ideologies of the Republic.

There has been governmental concern, mostly in Germany, about the damage that such transnational television might have on wider society, in particular the compromising of the authority of the State. The process is, however, a two-way one and whilst some Turks ‘might be watching Pepsi Pop hits of European singles over these channels’ (Aksoy 2001: 3) others may equally get news from CNN and music from MTV, both international global stations.

I have outlined some of the means that young Turkish speakers use to access music. I have dismissed some preconceptions about estrangement in music, particularly in the commercial Berlin hip-hop model. Following on from this I have pointed to the successful commercial activities of Star Productions UK and highlighted how Mustafa Sandal and Tarkan are viewed in terms of their approach to non-Turkish marketing. Finally, I have presented the significance of Turkish transnational television and how it has served to undermine the polarity between national identity in London and in Turkey by offering a comforting, mundane yet coherent notion of Turkishness in keeping with the Kemalist approach to how a Turk should perceive the Nation State.
Conclusions

I have drawn on my own experience as a teacher in exploring lessons at the Londra Saz School. The success of the pupils suggests that there is considerable merit in encouraging such dershane in London, particularly when compared to bağlama lessons that take place in mainstream schools. In the firmly established repertoire, methodology and role models that such dershane provide, the Westernising policies of Atatürk that affirm the allegiance of these children to the Turkish Republic are implicit. I have, however, identified a following of arabesk that, for this age range, appears to be larger than in Turkey and, although this is impossible to quantify, it is significant in that it suggests, paradoxically, a bridge to music other than Turkish and a possible musical link to outsiders. This is perhaps a more useful marker of protest than the rap and hip-hop models as seen in the Berlin examples where Turks have exploited urban hip-hop for commercial gain. Not all young Turks will subscribe to the presented model and many will reject their domestic culture in favour of the host communities.

In detailing the impact and popularity of Tarkan and Mustafa Sandal amongst London Turks I have demonstrated how Tarkan, who appears to maintain his Turkish ‘roots’ in his music, is more popular. That Tarkan grew up in Germany, yet returned to the ‘motherland’ seems particularly to endear the young diaspora Turks. In contrast, Sandal, who has from the outset of his career made a concerted effort to push his music into the global, English-speaking, market seems to be less commercially successful. I have pointed to the difficulty in assessing commercial success amongst the London Turkish-speaking community because of the unmediated nature of CD imports that serve to keep the prices lower than mainstream CD shops in London. This is not to suggest that there is not money to be made and I have used the enterprises of Star Productions UK to show how bringing Turkish pop stars to London can generate substantial revenue.
It would seem that the polarity that may have existed between London Turks and the homeland is diminishing. The London Turkish-speaking communities can enjoy elements of Turkish popular culture and may use this to assert their patriotism. Such elements as the dershane help young Turkish-speakers to acquire skills that they might otherwise not acquire in secondary school. In some cases there is considerable disparity between pupil behaviour in such dershane and in secondary school, where cultural markers such as the carrying of a bağlama may marginalise them.

Young Turkish-speaking communities either listen to Western pop artists, such as American gangsta rap, or Turkish language artists. There seems to be little interest in Turkish artists singing in English. I have shown this with Mustafa Sandal and this also seems to be true in the reception of Tarkan’s recent English language release. Western artists performing Turkish songs, however, seem to be particularly well received.

Whilst insider-outsider perspectives render impartiality impossible in such ethnomusicological studies, I have sought to consider as many sources as possible, even though a much larger study is required to detail them all. However, as Turkey, with the hope of EU membership, becomes more pluralistic it seems uncertain whether it will continue its current influence on the identity and musical activities of its compatriots in London.
NOTES


2 Bağlama refers to a saz tuned according to the bağlama düzeni (tuning) as distinct from various other modes of tuning the instrument.

3 Arif Sağ is a popular bağlama player in Turkey, and was especially so in the 1970s. The school was established by him.

4 Sunday 27th February 2005.

5 Spring 2005.

6 10th June 2004 and 12th June 2004.

7 Local Education Authority.

8 Plectrum.

9 Although the piece was well known before Tarkan’s version and appears to be a standard in the folk repertory.

10 See Mehmet Ali, 2001. ‘The estimated figures are 45,000 living in Cyprus and 70,000-80,000 in Britain’ (p. 94).


12 http://www.meblem.org.uk/index.htm

13 Karakan, Da Crime Posse, Erci C. and a title song with all three groups.

14 Co-manager of Star Productions UK.

15 Sunday 27th February 2005.


17 Law 3257, passed in 1989.


19 The aforementioned DJs all performed, with many others, at the Mustafa Sandal concert.


21 Turkish Radio and Television International.
This article is a comparative study of the various causative factors for the differences in integration of the Turks in Germany and in the Netherlands into the host society. The integration of the Turkish immigrants is analyzed by examining structural integration defined as “access to positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society by the immigrants and their descendents” (Heckmann 2003: 46) and identificational integration or measures relating to “feelings of belonging and identification, particularly in forms of ethnic and/or national identification” (Heckmann 2003: 47). The Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are more integrated into the host society than their counterparts in Germany.

Turks in the Netherlands are more willing to adopt Dutch way of social interaction and more prone to have social relationships with the Dutch. They have a high level of political participation, high voter turnout at municipal elections and they participate in other forms of politics (Fennema & Tillie 2000). Their level of trust in the institutions of the host society is higher than that of their
counterparts in Germany and they are more interested in local news and local politics. Both at the mass, leadership and organizational level, Turkish community in the Netherlands is more integrated into the Dutch society. At the mass level, people are more willing to learn the language of the host society and they have more social contact with the members of the host society on a daily basis. Turkish community leaders are integrated in the Dutch elite structure. They have strong contacts with Dutch local leaders and they consult in personal decisions they have to make (Tillie, Fennema, Kraal, 2000). The central Turkish organizations play the role of a bridge between the Turkish community and the Dutch society. The activities of these organizations aim to facilitate the integration of the Turkish community (Doomernik 1995). All Turkish organizations do (and are willing to) cooperate with Dutch institutions in integration (Tillie, Fennema and Kraal 2000).

On the other hand, Turkish immigrants in Germany are considered to be the least socio-economically integrated (Ozcan 2004:2). Most of them live in ethnic enclaves and do not speak the language of the host country. The level of employment is a central indicator for the integration of migrants in receiving societies. Since 1970s, the unemployment rate of Turks has been continuously above the rate of the total labor force and also above the level of all foreigners (Ozcan 2004:4). When they were asked about how they feel about the German society and their degree of connection to Turkey 59% of the respondents said that they felt very strong about their degree of connection to Turkey and that they did not feel part of the German society (Ozcan 2004:13). Contrary to their Dutch counterparts, Turkish organizations in Germany do not perform the bridge-like function. Their activities are towards creating an ethnic enclave and isolating the ethnic community from the rest of the society, which furthers both the economic and social exclusion of the Turkish immigrants from the German society (Doomernik 1995).
These two Turkish communities offer an excellent opportunity for a comparative analysis of integration since they share many socio-cultural characteristics but differ in their level of integration. First, most members of both communities emigrated from the same region in Turkey (mostly Central Anatolia) and speak a similar dialect. They consist almost exclusively of rural folk and most of them had never lived in a town for any extended period of time prior to emigrating (Manco U., 2004). Second, the original migration movement of the Turks to Western Europe was drawn by the economic needs of the host countries and propelled by poverty and overpopulation in the home country (Manco U., 2004). The migrants were initially recruited by the host countries as laborers. Third, both communities have existed for about the same length of time, approximately 45 years. Turks began to settle in Western European countries in the early 1960s. The purpose of this article is to analyze the causal factors for the different integration patterns of the Turkish community in the Netherlands and Germany. It suggests that “macroenvironmental factors” such as political-legal, and economic factors of the host society can act as stimulating as well as constraining factors for integration of ethnic groups (Wong 1978).

**Theoretical Orientation**

There are several approaches that analyze the process of integration and assimilation of minority groups into host societies. One example is the ‘natural history’ model which assumes that assimilation is a natural and inevitable outcome of race contact marked by stages of competition, conflict, accommodation and integration (Park, 1926). Despite the long years of settlement, automatic integration and assimilation has not taken place as a consequence of race contact in the Turkish community of Germany.

Another approach to the study of integration is that advocated by Walter G. Beach (1934) and Stephen Thompson (1974). These scholars argue that barriers to minority integration lie in the minor-
ity group and their old-world culture. They simply assume that certain ethnic groups and cultures are ethnocentric and are anti-assimilative (Beach 1934). However, this approach does not explain the difference in the integration patterns of the Turkish community in the Netherlands and Germany. They both came from rural origins and a family-based structure with similar customs and belief systems. In the early 1960s, both communities came to Western Europe as guest workers. Initially both groups had similar ethnic organizations such as mutual aid associations, hometown associations, and religious organizations but as time passed these organizations took on different roles. Initially in both Germany and the Netherlands the institutionalization of Turkish Islam was mainly characterized by the desire to live a life like the one at ‘home’. But in time their orientation towards the host society took on completely different directions. While the Islamic organizations in the Netherlands are towards integration of the community into the Dutch society, their German counterparts aim to create an ethnic enclave where the norms and values of the host society do not count (Doomernik 1995). Therefore the argument that barriers to minority integration lie in the minority group’s culture cannot explain the variation between the two cases.

Another line of argument focuses on the physical traits as an explanatory variable. Scholars like Gordon (1964), Lee (1960), and Myrdal (1944) argue that physical traits of an ethnic group distinguishable from the majority group can be a barrier to the integration of the ethnic group into the host society. This argument cannot explain the Turkish case either since both groups possess physical traits distinguishable from the host society.

Similarly the concept of ‘adaptive capacity’ (Wagley and Harris 1958) is not useful to explain the variation in the integration patterns of the two Turkish communities. Both groups migrated from the same region and have similar adaptive capacities, yet the Turks in the Netherlands are more integrated than the Turks in
Germany. Therefore it is not analytically useful to focus on the socio-cultural background, physical traits, or adaptive capacities to explain the process of integration of minority groups into the host society since these are all identical in both communities (Wong 1978).

Contrary to the rigid definitions of identity by the proponents of the primordialist approach (Isaacs 1975; Stack 1979), I argue that identity is a dialectic between how people see themselves and how others see them; both are subject to the intervention of external factors. Although it has an essentialist component, visible as ethnic or other named categories and focused on boundary maintenance, it also has a ‘processual’ internal component which builds social relations in a changing and unstable social environment (White 1997). The dynamics of this internal component is determined by the way of interaction of the ethnic group with its environment. Therefore, any study that is trying to analyze the process of integration of minority groups into their host societies has to focus on the external factors rather than external behavioral or linguistic characteristics. This study suggests that ‘macroenvironmental variables’ such as political-legal, and economic factors can act as stimulating as well as constraining factors for integration of ethnic groups. For example, in his study of religious acculturation of Jews, Stephen Sharot (1972) argued that religio-cultural orientations or the social structures of the host society affect the level of acculturation and integration of the Jews. Scholars such as Broom and Kitsuse (1955), Crissmen (1967) and Yuan (1963) argue that the larger society may present obstacles to integration and assimilation by limiting political participation, by passing anti-ethnic legislation and by restricting economic participation. These policies lead to defensive political strategy and selective group participation on the part of the ethnic group. Wong, in his comparative study of assimilation of Chinese in Peru and New York, also points out that the larger society plays the determining role in the assimilation process of the eth-
nic group (Wong 1978). I concentrate on the structural factors that were mentioned in Wong’s study (1978) and argue that it is these structural factors that determine the response of the minority groups and influence the use and non-use of ethnic identity (Wong 1978).

The Macro-environmental Factors of Integration: Comparison of the Dutch and the German Cases

a) Political and Legal Factors

Anti-ethnic legislation and unfavorable immigration policies discourage the integration of minority groups by affecting the public perception and self-identification of immigrants (Wong 1978; Broom and Kitsuse 1955; Sharot 1974; Koopmans 1999). While in countries where the nation is defined as a ‘community of consent’, to whom ‘in principle anybody who pledges allegiance to the common political values and institutions can have access’, ethnic boundaries are less visible and the integration of the minority groups are easier, in countries where the nation is defined as a ‘community of descent’, the society is polarized along ethnic lines (Koopmans 1999). Examining the Dutch and German immigration policies reveals the fact that these policies are important in shaping the immigrant response and their integration process.

Although these two countries are so similar with respect to economic development, Protestant-Catholic composition, a Christian Democratic welfare state and party systems composed of moderate centre-right and centre-left parties, they have experienced politics of immigration in a rather different way. The Netherlands agreed to a policy of voting rights for foreigners, anti-discrimination laws, security for residence after five years, and easy naturalization. Both the Dutch officials themselves and the representatives of the minority groups living in the country consider the Netherlands as a multicultural and tolerant country that respects
diversity (Thranhardt 1999). In Germany, on the other hand, such a culture of institutionalized diversity is not established. German politics has always revolved around the conflict about immigration and the identification of immigration and specific immigrant groups as a grand issue between the left and the right. In several waves of open xenophobia dozens of foreigners suffered arson attacks, beatings and killings which led to an infamous reputation of Germany world-wide (Thranhardt 1999).

Germany’s ethno-cultural conception of citizenship and nationhood is reflected in its definition of the nation as a ‘community of descent’. The commitment that is asked from citizens is not primarily political, but ethno-cultural in nature. According to Article 116 of the German Constitution, the category of ‘Germans’ not only consists of German citizens, but also of people of German ethnicity who do not live in Germany and are not citizens. Article 6 of the Federal Law on Expellees specifies this as follows: ‘Members of the German people are those who have committed themselves in their homelands to Germanness (Deutschtum), in as far as this commitment is confirmed by certain facts such as descent, language, upbringing or culture’ (Koopmans 1999). Germany’s ethno-centric citizenship regime leads to the creation of the label ‘foreigner’ for the immigrants that are not of German descent in the German public and political sphere. This label shapes not only the public perception of Turkish immigrants but also their self-identification. This rigid division between foreigners and Germans is reproduced with every generation since citizenship is not obtained by birth on the national territory (Koopmans 1999).

Hasan came to Germany from Turkey 25 years ago. When he first came to Germany in the 1970s he worked in a factory like most of the Turkish workers. Now he is retired and owns a small grocery shop in a Turkish neighborhood in Cologne. Although he understands German he still cannot speak the language very well. He says
“There is no need to speak German. All our customers are Turkish. And we live in this neighborhood where everybody is of Turkish origin. We have nothing to do with the German authorities either since we are not citizens. Besides why should I bother to learn the language of a country which treats me like an alien even after 20 years of hard work in the factories of this country? If Germany is where it is today, it is due to our hard work, and yet we are still treated like an unwanted guest. Our children were born here, we built our lives here. After so many years Germany should have been our home but it is not because we are still considered as guests who will leave soon.”

Hasan’s views are shared by the majority of the Turks living in Germany. The same concerns were raised by 36 interviewees out of the 40 interviews I conducted in Germany in the summer of 2005. This division between foreigners and Germans exists not only at the self-perception and public perceptions of the Turkish immigrants but it is also institutionalized by the ethno-centric citizenship regime of Germany and has further important consequences for Turkish immigrants and their chances of access to certain professional and political positions. For instance, among such central representatives of the state such as the police, the army or the judiciary, one can hardly find a representative of the Turkish minority. Turks are seldom confronted with police officers from the same ethnic background, while German citizens almost never have contact with representatives of law and order who are of Turkish descent. Similarly, the ethnic boundaries are strengthened in the main socialization institutions of a society, the schools. Since the teachers’ profession is reserved only for those who have German citizenship according to the law, Turkish students are not confronted with Turkish teachers who could serve them as a role model. At the same time, German students do not have the experience that someone from a foreign background can be in a position of authority (Koopmans 1999).
This exclusion is also true of the political profession. In the German Bundestag that was elected in 1998 only three of more than 500 MP’s were of foreign descent. The political representation of immigrants is restricted to the marginal institutions of the federal and local Foreigners’ Commissioners and the local Foreigners’ Advisory Councils which have very little resources and no decision-making power at all. The division between the Turkish immigrants and Germans is reproduced each day on Germany’s streets, in schools, and in the parliament. Definitions of citizenship thus have a strong impact on the ways Turkish immigrants are perceived by the German society and the ways they define themselves and their relationship with the majority society. Since most of the Turkish immigrants in Germany lack citizenship rights, they do not display interest in their integration into German politics and society. Instead, they are occupied by homeland political struggles. According to a study by Koopmans (1999) 41.5 % of the claims-making by the Turkish immigrants in Germany is related to homeland politics while in Britain where naturalization is easier the percentage is only 4.2. Koopmans explains this difference as the result of different citizenship regimes. He argues that Germany defines and treats its immigrants as ‘foreigners’ and consequently that is how these immigrants see and present themselves in the public sphere. Britain, by contrast, defines immigrants as British citizens ‘belonging to disadvantaged racial and cultural minorities’, which is also reflected in the way in which they mobilize publicly. Their claims are mostly related to the problems of the immigrants in Britain instead of homeland politics (Koopmans 1999). Sociologists call this orientation ‘sojourner’ (Siu 1952). Immigrants that are subject to legal discrimination gradually develop this attitude. Although making a living in Germany, the Turkish immigrants had no incentive to improve their lot since they knew that this was not their home. They considered Germany a temporary place to work and to accumulate savings so that they could eventually go back to Turkey and live a financially stable life (Bocker 2004: 8).
The long years of legal discrimination also brought about other consequences. Since the Turkish immigrants have been excluded from the institutional structure of the German society, they relied on their ethnic associations. While these associations filled many emotional needs, they also provided welfare and legal services for the older immigrants. But in doing so, they not only further segregated the residents of Turkish neighborhoods from the larger society but also played an important role in the formation of identities and setting up the more or less stringent social control that exists in this community making integration harder (Manco U. 2004). The presence of these formal organizations in the ethnic community sets out the forces that have the effect of keeping the social relations of the immigrants within its boundaries. It tends to minimize out-group contacts. The institutions of the ethnic community are the origin of much social life in which the people of that community get involved and as a consequence become tied together in a cohesive interpersonal network. Through these organizations the Turkish immigrants became more strongly integrated into an interpersonal network of their own group. Raymond Breton shows that although the members of the ethnic community do not attend regularly to the activities of these organizations, they are still related to more in-group relations (Breton 1961).

Germany has taken some steps on a more liberal immigration policy. Minor liberalizations of aliens’ and naturalization legislation were implemented in 1990 and 1993 under the conservative coalition. In May 1999, the Red-Green government has passed a far-reaching proposal. Due to the resistance by the Christian Democrats and the massive signature campaign in Germany, the government has had to retreat from some of the radical elements of its plans such as the general acceptance of double nationality. Although there have been more attempts to create a more liberal immigration law in the German parliament after 1999 proposal, it would be mistaken to think that the old ethno-cultural conception of identity in Germany will disappear from the perceptions of
Germans and Turkish immigrants and the integration problem will be resolved by parliamentary decree (Koopmans 1999).

While Germany’s ethno-cultural conception of the nation makes citizenship difficult to obtain for those who do not fit the membership classification, the Dutch tradition of tolerance and plurality is reflected in its policy towards naturalization. It is relatively easy for an immigrant to become a Dutch citizen after five years of permanent residence in the Netherlands. A child of immigrant parents has the option to become Dutch without the parents having to relinquish their own nationality (Doomernik 1995). This liberal citizenship regime is reflected in the naturalization rate of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. While about 20% of Turks have German citizenship, in the Netherlands this percentage is about 70% (Bocker 2004: 4). While German political culture is determined by a concept of unity: the rights and duties of all Germans towards their state which is based on the notion of Germanness (Deutschtum), the Dutch society has evolved according to the principle of living-apart-together in which ‘the differences constitute the national identity just as much as the common characteristics do’ (Doomernik 1995: 54). The institutionalization of this notion of tolerance in every aspect of Dutch society creates a social and political environment where the Turkish immigrants are not pushed outside the social, economic and political sphere of the host society as in Germany but instead included as an important and dynamic aspect.

Contrary to the German case, the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands have the right both to vote and to stand as candidates in municipal elections. At the end of the seventies the Dutch government that started to see that Dutch nationality and the suffrage should be unlinked decided on a new policy, aiming at equal participation of members of ethnic minorities in Dutch society. The intention was to strengthen the political participation of ethnic minorities (Rath 1983). This new policy increased the political par-
ticipation of the Turkish immigrants. According to a study conducted by Anita Bocker (2004) the turnout of Turkish voters are very high. In 1990, the first Turkish councilors took office. Their number has steadily increased since then. At present, practically all cities and towns with sizable Turkish populations have two or more Turkish councilors. In most of these towns, one could even say that Turks are ‘overrepresented’ since their proportion is higher than their proportion in the town population. This ‘overrepresentation’ is an indication of the openness of local political systems (Bocker 2004: 9).

This openness of the local political systems has far reaching consequences for the self-perception and public perception of the Turkish immigrants. It not only increases their level of trust in political parties and governmental institutions but also defines where they stand in relation to local politics. Contrary to their German counterparts who are mostly engaged with homeland politics and display little interest in local politics since they do not have the right to vote at local elections, the Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are more interested in local news and local politics (Fennema & Tillie, 2000), which makes them part of the host society both in the eyes of the Dutch society and in their own perceptions of self.

Kemal, like many others I talked to, states that he follows the Dutch news on TV because it is the decisions of the Dutch politicians that affect their daily lives not that of Turkish politicians. Although he says that he misses Turkey, he considers the Netherlands as his home and he is grateful for the opportunities that this country has offered him and his family.

While ethnic organizations in Germany are oriented toward creating an ethnic enclave for the immigrants and making their integration into the German society harder, the Turkish organizations in the Netherlands play a bridge-like function between the Turkish community and the Dutch society. This is not only due to
the Dutch policy of supporting ethnic associations but also because of the inter-ethnic coalition that exists within these organizations. Ethnic organizations have been subsidized from the 1960s onward and the maintenance of ethnic culture has not only been tolerated, but also actively promoted by the Dutch government (Fennema & Tillie, 2000). Although these organizations have to collect their own income from their members, if such an organization should launch activities that can be considered of public benefit (for example, schools, broadcasting, etc.), the state bears the costs. For instance, the Turkish religious organization Milli Gorus in the Netherlands organize activities that aim to integrate the Turkish society into the Dutch society such as offering language courses, inter-ethnic sports and cultural activities, which creates communication opportunities for the Turks and the Dutch. While more and more emphasis is put on activities that further integration by Milli Gorus in the Netherlands, the number of social activities in mosques that are aimed at furthering the chances for participation of their clients in the host society is rather small in Germany. Given the assumption that a mosque organization’s financial priority will be to maintain the primary religious activities and only spend surplus funds on other activities and ethnic organizations are not subsidized by the German government, this is not a very surprising conclusion (Doomernik 1995: 55).

Moreover, the Turkish organizations in the Netherlands are cooperating with the Dutch institutions, which increases the level of inter-ethnic trust. According to a study by Tillie, Fennema and Kraal (2000), all Turkish organizations in the Netherlands work together with at least one Dutch organization (political party, welfare organizations etc.). According to the study, this inter-ethnic coalition building among the Turkish organizations is the result of conscious organizational strategies. These strategies reflect the orientation of these organizations towards enhancing the life chances of its members in a modern Western context using the opportunities offered to them by the Dutch political and legal system. Such a
trend does not exist among the Turkish organizations in Germany. While their Dutch counterparts play the role of a bridge between the Turkish community and the Dutch society, the Turkish organizations in Germany have defensive motivations such as protecting their identity, culture, values and norms. Being excluded from the institutional structure of the host society, these organizations aim to create ethnic enclaves in which all the needs of the ethnic community is provided without the need to integrate into the host society.

Political and legal factors not only provide opportunities but also shape the incentives both at the individual and at the organizational level. Policies and regulations have the power to create a tolerant social atmosphere where coexistence of different ethnic groups is possible. In such a social setting, minorities will have both the opportunity and the incentive to integrate into the host society. While the legal definition of an immigrant and the policies that reflect this definition shape the identity of the immigrant by determining his/her public perception and self-perception, the policies that regulate the organization of the immigrant community shape the relationship of the organizational structure of the immigrants with that of the host society. Therefore, political and legal factors are important variables in the integration process of the immigrant groups.

b) Economic Opportunity

Economic opportunity is another aspect of the environmental structure of the larger society that plays an important role in the integration process of an ethnic group. In the first place, economic success and its accompanying upward mobility can provide incentives for integration (Fellow 1972; Befu 1965), but restricted economic opportunity may induce ethnic groups to use economic adaptive strategies, such as the formation of ethnic niches, which may deter integration (Barth 1969). Again if there is limited access to economic opportunity, ethnic group members may resort to the formation
of closed ethnic associations and neighborhoods for protection and thus isolate themselves even more from the larger society (Wong 1974). Finally ethnic groups may use their ethnicity as a resource for socioeconomic activities and thus perpetuate the ethnic boundary (Wong 1978).

In a comparative study of the two Japanese communities in California, Befu found that despite the similarities of the two communities at the beginning, one community became highly integrated while the other was not. He argued that the main reason for this difference has been the availability of opportunities for economic improvement. Where economic opportunities for Japanese upward mobility had been restricted, the Japanese were not integrated; where such an opportunity had been available, the opposite was true (Befu 1965).

Wong (1978) found the similar parallels in the two Chinese communities of Peru and New York. Since the Chinese in Lima have more economic access and mobility, they are able to move up socially in Peruvian society and gain access to prestigious neighborhoods and associations. Since it is possible to attain social prestige through economic success, the Chinese in Lima have incentive to integrate into the Peruvian society. However, it is very different in the case of the Chinese in New York. Since it has relatively been more difficult for the Chinese in New York to achieve upward mobility, many of them could not leave their ethnic neighborhoods. Restrictive and discriminative economic policies have made the Chinese resort to adaptive strategies that call for ethnic solidarity and the maintenance of their ethnic boundary (Wong 1978).

Similar patterns are observed in the two communities of the Turks in the Netherlands and Germany. While the Turks in Germany have limited upward mobility, the Turks in the Netherlands have more access to the public sector and higher positions (Bocker 2004: 24). Since the end of 1970s, when the return migration of recruited labourers declined, the unemployment rate...
of Turks in Germany has been continuously above the rate of the total labour force. It is striking that the unemployment rate of Turks has also been above the level of all foreigners in the country. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Turks’ unemployment increased markedly. While in 1990 the rate was at 10%, in 1997 it reached 24%. The rate decreased slightly to 22.7% in 2002. Although citizens of other recruitment countries have also experienced high unemployment rates, Turks’ rate of unemployment is higher (Ozcan 2004: 5).

Unemployment could have several causes. In the case of Turkish immigrants, their disproportionally high share in manufacturing industries, where job opportunities have been declining since the 1980s as well as their comparatively poor educational structure have been the key. According to the study of Ozcan (2004), Turks clearly have a worse educational structure than Germans. In 2002, 26% had left school without diploma whereas the share among Germans was much lower at 2% (Ozcan 2004: 5).

Though school certificates are an important indicator of a group’s educational structure, more crucial for the position on the labour market are vocational qualifications. It is striking that Turks commonly remain without formal vocational training. This is a trend which holds true for the second generation as well. The vocational qualification structure of Turks and Germans has only changed little between 1997 and 2002. In 2002 71% of Turkish migrants had no vocational qualification, while 25% had completed formal vocational training. In 2002, 42% of second generation Turks had completed formal vocational training. However, still every second (54%) among them was without a vocational certificate (Ozcan 2004: 6).

In 1997 82% of total Turkish labour force was employed as blue-collar workers whose main activities are often characterized by hard physical work, mental strains because of shift work and corresponding effects on health. Until 2002 this share declined by 10%. In 2002 62% of second generation employed Turks worked in
blue-collar jobs, the share in the comparable German group was much lower at 28% (Ozcan 2004: 8). As a result of the increasing unemployment rate and discrimination, the share of the self-employed among the second generation increased from 2% in 1997 to 5% in 2002. Turkish immigrants established ethnic businesses in Berlin. The initial market for immigrant entrepreneurs arose within the ethnic community itself. The geographical concentration of the ethnic group made it profitable for the entrepreneurs to establish businesses within the ethnic community. Moreover, due to the geographical concentration of the Turkish immigrants, social ties among the members of the ethnic group are very strong. These strong social ties are particularly important for Turkish immigrant entrepreneurs to mobilize financial and human capital. Surveys conducted in Berlin show that most Turkish businesses have been established thanks to the financial and human support of the co-ethnics. Altogether, the firms surveyed employ 412 persons, of whom 23 percent are family members and 65 percent are of Turkish origin. Ethnic businesses developed first in areas such as groceries, butcher shops, pubs, restaurants, bookstores and video stores, among others. Survey results show that Turkish firms were set up to satisfy specific demands from the Turkish community that lives in ethnic neighborhoods. About 76 percent of the enterprises set up by Turkish immigrants in Berlin are in retail trade and catering, while 45 percent of Turkish firms have mainly Turkish customers (Bayar 1996).

Bocker’s analysis of the report for the Sussmuth-Commission reveals that the public sector in Germany is not accessible for immigrants. According to the report “They (the immigrants) are heavily under-represented in the civil service. Civil servants in Germany are categorized into career civil servants and employees. Most career civil servant positions are only accessible to Germans. However, immigrants are under-represented among employees as well. Seifert produced the following data for North-Rhine Westphalia in 1999. Foreigners from former recruitment countries
made up 7.8% of the North-Rhine Westphalian labour force. In the public sector, however, this share was only 2%... In the sector of public administration, the proportion was 1.4%, in the social insurance sector 1.5%. In the educational sector, it varied from 2.3 to 3.7% ...

The discrimination in the labor market; the lack of capital to participate in any capital-intensive enterprise; a desire to avoid competition with laborers in the labor market led to the continuous concentration of Turkish businessmen in the ethnic niche. In order to protect their ethnic niche, the Turks have manipulated friendship, kinship and patron-client relationships to form protective and mutual aid associations. Thus limited economic opportunity has driven the Turks into Turkish neighborhoods and united them to protect a common interest, which led to a decreasing incentive to integrate into the German society. This “ethnic enclave” provides the Turkish immigrants necessary social environment to survive without using the institutions of the host society. They live in an “island-like space” where they do not have to learn German or deal with the German authorities for their economic, social or political needs since all their needs are met by the Turkish community.

35% of the 2.014 million Turks living in Germany are settled in North Rhineland-Westphalia. Close to 1/4 of Europe’s Turkish immigrants thus live in this German state. However, the prize goes to Berlin which, with its 136,400 Turks, hosts all by itself close to 5% of the Turkish immigrants in Europe (Manco U. 2004). According to the segregation index established by Franz-Josef Kemper (1998), the Turkish population in Berlin is the most segregated among the foreign minority groups.

This geographical concentration makes it easy for the Turkish immigrants to establish their ethnic institutions. There are nine Turkish newspapers, nine Turkish TV channels and 3,000 Turkish organizations including religious, professional, cultural and recreational organizations in Berlin, where Turks are the quantitatively
Islam is by far the most important mark of belonging and identity in the Turkish immigrant community, even though many other such ties exist. Turkish immigrants' attachment to the many facets of their native culture is strengthened by their geographical concentration and creation of ethnic institutions through which they can socialize with their co-ethnics. The Turkish population in Germany has recreated in Europe all of the social, political, religious, and ethnic cleavages of Turkey by setting up a true web of immigrant associations, from local associations and local mosques in Berlin to Europe-wide federations. The largest and best organized of these federations are of an Islamic bent (Manco U. 2004). These organizations have become large networks catering to specific clienteles, to whom they offer social, cultural, religious, educational, and commercial services. For instance, the Germany-based federation Islam Toplumu-Milli Gorus/Islamische Gemeinschaft-Milli Gorus (Islamic Community-Denominational Vision) is believed to have an audience of some 300,000 and nearly 800 local chapters throughout Europe.

In Berlin, there are also professional organizations such as Turkish Scholars in Germany, or student organizations such as the Association of Turkish Students, political organizations, mosques, dance clubs, sport clubs etc. These organizations have become large networks offering social, cultural, religious, educational, and commercial services. Kenan Kolat, who is the Secretary General of the Turkish Union in Berlin, asserts that the main aim of these ethnic organizations which he defines both as pressure groups and as non-governmental institutions is to "take steps for becoming economically independent and be in close dialogue and cooperation with the community it represents; to establish closer and stronger ties among the Turkish immigrants; to launch campaigns and manipulate people in line with their collective targets" (Kolat 2004:
2). Similarly, Ayhan Tonca, the president of the Consultative Council of Turks asserts that immigrant organizations have four main functions: representation of interests; introduction, information and education; foundation of religious institutions; cultural and recreational activities (Tonca 2004: 1).

No matter what their stated objectives are, these immigrant organizations provide the necessary environment for strengthening the ethnic bonds and creating a “parallel society” independent of the German society and its institutions. They not only enhance communication among members of the ethnic group but they also create a sense of common good and destiny. These organizations become forums to discuss the common problems of the members of the ethnic group. They create solidarity through the mutual aid programs and less formal activities such as helping a newly married couple furnish their house or families that are in financial crisis. These organizations play a crucial role in drawing and protecting the ethnic boundaries between the two communities, therefore detrimental to any integration efforts.

In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the nationality requirement constitutes much less of a barrier to the upward mobility of the immigrants, both because it applies to a more limited number of positions and because more immigrants have Dutch nationality. In the period 1987-1996, the central government implemented two positive action programmes. The aim was to increase the share of ethnic minority civil servants to 5% in 1995. Although this target was not attained and remained 3.5% in 1995, in the following years the share of ethnic minorities showed a rapid increase, to 7.2% in 1998 (Bocker 2004: 24). Local governments in the Netherlands have also formulated positive discrimination policies. As a result of these policies, Turks in the Netherlands are far less dependent on the ethnic niche for economic activity. Although there are Turkish neighborhoods, it is less popular among the Turkish community in the Netherlands to live in ethnic neighborhoods than the one in
Germany, which makes the integration of the community in the Netherlands easier.

Conclusions

The present study has shown that the structural or environmental factors in the larger society are principally responsible for the differential rates of integration. Historically, Germany has been more discriminatory in its treatment of immigrants. According to a study by Zick, Wagner, Dick and Petzel (2001) open forms of discrimination was found in 9 of the 14 studies made among the German population. Only one of the studies involved college students, and that one also revealed discrimination. Thus, negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities and immigrants in Germany are manifested broadly in terms of social discrimination by ‘normal’ citizens, as well. The legal structure erected in Germany reflects the attitudes and perceptions of the host society. The long years of discriminatory practices implemented against the Turkish community in Germany produced feelings of rejection among them, which led to defensive measures such as creating ethnic niches. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the Dutch cultural tradition does not emphasize racial differences. Therefore, the Turkish community could find a place for itself both in the public and political realm.

Methodologically, the causal factors of integration should not be determined only on the basis of a single case study. In order to ascertain the specific factors of integration, two or more comparative case studies should be undertaken.
NOTES

1 This study is based on the extensive field research that I conducted in 2005-2006 and was sponsored by the Miami-Florida EU Center of Excellence. The interviews that are used in this study are based on this field research. I conducted 40 interviews in Germany and 20 interviews in the Netherlands. Interviewees are aged 18 and older and selected randomly.
Immigration and Struggle for Integration: The Case of Turkish Americans

İlhan Kaya

Turkish immigration to the United States is not very well documented despite its long history. Turkish American identity formations and integration in the United States have received little or no attention from scholars in various social science and humanities. Although the events of September 11, 2001 have resulted in a growing interest towards Muslim immigrants, Turkish Americans have not received the same degree of attention. Only few studies exist on the issue, which include few books, one by Frank Ahmed (1986) and two recent volumes by DiCarlo (2008) and, by Karpat and Balgamis (2008), an article by Kemal Karpat (1995), a few pieces by myself (Kaya, 2003, 2004, and 2005) and outdated encyclopedia entries by various scholars (Altschiller 1995; Halman 1980; Ferris 1995). Although some young scholars have been conducting PhDs in the area, a lot more should be done to shed a better light on this long-ignored area of study.

According to the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), over 450,000 immigrants came from
Turkey to the United States since 1820 (INS 2001). The United States Census Bureau gives a figure of 117,619 for Turkish Americans (U.S.Census 2006). However, while helpful, these figures do not provide a very clear picture about the number of Turks in the United States. For instance, while the number that the INS provides is the only historical record of Turkish immigration to the United States, it is also very misleading. The INS figure of 450,000 represents all the immigrants from the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. Since the United States recorded all immigrants from the Ottoman Empire as Turkish, regardless of immigrants’ religious or ethnic orientations, the figure given also includes a large numbers of Armenians, Greeks and Jews who migrated from the Ottoman Empire to the United States during the last century of the Empire (Kaya 2004). There were also Muslim and non-Muslim Arab Ottoman citizens from places such as Syria and Lebanon among the first immigrants from Turkey to the United States. So the figure of 450,000 immigrants from the Ottoman Empire and Turkey to the United States can only provide a rough estimate rather than a complete picture (Kaya 2005).

The number that the US Census provides is also problematic. First, the classification system used by the US Census causes confusion among immigrants while filling census survey forms. The US Census does not have a category of “Turkish” in its survey forms. So if someone wants to acknowledge his/her ethnic background, s/he has to mark the “Other” category and write “Turkish” or “Turkish American”. Many Turkish immigrants who participate in census surveys do not do this but mark themselves as “White” among the categories given in the survey forms (Kaya 2004). Another reason for the small number of Turkish immigrants in census data is their lack of participation in surveys. Most illegal Turkish immigrants do not participate in the census surveys as they believe they might expose themselves to legal authorities and be subject to deportation. Also, many legal residents with temporary
visas fail to participate in the surveys, as they think that the surveys are for American citizens only. Therefore, while the Census Bureau and INS figures give us an idea about the Turkish presence in the United States, they can be misleading as well (Kaya 2003).

While official figures do not provide an exact number for Turkish immigrants in the United States, there are some estimates. The Turkish Consulate General Mehmet Ezen provides a figure of 350,000 Turks in the United States in 2002 (Kaya 2003). Others give figures around 500,000. Therefore, the number of Turkish immigrants in the United States is estimated to be between 300,000 and 500,000. Today, about 3,500 Turkish immigrants go to the United States every year as a result of the accelerated immigration since the late 1980s (Kaya 2005).

Turkish immigration to the United States can be categorized in three distinctive waves: the wave of peasants, the wave of professionals, and the wave of mixed groups (Kaya 2004). The first immigration wave began in the 19th century, accelerating towards the end, and reaching its peak between 1900 and 1920 (Figure 1). According to INS, by 1920 about 300,000 immigrants from the Ottoman Empire had reached the shores of America. While the vast majority of the 300,000 were members of non-Turkish and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire, Ahmed (1986) estimates that 60,000 of those immigrants were Muslim Turks. These were single male Turkish peasants coming from towns such as Elazig (Harput), Mardin, Trabzon, Samsun, who were often informed about America by missionaries or members of other ethnic groups, such as Armenians (Ahmed 1986). Fearing being prevented, these immigrants would generally leave Turkey without informing the authorities. The most important passage for these immigrants was via Trabzon-Marseille-New York. Turkish immigrants would take French ships from Trabzon and change to a ship leaving Marseille for the United States (Ahmed 1986).
Turks in Europe

Figure 1: Turkish Immigration to the U.S before WWII

Turkish Immigration to the U.S before WWII

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, 2001)

Turkish immigrants in the first wave were mostly poor single male peasants from Anatolian towns and did not have a goal of residing in the United States permanently. What they had in mind was to save some money and return back home after a few years. According to Frank Ahmed (1986) about 25,000 of the 60,000 Turkish immigrants in the United States returned back to Turkey during World War I and after the establishment of the new Turkish Republic in 1923. Those who stayed in the United States married women from ethnic groups such as the Irish or French (Ahmed 1986). Most of the immigrants who decided that America was their new home assimilated into the American culture and lost most of their contact with the home country. One of the reasons for this assimilation and lack of contact was the lack of immigration from Turkey after it the Republic was established and the difficulty of traveling back home during that time. The United States passed a new law in 1924, which almost stopped immigration from many countries including Turkey (Karpat 1995). After the law was passed, immigration from Turkey dropped to the low number of 100 per year until the end of World War II. Most those who were emigrating from Turkey during this period were family members.
of the immigrants who were resident in the United States. So the result was the complete assimilation of the first wave of immigrants.

The real Turkish immigration to the United States began after World War II, as the 1950s experienced a close relationship between Turkey and the United States. With the Truman Doctrine, the United States paid close attention to Turkey, which resulted in the Turkish membership of NATO (Karpat 1995). Therefore, although Turkish immigration to the United States accelerated greatly after the changes in American immigration laws in 1965, the close relationship between Turkey and the United States had already increased the number of immigrants from Turkey to the United States (Figure 2). The post World War II immigration, called the wave of professionals, involved a large number of architects, engineers, physicians, and academicians leaving Turkey for educational purposes (Kaya 2003).

Figure 2: Turkish Immigration to the U.S. since 1930

![Graph showing Turkish Immigration to the U.S. since 1930](image)

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, 2001)

What was interesting about the members of this immigration wave was that they were “children of the new Turkish Republic” and represented the first wave of a brain drain from Turkey. They grew
up in and were educated under the new regime and upheld its ideals such as secularism and nationalism. While members of the first immigration wave identified themselves as Muslim or Ottoman, these new immigrants asserted their Turkishness and formed many of first Turkish American organizations that are active today (Kaya 2004). These organizations include the Federation of Turkish American Associations and the Turkish American Society. This second wave also included a significant number of families compared to the previous wave. Besides these professionals, some skilled laborers, such as tailors, also immigrated to the United States during the 1960s. The Turkish immigrant community in Rochester, NY is made up mainly of immigrants who came to the United States during this period (Kaya 2003).

The last immigration wave began in the late 1980s and represents the most diverse group of immigrants from Turkey (Figure 3). In contrast to the previous two immigration waves, this group includes Turks from all segments of the society. There are families as well as single male and female immigrants. The number of female immigrants in this way is quite significant, as females make up about 40 percent of all immigrants (Kaya 2003). From lay workers to professionals and students, this last wave is miniature of Turkish society. Seculars, conservatives, ethnic Kurds are all represented in the last immigration wave. This should not be a surprise as globalization and the policies of the late Turkish president Turgut Ozal were very influential in the increasing and diverse immigration to the United States. Ozal’s policies encouraged all Turkish citizens to seek alternatives in the global markets. The United States has not been the only place that has attracted Turkish immigrants. In addition to the continuing immigration to Europe, many Turks have left Turkey for the Central Asian States that formed after the break up of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Turkish entrepreneurs opened businesses and religious movements such as the Gulen Movement, which opened schools in these new Turkic states of Central Asia (Kaya 2003).
To summarize, with the effects of globalization and the policies of the late Turkish president Turgut Ozal, many Turks have began to venture to different parts of the world. The United States has been an attractive place for Turkish immigrants from all segments of the Turkish society. Today, these groups are forming a different kind of ethnic community in the United States. While for the second wave immigrants, Turkishness and secularism were the most defining elements in defining Turkish identity, for the last wave immigrants, the motivations and elements of identity vary. Religion has become an important part of the Turkish immigrant identity. Today Turkish immigrants form quite diverse organizations and institutions. From civic and business organizations, to cultural and religious centers and schools, groups with different agendas create their own platforms for the constructions and expressions of their own versions of Turkishness. Therefore, the Turkish American community is a dynamic community with differences as well as similarities (Kaya 2003).

The Turkish American community is generally a high profile community with its highly educated members. According to the
United States Census Bureau (2000) while 46 percent of Turkish immigrants is female, 54 is male (U.S.Census 2006). This is a great change compared to the sex ratio of the earlier immigrant community. Moreover, over 77 percent of immigrants are 18 years or older. The community is highly educated compared to the Turkish immigrants in Europe and the larger American society. 81.4 percent of Turkish Americans over 25 years old hold at least a high school diploma. Over 40 percent has at least a Bachelor’s degree and over 22 percent has a graduate degree. These figures are above the American averages. It is also important to note that 43 percent of Turkish immigrants are American born and 48.3 percent of the immigrants work in management, professional, or related occupations, which is an indication of higher skills and education among the members of the community. Only 3 percent of Turkish immigrants reported that they were unemployed in 1999 (U.S.Census 2006).

Table 1: Sex and Age Structure of the Turkish American Community

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</tbody>
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Turkish-American Educational Attainment (Persons 25 years and over)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High school graduate or higher</th>
<th>81.4</th>
<th>36,529</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree or higher</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>18,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate degree or higher</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>9,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44,872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4, Matrices PCT35, PCT36, PCT38, PCT43, PCT45, PCT47, PCT49, PCT61, PCT64, PCT67, and PCT70.
Although from Alaska to Hawaii every state hosts Turkish immigrants, the majority is concentrated in several states. The New York, New Jersey and Connecticut area is home to the largest concentration of Turkish immigrants. California, Florida, Illinois and Michigan also have a significant number of Turkish immigrants. While better-educated and highly skilled Turkish immigrants are dispersed throughout the United States, those with limited educational and professional skills are concentrated in a few neighborhoods in the New York City metropolitan area. For instance, Sunnyside in Queens, Brighton Beach in Brooklyn, Paterson and Clifton in New Jersey are some of these concentration places. Immigrants in the New York City metropolitan area are quite diverse in terms of their class, social status, and ideological positions. Ranging from people such as the music producer Ahmet Ertegun and the prestigious surgeon Mehmet Oz to restaurant workers and gas station attendants, the New York City metropolitan area reflects the diversity of the Turkish American community. The diversity is reflected in the organizations formed by the community. While religious groups are forming new associations, religious centers and schools, others have formed a wide range of organizations such as dating services, business and cultural associations (Kaya 2004).

Figure 4: The Distribution of Turkish Americans in the United States, 2000
The diversity of the Turkish American community reflects the cultural and political backgrounds of the immigrants. Turkey, with its multiple and complex sources of identity holds a very diverse population (Ergil 2000). Sources and meanings of being Turkish are quite complex in the context of America. For instance, Turkishness means different things to different people. One may have to position him/herself in a wide range of meanings such as Easterness vs. Westernness, Muslimness vs. Westernness, Turkishness vs. Americanness. To map one’s identity in these complex webs of meanings is a not an easy task (Jackson 1994). While there are overlapping identities, there exist contrasting ones as well. During the fieldwork that I conducted in the New York City metropolitan area, I asked a question that appears simple, but which in fact is quite difficult to all the 38 people I interviewed: Who is a Turk? Not surprisingly, there was not one single or consistent answer to this question. Some defined Turkishness along ethnic lines, or in religious or civilization terms, others used citizenship or race to make a sense of their identity as well as the meaning they put on Turkishness. Below is a quote from a well-educated first generation Turkish American, who believes that it is not easy to define who a Turk is.

“Who is a Turk? For instance, my father is Macedonian. There are Albanians, Bosnians, Kurds, Jews, Arabs, Chechnians, and a lot of others in Turkey. We cannot reduce Turkishness to a single ethnicity. From a blonde person to Arab-looking people, we have a lot of different backgrounds. Turkishness is a concept that represents all the people in Turkey, not just those who came from Central Asia”

Turhan, first generation Turkish American

The complexity of identity may sometimes take a symbolic meaning (Jackson 1994). The media representation of a culture with par-
ticular stereotypes may be an echo of those who position themselves in this complex set of meanings (Said 1978). Burhan, a first generation Turkish American, describes himself as more Western than Eastern or Middle Eastern. “I am totally (my emphasis) Western. I don’t find myself Middle Eastern. If we say Middle Eastern, I think we have to add a mustache and beard.” Here, the mustache and beard have symbolic meanings of being Middle Eastern and Burhan uses those symbols very cleverly to disassociate from any meanings or negative connotations that may come with them.

However, there are those that identify with the imagined community of Muslims. They believe that Islam somehow connects them to other Muslims around the world. Here is a statement by Temel, a first generation Turkish American who studies mechanical engineering: “I feel closer to the foreigners who are Muslim. It means that Islam connects us in a way similar to Christianity connecting Americans with English people or with Italians.” What this indicates is that Islam is not only still a powerful source of identity for many Turkish immigrants; it is also boundary with the larger American society. The way Islam is represented in the media and academia, and the way public opinion is shaped put conservative Muslims in rather tricky position (Said 1997; Moore 2002). While Muslim Turkish Americans want to maintain their Muslim identity, they have also to deal with negative meanings that are circulated about Islam and Muslims in the media. This statement by Ayten, a second generation Turkish American, shakes our preconceptions of being Western or Middle Eastern. “I consider myself Western although I wear headscarf. I think I dress more Western.” Here one can see the complexity of identity and the difficulty of boxing diverse communities and individuals into stereotypical categorizations. Any categorization is not only limited, but also misleading (Pile and Thrift 1995; Jackson and Penrose 1994).
Being Turkish means something different in the United States than what it means in Turkey. After a Turkish immigrant leaves Turkey and begins to live in the United States, the new cultural context provides a different setting for identity and positioning. First, this is a change in power and position. While a majority in Turkey, a Turkish immigrant suddenly becomes the minority. This requires a modification in identity and the way it is expressed in public and private spaces. This is particularly evident in the way Turkish American organizations present themselves to the larger American society through activities such as the Turkish Day Parade. The parade becomes a space where Turkish Americans want the larger American society to view them in the way they want to be viewed and where they show competing communities, such as the Armenian or Greek communities, the unity and power of the Turkish American community. They want to influence the power in the United States so that Turkishness is defended and Turkey is supported against these groups who they believe work against their interests. The parade is also a platform for the community to transmit its values and sense of identity to young Turkish Americans. Normally, most of these activities would be seen unnecessary in Turkey, but they are seen as vital for the survival of the community and preservation of Turkish identity in the United States.

I could increase the number of diverse assertions about who a Turk is and the way that Turkishness is expressed, but that is not the point. The point is that identity is complex, multiple, contextual and contingent. It changes according to the context as well as according to the actors who define it (Peet 1998; Cornell and Hartmann 1998; Keith and Pile 1993). For instance, when I asked my interviewees to define Turkish Americanness, it seemed that the question was rather easier. While all first generation Turkish Americans who participated in the survey indicated they were first Turkish, all second generation immigrants identified themselves as Turkish-American without any hesitation. There was not much
hesitation among those who identified themselves as Turkish first or Turkish only, even if they were American citizens. This shows that generation is a very important factor in one’s loyalty to his/her sources of identity, as generation determines the context in which individuals grow up and socialize. As second generation Turkish Americans with no language barrier socialize with other Americans, they are exposed to American values and American practices more than their parents are. Their acceptance of American identity is not as difficult as that of their parents (Kaya 2004).

Another issue that needs to be discussed here is the way religion is institutionalized in the United States and the way that such institutionalization influences the Turkish American integration and identity formations in the United States. The United States has historically been dominated by Protestantism and the acceptance of Catholicism and Judaism as mainstream religions has been relatively recent (Alba 2005). The position of Islam is the most problematic, and has worsened since the events of September 11, 2001. First, the collective memories of the Crusades, colonialism, and Western influences and interventions in the Muslim world shape Muslim perceptions of the West and America, and many Muslims already have prejudiced views about the United States before they enter it. The historical Muslim penetrations into Christian lands and various terrorist attacks on American and Western targets in recent history have caused many people in the West to view Muslims with suspicion. This creates distrust between Muslims and the West, including the United States. The distrust between the two influences not only politics, but also everyday relations of Muslim Americans with other Americans (Esposito 2002). As a result of the long history of misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims in the United States, Islam is often seen outside of the norm and is not accepted as part of America’s religious heritage. It is often portrayed as a violent and backward religion, and its followers are associated with terrorism and fundamentalism (Muscati 2003; Mamdani 2002; Moore 2002).
Turkish Americans are also affected by the misrepresentation of Muslims in the United States and sometimes face discrimination. Although the United States portrays itself as a religiously neutral country, Turkish Americans with visible differences, such as the Muslim headscarf or Muslim names feel that they are discriminated against in the United States (Alba 2005). Sibel, a second generation Turkish American, feels that she is discriminated in job applications because of her name. She indicates that “… in job applications, they ask where I am from and I say America but they ask where my real country is. I was born in the U.S. and I do not have an accent. But it is my name that gets in the way.” I have heard many stories of similar discrimination from members of the Turkish American community in the United States during my fieldwork in the New York City metropolitan area. Particularly Turkish women with traditional Muslim clothing face greater discrimination and are sometimes verbally harassed.

Since the events of September 11, 2001, Muslims in the United States have felt great pressure as their organizations and activities are now under strict scrutiny. Immigrants who violate immigration laws have been deported (Bozorgmehr and Bakalian 2005). While Turkish Americans have not been affected as greatly as other Muslim American communities, such as Arab Americans, they have also felt some pressure. As a result of the unpopular image of Arabs, Turkish Americans often disassociate with them and assert their moderate and Western identities. This is seen as an appropriate way to escape from discrimination and avoid possible backlash resulting from the horrible events of September 11, 2001. Turkish American religious groups organized interfaith dialogues with Christians and Jews in the United States, and secular organizations such as the Federation of Turkish American Associations declared their solidarity with the United States. For instance, it was interesting to see Turkish immigrants carrying flags of all the nationalities that lost their lives in the events of September 11, 2001. Since Arabs were seen as somehow responsible for the events, Turkish
Americans distanced themselves from them and their negative image in the United States (Kaya 2004).

Conclusions

Turkish immigration to the United States began in the 19th century and the Turkish American community is today a viable and dynamic community. Each wave of immigration to the United States has added a new dimension and power to the community. From the first wave of peasants to the wave of professionals and the mixed group, each immigration wave has made its own contribution to the formation of the Turkish American community in the United States. Today the community with its increasing population and organizations is opening its own educational, cultural and religious centers. The Turkish American community is also highly educated and its members are well positioned in the middle and upper classes in the United States (Kaya 2004).

The Turkish American community is quite diverse in reflecting various identities and Turkish American identity politics come from multiple sources of difference, such as Westerness, Middle Easternes, Muslimness, Turkishness, Americanness. Such sources of identity result in different definitions of Turkishness and Turkish Americanness. Some sources of Turkish American identities, such as Islam, may seem to cause conflicts with the larger American society. However, the moderate and tolerant interpretation of Islam among Turkish Americans helps them find venues for dialogue and build bridges between the Western and Islamic traditions.

On the other hand, the integration and participation of Turkish Americans in the larger American society is not totally in their hands, as the degree of the acceptance of the community by the larger society is also crucial in the social and political integration and participation. Religious boundaries often hinder the integration of an ethnic group not because the religious beliefs or practices of that ethnic group are radically different from those of the domi-
nant society, but because the way the differences between the group and the larger society are politicized and represented. Turkish Americans often find the representation of Muslims in the United States biased and criticize the tendencies that box all Muslims in a single category and reject assertions and representations that equate Islam and Muslims with certain political tendencies, such as terrorism and fundamentalism. They believe that such a line of thinking ignores the history that shaped the current hostilities, and rather propose moderation and dialogue. Turkish Americans also disassociate from groups such as Arabs, as they think Arabs are somehow responsible for creating such negative images and representation of Muslims in the United States.

Finally, integration is a long process and it takes generations (Portes 1994). While first generation Turkish Americans identify themselves as Turkish rather than Turkish American, second generation Turkish Americans assert their Turkish as well as their American identities. While the majority of Turkish Americans are first generation, the proportion of the second generation is also rapidly increasing, which I believe will help for a better integration of the community in the United States.
PART III

TURKISH WOMEN BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY
Starting a Family: A comparison of transition to parenthood for new parents with Swedish and Turkish background

Mona Franséhn and Margareta Bäck-Wiklund

Introduction

Transition to parenthood is for most young adults a unique occasion in their lives. The Swedish welfare state offers, through public day care and the parental insurance, good possibilities for working parents. Does family formation differ between individuals with Swedish and individuals with other ethnic background living in Sweden? In this article we will present parts of a study based on biographical interviews with a life history approach with three different groups of couples that have recently become parents (first child 6-18 months). The groups are young adults with parents born in Sweden, young adults with parents born in Turkey and a mixed group of couples where one partner has a parent born in Sweden and one in Turkey. The analysis explores why these couples have taken the decision to become parents at this stage of their lives as well as considerations, experiences and knowledge of importance for their choices.
The study is part of a research project, Family Formation and Earnings, financed by The Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS). The empirical material consists of a register material in combination with biographical life histories. The register study examines the impact labour market attachment, education, sources of income and social policy have on women living in Sweden when it comes to the decision of starting a family (see Jansson & Österberg 2007). The study leans on the EU Framework 5 study ‘Gender, parenthood and the Changing European Workplace’, e.g. using a modified interview guide in relation to biographical life stories of working parents.

This article is built on the biographical life histories and focuses on similarities and differences between the three groups as well as individual cases in relation to the Swedish welfare system, notably the support to new parents, and to traditions in each group based on culture, nationality and family traditions.

**Contemporary Sweden**

Contemporary Sweden is a multiethnic society. One fifth of the Swedish population nowadays has their background in other countries and cultures. Most of them have come as political refugees from countries outside Europe during the last decades. It is a well-known fact that many immigrants have difficulties to enter the labour market and establish an earning of their own during their first years in Sweden. The unemployment rate for this group is high, e.g. in 2000 only 54 % of foreign citizens were employed (Schierup 2006). The unemployment rate in this group was 13% compared with 4.5 for native Swedes. The employment rate for women with children is also high in Sweden, and working mothers are well established in the labour market. The most common reason for people outside the Nordic countries to migrate to Sweden is family reunion. During the first years of the 20th century more than 50 % of immigrants have come to Sweden for this reason (Beskrivning av Sveriges befolkning, SOS 2005).
As to family formation and secularisation Sweden, along with Denmark, stands out in a global context. Both countries are regarded as the most secularised ones in the world and marriage as an institution has declined considerably. Young people’s coupling and transition to parenthood has undergone changes in most European countries and the age of becoming parents has increased over the years. Sweden fits into the Northwestern European pattern of informal coupling and individualism. It means that marriage and cohabitation are equally common ways of living for new parents, and the divorce rate is among the highest in the world (Therborn 2004).

In this presentation we have chosen to focus on migrants from Turkey. The reasons are manifold. People from Turkey have a history of almost half a century of migration to Sweden as workers, refugees or as family members. Taken together, they constitute a group possible to describe statistically and they have also experienced the institutional structure of the Swedish welfare state over time. The migration from Turkey started in the middle of the 1960s, with about 500 persons arriving each year. These numbers increased gradually and reached a peak ten years later with 2300 people in 1978. From 1980 to 2001 about 1000 Turks arrived each year; between 1988 and 1990, this number increased to nearly 1500 per year. In total over these two latest decades more than 27000 have migrated to Sweden (SCB, Yearbooks). Turkish migrants tend to marry or cohabit with partners with Turkish background. In 2001 this was the case for eight out of ten women and nine out of ten men. In line with the sometimes weak integration to the labour market, couples with Turkish background tend to have a considerably lower taxed income than Swedish couples, even though they have been in the country between 15 to 20 years (own calculations, SWIP 2001). Many Turkish migrants also live in neighbourhoods dominated by their fellow countrymen. In Göteborg, Sweden’s second largest city where the individual interviews in this study were conducted, this is the case in particularly one of the suburbs where the population is dominated by Turkish born or second generation Turks (Statistics Göteborgs stad).
**The Swedish Welfare Context**

The Swedish welfare state has for a very long time had a unique and radical social policy in the area of reproduction. The government has for more than 30 years promoted a progressive family policy and gender equality. Sweden as a welfare state is placed in the institutional or social democratic model with a high degree of de-commodification (Esping-Anderson 2002) and with a dual earner model based on individual labour market contributions. Social benefits are often based on income lost compensation, which implies the importance to have an earned income before receiving for example parental benefit. This directs the focus on the relevance of the structure of the welfare institutions and its impact on family and parenthood formation as well as it highlights patterns of class and gender inequalities, dimensions not developed in the Esping-Anderson typology. Korpi (2000) introduces a typology where these dimensions are taken into account in three models: general family support, dual earner support, and market-oriented policies (p. 144). Sweden fits into the model with dual earner support and its most distinguished features are the parental insurance, the public day care with a statutory maximum fee eligible to all children and extended welfare institutions for the elderly. The structure of these welfare institutions is often seen as a main reason why Sweden has been able to combine high fertility rate with high labour market participation for women, but also to relate the transition to parenthood to trends on the labour market (Hoem 1993). The parental insurance is also a distinguished gender policy promoting equity and equality for men and women in public as well as in private spheres of life.

**Parental insurance and public day care**

Sweden has a generous parental insurance legislation compared with other countries. If parents have worked before having children the parental insurance entitles them the right to a total of 13
months job-protected leave. Of the total leave two months are reserved for the mother and two months for the father respectively, in common language referred to as the “daddy-months”. The parents can split the remaining 9 months as they want. They will be compensated for the income loss up to 80 per cent of the income and many employers pay their employees up to 90 per cent of their income. If you have a loose attachment to the labour market you will get a much lower compensation. All parents are also entitled to further 3 months that are replaced at a low flat-rate level (180 SEK/day).

In Sweden all parents have the right by law to place their children in the public day care with a maximum fee. The system covers 80% of all children between 1 to 5 years of age and three quarters of all school children between 6 to nine years of age (Early childhood Education and Policy in Sweden in 1999).

Fertility trends

In an international perspective Swedish women are old mothers. Looking at fertility trends in Sweden young women today tend to wait until they have finished education and have secure employment before they have the first child. The average age at birth of first child for women has increased from 26.3 years in 1990 to 28.6 in 2004 and the corresponding average age for men is 31 years (SCB 2004). Previous studies show that two variables have been especially important for making a decision about starting a family; the relationship to the labour market and to finding a suitable partner. More than 80% of the young people interviewed, and in specific the young women, emphasized the importance of having a permanent job before children (Bernhart 2000)

Relation labour market – birth rates

Although the dual earner support model has increased women’s economic independence, it is still the woman who takes the pri-
mary responsibility for children and housework. In general she has also longer periods of absence from the labour market than her partner, which reduce chances for careers, income and expected pensions upon retirement. The father’s use of the parental leave has increased but still illustrates a traditional gender pattern. In 2002 the mother’s part of the parental leave was 84.5% and the fathers only 15.5% (which is doubled to compare with 1990, when it was 7.4%). In 2005 it has increased to 17% (National Insurance Board). Young women are today aware of this dilemma and want a partner who is willing to share not only the economic costs but also the social costs connected to caring duties and housework (Lane, Bäck-Wiklund, Szücs 2007).

**Method, Material and Analytic Approach**

As mentioned in the introduction this presentation is based on interviews with three different groups of new parents (first child 6-18 months). The groups consist of young adults with parents born in Sweden, young adults with parents born in Turkey and a mixed group of couples where one partner has one parent born in Sweden and one in Turkey. This mix was deliberately designed in order to get the largest possible variation. In all, 28 parents in the age 19-43 have been interviewed so far. Within the Turkish group some parents are born in Sweden, others are born in Turkey and have recently come to Sweden after marriage.

The main focus of the life histories is to explore why these couples have taken the decision to become parents at this stage of their lives. Which considerations, experiences and knowledge are important for their choices? How do individual and collective structures interact in the decision to become a parent? How do men and women balance independence and autonomy with class and ethnicity taken into account? How do men and women balance their individual versus the collective family project? Where do they find support as new parents?
Brief description of the informants

The selection of parents for individual interviews includes a variety of parents from each group for the purpose of giving a broad description of different preferences and life styles. In all, parents to 8 Swedish children have been interviewed (8 couples). A majority are in the thirties (the youngest couple is 19 and 22; the oldest father is 39). They live both in urban areas and in the countryside. Six couples live in own houses, two in rented apartments.

In all parents to 7 children with both parents from Turkey, or one from Turkey and one from Sweden, have been interviewed. The group where both parents are Turkish has a span from 25 to 43 years. Two of the couples are well established in Sweden with focus on careers and are regarded as “old” new parents (from 35-43 years). One couple consists of a 25 years-old student mother and an unemployed 27 years-old father that has recently arrived from Turkey. They all live in urban areas but in different districts. One couple rents a house, the other couples live in apartments. In the mixed group there are six parents, two couples and two separate parents (one Swedish mother and one Turkish father). Their ages vary from 22 to 41 years. Their housing conditions are split; one private house, two rented apartments and one apartment in a tenant-owners´ society.

Most parents irrespective of nationality can be defined as middle-class couples but some have working-class backgrounds. More than 60 % are married, the others are co-habiting. The educational level is medium or high (university or college studies alternative vocational training) with a few exceptions.

Of all parents interviewed there are five unemployed persons. Two are students and will start their studies again directly after the parental leave. Most of the parents have good or very good employments in different areas (both public and private), a few are running their own business.
Analytical approach

The analysis aims at comparing how and if family and parenthood formation differs between new parents with Swedish or with Turkish background. Comparisons always mean focus on differences and similarities. Preliminary results from the register study (Österberg & Jansson 2007) show that women with a non-Swedish background are much less affected by their labour market attachment compared to native Swedish women in the transition to parenthood. Swedish women seem to have adapted to the idea of a secure economic situation before the transition to motherhood. Own-working income has the strongest impact on Swedish women who are to become mothers but the institutional arrangements with social allowances and income compensation in case of unemployment also seem to give a sense of security when it comes to a decision on starting a family, though to a much lesser degree. For women born outside of Western Europe working income does not have that strong impact on decisions concerning timing of first birth.

The biographical life history approach gives an in-depth understanding about how individual lives and important decisions are constructed in interplay with dominant features of the present society. The aim of the comparative analysis is to find similarities and differences between the three groups as well as individual cases in relation to the Swedish institutional setting, e.g. the welfare system, taking into account traditions based on culture, nationality and family traditions. The confrontation of the overarching patterns mentioned in the register analysis above with the individual life histories opens up for an understanding of the complexity and meaning of individually lived lives.

Comparative analysis runs the risk of stereotyping if it concentrates too much on differences. Merkel Akkent points out in the foreword to “Women in Modern Turkey”, that in a growing body of research on the lives of migrant women they are defined as “vic-
tim of circumstances” (Akkent 1995: vii), and changes from tradition are overlooked, ignored or reduced to marginal phenomena.

When conducting analysis on the Swedish welfare institutions, according to the Swedish dual earner support model, it is important to “remember that institutions are always embedded in wider social contexts, including citizens’ attitudes, norms, and values, which may support or counteract policy outcomes. Furthermore, existing institutions reflect the combined effects of many different and often contradictory forces” (Korpi 2000: 144). This reminder becomes even more important taking into account in the following analysis that contemporary Sweden is a multiethnic country and that the transition to parenthood may invoke a diversity of practices, traditions and values.

Results: A comparison of the different groups of parents

Transition to parenthood

For the Swedish parents starting a family is an individual life project, something you create on your own together with your partner, making the family as a joint project. Modern family life is often characterized by a tension between the individual and the joint project, and to make life together as smooth as possible negotiations and reflections become constant ingredients in everyday family life (Bergsten & Bäck-Wiklund 1997). The family of origin is very seldom involved in young adults’ family planning. Their parents are in the background giving support if needed. Recent research shows that transfer of material goods as well as social support are important and common in a Swedish context (Björnberg & Latta 2007). Contrary to what is often argued people living in a welfare state are positively willing to support their children both financially but also with social support. This is never an issue talked about among the Swedish new parents in their reasoning about transition to parenthood. The main reason for starting a family is for the majority of the parents “good timing”, which means that both have
accomplished their education, are employed and have a good housing situation, e.g. the Swedish context-bound institutional arrangements. It is definitely an active decision. Some of the mothers also pointed out the biological issue, the risk of not being pregnant if they wait too long. Most parents (male and female) also mentioned more general reasons such as their longing for children, as something natural at this stage of their lives.

Only one couple, a young mother of 19 and a father of 22, had no plans to have a child. When she became pregnant they immediately decided that they wanted to keep the child, and they are today very satisfied with their family life. For two of the couples the life situations are more complicated with unemployment (for one or for both parents) and with more insecurity about the future. These couples explained that they wanted to start a family anyway. They were optimistic about the future and as one of the unemployed fathers said:

“if you have to wait for the perfect situation you will never be able to make that decision”.

The Swedish parents think that the parental insurance system is important but in reality had no direct impact on their decisions of becoming parents. They were not familiar with the rules before, but they all knew there was a compensation for the income loss during the parental leave. It is evident that they trusted the system without knowing so much about it from the beginning. During the pregnancy all couples received information about the parental insurance, which helped them to structure their leave. It seems that a sense of security has become internalised in their way of facing life and trusting in the future.

For the Turkish parents starting a family is more of a collective project related to culture and family traditions. It was something discussed with the family. This is normally connected to the marriage procedure and the expectations from relatives, waiting for the pregnancy. Their own parents are much more involved in compar-
ison with the Swedish couples and they are also expected to take on the responsibility to support the new family, both in material and practical ways. The issue on how one talks about family relations and expectations concerning support raises further questions about adjusting, attitude, discourses and expectations towards welfare state institutional arrangements.

The Turkish couples are aware of the Swedish parental leave, but institutional arrangements have not influenced their decisions of having a child. They normally expect concrete help from their relatives, e.g. the tradition is that a kin will help the new parents during the 40 first days. For one couple with own parents living in Turkey, the mother (36 years) felt very lonely in the new situation.

“I had no relatives who could be with me, I was alone and I didn’t want to be alone. I wanted someone next to me as a support, helping me with the cooking, taking care of me at home, giving assistance to both of us.”

The timing (in relation to work and economy) is not discussed as a specific issue in the same way as for the Swedish couples. Some of the parents mention similar reasons, especially having an education before starting a family however the pronounced planning and timing was not as articulated as for some of the Swedish parents. One example of a more “Swedish” thinking is a Turkish mother (32 years old, with an academic degree), who explains the importance of having a good life situation before one becomes a parent:

“Before we took the decision to start a family we had all we needed to have to get a baby; our jobs, good housing, an economic buffer. Everything was there, we didn’t have to change anything. The problem with the child welfare service was the only thing that surprised us.”

Some of the Turkish parents emphasized that it was not important to have everything in life organised before the transition to parenthood. The differences in their reasoning in relation to the
Swedish parents became obvious when discussing the transition to parenthood. If they have to choose it is more important to have a child than a good economy. Instead, they reduce other costs to afford the child. Often their parents help financially and they trust their family as the main provider of support instead of the welfare state. Both men and women stress the importance of children as being part of a family which sometimes also means meeting the expectations from the larger family system. Parenthood is a natural part of life that both men and women have always had in their minds.

To some extent the mixed couples illustrate all the previous statements. Their reasons for starting a family are more or less the same as the Swedish couples’ but include much more of negotiations and conflicts when it comes to balancing their different views of family life. The Turkish partners are more “Swedish” in comparison with the Turkish parents. They have often been raised in Sweden and their families of origin have adapted more of Swedish life styles. One Turkish woman, married to a Swedish man, describes the situation like this:

“...my family is not religious. We have been raised to merge with the Swedish society. We lived in a Swedish residential district with not so many immigrants. ....We were allowed to do things in the same way as the Swedish children, go on school trips, have boyfriends etc. “

Another mixed couple has struggled for years to find a good solution for their family life. They have been married for10 years and have got a daughter. It was a very difficult childbirth, a bit chocking for both. The woman born in Sweden of Turkish parents has been psychologically ill since childbirth and she now needs a lot of support both from her husband and her family. None of their birth families supported their marriage from the beginning and her father did not attend the wedding:
“For my parents it was a catastrophe, they didn’t want him because he was Swedish, which could lead to problems, I don’t know what they were afraid of... yes, I think it was because Swedish people often divorce and don’t take marriage so seriously...”

The mixed couples obviously live with double traditions and frameworks and try to find and negotiate solutions that will make everyone happy. One of the Turkish mothers, living in Sweden for 12 years, developed a strategy for this kind of complication in her life. She takes advice from her mother-in-law (living in Turkey) but then she does things in another way:

“I don’t get into conflict with her in the same way as before, I am not going against her either. I agree and then I do things as I want. I do it in a more flexible way now, I think.”

To summarize, the mixed group represents conceptions that are present both in Swedish and Turkish groups but also contrasting views. They have more problems to manage expectations and traditions from two different systems but also develop specific strategies to cope with this. They seem to be aware of the double perspectives; they are ambivalent but also understanding and supportive to each other, accepting the different expectations.

*To be a parent: experiences and dreams*

The majority of the parents in this study regardless of background have a very positive view of becoming a new parent. They often describe their feelings like the ‘most fantastic ever’ or similar. One young Swedish father explains that becoming a parent is a much stronger feeling than expected:

“Oh, it is like comparing a bathtub with the Atlantic Ocean. It is fantastic to be a parent. It is something new every day. It is not long ago she couldn’t creep. Now she stands up and can go around the table.”
Although the first period at home with the baby has been both challenging and tiring, they all say it is worth the effort. A new dimension has come into their lives and they look upon themselves as a family. Many of the parents also consider that parenthood has strengthened the relationship to the partner and a feeling of belonging together has grown. The focus of their lives has changed; the child is always first priority. They often mention the feeling of responsibility as a very important alteration in their lives. All planning is made having the child in mind, which has led to more dependency on the other partner. Some parents are a bit ambivalent to this. They were prepared for a restricted time schedule for themselves but not to that extent that has come up. Other parents emphasize it is not so important to meet old friends any more, going to cinemas or restaurants. They experience themselves as more mature and with other needs than before.

There are a few exceptions, e.g. a Turkish mother (married to a Swede) who had a difficult situation after the childbirth. The relationship to her partner was not so good at this time. She is now working hard to cope with the everyday life and has the following view on becoming a mother:

“I didn’t know that a child was so demanding and that it needed so much. Reality is much tougher than I imagined”

Disadvantages are mostly mentioned in relation to time for oneself, to pursue one’s own life project not only as a parent but for one’s partner and friends. All parents struggle with lack of own time no matter how. It is in this respect that differences related to culture and family traditions become visible. The main discourse among the Swedish couples is related to own and joint life project, the welfare state altogether in the context of gender equality. The Swedish parents try to plan and have a more structured and equal share of time to be used for own activities like physical training, evening courses or regular meetings with groups of friends. They often talk about having one evening for themselves every week or so.
The Turkish parents talk more about their lack of time and discuss this out of the possibility to employ a nanny or a housekeeper to facilitate everyday life. They are aware of the ideology of gender, equal sharing and responsibility in the household, but their solutions for a smooth everyday life often refers to support from outside the couple. However, this is a situation that causes a lot of ambivalence. Some of them miss having a kin in Sweden for the moment to support them in a practical way. But at the same time they can hardly see this solution as acceptable or possible in Sweden. If they return to Turkey employing a nanny will be a future solution, as this is still very common in the Turkish middle-class. On the other hand one Turkish mother has tried hard to keep her family out of her relationship with her Swedish husband. After her daughter was born she was unable to manage herself and her parents took over a lot of responsibility for the child. This re-established close kin-relationship also created a lot of stress and at the same time a relief for the new parents.

Other differences are foremost seen in relation to dreams and considerations for the future. All the parents worry in some way or another about their children. The Swedish parents focus on the nearest future; their concerns are about nurseries and time management in relation to the work situation. Again it is possible to discern in their discourse; a sense of security. They have been brought up in a welfare state with entitlement to paid parental leave, public childcare and free education up till university level. The Turkish parents and also the mixed couples seem to be much more focused on the future and their own responsibility of bringing up the child. They already consider different strategies to facilitate the children’s lives. They imagine future problematic scenarios, probably using own experiences as immigrants in Sweden. Questions like finding the right pre-schools, choosing good areas for living and the ambition to give the child university studies are part of their integration strategies in the Swedish society. They want the children to be integrated but also to have a basic set of more Turkish values to be compatible in both countries.
Work, housing and economy

The Swedish parents seem to have a joint main track of family formation including different steps such as accomplished education, employment and good arrangement of housing.

One father describes his view of the importance of having a good education:

“I wanted to finish my education first, I have always felt like that. If I don’t have an education, I don’t want any children. I must be able to give them something back, that has always been very important for me.”

Concerning working conditions a majority in the Swedish group are employed, mostly in the private sector. A young mother will continue to study at the university level after the first period at home. One couple has recently moved to a new city and both are unemployed for the moment. As they both have higher education, they are positive as to their chances of being employed a new job. One mother is between jobs as she had to leave her previous employment during the pregnancy because of shortage of work. She hopes to get a new job very soon. One father, 25 years-old, has been unemployed for 3-4 years (except for some temporary jobs) and has a more problematic situation. He is now at home with his daughter while the mother is working. He likes to be at home and he is not worried about the future. The family has low expenses and he hopes to get a job when the child is offered a place at a day care centre.

Most of the Swedish parents are content with their economic situation. They express they have no need of financial support from state or their families and stress the importance of independency. If they will end up in a situation where they need support come, most of them think it is possible to ask parent for help or borrow money from a bank. All couples except one have own savings, a buffer for unexpected expenses.
Another factor that impacts on the decision to become a parent is housing. Swedish parents often say that they cannot see any reasons to hesitate about starting a family once they have moved into a house of their own. One couple moved from an apartment to a house and the mother was pregnant some weeks later:

“I don’t like the idea of living in an apartment with children. Not because the neighbours will disturb me but more because a crying baby would annoy the neighbours, and that would make me stressed. But after moving to the house we had the best preconditions, I wanted to have a child. “

Among the Turkish parents one finds high status work as well as a student mother and an unemployed father. The father has recently arrived in Sweden after the marriage and is now looking for job. The mother has a very low compensation from the parental insurance and the father has a state allowance. His previous education in Turkey has not been accepted in Sweden and he has to start from the beginning. His frustration is evident and he cannot see any other solution for the moment than going back to Turkey in a near future with his wife and daughter. The dilemma is that the wife wants to stay in Sweden, she has been raised here and her family arrived already in the seventies. Her family is very supportive, but at the same time her mother is very intrusive and the daughter what to do in different situations. The young woman (24) has sometimes problems to handle this situation:

“My husband can cope with it, he says: you should have listened to your mother. I am the type of person that at one occasion, I do not care, next time I take it personally. Before I was more loud-voiced, nowadays I just go away. Sometimes she regrets and tries to get things right again when she feels she has gone too far.”

Some of the Turkish couples, in which both have higher education, good jobs and more or less the same income, still experience the man’s salary as the main income. The wife’s salary is regarded out
of a voluntary perspective. The general view is that she can choose to be at home if she wants to. And mostly, the woman also accepts the husband’s view of being the breadwinner. The traditional values are very strong and indicate that a man is supposed to take care of his family. The men also emphasize the emotional relationship between mother and child as a very important reason for letting the wife stay at home with the child.

The Turkish parents have different kinds of housing. The idea of having an own house is not so established in this group as among Swedish parents. To some extent this is related to their future plans, that is, staying in Sweden or leaving for Turkey. For one couple moving back is part of their strategy after they have accomplished their work period in Sweden. Their research experiences here will guarantee them well-paid employments also in Turkey.

Among the mixed couples one finds parents with different life situations. A Swedish father with university education had problems to manage his previous work. He was exhausted and had to take a long sick leave. After this experience he decided to change business and is now employed as a store man. He and his Turkish wife rent a flat but have the intention to move to another area, preferably to a house of their own. One mother is a student and the family still lives in a small apartment in the downtown area. Her Turkish partner (they are not married) is also raised in Sweden and they will probably keep this flat as they have reconsidered the common view of starting a family in Sweden:

“We had lots of discussions about economy when I was pregnant. You must admit that Sweden is a very good country for having children with all the security you get. We still live in our small apartment. We had probably an idea that you need all this practical things when you get a baby, a big house, a car etc. But we have gradually understood that this is what society demands, not the parents. We give our daughter love and energy and we let the future decide for us where to live.”
It is obvious that there are both similarities and differences in relation to work, housing and economy among the three groups. A big difference is that Swedish and mixed couples mostly see work as a future activity for both parents, possible to share in different ways. Turkish parents are more traditional and regard the father as the main provider.

Relation to life histories

The family of origin is of great importance for all parents in the study but it is more often a concern expressed among the Turkish parents. The importance has increased since they have become parents themselves, but there are many differences between Swedish and Turkish parents connected with autonomy and dependency in their life histories.

Swedish parents focus on the relation grandparents – grandchild as an important aspect of life quality and appreciate when their own parents live at a short distance, which gives them good opportunities to have contact with the grandchildren. They often try to balance the two different families and meet their parents once a week or once every other week. They do not want their parents to be too much involved and care about their independence. Their parents seem mostly to respect this and listen to their children, ready to help if needed. All parents in the study value the nuclear family as the ideal and stress that they have positive family experiences themselves from childhood. Only one of the Swedish parents has grown up with a single mother. He mentions this as a negative experience he will try to avoid in future. Another Swedish father gives his image of the ideal family in this way:

“The ideal family is together a lot, plays Monopol, has picnics or walking tours. It is also the family you can imagine sitting around the kitchen table, having a nice time. It is what you find in all commercials, it is the collective picture.”
For the Turkish parents the family traditions are much stronger and they normally expect their parents to participate in a more concrete way in their lives. There are more rules and values telling how one is supposed to behave in different contexts related to; for instance, religion, marriage, fatherhood and motherhood. Turkish young people often stay at home until they marry, which means that parents also have an impact on their choice of education as they normally must pay for their education. Most of the new parents describe the ideal situation as an extended family life in which different relatives are involved as important persons. But two of the Turkish couples have almost no relatives in Sweden, so their images of family life do not correspond with their everyday life.

Some of the Turkish parents express contradictions in their life histories, in relation to different values and traditions. They are influenced by Turkish family traditions but at the same time they have adopted concepts of the Swedish society with an overarching gender equality ideology as part of the public discourse. Turkish mothers are often aware of the gender discourse and describe that they need more support in a practical way. They wish the fathers could share the parental leave period with them to a greater extent, and they intend to continue working in the future. To a certain extent they have a double perspective, which means that they at the same time accept and do not accept the male dominance, illustrated by some of the Turkish fathers in the study (Kandiyoti 1995). One mother describes this double perspective:

“I am not happy about taking on so much responsibility. I would like to share it with my husband but for him it is so different. He has grown up in a reality in which men only do very little work at home. He is raised like that, so that picture is true for him.”

The men are sometimes ambivalent in their life histories. They see advantages with the Swedish welfare system and the possibility of parental leave. But old family traditions and expectations of being
a man, a breadwinner, are very strong. The father that has recently
come to Sweden is very disappointed about the fact that his previ-
ous education is inadequate in Sweden. He has tried to help his
wife as much as possible after the daughter was born. He is a good
example of a man who is in transition to a new fatherhood:

“I had no expectations because I did not know so much. You
think that fathers cannot be so present, so near, but the father
can have the same relationship to a child as a mother does. I
think it is a big difference between how I act and my father
acted. I don’t think he would have changed napkins or
washed her. But it is not a problem for me.”

The mixed couples experience more negotiations and conflicts in
their lives, trying to balance their different views of family life.
Before starting a family their different backgrounds were not a big
issue. But as soon as the child was born discussions about religion,
baptism, names, how to raise the child, etc. become more frequent.
For these couples traditional male dominance intersects sometimes
with Swedish gender ideology and traditional values regarding for
example religion and the extended family. The new parents have a
mixed discourse when they describe this scenario. They try to
please everyone and give the child a Swedish and a Turkish name,
for instance. They try to understand that all parents want the best
and cope with the differences as well as possible. This is an issue
where different new or alternative ways of living in the Swedish
society are under construction, which will be developed in a further
paper. Consequently, the discussion presented here is both brief
and preliminary. One young Swedish mother (23) has her own
analysis of the differences:

“They are more used to interfere in Turkey. They have the
family and other relatives, we have been there every summer
since we met. In Turkey they interfere because they care for
each other, in Sweden they don’t interfere because they care!
It is a big difference. “
Summarizing relations to life histories one can say that Swedish parents experience that they are more independent and free from the influence of the origin family, but on the other hand they express more dependence on the welfare institutions. They are used to more freedom as individuals and their preferences for work and education have rarely been influenced by the parents. However, new research (Björnberg & Latta 2007) shows that support from parents is common, but it is not mentioned in the family discourse. Being new parents they are anxious for good relationships with their own parents but they also have restrictions for how much they want them to be involved. Turkish parents are expected to be more involved from the beginning as this is the family history and the general opinion in Turkey. In reality some of the new Turkish parents have no or very few relatives in Sweden, so there is a gap between the ideal and the real situation. When the families have lived in Sweden for a longer period, it is obvious that there often exist double frameworks of attitudes and values, both for men and women. To some extent this can also be the situation in Turkey. Sümer (2004) emphasizes that the ‘strong Turkish family’ ideal contradicts trends in the labour market demanding individualisation, independence and mobility. But in Turkey it is obvious that women are supposed to take on caring responsibilities for children and elderly, though having fulltime employments, as soon as the demands of the public and private spheres collide.

**Conclusions**

There are more similarities than differences in many questions between parents with different backgrounds, e.g. ideal of the nuclear family, the positive feeling of becoming parents and the awareness of the importance of education and employment to manage a family. However each individual life history reveals contradictions, foremost among the Turkish and mixed parents. Regardless of background reflexivity and negotiations seem to characterize late modern parenthood. Different layers of opinions
co-exist in the same story and both traditional family patterns, with roots in their home countries, are present at the same time as more late modern perspectives on gender and parenthood.

As coming to differences the Swedish parents live in a context where the welfare state gives them a basic sense of security to become parents. They have adopted the dual earner support family model with individual labour market contributions and they opt for the “right timing”. The structure of the welfare institutions has an impact on family and parenthood formation. These preconditions make them more dependent of the welfare state but more independent in relation to their own parents. They have a very different approach to their parents and relatives in comparison with the Turkish parents. Starting a family is an individual life project for the Swedish couples.

For the Turkish couples it is more of a collective project related to family and cultural traditions in which other family members are of importance. The talk about “right timing” does not come forward in their stories. In spite of living in Sweden for years they still have a family perspective, counting on support from relatives in the transition to parenthood. They appreciate parts of the welfare system but regard it as a good complement to the family. At the same time some of the Turkish parents have very few supportive relatives in Sweden. In rhetoric they still emphasize the family as the most important support provider. In reality they have to use a combination of community service and family support to manage their everyday lives. The mixed couples, not surprisingly, have conceptions that are present both in Swedish and Turkish groups. They have some problems to manage expectations and traditions from two different systems but at the same time develop specific strategies to cope with these differences.

The adaptation to the dual support family model is not as distinguished as among the Swedish parents and the father has a different position in the Turkish families. He is regarded as the main
provider and he is supposed to be the breadwinner, also in cases where the woman has a high status job and a similar salary. Some ambivalence can be found about this traditional gender division but it is still the mother who has the main responsibility for childcare and domestic work. Swedish parents and the mixed couples seem to be more equal in their descriptions of the everyday life. The Swedish fathers in general emphasize much more the caring function as a father. They also try to share the responsibility concerning the domestic work. One can say that they often embrace gender equality in words but not always in actions and attitudes.

Both the support from the welfare state as well as the dual earner model, based on individual labour market contributions, is taken for granted by the Swedish new parents. For the Turkish new parents these matters are still issues open for negotiations in the process of responding to the Swedish welfare institutions.

NOTES
1 See www.workliferesearch.org/transitons
2 The parental insurance is based on the principle of income compensation. The time duration is 450 days before the child is 8 years old, 390 days of income compensation of 80 per cent for income up to 24 800 SEK/month (2005) and the remaining 90 days are compensated with 180 SEK. (www.fk.se/sprak/eng/foralder)
3 Muazzez Gürbüz, BSc in Social Work, has accomplished 9 interviews with Turkish parents.
Turkish Women in Sweden: Swedish Language, Contradictions and Transgressions

Marie Carlson

Introduction

This article discusses the experiences of Turkish women participants in Swedish language courses for immigrants (SFI). It traces their encounter with the Swedish educational system, as well as with the affiliated social institutions, constituting a symbolic habitat within the Swedish cultural environment that is both “traditional” and typical of its period, with a number of actors clearly anchored in welfare thinking. This line of thinking is articulated in various discursive practices, which the course participants experience and reflect upon. The 12 Turkish women, between 22 and 30 years old, attended schools in their native country, for at least 4 to 8 years. They are fluent in reading and writing from their childhood, but in Sweden they have been classified as “low educated”. The first section in the article focuses on the theme “being a mother, being a course participant”, whereby gender appears as a key relational dimension in the narratives about family patterns and socially constructed identities. The women’s stories are not only
about subordination, but also about negotiating and transgression on the way towards their adaptation to the expected life patterns. Within this context of fluctuating values, various tensions arise as linked to discourses in both Turkish and Swedish contexts. Further, my analysis highlights the SFI-education as an institutional power that shapes cultural definitions of citizenship. Here the category of gender as a relational subject is discussed in correlation with the concept of an immigrant in Swedish culture. Some salient concepts, such as the somewhat problematic dichotomy “traditional” / “modern” are discussed within the institutional framework of the Swedish welfare state. Following my empirical research, the course participants very clearly experience a “deficiency discourse” that functions as a structuring principle among the educators who comment on their students. However, dominant ideas in Swedish society, partly conveyed through participation in SFI, seem also to engage immigrant women into reflexive resistance. In the concluding remark, I argue that SFI indirectly enhances the participants’ effort to overcome certain dividing lines in order to ‘deal with life’ in their new homeland. I demonstrate that SFI contributes to “integration” through the course participants’ agency, although not always in accordance with the educational curriculum.

**Being a mother, being a course participant – a ‘relational’ story**

In narrating the SFI-studies, it is obvious that course participants’ relate their experiences to gendered discourses connected to social relations. Emine, one of the interviewed women, continually connects her account of language studies with her experience of being a mother, woman and wife:

“My husband was not really against that I should educate myself, but he was very careful about the children. He did not want that they already at the age of 16 months should attend a day-care centre; that they should be handed over to somebody else. He is very particular about his children and
wanted that the mother should take care of them that they
should be all right. Finally I accepted it and thought that ‘yes,
it is perhaps just as good that I take care of my children, take
the time for them.’ When they have grown older I could
maybe begin to satisfy my own interests. So when the chil-
dren eventually became older I said that ‘enough is enough -
now I want to start learning Swedish, and get a job, because
I wanted to work.’ That’s what I said.”

In one way, one might say that Emine expresses subordination and
conforming into the expected life pattern. It is also as “subordinat-
ed” that a large portion of previous so called immigration studies
or ethnicity research have often described and understood “immi-
grant women” – subordinated in their homes as well as in society
at large; thus a “double relative subordination”. But if we are to
reconsider Emine’s words, one will notice that she also mentions a
course of events in her life, where she maintains that she took up a
definitive position in various ways. Obviously, this indicates an
active construction of meaning at hand within the framework of
existing conditions. Attention should be paid to how categories like
gender, class and ethnicity simultaneously imbue social positions
in a complex way (cf. Bradley 1996). To study women as an a priori
category is questionable. Mohanty (1991), for example, maintains
that an inclusive concept of “women” is problematic as an analyti-
cal category:

“That which unites women is the sociological notion about
the “similarity” in their oppression. It is on this point that an
elision takes place of that which goes between “women” as
subjects in their own history” (Mohanty 1991: 199).

Instead there should be nuanced and well-informed close studies,
which focus upon how “women” are constituted as women by a
complex interaction between class, culture, religion, and other ide-
ological institutions and frames of reference. The Turkish migrant
women within SFI are actually situated in a life situation, where
power and subordination are embedded in a network of complex structural relations, institutional arenas, and interpersonal activities. This becomes quite obvious in their personal accounts on how they experience a wide range of perceptions articulated about them in different contexts. In a way, the women are situated in crossfire of discourses. Overall the concept of gender can be interpreted, as:

“... a key relational dimension of human activity and thought informed by cultural and individual notions of men and women – having consequences for their social or cultural positioning and the way in which they experience and live their lives “(Indra 1999: 2).

In the ‘relational’ narratives on cultural and individual notions, the Turkish course participants often speak of their “primary responsibility” for the family, above all for the children, where the Swedish language is needed to maintain regular and meaningful contact with institutions such as schools, day-cares, and welfare centres. In contradiction to a widespread belief in various contexts that new immigrants (especially like the Muslim women in this study) are resisting the necessity of learning Swedish, the women clearly articulate a desire for learning the majority language in the new home country. However, the ways they manage to combine their language studies and other important tasks vary considerably. While referring to the strategies for structuring their studies outside school, a clearly emerging question is how to procure time and create a learning space (‘a room of one’s own’), a theme familiar to many other women engaged in adult education. Their need ‘to be left alone’ indicates that a possibility of undisturbed and uninterrupted work has been formulated and negotiated by the women themselves. One of them for example, having a husband who works late at night or throughout the night, projects this as an advantage:

“My husband works during the night, he leaves at 11 p.m. After he has left, I sit for one hour and practice my home-
work. It has become all right since he started his night work. Before it was not - I am satisfied this semester. I gain so much. It is so quite, the children are asleep - no man about the place.”

Another woman finds it harder to get enough time, but she, too, is anxious to “create time” for herself:

“It is obvious that one does not always have an opportunity, sometimes one can study at home, and sometimes one has a hard time. But I think that it very much depends upon oneself how much one... one must find some time and one must act so that there will be some time – I at least try to make time. I always try to practice an hour at any rate – I go through what we have learnt at school and check if I got it right.”

The fact that the women emphatically stress the importance of having their “own time”, that it is an advantage over men who are not at home all the time, is not generally related to negative attitudes of their husbands towards language studies. On the contrary, some of the women mention the support and encouragement they receive from their husbands, their children, and their parents-in-law as well. Fadime tells us that her husband associates studies with independence:

“My husband certainly wants me to learn Swedish. That I shall work, he certainly wants me to become independent. He himself works a lot, but if he sometimes comes home earlier he then helps me. He helps me with my homework; he brings the children from the day-care centre, so he really does what he can.”

Ümit gets support from both her mother-in-law and her husband, both trying to motivate her to attend the course, while she occasionally would prefer to stay at home:
“I get a lot of understanding from my parents-in-law. I think one must get it - I mean I am doing something, I go to school and then they must stand by me. That's all. No, I do not have any problems concerning homework. When my mother-in-law is here (= in Sweden) she prepares the food and similar things - then all is ready and served. And my husband really wants me to continue to attend school. He says, “You have got these opportunities in Sweden, why shouldn’t you use them? You ought to do that” - when I stay at home, he says so.”

In the narratives about options vis-à-vis studies when relating to various persons, a rather dense social network is discerned. This also coincides with how “Turkish” patterns of identity are often described (see e.g. Abu-Lughod & Parla 1998; Ahmad 1996; Akpinar 1998; Engelbrektsson 1978; Kagitçibasi 1996; Sümer 1998). The portrayal of “Turkish traditional rural culture” which is found among these sources usually emphasises the family collective and not the individual as the basic social unit (cf. Özdalga 2002). Furthermore, there exists a gender- and age hierarchy. Wisdom is incorporated into and legitimated by two comprehensive systems of meaning, namely Islam and the Mediterranean ethics of honour. The role of young women belonging to this tradition is described as subordinate and passive (cf. Timmerman 2000). Traces of this tradition, a kind of a family-oriented discourse, as it is described in the academic as well as in popular discourses, can be discerned in the narratives of the SFI-participants. We can also observe increasing autonomy, responsibility, and a number of plans for the future in relation to employment prospects. This can be described as a theme of independence, which is also present in other studies on Turkish women in Sweden (e.g. Thomsson & Mohl 1998). It is obvious that the SFI-participants are aware of various images, which frequently occur in the dominant society, and, therefore, they are often hesitant to demonstrate any attitudes or behaviours that would contrast with the Swedish ideals of “individuality” and autonomy”.

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However, at the individual level, there is a striking variation in the narratives discussed. For example, Ayten and Gülay claim that they lack support for their language studies in their home environments. They tell us of demanding parents-in-law who show scant understanding for homework. Both these women are expected always to be ready to serve in their homes. Ayten says that it is not uncommon that her father-in-law is wondering when they will eat when she is busy doing her homework. Both she and Gülay are in a somewhat precarious situation vis-à-vis “the Swedes”, in that their teachers expect them to study at home. They relate explicitly to a “Swedish” contrasting image – the ‘Swedish’ norm of gender equality. As Gülay says:

“The Swedes do not really understand; they think we are just like them. They think about their own conditions, that we have every possibility to pursue this on our own, to only allocate time to ourselves. That we cannot do. The teachers have a hard time understanding our situation.”

This dialogue in a way illustrates how identity is constructed relationally in terms of “the other” – in this case of the Swedes. Ayten means to say that “Swedish” women can manage to nurse children, manage their homes and jobs because there is a difference between “Turkish” and “Swedish” men:

“Among Swedish couples the men lend a hand, they wash up the dishes, they share work at home. If Turkish men occasionally wash up, then it should be regarded as something close to deviant behaviour. And if the men also work outside the home it is taken for granted that the wife alone should do practically everything in the household. But at the moment my husband is unemployed, so it does not really matter if he is working or not – rather it is a matter of attitude.”

In Ayten’s and Gülay’s cases one might say that their schoolwork lacks legitimacy among the other family members – and maybe even to some degree among themselves. The attitudes and social
roles here are quite similar to other identity studies of Turkish women in the midst of so called modernisation processes. There seems to be a co-existence of “traditional” and “modern” lifestyles, but home and children are still given priority (see e.g. Kagitçibasi 1996; Kandyoti 2002; Sümer 1998). To a greater extent, some of the women I have interviewed seem to reproduce established sex role patterns. But, as already mentioned, there is a simultaneous process of reflexivity. The women negotiate and interact in different contexts and sometimes new ground is broken. Concerning the reproduction of sex roles, Ümit relates an episode with her son:

“Among us, in Turkish families it is actually so that in general it is the woman who is mainly responsible for children and the household. The men are not too helpful. When I attended a bimonthly meeting at the day-care centre with my son, it appeared that he obviously had that attitude that “yes, as a man one doesn’t need to lend a hand in the house or do anything - he doesn’t need to work in the household. It is he who makes the decisions”. Then the teacher asked me “How come that he is thinking in that way?” And then I said, that it is what he has seen - therefore he has got such ideas.”

When Ümit tells about the conversation with the son’s teacher, she laughs as if it was self-evident that the boy should imitate the actions of the father. She seems to suggest that even if one is talking about sharing tasks in the family, it is that which the son observes in practical action that counts. The question asked by the teacher seems to imply that she is holding Ümit responsible for the son’s behaviour, which reflects “the norm of the man”, or prevailing values within the family. Ümit must, in this context, relate to both “the Swedish” and “the Turkish” normative system. If the Turkish normative system is embedded in a more family-oriented discourse, the Swedish normative system belongs to a gender equality discourse based on the individual unit (cf. Özdalga 2002). It could be said that Ümit, similarly to other women, have “assimi-
lated” discourses about family and identity in both Turkish and Swedish contexts, and have to relate to both. Their stories are many-faceted and serve as anti-discourses within the Swedish majority society. While articulating this anti-narration, various ways of conquering denied subjectivity can be clearly observed. But coming closer to the institutional level within the SFI-education, other power relations and domination can be discerned, such as a deficiency discourse at work.

The SFI- institution – the power of definitions

SFI has been assigned a multiple function by the Swedish state, and it plays an important part in the integration policy due to a decision made by the Swedish Parliament in 1998. SFI is also regarded as part of the labour-market policy and is intended to aid in the realization of national educational goals. The “integration initiative” comprises several parties, such as social services, reception of refugees and, employment offices. Consequently, on an institutional level, SFI is in collaboration and interaction with other authorities such as social service and employment office, which have partly distinct logics and assignments. Tensions sometimes arise, in particular, as the institutions both disturb and co-operate with each other’s central assignments. SFI-teachers, for example, criticize employment office clerks for their interpretation and use of SFI-certificates as sorting instruments and borders for immigrants to become “active work applicants” (cf. Franzén 1997; Hertzberg 2003). Similarly, the social service checks attendance and intervention in the pedagogical assignment are questioned. However, goals for improvement and a so-called deficiency perspective operate as a frame of reference for all three institutions when working with clients, immigrants in general as well as the SFI-participants. Here we find jointly structuring principles concentrated on “problems” and “problem solving” whereby the institutions, despite their conflicts, still manage to interact and work together.
Thus, a kind of institutionalisation has occurred which focuses on the “immigrant”; a process, which has involved the rise of many specialised professional groups (cf. Kamali 2000). The contemporary SFI-education, not only in the municipality of Göteborg, is an integral part of this institutionalisation and interacts in this respect actively with several other social institutions and with its civil servants. Various administrators can often function as “gate-keepers” with authority to open or close the door to particular social groups or individuals, and different dominating notions and action strategies are far from being irrelevant in this respect (cf. Franzén 1997).

Consequently, the image of a “weak immigrant” is frequently articulated in interviews and conversations at the two SFI-schools. Repeatedly teachers and other staff members use a mode of delivery, which specify “problems” rather than possibilities and recourses in the discourse on the “low-educated immigrant”. A counsellor for example talks about courses, which “did not elevate them (= the immigrant clients) because “they were too weak” and “then we hold them under their arms”. It is also highlighted that an objectifying view is articulated in expressions like “taking measures”, “handing over”, or “taking care of”. The notions, which are produced and reproduced in everyday practices, have often very concrete consequences for the groups concerned, as their previous experiences and capacities are left unaccounted for. Ålund, for example, has, throughout the years, maintained how she discerns “a wall of problem-centered ideologies being erected in Sweden” (1988:39). This wall wall, on the one hand, prevents “immigrant women” from developing their self-esteem, and, on the other hand, represents obstacles instead of possibilities (Ålund 1988). As Westin has argued in the Swedish context, the reception of Asian refugees from Uganda could be interpreted as a “treatment” from a “care-taking perspective”, which places human beings in a kind of collective “patient’s situation” (1986):
“They were certainly informed about what would happen to them, they could decline or agree to various proposals which were put before them, but the planning, the initiatives and, the procedure in the trend of events were decided prior to that of the Swedish authorities” (Westin 1986: 13).

Admittedly, more than twenty years have passed since the reception of Asians from Uganda, but as Franzén puts it in Invandring och arbetslöshet (Emigration and Unemployment, 1997:100):

“...the reception of refugees appears to have been bureaucratized even more and what Westin calls ‘the procedure in the trend of events’ has been even more formalised. Statements of honour about a comprehensive view and coordination between various authorities notwithstanding, there are formulations that clearly state what the refugees shall go through in a process of integration.”

The SFI-educators also express discomfort when engaged in the discourse about the fostering aspect of SFI-education. A teacher has commented, for example, that she often feels “a bit silly” when, during social orientation, she teaches about “things that are obvious for us like school/education and health care” (Carlson 2002: 103):

“It feels like getting on one’s high horse, even though I think that they somehow should learn about that. Otherwise it can develop into stumbling-blocks” (Carlson 2002).

But the same person can at one point of time dissociate herself from this attitude, and somewhat later during the same conversation, switch to a decidedly more positive one. Depending upon which values are evoked in the interviews, various tensions arise. It seems, for instance, comparatively easy for the interviewees to adopt a reflexive and critical remark towards a fostering attitude when the conversation is focused on the individual level in regard to children rather than to adults. But when the same conversation
turns to the immigrant in relation to the Swedish society, it seems
that more symbolically charged non-contestable values are at stake.
Values and value hierarchies in the “Swedish” mainstream society
are then given right of precedence in an unproblematic way (cf.
Narrowe 1998). “The Swedish” is given normative preference. The
power of definitions belongs to the majority society and it is also a
question of social position. For the Turkish participants all this is
very obvious. Categorised as Muslim migrants from the Middle
East, and sometimes perceived as “coming from the Third World”,
they are bombarded with a plethora of stereotypical images (cf.

“Modern” and “traditional” – a problematic dichotomy
Statements in the media, public debate as well as research, are often
about particular immigrant groups and “their” “premodern and
traditional” societies related to “our” “late modern”, “post-mod-
ern” society. The migration journey seems to go in one direction
only, from “darkness towards the light” (cf. Kandiyoti 2002).
However, in my data, this dichotomy is not as straight-forward;
instead there is a great deal of variations in the attitudes expressed.
The Turkish women’s narratives rather tell us about a contradicto-
ry and ambivalent relationship with continuous changes and dis-
placements. The women actually see themselves as both “modern”
and “traditional” bearers of values within “their tradition”. The fact
that the migration journey seems not to be a matter of a “homoge-
neous” modernisation process is borne out by Emine’s statement
that in Turkey she left a “modern” and “outgoing” family to end up
in something very different in Sweden:

“When I came to Sweden I did not have too much knowledge
about Sweden, I only knew a little. And I was rather young
when they sent me – here (= in Sweden) they did not allow
me to attend school to tell you the truth. Actually I cannot tell
you who did not allow me, but I think that it should have
been my husband’s duty to inform me. He had grown up in this country and he knows everything, what kinds of options there are, what you can make the most of, what you can profit by. He should have told me that “it is important for you to learn the language and that you can attend school and so on.” The rest of the family didn’t either. In a way this family was not as modern - one can say that they held the opinion that one should be at home and work with domestic work and get children and one should take care of the children etc. On the other side, my own family, even if I come from a village, my family was much more modern - they were more outgoing, more liberated in their manners, so there was a difference between these two families.”

In spite of the fact that Emine, as she underlines, comes from a village, she thinks that her family had “a modern way of thinking”. Ayten’s migration, however, seems to imply a breach with an earlier “traditional” lifestyle in Turkey. She comes from a town, which is famous for its religious orthodoxy. There she had been “a daughter living at home in a natural way according to both her own and her father’s will”, as she puts it. However, in Sweden she sees “many studying women” and that will change her attitude to studies:

“In Turkey I did not want to continue with my studies - my father didn’t want it and so I didn’t either. When I came to Sweden I saw something different, that all women attend school - it is great!”

That the conceptual pair of “the traditional” and “the modern” as a very problematic one, has been discussed during some period now and within several disciplines. Kandiyoti, for example, argues that utilising the blunt tools of modernisation theory has “resulted in attempts to fit myriad complex and contradictory cultural phenomena into the conceptual straitjacket of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’” (2002: 2). In a way it can be said that the dichotomy often is dis-
solved when it comes to empirical reality. Instead of applying this conceptual pair as attached to two absolute epochs, which will readily result in both essentialism and a static line of thought, the concept of tradition can be put to use for signifying continuity as well as discontinuity (cf. Kemuma 2000; Mørck 1998). When the Turkish SFI-participants refer to “traditions”, they comment on religion and various customs for which they view themselves to be active transmitters. Several women emphasize the importance to convey Muslim traditions to the children. As one of the women puts it:

“This is a responsibility - we have the responsibility towards our children to bring them up as Muslims, because we are Muslims. And it is even more important when living in a foreign country - that we must give this to them. But it is difficult when living like this. In Turkey they get instruction at school, in that case the family has not such a great responsibility to convey this kind of religious instruction. But on the other hand it is exceedingly difficult to fulfil one’s religious duties in this country. For example my husband has grown up in this country so he is not as interested as I am. Therefore I get jammed between these two cultures - it is more difficult for me. It is actually quite a difference. And it is very difficult for the children - these who grow up here, because when they go out there is another culture, they come home then it is yet another culture - they, as it were, sway to and fro between these two. They get jammed between these two.”

Ideas about each other and “the other”

The interview conversations on the SFI-studies, both with the teachers and course participants, largely build on ideas about each other, despite missing conversations with each other due to the lack of a common language that would allow to develop more intricate topics. The language used between the SFI staff and the Turkish women is mostly Swedish. This creates a paradoxical situation in
which the course participants have to learn Swedish in order to communicate, while already using this language in their interactions with the educators (cf. Norton 2000). Consequently, in more demanding discussions, the opinions of the participants are not necessarily heard. This somewhat troublesome situation can be partly ascribed to deficient economic resources, but, as I would argue, is also related to the question of who is given the right to speak (cf. Bourdieu 1991; Skeggs 1997). In this context, we also have to pay attention to systematic and interpersonal power relationships at work, and especially within different institutional frameworks and social interactions. As Bourdieu has suggested in Language and Symbolic Power (1991), the value ascribed to speech cannot be understood apart from the person who speaks, and the person who speaks cannot be understood apart from larger networks of social relationships. An expanded definition of communicative discourse should also include “the right to speech” and even more “the power to impose reception” (Bourdieu 1991). These kinds of questions have been raised in my analysis that ultimately involves power and the right to define “knowledge”.

Interestingly, all SFI-participants in my project refer to shortcomings in different situations, in which they are expected to speak Swedish. Often, the stories are about how they feel embarrassed. Sometimes such occasions involve specifically gendered attitudes. Some of the Turkish women’s narratives are about emotional aspects in relation to the opinion they believe Swedes hold about them. Feelings of inferiority due to their belief of being seen as ‘unintelligent’ are common. In one way or another, the women seem to be drained of their previous experiences and cognitive abilities (cf. Thomsson & Mohl 1998: 285). Emine depicts it as follows:

“When we arrive here we become almost like children nevertheless - it doesn’t matter if you have earlier knowledge of different things or so. But when you come here and sit down and can’t speak the language, then it is like having no mouth
or ears - you can’t listen, so you become a nobody. You sink to become nobody. You feel that you are worth nothing that you really do not exist. Actually one can have different kinds of knowledge, but when you can’t tell this in words or retrieve this by language - then I have really no use of my own knowledge. Then you believe or you believe that from their point of view they consider you as, yes, as being in the dark, uneducated and reactionary or yes, unmodern etc. Maybe they don’t think such things about us, but it’s exactly what I feel - that they think that I am good for nothing.”

Because she can’t express herself in Swedish in a proper way, Emine has a feeling that other people may not realise that she is competent in many ways. She might be even, as she says, considered old-fashioned. This calls for a perspective of the encounter with “the other” as interwoven with a new linguistic practice. SFI-educators often position “traditional knowledge” within the realm of “the other”. This determines their understanding of it in a comparatively unreflecting way. The traditional epithet is ascribed to the course participants and, as such, is conceived as something decidedly negative, something to dissociate oneself from, in contrast to the ideal of “a modern, critically reflective individual”. Likewise the SFI-participants are often associated with lack of independence, passivity, and subordination which directly contrasts with the independent, active and outspoken participants “here in Sweden”.

Although the Turkish women encounter various forms of structural inequality, simultaneously their actual migration can in certain respects be interpreted in terms of an “upward” social mobility. Through the migration, the women have to redefine themselves in a partly new social and cultural environment. In many respects, the women’s lives evoke the experience of “class travellers”, whereby “class journey” and “class traveller” represent concepts used within Swedish research, and often replace the
notion of social mobility. None of the SFI-participants have highly-educated parents; instead, several of them have at least one illiterate parent. In this sense, the SFI-education is seen as increasing participants’ knowledge capital, rather than the language exclusively. The SFI-participants give many examples from their everyday practice testifying the significance of language. The knowledge gained through SFI-studies clearly serves both as “strengthening” and “bridging” the cultures. Their self-confidence increases through greater possibilities to act in diverse social arenas.

The benefit of speaking Swedish appears most obvious in contacts with institutions that require administrative competence. In many respects, the women become more alert in public space than their husbands by virtue of their responsibility for the children in a plethora of contexts. This clearly challenges the general portrayals of men as being in charge of the public sphere. In a study about women in exile from South America, Xavier de Brito and Vasquez have also argued that it is precisely when handling the everyday “trivial tasks” that women establish more extensive contacts with other adults, and, thereby are also able to compare their own lives with other people’s lives (Xavier de Brito & Vasquez 1998). Consequently, these social encounters challenge the common images that often “reconstruct a traditional division of labour based on rigid distinctions between the so-called ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres” (Sharoni 1997:430-431).

**Concluding remarks**

Categorizations embedded in hierarchical forms of organization, with accompanying praxis, are palpable elements in the SFI-education and its surrounding institutions. Especially the category of gender as a relational subject has been in the foreground of the discussion. The Turkish women, for example, relate their experiences to both “Turkish” and “Swedish” discourses about family and identity. Ideas are constructed of both “the Swedish” and “the oth-
The educators do not regard SFI as an educational tradition in its own right. On the contrary, the education is taken for granted as a result of perfectly rational decisions. Altogether, several fundamental “Swedish” social values and ideologically charged attitudes are involved in both the SO subject and the SFI practices. “Education” always seems incontestably good, school concerns all of life, and this is seen as self-evident in a “knowledge society” which tends, on a rhetorical level, to regard society itself as a school arena. Moreover, Sweden is presented as purely “Swedish” within the SFI-education, while the participants are perceived as “the others” – information is given to the participants about roles and strategies to embark upon. Textbooks and other material, like the teaching practices, express and interact with prevailing values, norms, and ways of thinking (cf. Popkewitz 1998). As far as the textbooks and teaching aids are concerned, Sweden is likewise presented as totally “Swedish” without any real, more complex historical and cultural perspectives. Class, gender and ethnic variation are conspicuous by their absence in these texts. They exist neither as historical categories nor as constructions. Instead the values and images conveyed to SFI-participants in the textbooks aim largely at encouraging behaviours associated with proper workers, and “good democratic citizens” in a “Swedish” sense. The participants are often described in terms of deficiency, (as traditional, un-mod-
ern and ignorant), which ought to be rectified. Admonishing and fostering vocabulary is often used by the educators towards adults and despite their conscious repudiation. This breeds reflexive resistance, a sort of transgression, among the participants.

Clearly, it is primarily the SFI-participants who discuss “tradition” in a double way – the “Swedish” and the “Turkish” traditions. In their narratives the women refer to continuous changes and displacements. Compulsory discourses seem to arouse reflexive resistance, primarily because the participants believe that stereotypical traits are ascribed to them unreflectively. However, despite being characterized by “traditionalism” and “backwardness”, they are able to distance themselves and reflect upon designations and dominant speech, thereby bridging borders that the discourses create. Finally, it can be argued that dominant ideas in Swedish society, partly conveyed through participation in SFI, force the women into reflexive resistance. Therefore, SFI indirectly enhances the participants’ effort to overcome certain dividing lines in order to deal with life in their new homeland. Interestingly, thus, SFI contributes to “integration” through the course participants’ agency, yet not always in the way that was envisaged in the guideline documents.

NOTES

1 SFI, “Swedish For Immigrants”, a voluntary education, aims at providing adult immigrants with basic knowledge of Swedish language and society. SFI offers “a bridge to the life in Sweden” (SKOLFS 1994: 28). The results and empirical data in the article stem from Swedish Language Courses for Immigrants – Bridge or Border? On Views of Knowledge and Learning in SFI Education (Carlson 2002). In addition to the 12 course participants, a number of “key persons” within SFI and surrounding institutions, as well as 9 teachers and 3 school principals at 2 adult education centres have been interviewed. The “key persons” were a study and career advisor, a school nurse, 3 welfare officers, and 2 employees at an employment agency. The empirical data further consist of analysis of textbooks and diverse documents about the school.
Most of interviewers migrated to Sweden in order to marry Turkish men residing there. On average, they have two children.

All names are fictitious.

It is also worthwhile to look at a discursive shift in the steering documents in the 1990s – the earlier designations “course participants” and “adult students” were then exchanged to “pupils” which in a Swedish context appeal to children.

The economic historian de los Reyes has, within the Swedish context, criticized earlier research of gender and identity in the so-called Swedish Model. Hereby she has paid attention to how ethnicity, gender and class are constructed in social practice and fit into a hierarchical structure. A structure, she argues, that is expressed in dichotomies where one side is defined as norm (= the Swede) and the other (the immigrant) as a deviation (2000:34). De los Reyes maintains that the image of “the immigrant woman” in an historical perspective has been utilised as a counter image and model of “the Other” when it comes to the construction of a new “modern” Swedish female identity (de los Reyes 1988).

The course participants include inhabitants of urban and rural areas. The time of residence in Sweden varies between 3 to 10 years. Most of the women have been housewives prior to their SFI-studies, but some have also been wage earners. Often they have worked as professional cleaners, but also in a restaurant run by the husband or a relative.

Abu-Loghud (1998), for example, points out the difficulties in trying to define “modernity”. Instead we should track the diverse ways the instant claims to being modern are made and explore how notions on modernity have been produced and reproduced through being opposed to the non-modern in various dichotomies. Even more importantly it is to ask how modernity, as a condition, might not be what it purports (ibid).

9 of the 12 course participants have chosen to use an interpreter in the interview. This didn’t mean that the interpreter was used all the time – a mixture of Turkish and Swedish was used. However, the role of interpreter, a kind of mediator, turned out to be important. When the interpreter translated, the interviewees listened very carefully. And they seemed to be very pleased with the result. As one of the participants said in Swedish after the tape recorder was turned off: “You are the best interpreter I ever had. You have said exactly like it is.” The possibility to express oneself in one’s mother tongue turned out to be of crucial importance.

None of the women actually refer to any “Swedish” friends, and they do not seem to socialize with ethnic Swedes. However they express a need to get in contact with “Swedes”, to interact with Swedes and in Swedish. In this context, I refer to “empty” social space that remains problematic for successful language learning (cf. Lindberg 2003).
Transition from the Traditional to the Modern: Islam and Turkish Women in Germany

Nezahat Altuntaş

“I have been in Germany for 37 years. When my father brought me here, I was 6 years old. I did not want to come here. When I got off the train, there was snow all over. I remember asking my father, “Where did you bring us?” My father’s answer was “We are going to work here for two years, and then go back.” He went back; my father is now in Turkey, but I am still here.” (Ayşe K.)

Introduction

When Turkish workers first arrived in Germany, they thought that they would only stay there temporarily. Their aim was to work, save money and go back to their country. Because Germans had a similar understanding in this regard, they called the Turkish workers guest-workers (gastarbeiter). But when their return to their homeland was delayed, the Turkish workers brought their wives and children along with them. Still, they were only thinking of working there for a while, saving some money and going back to
their homeland as soon as possible. Today, however, both parties know that the return to homeland is not plausible. Turks are getting used to the idea of living in this alien land from which they cannot leave, and have begun to envision a future for their family and children in Germany. One of the most tangible consequences of this situation is that Turks are now asking for social, political and cultural rights in German society. In this regard, the Germans seem to assume that they must make arrangements in order to integrate the Turks into the German society. Another important development in this process is the fact that Turkish immigrants have reformed their identity in the German society by taking into account the new social and global developments and thus creating a new environment for social interaction based on this reformed identity. Construction of a new identity by Turkish immigrants has been most influential among women in particular. It was the traditional structure that determined the character of the first generation of immigrant (Turkish) women. In the second generation, one sees attempts to replace this with the influence of religion (Islam). Second-generation Turkish women, by reconstructing Islamic religion as their identity, have used it as a means to participate in modern activities in German society. Global developments have also been influential in the emergence of this process.

This article focuses on the identity search of immigrant Turkish women living in Germany. In this context, the first generation of women who immigrated to Germany and the continuing traditional structure are examined. This is followed by a discussion of the efforts of second generation women to dismantle this structure and the role played by religion (Islam) in this process. In this process, it is argued that Islam has been reconstructed as a fundamental identity, that communities were influential in the formation and internalization of this identity, that veiling became efficient as a symbol of Islamic identity, and that it is a common assumption that in Germany Islam is represented by immigrant women, and this assumption makes people feel responsible. The data used in
Immigrant Women and the Continuity of the Traditional Structure

The history of the Turkish workforce going abroad can be traced back to the years immediately following the Second World War. During the years following the war, central European countries adopted policies by which they reorganized their damaged economies by using labor force taken from neighboring countries. In this process, while England and France brought labor forces from their former colonies, Germany, without such an alternative, relied on labor forces taken first from Italy, then Spain, Greece and Turkey. By mutually signed treaties between Turkey and Germany, the movements of labor forces were legally organized and Turkish workers were invited to Germany as “guest workers” (gastarbeiter) (Abadan-Unat 2007: 3-5). In this process, the workers did not take their families abroad with them, since they thought they were going temporarily.

At first, only men were invited as guest workers. However, after the economic crisis in 1966/67, as the need for a labor-intensive work force increased in industries without automation, women also took part in the immigration process as part of the work force. (Abadan-Unat 2007: 11). Until the economic crisis in 1970, Turkish immigrant female workers, just like other immigrant women, were employed under harsh conditions and in the least attractive areas of the German economy, such as in the plastic, chemistry, metallurgy, electronic and textile industries, as well as in refined food, fishery, canned food and paper production (Wilpert 2007: 165). Despite these difficult conditions, female workers earned an important status within the family, and participated along with the male authority as the other person who contributed to the livelihood of the family. Nevertheless, the number of these
female workers was limited. Turkish women became an important part of the immigration process particularly after 1973, not under the status of a worker directly entering into the job market, but mostly as wife through family unions.

The first generation of women immigrating into Germany, just like the immigrant men, represented the rural part of Turkey and thus displayed the traditional structure. This is why the first generation of the immigrant women was of a lower-secondary status, compared to the men within the family, as well as within German society, insofar as image was concerned. According to the traditional Turkish family structure, the woman as part of the family is under the control of the man and subject to his guidance. She is in a clearly defined network of relationships, in a separate and unequal position. However, in a foreign country like Germany, the dependence of the first generation immigrant women bound by the traditional structure on man increased and the man became the most important vehicle by which women were able to interact with the outside world. The immigrant women even lost some advantages that were secured by the traditional structure under certain circumstances in this foreign country to which she had immigrated. In the traditional structure, the woman is stronger with regard to having authority within the family after she reaches a certain degree of maturity and by means of her children, especially if she has had sons. However, in a foreign country, this traditional rule did not work so well. The authority of mothers was conditioned by the values of these foreign countries and mothers did not have as much authority over their children as they would have had in a traditional society. And furthermore, mothers could not understand why they failed to have this kind of authority. For example, Yasemin Hanim expresses the attitude of her children towards her as follows: “My children do not like their parents. My daughter does not like me, my manners or the way I talk. Perhaps this is because she is in her adolescence.”
Nevertheless, since immigrant women were able to come to the country under certain conditions with “the status of spouse”, the dependence of the woman on her husband became stronger and the traditional structure continued to govern her life with all its disadvantages. Thus, the first generation of immigrant women had to build a new, but limited life for themselves in this new country in which they knew neither the language and the rules. For these women coming from rural areas, ties based on kinship, neighbors and citizenship make up the foundation of the network of social relations outside the family. The activities characterizing the daily life of the Turkish immigrant women in Europe are frequent visits to neighbors and household duties (Aksaz 2007: 374). Thus the first generation of immigrant women kept living through the vicious circle of the traditional Turkish structure in Germany after they had immigrated.

Daughters of the first generation immigrant women, whom they had brought along or those to whom they had given birth in the country of immigration, found themselves under the pressure of this traditional structure. Cigdem Hamin states this situation as following: “When I was small, my (German) friends used to go to the theatre but my family did not allow me to join them. I kept asking, why? The reason had nothing to do with religion. They did not know anything about religion. They only cared about the reaction of Ahmet and Mehmet.” An important point deserving attention in this statement made by Cigdem Hanım is that while it acknowledges the faithfulness of the parents to customs, it questions the religious knowledge of the parents. Hülya Hanım underlines a similar case when she points out that “the generation which has grown up here pushed the older generation—our parents—to assume religious life anew.” Finally, among the first generation of the immigrants, traditional values rather than religious ones were more influential and this is something that the second generation of immigrant women complain about.
The Second Generation of Immigrant Women and Escape from the Traditional

The second generation of immigrant women had the opportunity to pursue a career after graduating from various branches of vocational high schools, such as lawyers’ assistants, pharmacists’ assistants, physicians’ assistants, radiographic engineering, tailoring or hairdressing. Although this seems to be a positive development compared to the situation of the uneducated first generation of immigrant women, it reflects a serious disadvantage for Turks within the German educational system. Turkish girls encounter serious problems on their way to university due to a lack of proper linguistic skills and they had to be content with various branches of vocational high schools. Even though they seem to have received a better education in comparison to their mothers, they understood well that under the circumstances in the country where they were living, i.e., Germany, they were at a disadvantage. This was felt, primarily, in the economic arena (today, they are still at a disadvantage). This is because there is a huge difference between German and immigrant women with regard to work. For example, the probability that an immigrant woman becomes unemployed is twice as great as that for a German woman, and the probability that an immigrant woman works as a manual laborer is four times greater than that of a German woman (Wilpert 2007: 161). This is why Turkish women either work at the jobs for which they were trained in vocational high schools at lower wages or they work for Turkish employers. In fact, recently as the unemployment rate have increased among Turks, it is becoming more popular to work as a small-scale retailer, for example selling döner-kebab, running a shop, a hairdressing saloon, or butchers.

Among the second-generation immigrant women, especially those who came to Germany when they were children, some of them work as cleaning women. It is interesting to see how they justify this situation. Yasemin Hanim: “If I say I go to do cleaning, in
Turkey they belittle me as “the cleaner” (temizlikçi). But Turks have been employed here as cleaning people, they work (in unattractive jobs). The number of those who graduate from the university and those who get good education has been increasing only recently.” Dudu Hanim: “…One day for every week, I go to do cleaning. I wipe the stairs of 4-5 buildings near to our apartment.”

The second-generation immigrant women married Turkish immigrant men with similar statuses in Germany. Although there are some cases in which “imported grooms” were brought into Germany, these arranged marriages have been troublesome. Cigdem Hanim has lived through such difficulties, and had to end her marriage when her husband went back to Turkey leaving her and her two children behind. “My husband was in Turkey. When we got married, he came here. We went through many problems. It was as if I had brought a small child to Germany. Taking his hand, I took him to the doctor, shopping, to government offices for official procedures, and to language courses so that he could learn German. I took care of everything concerning him, both spiritually and materially. Despite all this, he had psychological problems; I tried hard. He demanded too much care, I did my best. But it did not work.”

There are also cases in which these women married German men. Such cases are few; one may consider them as exceptions. This kind of marriage created much more serious problems. The women who married German men usually lost their place in traditional Turkish society. Although working as a small-scale retailer has increased among the jobs that are pursued by the husbands of immigrant women, as I indicated above, the majority of these men are employed in factories as heavy laborers or they are employed in more than one job. The women are quite unhappy about this situation.

Dudu Hanim: “My husband works four shifts at the iron factory. The work conditions are pretty strenuous. He works
during the weekends, and his days off are during the week. He does not work less than 10 hours, night and day. He only has one and a half days off. Since they pay more for the night shifts, Turks usually work this kind of job.” Nagihan Hanim considers the fact that her husband works under severe conditions and for longer hours to be a problem within the family. “The issue about which my husband and I absolutely disagree is that he comes home very late. He works for longer hours, and he has less time for his family.”

Bott states that the network of social relations that surrounds a family depends on the intensity of the social relations between husband and wife. The stronger the social relations surrounding the family, the more distinguished are the relations between wife and husband. When the social relations surrounding the family are weak, then the social relations shared by wife and husband are more in number and intertwined (Quoted from Bott by Akpınar 2007: 338). This judgment is applicable to second-generation immigrant women. They have been able to cope with their loneliness caused by the workload of their husbands to some extent by participating in religious activities and religious communities. Nagihan Hanım—who complained that her husband has very little spare time above—regularly attend a certain community’s (Fethullah Gülen Community) sohbet (conversation) meetings.

Furthermore, since in Germany the dominant character of relations is the “eternal otherness” (Tietze 2006: 341) in practice the chance for immigrant women to become integrated into German society is quite low. England and France promised that the immigrants who were brought from their former colonies and from whom the countries benefited as laborers would be granted equal rights as citizens with education and jobs. However, Muslim immigrants to Germany were not German citizens and they were not promised equal rights (Malik 2005: 93). This is why the immigrants in Germany, regardless of their socio-economic status, always
remained foreigners. Ayshe Hanım clearly points this out: “I would love to go back to Turkey. Living there is different and more comfortable, people are quite different. They are my relatives, it is my own religion. I shall remain here a foreigner forever."

Thus the second-generation immigrant women have not been able to integrate into the traditional structure in which they found themselves and with which they felt discontent. Nor have they been able to integrate into the structure of German society. Thus, they have had to differentiate themselves from both. The most functional tool used to achieve this distinction is religion (Islam), which is an important element with regard to global developments as well as traditional values. The second-generation immigrant women use Islam as a factor to secure their existence and become visible as a woman in Germany. This is because while they have no efficient status as a “Turk” or as a “foreigner”, but rather have a lower status, they have been able to claim some privileges and rights as a “Muslim” within the traditional family structure against the man, as well as within the German administrative system in general. Thus, the second-generation immigrant woman has become visible in society through her Islamic identity and this greatly supports the protection of her self-respect.

The second-generation immigrant woman, who like her mother was of a lower status and in a secondary place according to the traditional structure, has made clear her discontent about this situation and attempted to get rid of the oppressive prejudices of the traditional structure. First, she reacts against the image of women in the traditional structure, which presents women as people who are weak and unable to realize themselves. For example, Yasemin Hanım states how terribly uncomfortable she felt about the questions asked during the process of becoming a German citizen: “I did not feel any difficulty in the written exam, but the spoken exam was difficult. They asked me in the exam, “Do you take your child to the doctor by yourself?” And I said, “Of course. I know everywhere
here (in Germany)!” Meryem Hanim questions traditional activities associated with women:

“In Turkey I come across women who were busy with knitting and with going to visit their neighbors all the time. I do not understand how they find such leisure time.” Rahime Hanim makes the same complaint: “In Turkey, housewives spend their time cooking and attending neighborly meetings (günler). However, in order to develop, people must work.”

Another complaint made by Meryem Hanim is that the concept of “Turkish culture” is associated with traditional values. “We have not been able to celebrate our cultural days properly. Do we have only dishes? Why are not movies and plays, especially children’s plays, shown here?”

The traditional men, who dislike the change in the traditional role of the woman and women’s attempts to have a more active role, have been quick to raise their objections to this situation. Women are aware of this. Dudu Hanim told us how she was criticized by her relatives because of being active, displaying an image contrary to the traditional woman’s image. “Unfortunately, my husband’s uncle did not hesitate to say ‘do not allow your wife to wake up’.” Çigdem Hanim mentions similar reactions when she talks about a project concerning Turkish children that is carried out with the collaboration of their mothers. “While we were interviewing participants, a gentleman talked about the damage the project was causing. For him his wife would wake up through this project.”

Thus, immigrant women, who have a lower status and are in a secondary position within the traditional structure, attempt to climb to a higher status both within the family in relation to her husband and relatives and within the German social structure in relation to other people. However, it is difficult for men to recognize that women are drawing away from the traditional structure. In this case, Islam becomes important as the most approvable means of defense against the objections raised by men. Men do not
object to the fact that the women are becoming active under an Islamic identity. Thus, Islam becomes important as the identity that makes immigrant women more visible and grants them a higher status in society. Furthermore, this identity is used for participation in the public sphere in a more comfortable manner.

The Construction of Islam as an Identity

As Nökel himself (2006: 403) has discovered, it is immediately noticeable that second-generation immigrant women living in Germany are undergoing a process of Islamization. For immigrants, gradually, Islam has become the cause of their life in Germany (Lemmen 2005: 72). This is because Islam puts into realization a multi-dimensional chain of functions, especially for Turkish immigrant women. Islam is being rediscovered as an important resource to get help in order to solve the problems encountered by Turkish immigrant women. Primarily, Islam is a port in which women take refuge vis à vis psychological, social and economic problems and discrimination. For example, Cigdem Hanım states that she turned towards Islam when she had psychological problems: “When my husband returned to Turkey (now, they are about to get divorced), I became more inclined toward religion. When my husband went away, the children and I felt empty. Then we concentrated on religion…. When I pray, I feel inner peace…..I attend the sohbet meetings whenever I have time. I get to know more about my religion in such meetings. When we talk about our religion, it feels like meditation…..If you want a balanced life, you should take hold of religion.” And Rahime Hanım says “If you truly believe, it relieves you and gives you peace.”

For the immigrant women, the discrimination to which they are subject is an important problem. Ayse K. Hanım makes the following remark: “Turks work at factories, but they do not receive proper treatment. I worked at a factory once. One day I was ten minutes late to begin working on the machine. My chief humiliat-
ed me. I was very upset then. Turks do not deserve such bad treatment.” Meryem Hanim says: “They put us and our children down since we cannot speak German fluently.” Therefore, the immigrant women try to overcome the damage of discrimination they are subjected to by affiliating themselves with a religious community. This is because their identity as Muslims allows them to assert specific rights against others.

Subgroups and minorities attempt to satisfy their unsatisfied social identities in different ways. One of these ways is to underline the superior features of one’s own group, and to separate oneself from the dominant group on the basis of positive values (Marques et alii, 1998: 166, quoted from Tajfel). The group with the lower status distinguishes itself from the others by using cognitive creation. The immigrant women attribute superior features to their identity through features that belong to Islam and thus they satisfy their needs for self-confidence. For example, Hülya Hanim say:

“….Additionally, there are the feelings of tenderness and mercy which are induced in people by Islam. One finds these feelings in all Muslims whether observant of designated acts of worship or not. These are provided to Muslims by Islam. Germans or Christians lack them.” Nagihan Hanim states: “Islam is universal and encompasses everybody. Christianity, however, is not even self-sufficient. Islam addresses every aspect of human life while Christianity has gone astray, and is something like a human speech.”

The members of the group in the secondary position in society draw support for their self-confidence by replacing the external group, to which they compare themselves, with another group. Another way by which immigrant women distinguish themselves from the other with a higher status in the social hierarchy is to create positive differences from the external group to which one’s own group is compared by replacing it with another group. For exam-
people, immigrant women, instead of comparing themselves to Germans, compare themselves to the Russians who came to Germany later and whom they consider to be inferior to them. Thus, the immigrant Turkish women draw support for their self-confidence. Neshe Hanim remarks about Russians: “Here we live among Russians and Romanians. The population around here is quite mixed. Russians make their ten-year old kids drink vodka.”

However, the immigrant women who were born in Germany and those who came to Germany at a younger age can adopt neither the Turkish nor the German identity. For them, the Islamic identity is more acceptable and provides them with a way out. Cigdem Hanim expresses this in the following way: “I could never say for Turkey “oh I missed my home country so much.” But I could not adopt Germany either. Those who do not have such an experience cannot understand me. My deepest worry for my children is that they may also have such an experience.”

In fact, Islam is already an efficient factor within the traditional structure and so it is one of the important sources to which one should turn against problems encountered. However, in the new process that is being experienced nowadays, Islam is expressed as the hallmark of identity by immigrant women, and it has been rediscovered and reconstructed in this context. In this way religion provides a general framework that helps individuals to understand the world and find the answer for the unexplainable. Having these functions, religion maintains its importance as a fact or as port in which one can take refuge against the hardships encountered. Additionally, it emerges among second-generation immigrant woman essentially as the source of the fundamental identity. When religion is expressed as one’s identity, it acquires quite different dimensions.

In the formation of identity, relationships with another group, i.e., the other, is required. Identity emerges out of relationships between individuals and groups and justifies these relations
The identity which is made up of similarities to our group (the we-group) and of created differences from the other transforms the difference into the otherness. In this process, the difference or the other takes shape through comparison and categorization. People classify things around them according to their relations to them, developing a symbolic model and determining their identity accordingly (Zdzislaw 1993: 7). For the second-generation Muslim woman, the category of “Muslim woman” emerges as an important source that makes up the our-group. Unlike the image of the woman reflected by the first generation of immigrant women—according to this image, women are wives of their husbands, who are members of a traditional community, and they are suppressed under the pressure of traditions—this new image of the woman captures attention, since according to this image women have “extended rights” acknowledged by Islam and they are active. In this framework, the other is both “non-Muslim” and “non-woman.” The powerful community consciousness in Islam cultivates the sense of we (Muslim-women) in the consciousness of the immigrant women. Through the communities of women, the immigrant woman separates herself not only from the “non-Muslim” but also from the community of men. Thus, the second-generation immigrant women make use of the rights acknowledged to them by Islam, not only against the external other, i.e., “non-Muslims” but also against the internal other, i.e., her husband and relatives.

The second generation of immigrant women, which takes Islam to be the fundamental element of their identity, seems to make a special effort to learn the place and rights of women in Islam and to reinterpret them. They make efforts to have a clear understanding in this regard, reading religious books or attending meetings of Muslim communities. They make great efforts to this end. For example, Yasemin Hanim replied to the question whether she thinks “that Islam limits the rights of women” in the following way: “They say this out of ignorance. Islam acknowledges many rights for women. Women cannot be compelled to breastfeed their

(Zdzislaw 1993: 6).
babies, they do not have to work. But if they work, they do not have to
give their money to their husbands. Although in Islam women
appear to have a secondary status, it is not true. I have read about
these issues in amazement. Islam holds women with higher
esteem.” Bahar Hanim states:

“I did not know the progressive position of Islam concerning
women rights; I learned it by reading. When we say a man
and woman are not equal, but different, Germans misunder-
stand this. They think that this means that men are superior
while women are inferior. But this is not the case. Even
Muslim men do not know this. For example, Islam holds
women with high esteem; it does not consider women to sim-
ply be a sex object. But German women consider women to
be sex objects. When I was a little girl, my mom used to say
that in the Qur’an it is written that “paradise is under the feet
of the mothers.” Germans do not have any such concept.”

Cigdem Hanim shares her views as follows:

“I heard in a sohbet meeting that women do not have to do
the housework, they do not have to cook. They have the right
to employ a servant. No woman has to breastfeed her baby
after giving birth. But her husband has the responsibility to
employ a wet nurse. If a woman gets divorced, she is entitled
to receive an amount of money that was decided upon when
they were married. Our prophet used to help his wife with
housework. Moreover, a woman is a mother and according to
Islam, paradise is under the feet of the mothers.”

Hülya Hanim further emphasizes the role of motherhood:
“According to Islam, paradise is under the feet of mothers. Paradise
is the most valuable thing, and it is considered to be under the feet
of mothers. According to Islam, mothers are very sacred and every
mother is a woman. Our Prophet was asked, ‘whom shall we listen
to in this world?’ And he answered, ‘your mother, your mother,
your mother. And the fourth time he said ‘your father.’ In Islam, the
mother is the symbol of women.” Ayshe K. Hanim, who does not wear headscarf, was asked: while women are held with high esteem in Islam, why are the conditions not good for women living in Muslim societies? Her answer is this: “Most of the restrictions on women in Muslim societies stem from Arabic customs and traditions. But ignorant people are taught to think that these come from Islam. These people are kept ignorant of the truth so that they can be easily governed.”

Thus, the second-generation immigrant women declare their rights based on Islam within the family and at the societal level. They take the role of motherhood, to which a sacred value is attributed, as the basic point of departure for the status of women. The immigrant woman who pulls herself away from the sexual dimension and takes up a position under the protection of the umbrella of motherhood obtains extensive freedom to put this role into action. Moreover, since this freedom falls under the umbrella of religion, it is not difficult to justify. Furthermore, by making a clear-cut distinction between religion and tradition, Islam is considered not as an element of the tradition but rather as an instrument of women becoming visible in modern life. Thus, Islam is seen not a part of that which is traditional, but rather as a part of that which is modern. Religious communities seem to have played an important role in that women are able to learn about women’s rights as acknowledged by Islam and also in that women are able to put into action what they have learned about women’s rights in Islam.

**Religious Communities and Islam**

Religious communities have an important place in the life of the immigrant women in Germany. While their husbands have less interest in such communities because of their intensive workloads, it is quite noticeable that women regularly attend meetings of religious communities, a large number of which are present in Germany. It seems that these communities exercise quite a power-
ful influence upon women. Usually, the invitation made by a relative or a neighbor to go to the meeting of a community is influential upon them for taking the first step in this regard. Ayshe K. Hanim, who does not wear a headscarf, says, “I have attended these sohbet meetings. I did it sometime because a friend insisted, and sometime because I wondered what was going on.”

Those who attend the meetings of communities have various intentions. Ayshe Hanim says: “I attend to the sohbets, e.g., Fethullah Hoca’s meetings. Indeed, I do not discriminate among various meetings; I attend all religious sermons that I am invited to. Nevertheless, the Fethullah Hoca group has a special interest in young people, and I like that. When my daughter became acquainted with young people at university, she became more careful about her school activities. They teach youngsters religion and science together. They care about young people and love them. I also like the fact that they rescue the young person who has fallen and is pursuing a blameworthy life.”

Not only veiled women, but also those who do not wear a headscarf are affiliated with these communities. Seher Hanim, who achieved a difficult ideal in Germany for an immigrant by becoming a teacher, frequently visits these communities, even though she is not veiled. She tells us what she has found in these communities: “There the atmosphere is good; there are people I like. When the religious sermon is over, we converse about various issues, exchange ideas. In such places, I feel as if the rust within myself has been eroded. I feel refreshed. I cannot achieve this at home. It feels very good, spiritually.” Hülya Hanim states:

“I go to sohbet meetings. Here (Germany) there is no place where we can learn about our religion and culture. When Germans see me (veiled), they ask me “where did you learn about Islam?” My mother and father did not know Islam. I learned my religion by myself. When I was a kid, there were no sohbet meetings like today ....When I attend to sohbet
meetings and learn about my religion and culture, I feel more self-confident. In sohbet meetings, they do not teach simply religion, they also provide education for women concerning various issues, such as the education of children.”

Religious communities provide various services in addition to helping people worship and teaching them the religion. They also form hajj (pilgrimage) organizations, provide services to send the bodies of relatives who have died back to Turkey, and help people to get halal food through the places and shops that they own (Lemmen 2005: 73). In this sense, they have permeated into daily life quite extensively. Religious communities are more functional for the immigrant women than simply providing services to the public in general. They educate women (about religious, cultural and national issues and about children and marriage), they comfort them psychologically by eliminating their loneliness and they also become efficient as a social solidarity group. However, the most important function of these communities among all their functions is that they provide women with a feeling of belonging. This feeling is very important with regard to the formation of an Islamic identity and its establishment. At times, female communities even feel the need to separate themselves from other communities, i.e., the internal other, so that the feeling of belonging and Islamic identity can grow stronger. For example, Ayshe K. Hanim describes this as: “….each group prescribes a different way of veiling. For example Süleymancilar have their own way of veiling, they designed this style. If a woman ties headscarf so that it is curved, she is a Süleymanci.” This is how the immigrant women homogenize the we-group, trying to enhance the we-identity, i.e., the identity of Muslim women, and they use it to underline the difference between similar groups.

While until recently the network of social relations was restricted to relatives, neighbors or extraction from the same region in Turkey (hemserilik), when immigrant women began to partici-
pate in community activities more intensely, the sphere of the social relations network was extended. Through activities of the communities, the area of social interaction for immigrant women became extended and freer. Activities that take place within kermises (fund-raising sales) and other community organizations make women feel that they are effective. Participating in religious activities transforms bashful and shy women into highly self-confident women and contributes to their self-transformation (Nökel 2006: 4005). Thus with Islam, immigrant women become more efficient in their personal and private lives, as well as in their social life, and they become visible. In Germany among the Turkish immigrant women with an Islamic identity, the most important result of this situation is that there has emerged a feminine sub-culture and one encounters the formation of a feminine Islamic agent (Nökel 2006: 437). Furthermore, this feminine Islamic agent is in the process of becoming more active in the social sphere.

An important feature of identity is that individuals categorize themselves as members of social groups, expressing themselves and conducting their behavior in terms of these categories and through these values. When Islam is taken as the fundamental identity, one’s daily attitudes, behavior and preferences are modified by this preference of identity. Those women who establish an individual connection with the Islamic tradition turn religious rituals and rules into codes that govern their conduct in daily life (Tietze 2006: 344). The fact that the immigrant woman who takes Islam to be the foundation of her identity becomes more active and that Islam is put into practice in her daily life makes her more visible in the public sphere. Naturally this situation has resulted in requests made by immigrant women to enter the public sphere with their Islamic identity. Islam encourages women to participate in the existing system and its institutions (Nökel 2006: 414) and women began requesting their right to take a place within the system with their Islamic identity. Hence, the Islamic identity has become a source pushing women to obtain a place for themselves.
in social, political and public arenas. In this process they want to be both different and equal. Their demand to be different and at the same time equal emerges in the most visible manner in the issue of veiling as the symbol of Islamic identity.

Headscarf and Immigrant Women

The second generation of immigrant women feels the need to separate the issue of the headscarf from the tradition culture. Immigrant women state that they wear the headscarf at first because they saw their mothers doing so and because they thought it was tradition. However, today they describe wearing headscarves as veiling, and they underline the distinction by stating that they wear headscarves not because of tradition, but because of religion. Nagihan Hanim describes this clearly: “I went to primary school wearing the headscarf when I was 7 or 8 years old. My mother used to be veiled. I saw her wearing the headscarf, perhaps I was imitating her. But now I know that primarily this is because of religion.” Yasemin Hanim says, “There are those who wear headscarves as a tradition. But I wear it consciously, as something required by Islam.” And Meryem Hanim states this: “They (Germans) consider wearing headscarves as something customary or traditional. But now they should know that it is something religious.”

Another issue, which is connected to the fact that women do not consider the headscarf to be a requirement of traditions anymore, but rather perceive it as a responsibility assigned by Islamic identity, is that women emphasize that they started veiling themselves not by force, but out of free will. Meryem Hanım complains, “People think that Turkish women become veiled by force. This is stupid. Those who do not know their religion create such an image.” And Hulya Hanım states: “When I first began wearing the headscarf, the first question I was asked was whether it was my father who wanted me to wear headscarf. The second question was
whether I had become engaged or I was about to marry. I became veiled freely when I was 16 years old. My family did not know about it. I decided. I said to my friends that I was going to come to school on Monday wearing a headscarf; they did not believe me.” Thus, the passive position of the traditional woman is rejected and the active agent position of women making decisions based on Islam comes to the fore. The headscarf and difference reflect the idea of integration into society with one’s different identity rather than presenting a challenge to the rules of national integration (Tietze 2006: 335).

Another important approach toward the issue of veiling among immigrant women is the observance of religious duties, like veiling, under severe conditions creates a feeling of satisfaction. Elif Hanım describes this situation as following: “I am proud of myself for being able to wear the headscarf under today’s severe conditions. I feel that I am a special person.” Thus the self-confidence drawn from achieving something difficult makes the identity of Muslim women more powerful. Indeed, veiled women state that they have not encountered serious problems or discrimination in German society because of their being veiled.

However, the period after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11 became a turning point in this regard. Elif Hanım, who is veiled, describes the situation as follows: “I have never encountered a problem because of being veiled. Nevertheless, after the events which occurred on September 11, the Germans were afraid. This is why they insulted some of my friends.” Cigdem Hanım, who is not veiled, takes this situation more seriously: “After September 11, they attacked veiled women. They cried, “Tear these off.” The media have pushed them against Muslims.” Fatma Hanım says, “Some few bad events happened. But this much is understandable. For example, when we walk on the road, or when we are on the railway, some people murmur. Some of them get angry with me, even though I had nothing to do with those
events. While traveling in a railway, a person might say “There is a veiled woman behind me, let me sit somewhere else.” Thus one may see that global developments have had some effect upon immigrant women.

If immigrant women feel that they are subjected to pressure because of the identity, which they take as being fundamental, (i.e., Islamic identity), this affects the expression of their identity and their interaction with the rest of society. When one’s identity is under attack, one tries to find connections of social support in order to gain approval for one’s identity again, and one increases one’s emphasis upon one’s identity (Worchel 1998: 73). People become focused on abstract features that characterize the group, and the group is inclined to see itself as homogeneous so that it becomes more powerful (Marques vd., 1998: 132).

Thus, Turkish immigrant women perceive their personal connection to Islam as something specific and they feel the need to distinguish themselves as Muslims from Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds. By this distinction they separate themselves from the traditions of other Muslim societies and their under-development and also from those who commit terrorist acts in the name of Islam. Dilek Hanim states:

“I watched a program on TV. In Arabic countries, women cannot go to a doctor by themselves. There are designated areas for women in cinema halls, restaurants etc. I think these applications are wrong. We should veil the designated parts of our body, but we should not wear the niqaab (face-veil). These are psychopathic. These are not Islam but Arabic tradition.”

But the strongest reaction is directed against those who commit terrorist attacks. Ayshe K. Hanim: “…Al-Qaida, Hamas and similar terrorist organizations claim to be Muslim. That is why everybody thinks that Muslims are such people.” Ayshe Hanim states: “When those events happened in America, a German said: “You bombed
America.” I said, “I am not one of them”.... Sometimes people show reactions, even if it is weak.” Hülya Hanim maintains that the Turkish understanding of Islam is more modern compared to the understanding of Islam by other nations. “There is only one Qur’an. But the Qur’an should be in accord with contemporary values. Turks can apply this.” Thus, immigrant women draw away from traditions to Islam. They also distinguish themselves from other Muslims whom they think are failing to represent a modern interpretation of Islam. Therefore, especially among the veiled second-generation immigrant women, Islam seems not to be an element of separation from modern German society, but rather to be an element of participating in modern processes and playing an active role in them. Women who are not veiled have a stronger reaction to the negative attitudes opposing Islam and Muslims. For example, Ayshe K. Hanim (who does not wear a headscarf) says:

“In Germany, they attempt integration. But integration does not simply consist of citizenship. They expect us to change our religion. ... Sometime they ridicule me as I am a Muslim. For example, they say, ‘do not worry, God does not see you. His passport is invalid after Vienna,’ ‘Nothing would happen if you ate pork once.’ They imply that I can eat pork or drink alcohol if no one sees me. They do not understand Islam.”

Bahar Hanim (who does not wear a headscarf) states:

“I was on training (assisting a doctor at a hospital), when the events of September 11 happened in America. After this event, some patients reacted to me in a negative way. My partners at work did not speak to me for one week. My chief did not treat me properly. But I did not understand that the reason behind their behavior was these events, to put it more properly, I did not want to think that way.”

Cigdem Hanim (who does not wear a headscarf) says: “Recently, the Pope said that people were converted to Islam by the force of
the sword. Let them look at themselves. Wars between Catholics and Protestants have lasted for centuries.” Yet Ayshe Hanim, who is veiled, states that she did not encounter discrimination because of being veiled: “.....At first, I experienced difficulties. I continuously wanted to go back. All the people around me were German, my friends, my neighbors. But I have never encountered a bad reaction because of being veiled. I have always been able to express myself....” Another veiled women, Elif Hanım has a milder and softer approach to this matter, although she feels disturbed by prejudices against veiled women:

“They think that those of us who live according to our religion will cause them harm. In fact we simply want to live according to our religion. We do not intend to disturb the order in the country. This is so sad. Just like them, we are people of culture, we are intelligent. We also want to work and we also want to get educated. We want to achieve prestigious positions. I feel sad and offended because they have such ideas about us. I feel offended when they call us “spider-headed.” Nevertheless I think that such opinions are not common, but the media keep reflecting them.”

When an individual distinguishes herself from the other, she does not employ prejudices between groups. Immigrant women who clearly distinguish themselves from Germans and from other Muslims with their Islamic identity and who declare it to the public by veiling are quite moderate towards the other. This is why veiled women have a more moderate attitude towards German than women who do not wear headscarves. For example, Dudu Hanım (veiled) says: “If Germans were to utter the word of bearing witness (to Islam), they would make better Muslims than those we see around us. They are already more honest than Muslims.” Rahime Hanım (veiled) maintains, “Germans work six hours per day, they work a lot. Would that they became Muslims! We are lazy. We should work a lot. We are simply indifferent.”
Indeed, Islam is an important source of reference even for the unveiled woman with regard to defining her identity. Women who do not wear a headscarf point out that they want to become veiled. But fearing that it would cause some problems for them, they are not able to do it. Cigdem Hanim says: “I cannot wear a headscarf. If I do, I cannot find a job. They do not employ people with headscarves in offices or any other jobs. If I was financially comfortable and if my husband wanted then I would like to become veiled.”

Dilek Hanim states: “I try my best to observe the prayers required by Islam. Although I would like to implement Islam in my life fully, I hold back where there is discrimination. I implement Islam in all manners. But women who wear headscarves are subjected to bad treatment and discrimination, as if wearing the headscarf is something terrible. This is why I do not wear a headscarf. They still look at you in a bizarre manner even if you do not wear a headscarf….” Ayshe K. Hamin tells: “I do not wear a headscarf. They tell me, ‘what kind of a Muslim are you, what kind of a Turk are you? However, if I were to wear a headscarf, it would be disadvantageous for me. I would loose 40% of my German customers.”

Thus it can be seen that Islam is an important element in the construction of identity even for the women who do not wear headscarves. These women do not wear headscarves, the symbol of this identity, because of practical reasons. However, at times one notices the distinction between the veiled immigrant women who don the symbol of Islamic identity and those who do not. Bahar Hanım explains the situation as follows: “…..Some women who wear headscarves push us away with their behavior just because we do not wear a headscarf.”

**Islamic Identity and the Sense of Responsibility It Gives to Immigrant Women**

An important result the fact that the second-generation immigrant women take Islam to be their fundamental identity is the growth of...
the idea that women represent Islam. Such an understanding naturally has resulted in a sense of responsibility entrusted to women by the perception of representation. Muslim women, especially veiled ones, are considered to be symbols of Islam, and this perception creates a sense of responsibility. This in turn compels women to have the intention to act appropriately. For example, Rahime Hanim says the following: “Living here means taking great responsibility. Any mistake you commit—this may be a mistake resulting from being human—is generalized and applied to all Turks and women with headscarves. You should behave properly.”

An important effect of the sense of responsibility induced by Islamic identity is to convey the message of Islam and to introduce it to others. Rahime Hanim points out the situation as follows: “Germans ask questions that sometimes I cannot answer. Then I say, ‘let me find out about it first and then explain it to you.’ I go to religious scholars who hold sohbets and ask them these questions. I learn the answer, and then relate them to the Germans. We have a huge responsibility. I am most afraid about saying something wrong about the religion and causing them to misunderstand it.”

Hence, the sense of responsibility has caused women to carry out research, to learn and to improve themselves. The improvement in question is not simply in the area of religious knowledge, but can be traced in all areas. For Meryem Hanim, the sense of responsibility felt against the non-Muslim other is the main reason that justifies the existence of Turks as Muslims in Germany: “There is a reason why we are here. We have a responsibility towards people living here....There is a group (Islamic community) to which I am affiliated. I also attend meetings of other groups. I have an Alevite friend. Once I attended their gathering as well. I also want to go to a church one day. I want to go among them and get to know them. I also want to let them know us.” Hence Meryem Hanim feels that she has assumed an important mission at the individual level for the representation of Islam.
Another issue in which Islam and the sense of responsibility affecting women is reflected is the issue of whether women shake hands with men. The immigrant woman who takes Islam to be the basic element of her identity thinks that she should be a role model as far as the implementation of Islamic values is concerned. This idea is, in a sense, part of the feeling of responsibility which she experiences. However, the feeling of responsibility may allow some exceptions with regard to the realization of Islamic applications. For example, immigrant women point out that they do not want to shake hands with men in general. But out of their concern, lest people misunderstand them and Islam, they shake hands with non-Muslim men. Ergül Hanim states: “I usually do not shake hands with men. I feel uncomfortable when I shake hands with men. Nevertheless, for example, when I go to a doctor, so that they do not misunderstand me—as I am veiled, so that they do not interpret it in the wrong way—I do not ignore the hand that is extended to me. But other than that I do not accept shaking hands with men.”

Meryem Hanim: “Indeed, I do not shake hands with men. But I do make a sacrifice, so that they do not get a wrong image of me. With those who do not know about Islam, I shake hands. But with those who know about Islam, I do not shake hands.” Dudu Hanim: “…For example, when your doctor extends his hand, if you do not shake it, they condemn the action. I extend my hand to Germans, so that they will not misunderstand our religion, so that they do not consider us to be uncultured. As for Turks, they do not put out their hands” Hülya Hanim: “I shake hands with men depending on the circumstances. I shake hands, if I have to, to prevent the other person developing a prejudice about me, or if I am there representing somebody else. Yet I do not like it. If it were up to me I would easily refuse to shake hands.”

Women express a symbolic feeling of responsibility. They also point out that the clothes a veiled woman wears should be aesthetically pleasing so that a veiled woman should not cause people to
feel antipathy. Elif Hanim states: “…..In particular older Germans say how my headscarf suits me. The important thing is not to wear a headscarf, but to make it suit you.” The feeling of responsibility which the Islamic identity causes women to feel is also discernable with regard to the issue of terror, the problem of Palestine, the events occurring in Iraq and so on. Despite all the unfortunate events that are happening in the Muslim world, these women do not approve of terrorist acts carried out on the behalf of Islam. This is important in that it shows the sensibility of Muslim women. They show the same sensibility, when it comes to issues such as the meaning of jihad and the things that need to be done in order to change the situation of Muslim countries under invasion. Yasemin Hanim states:

“There can be no such thing as Islamist terror. A true Muslim cannot carry out a terrorist action. People may defend their country, but it should not be by placing bombs around. Islam does not approve of killing people indiscriminately. You should defend your country by whatever means you have, but while doing this, you should observe rules. One may not attack hospitals, schools or mosques. One should defend themselves not by killing civilians through suicide bombs. Soldiers should go to war; no one should carry out terrorist actions against innocent people. Otherwise, Muslims are in the wrong. Although Muslim countries are usually subjected to injustice, there still should be no terrorism.”

Ergül Hanim states: “One should carry out jihad not by waging a war, but by setting good examples. It should not be through barbarous war and killing.” Nagihan Hanim says: “Today, jihad should be carried out by knowledge. Knowledge is very important.” Hülya Hanim: “Islam and terror cannot go together; they cannot stand side by side. They cause severe harm to Islam. The results are against Islam. In the Qur’an, God says that if one kills a human being, they are considered to have killed all human beings.”

Finally, the concept of responsibility and representation created by
the Muslim identity make the immigrant women more active in the social arena. Their effort to communicate with other groups (the other) and to express themselves on the basis of their Muslim identity results in integration into the existing system and modern lifestyle instead of withdrawing from the other and excluding it. This situation is a reflection of the fact that women are moderate insofar as communication and interaction is concerned and that they have the ability to soften problems of encounter.

Conclusions

The immigrant women living in Germany separate themselves from the traditional structure and they use religion, an element of the traditional structure, in this process. They have reconstructed Islam as an element of identity in the context of social and global developments. Hence, Islam has become a legitimate and irresistible means of protection from traditions and the pressure they create. It has also become an alternative way to enter into modern life and secure a place within. Islam functions not as a means of disconnection from modern life by self-withdrawal, but rather as the essential means of entering into modern life with a different but equal status. Thus, Islam has emerged as the major source of differentiation from the other and formation of the we-group/our group in terms of fundamental identity.

Islamic communities have an important effect on the fact that Islam was chosen and reconstructed by women as an element of their identity. The communities in question have helped women to build a network of support among themselves and thus eliminate their loneliness. They have also contributed to the creation of the identity of Muslim women with a more active and self-confident personality.

Being an important symbol of Muslim identity for women, the veil is an important means used by immigrant women to differentiate themselves from the other. Through the headscarf, second-
generation immigrant women, who have not been able to create a positive differentiation through their traditional Turkish or foreign identities, want to be different but equal. In this way they not only draw support for their self-confidence by creating a positive difference, but also ask for rights based on their difference as they become more visible in the public sphere.

Although Turks have a status of a minority in Europe, in some senses they want to conceive of themselves as the major group (Malik 2005: 83). Islam appears to be an important vehicle in this sense for the Turks, as it is for other Muslims. However, Muslim identity is not an identity preferred only by immigrant women. While the second-generation immigrant woman defines herself as Muslim, the other, i.e., Germans, also define her based on her Muslim identity. Particularly after attacks on America on September 11, they began to refer even to the Turks living in Germany by their Muslim identity rather than as Turk. This Muslim identity is the other for the West and they have attributed negative properties to it. But this situation has disturbed the Turks, in particular veiled women who receive unpleasant reactions in public areas. As a result, the Islamic identity of the second-generation woman is expressed as something different from the identity of Muslims who constitute the other for the West. Thus, Islam is still functional in responding to new challenges (Malik 2005: 89). Islam also presents itself as a response to challenges against itself, challenges which have been cultivated in global politics.

NOTES

1 Tietze makes such conceptualizations identifying Turkish immigrant youth (Tietze 2006: 345).

2 In this study, the people interviewed are referred to only by their first names. In keeping with their preferences, their last names were not publicized.

3 Seher Hanim regularly attends the sohbet meetings organized by the Nur Community. This community organizes different sohbet meetings, depending on the education, profession, gender and so forth of the participants.
Refugees from Turkey: Reconstruction of Identities in UK

Seçil Erdoğan

Introduction

Increasing population movements have implications on ethnic group relations. Migrating ethnic groups rethink their attachments and belongings; reconstruct their ethnic and cultural identities through inter cultural interactions. This article is an analysis on ethnic and cultural identity negotiations of asylum seekers and refugees in a host society; based on material gathered from a series of interviews with refugees from Turkey, undertaken as a part of an exploratory study completed in England. It is argued that ethnic and cultural identities are neither essentially given nor fixed in the global world; people make claims in different contexts and at different times. Modern human-beings constantly construct and reconstruct their identities. Despite ethnic groups share ‘common’ ties and attachments, members of the groups engage in different interactions which affect their perceptions of identities. This is a negotiation process; people negotiate their belongings in response to their social contexts. In this process ethnic language, community
networks, ghettos, religion and mass media form an ‘identity protective circle’ creating living areas for the communal culture and identities.

The ‘primordialist’ approach to ethnic identity is one of the oldest ethnicity theories in the literature. Harold Isaacs’ (1975) notions of ‘basic group identity’ and ‘primordial attachments’ gave birth to primordialism. According to him, there are eight elements that contribute to a person’s basic group identity: the physical body; a person’s name, the history and origins of group one is born into; one’s nationality or other group affiliation; the language one first learns to speak; the religion one is born into; the culture; and the geography and topography of the place of birth. One’s ethnic identity is created by these elements, so it is resilient and enduring (Cornell&Hartmann, 1998: 48). Primordialism argues that ethnicity is something given, ascribed at unchangeable circumstances of birth, deriving from the kin and clan structure of human society. Ethnicity is taken as fundamental, fixed and unchangeable (Isajiw 1999).

A major approach responding to primordialism is ‘constructionism’. According to this approach, ethnic identities are not simply products of primordial ties or a set of historical cultural goods. People are active agents in negotiating their identities; they pick up some of the elements from the past and present to construct their identities (Isajiw 1999). Identities are built, rebuilt and sometimes dismantled, they are constructed by people.

This article locates constructionist approach to studies of ethnic and cultural identity in the literature, and presents evidence for these assertions from a study conducted in England with refugee groups. This approach is seen more adequate to examine the identity struggle of the transnational groups in the global world. Primordialism is still noteworthy as primordial attachments are still of importance for many people. However, this theory is inadequate to define various identity assertions within a group. Some
elements of the ‘basic group identity’ change by time and circumstances while some are preserved.

Weber’s writings on ethnic groups and identities to some extent support our approach. He defined ethnic groups as “human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common decent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (2004: 109). According to Weber, ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group by being a ‘presumed identity’, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In this definition, he isolates the fundamental characteristics of the phenomenon that centres on a set of beliefs and not on any objective features of group membership such as shared language, religion, and especially biological traits associated with the everyday understanding of race. It is this sense of common ancestry that is vital, but the identification with shared origins is largely, if not wholly, fictitious (Stone 2003: 32).

Weber remarks a difference between ethnic group membership and kinship (2004: 110) “wherever the memory of the origin of the community from a mother community remains alive, there undoubtedly exists a sense of ethnic identity, which is determined by several factors; shared political memories, persistent ties with the old cult, or the strengthening of kinship and other groups, both in the old and the new community or other persistent relationships. Where these ties are lacking, the sense of ethnic group membership is absent, regardless of how close the kinship may be”.

**Refugees from Turkey**

The conflicts in the world caused an ever growing stream of refugees. At the start of the seventies, there were 5 million refugees while that number is currently 11.5 million refugees and asylum seekers. If we include internally displaced persons, the number of
the people in need of protection and assistance comes to approximately 21.3 million (UNHCR 2006). According to the UNHCR statistics by the end of the year 2005, 181,488 asylum seekers and refugees in the world were originated from Turkey (UNHCR 2006). The number of asylum seekers from Turkey has decreased sharply by 61 percent since 2000. This is related to the changing socio-politic conditions of the country. Refugees from Turkey are the fourth biggest group of the people seeking asylum in the industrialised countries, mostly applying to France, Germany, Great Britain (UK), Austria and Switzerland (UNHCR 2006). However, these numbers do not include the illegal people who are living beyond the information of the authorities.

The migration and asylum movements originated from Turkey have been sourced by unstable periods the country survived; ideological conflicts followed by military coups, ethnic conflicts in the East, economic recessions, etc. Asylum seekers who flee from Turkey can be analyzed in three different groups. The first group is the Kurdish ethnic groups who leave the country because of the conflicts with state authorities. The second group is the left-wing political refugees oppose to the Western type economic and political regime. The last group is of economic refugees, namely immigrants migrating in order to improve their economic standards of living, but apply to the receiving countries for refugee status. Therefore, we see a significant increase in the number of immigrants and refugees from Turkey when the country heads into a period of economic recession. The rise of economic refugees is a central issue because refugees are legally defined in 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention as “people who are outside their countries because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, and who cannot or do not want to return home” (United Nations General Assembly and UNHCR, 1996: 16). This definition does not include all of the reasons why someone might become a refugee for example; internally displaced persons and
economic refugees. With the growing gap between rich and poor countries, larger numbers of people are now forced to leave their homelands to seek jobs, usually by entering wealthier nations illegally. Today, most of the countries agree to provide sanctuary to political refugees, but not eager to open their doors to the economic refugees. This tendency caused to the emergence of ‘bogus refugees’ who act as political refugees while all they need is better economical conditions. The last group in our research is composed of ‘bogus refugees’.

Obviously, these three groups have different social backgrounds and life experiences. Even their lives and reasons for seeking asylum differ, the process of applying and arriving to a host country is very similar as they both apply as political refugees and they are offered similar socio-economic conditions when starting a new life in the host country.

Methods and Sample Characteristics

Semi structured interviews were carried out in the context of a larger study on integration, identity, settlement problems in the host country. To obtain our sample, a purposive snowball technique was used in which participants were selected through references provided by the other participants. An attempt to reduce bias was to expand the research to different locations; London, Guildford, Aldershot and Farnham, instead of interviewing only the refugees in one town. The interviews were administered both in Turkish and English by the researcher. The interviewers were free to reply either in Turkish or English although there is a predominance of Turkish in dialogues. The interviews were not auto-taped as the respondents did not feel comfortable. Interviews were analysed using a comparative method; the narratives were sorted and according to emerging themes and compared to each other.

The number of asylum seekers and refugees interviewed includes 75 individuals who made long trips to seek asylum and
applied to the receiving country, and 25 individuals who were born in England, representing the second generation. The group consists of both Kurdish (more than a half) and Turkish ethnic groups, who were relatively young (20-45 years old), educated (mostly high school), and used to live in the eastern regions of Turkey. Consequently, the results of this research are not representative of the situation of all refugees originating from Turkish Republic. These qualitative interviews offer us an exploratory view, not generalized statements about more general conditions of all the refugees from Turkey.

Most asylum seekers we interviewed had spent time in a refugee camp, on average one year. Some had gone to France before they came to England and made their asylum applications at the border. Those were sent to the refugee camps located on the border of France and England (UK). Not having been able to prove their case, they were screened out as "illegal immigrants" or "economic migrants". Denied refugee status, they were de facto kept on hold for an indefinite sojourn which means to enter a new period of waiting and screening. When we approached to potential interviewees, they were suspicious of outsiders who enquired about their past and present; they suspected that we would pass on the information to the immigration or security authorities, therefore, some held back information on their refugee status or ethnic heritages in order to be exempt from the research. Some interviewees have chosen to prevaricate about their ethnic identity or personal life history. ‘Fear’ can be the possible underlying reason for the refugees’ denying or hiding their identity. In asylum, ‘fear’ can shape social actions and relationships (Malkki 1995; Kibreab 1999). The asylum seekers feared that they may lose their right to refuge and be sent back to Turkey. This is notably the case for the bogus refugees striving for refugee status by pretending as a member of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that fights for independence from Turkey.
After building a trust with the researcher, some of the asylum seekers confessed how they created their life stories. As Knudsen (1999: 22) states “a carefully crafted life history is a ticket” for grant of refugee status while a mismanaged one could be a cause of rejection. “Inconsistencies must, therefore, be minimized, not only in the personal data reported but also in the life history presented… Problems arise, however, when the borderline between fiction and fact is erased and when one has invested so much in the official version that one starts to believe one ‘is’ the story presented. Thus two battles are fought at the same time; one for recognition as a refugee and one for recognition as a person.”

Identity in Question

There is a direct link between identity and asylum seeking; refugees are essentially people who leave their home countries because of their real or imaginary particular aspect of identities; ethnic, racial, political, religious, or social class. Also refugees are people not only whose identity is a source of danger for them, but people who take the risk of abandoning the numerous ties of identity that links them to their country of origin, home, family, friends, culture, language and work and searching for a new identity in their host countries (Hieronymi 2005).

Identity is also linked with the “land” one lives on. For Kibreab (1999), today spaces are more territorialized than ever before. The nation states have the right to exclude or deny entry to outsiders; impose conditions of entry, residence, as well as resource use. People derive their identity from a natural geographical area, because this provides them rights of access to resources and protection by a virtue of being a member or citizen of this territory. By identifying themselves with territories, people gain a sense of ‘belonging’. Outside that physical context, they are treated as strangers or as non-members of the host society with conditions that attend otherness. Therefore, displacing people from their
places of origin constitutes “gross deprivation and loss of some part of one’s identity and very humanity” (p.407).

According to Habib (1996) home can be reduced to an island within the country and linked to only a few people, not the whole population on that geographical area. Following the usual alignment attaching one’s identity to a place; it makes sense to attach Kurdish identity to the land which is within the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. In our case, this is the eastern region of Turkey where Kurdish refugees in our group were born and grown up. For the Turkish refugees we interviewed, it is the same land; they are rooted in the same region, they have been living together in the same land with their Kurdish counterparts. ‘Home’ is associated with the same land for both groups. Turkish refugees had a national identity whereas the Kurdish has never had an official Kurdish nation, they have a Turkish nationality and have been in search of a coherent national identity as well as the ethnic one.

The refugees interviewed were seeking to accomplish a consistent identity; consisted with their past and present situation. When defining themselves in terms of identities, in the entire group, 42 percent identified themselves as “Turkish”, 26 percent “Kurdish”, the same ratio “European” and 6 percent used terms “mixed” or “world citizen”. Even the Kurdish ethnic group consisted of more than half of our sample; only a quarter asserted their Kurdish ethnic identities when defining “who they are”. Some defined themselves by attaching to the land they were born, and some by considering different locations of their lifetime. There are some refugees in the interviewed group who in fact had Turkish ancestors, pretended as they were “Kurdish” in order to guarantee the refugee status and after spending a period of time in the host country started to feel “European” or “mix”....

It is significant that even some interviewees had lived in the host country for long time and gained the British status, none identified themselves as “British”. Similar to the Gross, McMurray, and
Swedenborg’s (1996) observations on Franco-Maghrebi ethnic groups in France, refugees in England do not define themselves in terms of hyphenated identities such as Turkish-British or Kurdish-British as this is the case for Turkish-Americans or Turkish-Canadians. In England, ethnic groups are expected to be assimilated which can be an issue for the next generations, but specifically the first comers are segregated from the “British” society. It is particularly problematic for refugees from Turkey, because their religion makes them inassimilable. Citizens or not, people from Turkey tend to be regarded as foreigners.

No significant correlation is found between the time spent in England and identity assertions, whereas the time spent in home country (Turkey) and age are highly correlated. The older people tend to preserve their ethnic identities remarking “it is who we are and where we belong to”. The younger the people are, the more likely they question and reconstruct their identities and belongings.

While most of the refugees mentioned that they had a desire to retain their ethnic and cultural features, they were aware that it was not totally possible to “be the same person”; they were reshaping some aspects of their identities in the new foreign context. Refugees select elements of their own traditions and history while selecting some new elements from the new environment in order to recreate new identities. As Stuart Hall states; the experience is defined, “not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity: by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity” (1989: 80). Naila Habib (1996) sees that process as an eclectic one that would allow keeping the best of both cultures; but it means to be “between cultures and into none” (p.100).

“Each generation constructs its own form of ethnicity so that the ethnic identity of second generation is different from that of the first, and that of the third is different from that of the second” (Isajiw 1999: 33). The second generation goes through a double
process of socialization; in the cultures of the traditional community and the broader society. Those born in host country have sought ways of reconciling their ethnic identity with their sense of being in England and of being British (Fenton 1999). They have a loyalty to both England and Turkey, but very rarely think about returning to the motherland. They are involved in inter-ethnic activities, more willing to integrate and accept the host population’s culture. They seek to negotiate integration and hybrid identities. It is, however, important to note that although the second generation tends towards adaptation to the British society; it is still preserving ethnic culture of own community. This preservation of ethnic culture is an important part of its identity.

There are also members of “one and a half generation” (Rumbaut 1991; Zhou 1999) in our sample who were born in Turkey and brought to England between age of five and adolescence. The migration scholars agree that this group would have different experiences than the second generation in terms of socialization and orientation toward homeland. This group have spent varying amounts of time in both countries, and seem to be familiar and comfortable with both cultures and social systems. On the other hand, such persons particularly mentioned the sense of “not belonging solely to either of the two cultures” and “feeling different within both cultures”.

Language

Ethnic language is seen as an important part of a consistent ethnic and cultural identity, since it refers to a criterion for distinguishing between in-group and out-group. Our findings show that the refugees from Turkey are not willing to give up their home language, which is a main aspect of their identity. 60 percent of the refugees’ said that their mother tongue was Turkish and 40 percent said Kurdish. When we examine the language they mostly speak; we see that only 4 percent speaks English at home. 82 percent
prefers to speak Turkish, 13 percent chooses to speak Kurdish. Some Kurds prefer Turkish rather than their ethnic language. This is caused by two different reasons; firstly Turkish is the official language back home; they used to communicate in Turkish (attending schools, engaging job markets, following media etc. require knowing Turkish) and also it is a direct result of the fact that in the new host society, Turkish and Kurdish refugees live and work together.

The families state that the choice of spoken language at home is a common source of conflict between them and their offspring. “The first generation retains language use in a very high degree; the second and third generations lose both rather quickly” (Isajiw 1999, p.188). The strategy followed by the second generation can be defined as “optimal cultural and language maintenance combined with optimal acquisition and use of new languages and cultures, hence peaceful coexistence” (p.333) as Vedder & Virta states (2005).

Community Networks and Middleman Minorities

“In exile, with very little to possess, you hold on to what you have with aggressive defensiveness. What you achieve in exile is precisely what you have no wish to share, and it is in the drawing of lines around you and your compatriots that the least attractive aspects of being an exile emerge: an exaggerated sense of group solidarity” (Said 1984: 51).

Refugees from Turkey spontaneously formed networks in the new society which serve as an alternative assistance system dealing with their most pressing needs, such as finding accommodation and work. For many Turkish and Kurdish refugees, the networking across ethnic boundaries enabled them to cope better with their day-to-day problems in meeting their immediate needs, which were common to all regardless of their ethnic background. As a community sharing common roots, they needed each other to mediate their acculturation. According to Light, even the solidarity does not exist before migration; the experience of migration pro-
duces a reactive solidarity. The ethnic entrepreneur and underemployed, disadvantaged co-ethnic workers manifest themselves as ethnic resources that provide advantages to the others (in Mobasher 2004).

This population in England, some living on welfare and most not being able to find well-paid jobs, reflect some features of Bonacich’s ‘middleman minorities’. Middleman minorities are ethnic groups occupying similar, low-status positions notably trade and commerce- in the host countries’ social structure; “they are the middlemen between the producer and the consumer, employer and the employee, elite and masses” (Bonacich 1973: 583). The refugees and migrants from Turkey are engaged in a common small trade business; running ‘kebab’ restaurants or grocery stores. In addition, the new comers who do not have enough capital to set up their own business usually are employed by those artisans.

According to Bonacich (1973); communal solidarity plays an important role in the economic position of middleman groups; the “primordial tie of blood” provides the basis for trust. The typical business of this group in England is a family store which relies on family labor. If more labor is needed, it is chosen from own community who work for long hours and loyal to the owners. Most of the labor working in the Turkish restaurants and groceries are Turkish/Kurdish. The asylum seekers who have not yet taken the refugee status or resident status do not have work permit according to the British laws, so employing a Turk or Kurd has more aims than trust for the employer; while he pays much less than he has to pay to a British citizen and do not to pay the insurance he is reducing the labor costs significantly. For the illegal worker, it is a place to live, to earn money which provides the feeling of security by knowing nobody in the community would report the authorities that he is “illegal”. According to Fenton (1999: 161) migrant workers are less likely to protest about their working conditions when they are worried about their right to stay and more willing to do work which is dirty or evades safety regulations.
Although Bonacich linked the success of middleman minorities to their social solidarity, our study found out that the social solidarity helped to establish success in the first generation was eroding in the second generation as many move into high professions by taking the advantage of their fluent English and high educations. Ethnic solidarity in this case can be seen as situational and valid for the first comers.

**Ghettoization**

Habib (1996) argues “sharing everyday life makes people belong to each other and to a culture”. Maja Korac’s study (2003) in Italy represented a situation that the newcomers were not spatially segregated in the city, contrarily they lived together with Italians, their neighbors were Italian, and often their flat-mates were Italian. This “helped to avoid a perception that the differences between Italian and non-Italian identity and culture are set in opposition” (p.412). But regrettably in most of the European countries, there is still a fear of being invaded or diluted by foreigners who want to become full members of their host communities. Integration, changing identity, let alone assimilation, were neither encouraged nor facilitated in Europe (Hieronymi 2005:143). Clearly, newcomers are aware of and engage with attitudes of the host society. This directs them to construct life areas they can feel comfortable and safe away from xenophobia and open racism.

Ethnic groups try to ‘transplant’ the culture of their homeland to some segregated areas available. “They establish ethnic institutions based on the model of those of the home country. This is the process of building ethnic ghettos in the new country and establishing or re-establishing relations with people whose sympathy and acceptance can be taken for granted” (Isajiw 1999: 193).

According to Laws (2004), minority groups change the character of the places in which they settle. They establish businesses, invest in housing and other aspects of neighbourhood infrastruc-
Ture, celebrate cultural festivals, and bring with them a variety of cultural practices. They modify the social and cultural geographies of the places in which they live and work. This modification can easily be seen in London, UK. Today, Green Lanes in North London which begins in Newington Green and finishes at Enfield is known as “Turkish town” by all the Londoners. Most of the refugees and immigrants from Turkey prefer to live in this region, even if they have the benefit to live in costless residences reserved for the refugees. The interviewees mentioned that they these places did not supply the feeling of ‘home’. They prefer to live with other people from Turkey in segregated areas, where they can find the feelings of ‘familiarity’, ‘belonging’, ‘comfort’ and ‘security’.

The ones living outside London do not have the same opportunity, but they mentioned that they make effort to find places close to others from Turkey and visit London regularly in order to do shopping from the stores which import goods from Turkey. Some mentioned that they go to London for the night and party at clubs where Turkish/Kurdish popular and folkloric music is performed.

This Turkish atmosphere provides immigrants and refugees to maintain the same lifestyles they are accustomed to and prevents them from assimilating in the receiving society. The host society becomes a place where they negotiate their cultural identities.

Religion

Being a Muslim is more then a belief, it is an important aspect of ethnic and cultural identity. The most significant distinguishing characteristic of the Turkish communities within a larger Christian dominant host society is their religion; ‘Islam’. Muslims in Europe have always been the ‘others’ who name the ‘God’ as ‘Allah’, fast in holy month ‘Ramadan’, do not eat pork and wear differently (Heckmann 1994).

The interviews on everyday practices and beliefs showed that practicing religion differs for each individual who reconstructs new
lives in the host society. Significantly the second generation expressed their unwillingness in maintaining strict religious practices and cultural rites. Most refugees from Turkey mentioned that they drank alcohol and about a third ate pork even these were prohibited by Islam. Nearly half of them eat only halal meat (slaughtered according to Islamic precepts) and less than half fast during Ramadan, a large number are strict at not drinking alcohol during the holy month.

Our findings on the celebration of religious holidays contradict with some other researches. For example, Heckmann (1994: 191) observes that Turkish immigrant groups in Germany are still trying to have a minimum standard and way of recreating the importance and meaning of the religious holidays. Buying sweets such as baklava, visiting older relatives and close friends is the minimum practise of almost all families. Contradictory, refugees we interviewed in England do not assign much importance to religious holidays, reasoning lack of the atmosphere and their closest relatives’ being in Turkey. One reason might be related to the nature of our sample; the number of the asylum seekers who left their families in Turkey, and who have never been religious might have affected these findings. However, it is significant that the ones defending perpetuation of religious holidays are the ones living in the Turkish town in London within the Turkish community and were able to create the feeling of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’.

Asylum seekers and refugees from Turkey do not solely maintain their cultural practices or adapt to the practices of the host society. They define the situations, negotiate and reconstruct their practices, and their cultural identities.

**Mass Media**

The literature concerning refugees and the mass media deals specifically with the media constructed images and negative representations of these groups. One other aspect of the media that needs to
be studied is its role in sustaining ties between migrated populations and their home countries. Satellite, cable and internet are important technologies which enable refugees to follow the news, popular movies, soap operas, shows, music clips etc. that are broadcasted in their home country; by doing so, these technologies bring the daily events of Turkey to refugees’ homes and lives.

In most of the houses we visited, TV was tuned to Turkish channels. 97 percent of the refugees interviewed are following the Turkish media everyday. Most of them are following the Turkish daily newspapers and Kurdish press which are available in cosmopolitan cities such as London. More than half of the interviews use internet for following the daily news and broadcasts of Turkey. As Erkhamp (2004) states; the experienced or imagined ‘home’ thus is no longer just a memory in immigrants’ minds and narratives; it is present and part of their everyday lives.

**Conclusions**

In the modern global world, changing economic and social circumstances create new forms of ethnicities. Ethnic groups share ‘given’ common ties and attachments, but members of the groups experience different circumstances which affect their perceptions of life. Two members of the same ethnic group living in different circumstances and sometimes even in the same social context do not appropriate the same ethnic identities.

Refugees originated from Turkey represent negotiating new forms of identities in a host society. As active agents, refugees construct and re-construct their identities by making individual decisions of maintaining some cultural elements of own community while discarding some others and taking new ones from the dominant host culture. This is an ongoing negotiation process; they are negotiating their belongings. Each generation and each person constructs his own identity different from the other, because each develops different socio-psychological strategies to combine differ-
ent cultural perspectives. This process is more obvious in the second generations’ lives that experience double socialization in distinct cultures.

Each refugee preserves his/her ethnic culture in some degree, which indicates us that primordial attachments still have strength, but individuals also adapt to the host society in different degrees. While creating new homes in the host society, they create new life styles and new identities. During this process; ethnic language, ghettos, community networks, religion, mass media create a protective circle around refugees; they prevent refugees from assimilating, help them deal with this conflicting process and create living areas which allow to maintain ethnic and cultural identities.
PART IV

TURKS AND TURKEY - EU RELATIONS
A general aura of insecurity has noticeably gained a worldwide ascendance following the terror attacks of September 11. The perils threatening our national security are no longer confined only to menaces such as the sovereign states of the Cold War, political ideologies or nuclear weapons; the elite governing nation-states are inclining towards defining new threats beyond the traditional ones. It has become quite conventional nowadays for political authorities to enumerate Islam, migration, foreigners and ethnic groups among the threats to national security. The others within, diverse ethnic groups and migrants, are incessantly given mention in tandem with human and drug trafficking, crime, violence and terror, and thus are coerced to a ceaseless process of transformation, unscrupulously depicted as menaces to national security. Isn’t the rather successful Republican dissemination of an air of insecurity after September 11, for instance, the underlying reason for the reelection of George W. Bush in the presidential elections of November 2004? The reign of fear is thus sovereign in contempo-
Defining the nationalism of minorities as a universal phenomenon, Will Kymlicka makes a significant classification concerning the types of governmental responses, in both West and the East, to minority demands. Kymlicka asserts that nationalist minority demands in Western Europe are appraised as being in the context of a form of pursuit for justice and equality, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, similar demands are evaluated within the framework of threats to national security. While the objective, in the West, is to ascertain a point of reconciliation, more or less fair to both the majority and the minority, in the East, the prime intent is to prevent minorities from constituting a threat to the existence or territorial unity of the state. Thus accordingly, while many Western European states acknowledge that justice necessitates a mode of autonomy to minorities, a preponderance of Central and Eastern European states regard a grant of autonomous government to the minorities as a threat to the state.

Put more simply, Western European states have a proclivity to conceive the demands of ethnic minorities in the context of a problem of justice to which the minorities are equally justified in benefiting from. Eastern and Central European states conversely interpret the very demands as probable threats to national security. The chief reason for the manner in which Eastern European states approach the nationalism of ethnic minorities is the unwavering suspicion that they are in collaboration with adjoining countries; in fact it is commonly thought, for instance, that Serbs in Bosnia collaborate with Serbia, the Albanians in Kosovo collaborate with Albania, and so forth.
As can be understood from what has been hitherto stated, there is a tremendous difference between the two approaches; on the one hand the discourse of justice and impartiality, while on the other, that of loyalty and security. After such a comparison, Kymlicka articulates that a discourse of justice could undoubtedly be preferred to a discourse of security. Yet, what can be done to shake off the constraints of the discourse of security which is so prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe? The answer is simple: Transforming demands expressed by minorities into a discourse of justice and tolerance, exonerating them of apprehensions of security, the implementation of which, however, seems much more intricate. In his recent works, Kymlicka attempts to explicate the possibility of exporting the Western model of governing minority rights to Eastern and Central Europe.

The presuppositions entrenched in this proposal are the inferences that Western European values have become globally dominant, the Western discourse of justice is palpably more fruitful, the Western model is imminently more efficiency provided it is embraced by the EU candidates, and the sheer plausibility and logicality of the pertinent model. Kymlicka henceforth advocates the possibility of exporting the Western model to other countries. The unique characteristics of the Western model are predicated on the discourse of rights and justice, and are comprised of three strata: regional autonomy, rights of language and institutional totality, i.e. the launch of universities teaching in their native languages, etc.

At the dawn of the 20th century, only Switzerland and Canada had recognized the statuses of regional autonomy and official language for local ethnic groups, an initiative soon emulated by almost all Western democracies that accommodated a cluster of nationalist movements within. This list comprises, after World War I, the conceeding of autonomous control to Aland, an island in Finland inhabited by a Swedish speaking population; and after World War II, to
Southern Tyrol in Italy and then to Puerto Rico in the US, in the 70’s Catalonia and Basque in Spain, in the 80’s to the Flemish of Belgium and finally to Scotland and Wales in the 90’s. The aforesaid changes are congruent with the evolution of Western democracies, one way or another, into multi-racial federal states. The success of Western democracies stems not just from the conferral of autonomous governance it is also a corollary of granting the right of realizing their cultures by virtue of dual languages and the ambiance provided by universities. Consequently, the factors rendering Western democracies more plausible and successful are the rights granted that will be conducive towards the destruction of previous barriers, the mobilization of all minority groups to take an active part in the political arena, and thus the elicitation of their full-fledged participation in the pertinent sphere.

Central and Eastern European states reciprocate quite differently to such minority demands. In Macedonia, for example, the minority plea for a private university is deemed as a threat to the state’s existence, or is immediately refused as a potential danger to the concept of the collective rights of Eastern Europe or to national security, or is at best considered to be a catalyst of separatism. In the East all kinds of demands enunciated in the context of regional autonomy, higher education in the native language, collective rights or official language galvanizes the discourse of security. Pursuits revolving around collective rights or minority nationalisms in the West are appraised within the framework of security only when they entail terrorist activities, as in the case of Northern Ireland or the region of Basque, hence the nationalisms of minorities are never regarded as a problem to security, even if they openly proclaim subversion, as long as they remain within the boundaries of peace and democracy.

Promulgating Western democracy as an example for the states of Eastern and Central Europe, Kymlicka is concurrently alert to the
recent changes in the appearance of minority nationalism to one that seeks separation. Following the Tindemans Report, presented to the EU commission in 1975, that induced member states to becoming political entities synchronous with their national flags, anthems, myths, experiences, territories and the rights and obligations conferred to EU citizens, the European Union has displayed a noteworthy political unity. Therefore, the hidden supposition behind Kymlicka’s proposal for replacing the Eastern European discourse of security with the Western one of justice is the reflection that a powerful vision of EU may provide a bulwark against subversive and inflating demands of national minorities in Eastern and Central European states. In due course, the pertinent states’ omission of the discourse of security may be expected. The entire debate at this juncture is in concordance with the idea of unity within diversity, a motto that has considerable preeminence in the EU.

In our time, diversity has become one of the most celebrated concepts in political philosophy. Diversity in its current form, whether cultural, political, ethnic or religious, is essentially a by-product of globalization, which furnishes a freedom of movement to the individuals that make up ethnic groups. The political management of the concept of diversity is conceived as being a pivotal malady by nation-states, as well as international organizations like the United Nations and the European Union. It would be fitting at this point to cite two opinions provided by political philosophy regarding the management of minorities and diversities, a predicament equally central to the agenda of the EU; namely unity over diversity and unity in diversity.

Unity in Diversity: There are many contemporary political scientists who have innovated conceptual and philosophical paraphernalia for erecting a framework around debates that concern diversity. As a liberal-communiter, Will Kymlicka (1995) strives to unite the liberal democratic principles in a nation-state as the foun-
dation of a unifying social structure (unity), with the notion of recognizing the collective rights of cultural minorities (diversity), maintaining that collective rights for minorities are not at odds with a perception of liberal politics, as they are vital in bequeathing the individuals of the relevant minorities their individual liberties. (Kymlicka 1995:46)

Unity over Diversity: Alternatively, Brian Barry, as a liberal, reminds us that respect for diversity may ultimately threaten the unity required to establish equality among citizens, forewarns against segregation that stems from a multicultural perspective. The predicament is not so much economic, as it is one of an equal allotment of rights. Barry alludes to the negative ramifications of Kymlicka’s emphasis on group rights in relation to religious denominations, in that if the liberal state is to abide by the ideal of impartiality, there cannot be exclusive privileges given to minorities. (Barry 2001:165) Barry’s priorities are balanced on the governance of the majority embedded in the recognition of individual rights, precisely a type of unity over diversity, as opposed to group centered multicultural principles.

The examples provided by Kymlicka amply illustrate the success of the policies concerning the management of diversities espoused by the populace in post World War II Europe. The pinnacle arrived at by the EU today is whether or not the rich know-how and tradition that has been accumulated pertaining to the peaceful management of diversities is an exportable commodity. Whether the recent tensions witnessed in Turkey, Serbia and the Ukraine can be triumphantly surmounted by utilizing this method is a question that will perhaps be answered in the upcoming years. Are the states of the EU really in possession, as they are depicted above, of a political and legal structure that metes out an abundance of justice and equality to all the diversities and others within? Can Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Sweden, or any other Western European state for that matter, approach the other replete with equality and justice when the subject matter is Islam?

Undoubtedly, these queries cannot be uniformly resolved; their answers depend on the type of political governance and the kind of society model embraced by the states in question. This article, based on the findings of a qualitative and quantitative investigation undertaken in 2004, will seek to respond to the above questions from the vantage point of German Turks and French Turks. Are Muslim Turks regarded, in Germany and France, as menaces threatening national security? In the process of accepting the other, it could be argued that the individual may prove to be resistant and reserved, displaying a sort of hostility toward the foreigner, and in fact, many could even accept this, to a certain extent, as being natural. The perpetuation or demolition of this resistance, however, remains in the hands of the political power. A political will, inaugurated by the political authority, may render this resistance asunder, expediently carrying public opinion onto a more peaceful and multicultural platform. Or if the power in question is conservative, it could prolong the social resistance nurtured against the other, by manipulating it to its benefit. Public opinion is not a static entity with prior existence; it is rather constructed. In this respect, politicians, intellectuals and the media are seminal factors, and the transformation, into positive or negative, of the social reflexes acquired concerning the other predominantly rests with the incumbent political power. Thus in this backdrop, the recognition/non-recognition of Muslim minorities by Western states or the perception/non-perception of them as threats to national security primarily hinge on the ideological characteristics of the political powers in question and the kind of European Union or Germany/France they envisage.
What kind of a European Union?

Nowadays it is quite possible to provide different definitions of Europe, the most conspicuous of which were perhaps expressed by two German politicians who visited Turkey in February 2004. The first definition belongs to Angela Merkel, the leader of the conservative Christian Democratic Party, and the second to Gerhard Schroder, head of the Social Democrats and the former chancellor of Germany. In defining Europe, the conservatives tend to put the overwhelming accent on Christianity and particularity, tradition, racial lineage, physical geography, cultural unity and national borders, while espousing the renouncement of cultural amalgamation. This definition, rendering the idea of Europe as an absolute, has no room for either Turkey or Islam. On the other hand, the idea of Europe developed by Social Democrats and liberals is predicated upon principles such as diversity, cultural divergence, a common future, democracy, human rights, secularism, political geography, a beyond-state concept and political unity. (See Table 1) Within this definition, traditionally non-European religious and cultural elements such as Islam and Turkey may find space for themselves in Europe. More precisely, on the one hand lies an inflexibly absolute notion of Europe, while on the other there is the concept of unity in diversity. Taking this analysis further, it could be implied that the conservative definition entails an inflexible concept of Europe and being European which is religiously, culturally and ethnically pre-arranged and unalterable, while the counter definition asserts that Europe or being European is not a prearranged identity or geography, but rather that it represents a constructed, changing and dynamic notion that is perennially in the state of becoming. The objective of this article, embarking from the aforementioned second concept, is to substantiate that there is space for Turkey, Islam and other cultural, religious and ethnic diversities within the definitions of Europe and being European, and to argue that the contemporary identity of being European is one that is political and cultural, and constructed from top to bottom.
Table 1. A Speculation of Two Probable European Unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Traditional Europe</strong></th>
<th><strong>Liberal Europe</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Static</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural</td>
<td>Beyond Cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Unity</td>
<td>Economic Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-cultural</td>
<td>Political and Cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Conception of Culture</td>
<td>Synchretic Conception of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of Civilizations</td>
<td>Beyond Civilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective</td>
<td>Prospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutist</td>
<td>Anti Absolutist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Other’s Enemy</td>
<td>The Other’s Friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Geography</td>
<td>Political Geography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Union, having been established in 1952, following World War II as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), converted into the European Economic Union (EEC) with the 1957 Agreement of Rome, subsequently adopting the name European Community (EC), and finally embracing the appellation European Union (EU) as a consequence of the Maastricht Agreement in 1991. Originally inaugurated as an economic association, the union later developed into a political unity; insofar as the life of the Union is concerned, the Maastricht Agreement was a defining moment at which aspirations of transforming Europe into a unity founded on a basis of mutual political, social, economic, cultural and military values were expressed. The Tindemans Report of 1975, raising a discourse on the Nations of Europe and unity among the nations, marks the initiation of this process. Through this report the principle of inaugurating an independent flag for the European Union was espoused; in fact the EU flag was hoisted for the first time on the 29th of May 1986, accompanied by The Ode to Joy, from Beethoven’s 9th symphony, which had been adopted as the official
anthem of the Union, with the acceptance of 9 May, the memorable date on which Robert Schumman originally inaugurated the proceedings of the ECSC, as Union Day. Later, in 1988 the summit of European Leaders decided to infuse a European viewpoint into the literature, citizenship, history, geography, language and music books of the curriculum, a scheme whose core objective could be described as identifying a common future through deliberation, as opposed to seeking common values in history. Contemplating European citizenship, common foreign politics, migration politics, military politics and the use of a common currency instantaneously reveals an endeavor to construct a European identity that reaches from the top to the bottom; this has made its mark in the last thirty years. If this definition of what is European needs to be reiterated, it takes reference in the future and the peoples of the future, rather than in historical symbols or myths; this is an identity which doubtless brings to the fore the requisite of spelling out the borders of Europe imbued with a beyond-nations, secular and pluralist outlook. The new definition of Europe encapsulates an identity of being European that perennially needs to be nourished by cultural diversity and unity in diversity.

The Characteristics of Euro-Turks Research

It seems untenable not to concur with Kymlicka’s evaluations within the environs of East and West or with the political discourse expounded by minorities, although it cannot be averred that Western states have always been assiduously liberal in the face of strategies for the political participation of various minorities within their national borders. We are all familiar with the extent of prejudice and the problematic behavior displayed by numerous Western countries, particularly after September 11, regarding the subject of Islam. A preponderance of Western states and societies has inclined towards appraising Islam as a monolithic block that is jeopardizing the existence of Western civilization. However, is
there any truth in this allegation? In the following parts of the article, by referring to recent research undertaken on Euro-Turks, I will attempt to demonstrate that the Islam exhibited by migrants of Turkish origin and their children living in Western Europe, what I call Anatolian Islam, does not constitute a threat to Western social or political life.

The investigation, spanning the years 2003-4, called “Euro-Turks: A Bridge or an Obstacle Between Turkey and the European Union?” culminates with a case study undertaken in September-October 2003, in Berlin, Köln, Essen and Munich in Germany, and Paris and Strasbourg in France, and includes a survey that comprises approximately 100 questions involving 1,065 people of Turkish origin in Germany and 600 in France. Setting out from the results of the surveys that included interviewees over the age of 15 and which were conducted with an equal amount of men and women, there is an attempt to depict how the Euro-Turks regard various issues. The other two criteria observed in the process of acquiring such a depiction were regions of residence and areas of employment. (Table 2; Table 3 and 4) In addition to myself, the sociologist Ferhat Kentel and our advisors, ethnologist Martin Greve and political scientist Bianca Kaiser, made up the team that carried out this assignment from beginning to end. The surveys were prepared by Gelszus GmbH and Socioscan (Paris), working under the auspices of the Data Research Company. The surveys containing questions prepared by the research team were organized by Turkish university students who were trained by Data Research and tested in their relevant fields. It was required for the interviewees to have a command of Turkish and German/French, and the survey was conducted in either Turkish or German/French, depending on the preference of the interviewee. Accordingly, around 20% of the German Turks preferred to respond to the survey in German, with the corresponding figure in France - that is the preference to answer in French, reaching almost 32%.
Table 2. Places of surveys and relevant figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Number of Surveys</th>
<th>Number of Surveys</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niedersachsen-Bremen</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>Ille De France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordrhein – Westfalen</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessen</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Rhone Alpes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden – Württemberg</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Franche Comté</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Alsace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Loraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1065</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Socio-economic Status

Table 4. Distribution of Socio-Economic Status
The aim of this work is to accurately delineate the kind of sensitivities developed by the German-French residents of Turkish origin on the subject of the Turkish-EU relations, the type of political culture they have developed, the nature of their relations with the German/French state and society, their thoughts on the European Union and being European, their views on Turkey’s political culture and institutions and how they have inadvertently become an imperative part of the processes of citizenship, political participation and globalization. This work, affording vital data about the socio-economic status of Euro-Turks, at the same time provides a more extensive opportunity to gain insight into the ethnic, religious, national and cultural identity of the people under discussion. That France and Germany harbor a large number of Turkish migrants, in addition to their contrasting traditions as regards the immigration policy, could be given as one of the underlying reasons for their selection, among other countries, as locations for the case study. Indubitably, the two countries’ divergent approaches of late to issues such as nationalism, culture, civilization, republicanism, citizenship and integration, further serve to enhance the significance of this comparison.

**Being European: A Condition of Cultural Pluralism**

During the one to one interviews, surveys and comparative observations recently undertaken in the two countries, we have stumbled upon somewhat interesting data pertaining to the identity of European, certifying that although when looked at from Turkey, Western Europe gives the impression of exhibiting a homogenous geography, in actual fact, speaking of the existence of a clear European identity seems problematic, for natives and migrants alike. We came to realize that simply and directly filling the void that is the identity of European was very difficult for both the representatives of the majority and those of Turkish origin. We can
comfortably state that the Turkish discourse of Europe and being European, effortlessly articulated within a presumably homogeneous totality, which apparently attained a flawless manner of expression in the more than 200-year adventure of Westernization and Europeanization, does not easily correspond with definitions in the West. The European identity, in reality and as mentioned before, reflects a European Union Commission objective that is to be accomplished within a project of social engineering through the utilization of education, European citizenship, history future, and similar apparatuses. More precisely, as truthfully elaborated by Gerard Delanty (1995), when evaluating the idea of Europe and being European from the vantage point of history, their tenable explication will be enabled by the sphere of state tradition and the culture of the elite, rather than that of civil society.

Conducting a thoroughgoing evaluation within the framework of the current European Constitution, secularism, religion and the expansion of EU, a process which includes among others Turkey, will reveal that particularly the serving liberals, social democrats, greens and socialists define the European identity as a changing, dynamic identity which is on a course of perpetual construction. From this vantage point, it would be fitting to maintain that the inclusion of Islam and Turkey in the European identity is imminent. Euro-Turks, brave enough to brand the inhospitable German Christian Democrats (CDU) as un-European, delineate a Europe in which diversities subsist together in harmony. As can be understood from the following table, Euro-Turks offer their full-fledged support to the social democratic and environmentalist leagues that propound a more dynamic definition of Europe and which yields Turkey and Islam a place in the European Union. Table 5 demonstrates that almost half of Euro-Turks take a keen interest in the politics of the countries in which they reside and opt for left-wing political parties owing to rational incentives. It ought
to be mentioned that until the beginning of the 1990s, Turkish migrants sustained their political preferences, which they brought with them from their homeland to the Diaspora, and by so doing showed an inclination toward conservative parties. (Kaya, 2000 and 2001).

Table 5. The political inclinations of Euro-Turks

In addition to becoming a chief part of the political life in the relevant countries and developing rational political conduct, Euro-Turks have similarly been able to expound a rational sequence of relations pertaining to the EU. (Table.6) Essentially appraising the EU as an economic powerhouse, Euro-Turks remain wary of the prejudice that perceives the Union as a Christian Club; effectively, the ratio of Euro-Turks who conceive the EU as a Christian Club is 20% in Germany and almost 10% in France. Then again, according to the study “The Skepticism of Europe”, undertaken in Turkey by Hakan Yilmaz in October-November 2003, approximately 50% of the Turkish population regards the EU as a Christian Club, with a further 30% disagreeing. Alternatively, almost 60% of Euro-Turks foster affirmative sentiments regarding the European Union and her institutions, with 27% holding a negative opinion. Another figure to be taken into consideration in this context is the 10% who confess to having no ideas about of the matter. A preponderance of those who gave negative comments about the EU or who had no knowledge of the issue was either among the underprivileged or first generation of migrants.
Concerning the evaluations pertaining to the European identity, it is appropriate to resort to a classification with a primary focus on class. The definition of the working class, their encompassing values, attitudes to democracy, equality, human rights and contemporariness, for the most part is analogous to the description articulated by a predominance of the public in Turkey. In contrast, asking the same question to the middle class of Turkish origin, who are acquainted with several languages and have had ample opportunity to visit a number of countries and develop a cosmopolitan identity, revealed their lack of theoretical concern for Europeanness, which, they claim, is an identity they live and sustain. A word must be said at this point about the difference in generations. By and large, first and second generation Turks perceive of nothing more than the sovereign discourse that has developed in Turkey over many years, while younger generations place greater emphasis on a cosmopolitan identity, citizenship and cultural differences, a factor all the more discernible when comparing the generational differences. As is known, whereas in the 60s and 70s the first generation of migrants voiced their concern about economic problems, in the 80’s the second generation set out Turkish-based ideological and political discourses. The third generation, in contrast, particularly towards the end of the 90’s, placed weight on promulgating a discourse of cultural dialogue, tolerance, multiculturalism and diversity. In short, while the middle class of the first and second generations reiterated the sovereign Turkish discourse of

Table 6. Definition of the EU?

![Graph showing the definition of the EU in Germany and France.]

Economic Integration
Common Culture Project
Common Democracy Project
Christian Club
Imperialism and Colonialism
Political and Military Might
Bureaucracy Detached from Public

Germany, %
France, %
Europeanness, the youth of the third and fourth generations have developed a cosmopolitan identity that puts the accent on diversity, pluralism and citizenship.

There would be a great benefit in highlighting, at this juncture, a few more aspects. In passing judgment on European identity, the members of the middle class exhibited an inclination to stress the importance of science, the scientific spirit, reason, the system, rules and rights, while the working class accentuated justice, law and equality. Another point worth considering is the noticeable acquiescence of the middle class to integration, in addition to their acceptance of taking part in the public sphere, as opposed to the detectable working class defiance with reference to the same issues.

Data acquired from exhaustive interviews and surveys reveal that German-Turks, compared to the French-Turks, are more communal, religious and conservative, and advocate integration on a lesser scale, stemming from a comparative satisfaction with their current prerogatives, religious privileges and traditional ties of cooperation. But other findings in the research suggest another factor, that when juxtaposed with German Turks, the Turks in France are somewhat closer to aspects such as secularism and are more comfortable in the French language, both of which are indicative of their active part in a specific process of modernization and integration, although they remain somewhat aloof from the other prerequisites of a Western lifestyle, such as awareness of internal policies, the political parties of the countries they live in, not to mention the social and cultural life (theatres, cinema, etc) and other paraphernalia of globalization (internet, media, etc). The German Turks, however, foster an affinity towards creating cosmopolitan, hybrid, global and reflexive identities that redefine their European identity; stated differently, although at the outset they may be prone to being perceived as communal, the German Turks are more competent at acclimatizing to the political, social and cultural climate of their country, demonstrating an enhanced proficiency in making better use of the apparatus of globalization, and taking pride in

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having both the strength and courage to reshape Germany’s geography of meaning. In the German case, the likes of Fatih Akin, Neco Celik, Emine Sevgi Ozdamar, Azize-A, Zehra Cirak, Zafer Senocak and many other names appear as exemplars who have played a key role in instilling a certain dynamism to the European, and concomitantly, to the German identity, attesting that the experience of the German Turks, Islam and communality is not ipso facto at loggerheads with being European or cosmopolitan, not to mention modernity or globalization. Conversely, Islam and such moderate inclinations toward communality are even able to provide an alternative expedient to modernization.

Migrant societies or minorities develop strategies for political participation in concordance with the political and legal structures of their countries of residence. Parallel with the institutional guidance theory, conceptualized by the British researcher Patrick R. Ireland (1994 and 2000), migrant groups, when confronted with an ostracizing factor such as racism, ethnic enmity or institutional exclusion, show a propensity to utilize ethnicity, religion and/or culture as the principal strategy of political participation, behind which hides the home society’s juridical and political arrangements vis-à-vis the minorities. Looking from within this theoretical framework, one can make sense of the impetus behind the convention that lies around the core of ethnicity which is espoused by so many minorities Turks and non-Turks alike in Western societies that are not as charitable as Germany toward cultural diversities. In light of this theory, it is imperative for Turks to institute an exclusive political formation within a juridical ambiance that discriminates towards minority participation in the political arena. In other words, in the face of conservative German politics, which have stringently abided by, until very recently, a segregationist migration policy, refusing to not even pronounce the word integration, it is quite explicable that German-Turks should place a greater emphasis on traditional, communal, religious and ethnic identities. It is moreover reasonable for German Turks to identify themselves
with Islam in a society where religion, for the overwhelming majority, still remains a focal point of reference. Alternatively, in France, a setting dominated by a secularist, republican, pro-assimilation and universal tradition, it is more common for Turks to identify themselves with such modern references. No expressed identity can be independent of the structure it belongs to. It should not be overlooked that the Turks, in the French case, who have an extremely secular, republican and Kemalist appearance, are fairly ineffective in making their presence felt in the social, political and cultural spheres. Comparing the rather divergent French and German traditions, the dominant discourse in France is civilization, which comprises a pro-assimilation overtone, while culture, characterized by multiculturalism, prevails in Germany. Examining on this comparison, it could perhaps be construed that those who unconditionally accept French values and become assimilated in their cauldron may achieve prominence in the public life of France, while it could simultaneously be deduced that different cultures in Germany keep their distinct grounds in opposition to the dominant German culture, thereby paving the way for two hypothetical crystallizations: the political sovereignty of conservative wings that can be conducive for the intensification of a divergence between cultures, and which contributes to racism and xenophobia; or the incumbency of the greens or social democrats that can set the scene for the implementation of multicultural politics.

The tables below reflect information that is related to what the admission of Turkey into the EU would signify for Euro-Turks, the sorts of positive activities they plan on undertaking in European societies provided such an entrance does occur, and how they classify themselves in terms of identity. As will be demonstrated, Euro-Turks believe that the inclusion of Turkey into the EU will confer many significant contributions and by and large disagree with the claims that Turkey will relinquish her sovereignty and become subject to partition upon entrance into the EU, contentions which also, have time and again, come to the fore in Turkey. (Table 7) On the
other hand, a significant amount of people believe that Turkish inclusion will give Europe cultural wealth. (Table 8) A majority of the interviewees define themselves with hyphenated and multiple identities, that is, either as Turkish-European or European-Turkish (Table 9). Approximately 32% define themselves as Turkish per se, while 63% who opt for multiple identities, 53% of this seeing themselves as Turkish-European and 10% as European-Turkish. Though, as indicated in the study “The Skepticism of Europe” by Hakan Yilmaz, the Turks of Turkey identify themselves through different proportions: 54% see themselves as being Turkish, %30.5 as Turkish-European and 5% as European-Turkish.

Table 7. In your opinion, what does Turkey’s admission into the EU mean? (Multi-answered)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany, %</th>
<th>France, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progress in Human Rights</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Democracy</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More employment</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Corruption</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialization</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of Sovereignty</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partition of the Country</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. What kind of positive contributions may Turkey offer to the EU upon acceptance? (Multi-answered)
Undoubtedly, the most crucial point highlighted by the tables above is that Euro-Turks, who are distant from the tension regarding Western Europe and the European Union in their migration experience of over 40 years, are the focal points of a harmonious process that is gradually heading towards integration. Perceiving the EU mostly as a political and economic project, the Euro-Turks, far from posing a threat to the politics, social life or culture of their countries of residence, have put up a struggle to integrate, with their distinctive color, into the social, economic and cultural life. The gist of the political discourses expounded in the process of this struggle have always been formed with the aim of procuring political, social, civilizational and cultural rights, which are imperative for liberation from a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the majority.

The subsequent table comprises of 3 separate investigations conducted in 2003 and 2004, presenting a comparison of the French, German, Euro-Turk and Turkish positions in relation to European and national identities. The study of Hakan Yilmaz shows that 54% of the population in Turkey conceives of themselves as Turks as such, while 30% as Turkish and then European, with 5% seeing themselves as European and then Turkish and 4% as European only. The Eurobarometer Research of 2003 exposed that 38% of Germans and 35% of French took comfort in a nationalist identification, while nearly 60% of Germans and French alike preferred to give hyphenated identities. With an amount of 60% who favor hyphenated identifications, it seems that Euro-Turks are no differ-
ent from the native Europeans, insofar as identities are concerned. (Table 10) The panorama in Turkey concerning the hyphenated identifications is rather vague, however, with a preeminence of the population displaying nationalist tendencies.

Table 10. European and National Identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>National Identity Before the European</th>
<th>National Identity Before the European</th>
<th>European Identity Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germans+</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German-Turks*</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks**</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French+</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-Turks*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source Eurobarometer 2003+; Skepticism of Europe in Turkey 2004**; and Euro-Turks Research*)

**EU Membership and the Possibility of Turkish Migration**

One of the gravest concerns voiced regarding Turkish membership in the EU is the possibility of a wave of Turkish migration into Europe. Our qualitative and quantitative research thus far, however, exhibits a picture that contradicts this assumption. First of all, during intense meetings, thorough group discussions and prearranged conventions, Euro-Turks were vehement in advising the Turks of Turkey not to migrate to EU countries, in close connection with predicaments like escalating unemployment, low wages, overdisciplined working conditions, intolerance and corrosion of moral values, provided their homeland is granted acceptance. (70%, Table 11) In spite of this, there is an insurmountable belief held by the very same persons of an imminent upsurge of migration, which at once represents the general impression of the EU countries. Thus the experience of the Euro-Turks must unequivocally be conveyed to the Turks of Turkey. In hindsight though, past experiences of the integration of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece did not occasion waves of migration; in fact, if there were any, they were directed...
the other way round, which could also turn out to be analogous to the possible Turkish experience. The percentage of those ready to contemplate a return to their homeland upon Turkey’s admission, in both countries, is over 30%. (Table 12) A large number of qualified young Euro-Turks, moreover, whose numbers of late have risen tremendously, are increasingly settling in Turkey and pursuing careers in tourism companies or international firms. Additionally, considering the fact that approximately 150,000 EU citizens have embraced Turkey as a place of permanent residence (Kaiser, 2001), investing in unmovable assets, especially along the southern coast, we can deduce that migration between Turkey and the EU is, at any rate, reciprocal.

Table 11. Would you recommend that Turks migrate to Germany/France?

Table 12. If Turkey joins the EU, would you consider returning to Turkey?
Conclusion: Anatolian Islam is not a Threat

By and large, Islam is conceived and explicated in Western Europe as a threat to her lifestyle, with Islamic fundamentalism viewed as the source of Western xenophobia and the negative behavior that is predisposed toward racism and violence. But when the opposite viewpoint is espoused, it would be possible to appraise the revival of religious values as a specific symptom occasioned by certain encumbrances, such as unemployment, racism, xenophobia, exile and in certain cases, assimilation. To cope with such turbulent challenges, discourses propounded in close proximity with culture, identity, religion, ethnicity, traditions and history have become a crucial weapon for minorities, particularly migrants. For migrant societies reinventing the past, investing in culture, ethnicity and religion seem to serve a two-folded purpose, the first of which perhaps could be adumbrated as seizing the present while ostensibly remaining indifferent to the criticism of the status quo. The subjects of the Diaspora, in this case, utilize the mighty past, authentic culture, ethnicity and religion as a strategic shield against contemporary harm caused by persecution, structural discrimination, poverty, racism and institutional inequity. Secondly, this helps to cultivate, in the individual, sentiments of independence from the criteria coerced by the other, as the past is an entity envisioned by members of the Diaspora as their own. The fact of the matter is that a stance as such is but a type of politics created by the expelled. In the words of Alasdair MacIntyre, there are two types of implementing politics: the politics of the included and the politics of the excluded. While the included, to attain to their objectives, collaborate with legitimate political institutions (the parliament, political parties and the media), the excluded draw on culture, ethnicity, religion and tradition to reach their goals.

The results of our research illustrate that around 8% of Euro-Turks consider themselves to be fairly religious; this is an amount
parallel with the figure in Turkey and alludes to a portion that renders religious beliefs absolute and maintains a relative distance from the secular lifestyle. The religious communities like the Suleymancis, Nurcüs and Kaplancis could be classified under this heading. Diasporical religious communities, as Salman Rushdie said, are predicated on purity and authenticity. “The defenders of purity” says Rushdie, “are afraid mixing with other cultures will weaken their own.” They think that communicating with others who do not share their beliefs may disturb their belief systems. A Turkish man, aged around seventy, who was living in Berlin and who belonged to the Rufai tariqah, provides us with interesting insights into the formation of the Islamic Diaspora identity

“Us Muslims are continuously among our believing brothers. To be a Muslim is to surrender to Allah. But surrendering to Allah may not mean complete belief in Him. In Islam, there are three types of humans; Avam (the ordinary folk), Has (the Believers) and Hassin Hassi (those with the strongest faith). In order to strengthen our belief in Allah and maintain a spiritual power in the material world, the Qur’an advises us to be with the Believers. In view of that, we try and keep our distance from the avam, and in so doing, seek to establish ways of connection with the true believers.” (Meeting, Mevlana Mosque, Kreuzberg, 25 January 1996)

The Euro-Turks who fall outside the 8% percent represent a significant bulk; these are ones who appreciate Islam without rendering it absolute, who experience religion on a symbolic level and having embraced a secular lifestyle can envisage the possibility of the coexistence of diverse religions and cultures, and they see no harm in pronouncing a hyphenated identity, such as French-Muslim-Turk or German-Muslim-Turk. (Table 13)
In this day and age in which fundamentalist religious movements are perceived as an enormous threat, Islam has undergone a malignant incrimination that is homogenous and singular. The ubiquitous mood that Islam is the primary threat to multiculturalism prevails in both the media, the political arena and in academic circles, which are dominant forms of judgment that singularly have an impact, in the West, on migrants of Turkish origin. From the conclusions of a number of research studies we have undertaken it could be deduced that Islam or other religious, ethnic and traditional proclivities are but symptoms generated by migrants who have undergone long years of structural discrimination in the relevant and are the outcome of culture-religion-ethnicity-identity oriented politics. Hence accordingly, instead of speaking of one Islam, in this case it would be more appropriate to speak of several Islams, of which Anatolian Islam, Alewism and Sufism, all of which stand outside the periphery of the Wahhabi interpretation, may be enumerated.

I cannot help but mention the group we met with in Strasbourg during our research, whom, identifying themselves as Cojepiennes, have split from the Milli Gorus line they had previously espoused, and now have determined a strategy of their own. The members of this group, showing a striking similarity with the current AKP of Turkey, trendsetters who separated themselves from the approach of the Refah Party, define themselves as French-
Muslim-Turks and envision a coexistence with Western societies with no threat being posed, and advocate the acquirement of French or German citizenship, aiming towards political participation through the utilization of legitimate political tools; in addition they call for direct government from the European Parliament in Strasbourg and the Commission in Brussels, correspondingly advising that Turkey adopts a similar political outlook. The Cojepiennes, in addition believe they can impart a fresh impetus to the ever-changing European identity, just as they can offer new strength to the already powerful Europe. Modern interpretations of Islam along these lines prove that Islam, far from posing a threat to Western values, is merely seeking enlistment in the already existing social and political system, or put more simply, a significant bulk of Muslims do not constitute a security hazard for the European Union, as they are endeavors to develop strategies of participation en route to justice and equality. The growing presence of Muslims, in particular Euro-Turks, in the political, cultural and economic arenas of such countries, is confirmation of their exertion toward becoming permanent elements with their unique voices, concepts of aesthetics, priorities and problems.
NOTES
1 For more a detailed account, see Doty (2000) and Hulysmans (1989).
2 For more detailed information regarding governmentality, see Foucault (2000). Michel Foucault defines the concept of governmentality as the art of procuring politics, or the sum of methods utilized by the political party to sustain its incumbency.
3 For a detailed account of the matter see, Kymlicka (1995) and Opalski (2002)
4 For a more exhaustive evaluation on the possibilities of exporting the Liberal Western Model, see Kymlicka and Opalski (2002)
5 Leo Tindemans was at that time the Belgian Prime Minister. A thorough account of the Tindemans Report can be found at Tindemans (1975); Shore (2000) and Mass (2004).
6 The most important supporter for the ascendancy of the Unity in Diversity discourse in the EU is indubitably Romano Prodi, the Chairman of the Commission. For the speeches in which he alludes to the discourse, see Prodi, 8 March 2001: Europe: A Family Governed by Common Rules. Joint Seim and Senate commissions on European integration, foreign affairs and European law: Warsaw (speech 01/110); 4 April 2001: Bring the family together. Academy of Sciences: Budapest (speech 01/158); 26 April 2001: Are we really on the road to European Integration? Bayrische Hypo und Vereinsbank AG: Munich, (speech 01/187); 7 June 2001: Where do we go from here? National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia: Ljubljana (speech 01/271); Prodi, Romano 27 November 2001: Europe at a crossroad. Bertelsmann Forum: Gutersloth (speech 01/585).
7 Among the key references for the transformation of the concepts of Europe and the European Identity over the course of history is Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality by Gerard Delanty (1995). In this work, Delanty asserts that the idea of Europe is interconnected with the state tradition and elite culture rather than with the tradition of civil society. From this vantage point, Europe transpires as an idea that emerged in Anatolia in a mythological nuance, taken beyond Persia through the conquests of Alexander the Great, and further transported to England through the expedient of Roman triumph; this was followed by an integration in Northern Europe by the Holy Roman Empire and has endured to the present day in the current condition of Europe. Europe, historically able to flexibly expand over a vast geography, seems on the outside to be constructed on the pedestals of Hellenism, Rome and the Church, although European societies constructed after World War II exhibited a shift from an ethno-cultural perception of Europe to a political and economic one. (Delanty,1995)
8 For more detail on the Süleymançı, Nurcu and Kaplancı movements see, W. Schiffauer (1997)
The Growing Strength of the Euroturk in Pro-Turkish and Euro-Sceptical Sweden

*Sven E O Hort*

“The Swedish Embassy inspired the chief literary monument of the diplomatic life of the city. Its author was an Armenian Catholic of Constantinople, born in 1740, called Mouradgea... He hoped both to lessen popular prejudice about the East in the West, and to bring Western knowledge to the East. He called for a new Suleiman the Magnificent who would `maintain more intimate relations with the Europeans, adopt their tactics, in fact absolutely change the face of their empire`.”


**Introduction**

At the very end of the last millennium a brand new quarterly magazine was launched in Stockholm, Sweden: the bilingual Euroturk. From a sociological perspective, the release of Euroturk can be considered as a social event, a synthesis of structural and agential
influences in the incessant process of the human being in the social landscape (Sztompka 2006; Papakostas 2004; Ahrne & Papakostas 2002). This journal was, and still is, published by an offspring of the National Association of Turks in Sweden, at the time a three-year independent Turkish Youth Association. By now – April 2007 – it has been a regular enterprise for more than eight years, and since 1999 more than 30 issues have seen the light of day (Euroturk 1999-2007). What kind of journal is it, or has it become? After more than eight years in public, in the globalized Swedish context what does “Euroturk” stand for? What is its trademark? Is it just an ordinary youth magazine published in the far north of Europe? Or, is Euroturk an expression of a broader, trans-national “Euro-Turkism”? In that case, how much euro, and how much Turk? And what about the Swedish ingredient(s)? To answer these questions, this journal will be discussed in the context of Swedish-Turkish relations in an enlarged, and historical, Eurasia. First, however, two introductory notes are presented.

**Imagined communities: a methodological note**

Thus, let us for a second or two leave the present as history for theory, or theoretical practice – and empirical reality, the social practices of everyday life. Despite the recent success of individualism and individuation, no individual is an island. People cannot do without each other. Since Gutenberg, or a little later, printed media is an indication of this social situation. The media contribute to the way people learn and know about the world including their fellows. The media are of course just one of a number of instruments for the necessary worldly – and spiritual – orientation of people. Individuals are dependent and interdependent human beings, and to survive they live under more or less organized conditions. Ideologies aside, the fact that people tend to coordinate their activities so as to constitute social set-ups, imagined and real existing communities, is a core insight from the social sciences. These arrangements can range from bonds between and within rather
small pools of human beings to a few nation-states that can coordinate a billion people or more quite effectively (de Swaan 2001; cf also Ostrom 1990). Thus, there is a diverse variety of imagined communities and civil societies, from Rinkeby (Stockholm) to Istanbul, from Kurdistan to China.

Three years ago (2004) I made my first visit to the city of Istanbul to participate in a Conference at Marmara University on the topic of “The Integration of Turks in Europe and the Integration of Turkey in the European Union”. As this was also my first encounter with Turkey, I did not know the local habits, for instance what one is allowed to say or not to say. Of course, over the years I had met Turks in Sweden, but that is a very different story. The playing-fields are entirely different. Three years ago in Istanbul I deeply offended one of the conference participants, a Swede born and raised in Sweden, and maybe several others too. I had given my paper – and speech – the title “The Invisible Peoples from Turkey living in the Far North of Europe”, and it was, of course, a great insult to those who had a deeper and more profound knowledge and understanding of the situation of the Turks living in Sweden. I had found some indications – and as such, was open to inquisitive questions – of a fair amount of social integration characteristic of the Turk-Turkish community in Sweden (cf also Hosseini 2003). On the one hand, I would like to express my regret, although it is a bit late. On the other hand, I do not regret my mistake as I think this is the way research should develop: through provocative questions and tentative answers, through paradoxes.

At the conference I also met a recently repatriated woman, at that time at Bahcesehir University in Istanbul with a PhD from Uppsala University Sweden (cf Akpinar 2003). Another participant at that conference informed me about a book written in the 1970s or 80s in Turkish on “Rinkeby – a Turkish ghetto in Sweden”. In Sweden, and partly also outside Sweden, Rinkeby is a well-known suburb of Stockholm. For the average reader of the main Swedish
dailies, Rinkeby is synonymous with a vivid urban multicultural diversity – and thought-provoking social segregation. However, I have still not seen the Turkish book about Rinkeby. I am not able to read it, but sooner or later, hopefully the former, I will be able to see this work and to hold it in my hands (cf Andersson-Brolin 1984). Today, Rinkeby is still a kind of ghetto, maybe not a Turkish ghetto, but a segregated community in the Swedish parlance; although my visiting American undergraduate students for many years told me that “you don’t know what a ghetto is”. The reason is of course that Rinkeby is a rather decent place, where for instance my political science colleague Adolphe Lawson from Togo lives together with a lot of other people coming from most parts of the world, except white downtown and suburban Stockholm (cf Lawson 2006). Altogether, some 15,000 people currently live in Rinkeby, which is almost exactly the size of Ostrom’s maximum CPRs, or the size of an average Swedish municipality. Perhaps a thousand of the inhabitants of Rinkeby have some kind of Turkish roots. When you enter its main square, a large sign tells you that the Swedish-Turkish Association is there. In nearby Tensta and Kista even more people with Turkish roots reside.

Hence, Rinkeby is an example of an imagined community, or of several. As a young student at the University of Lund one of my teachers, the internationally well-known Swedish sociologist Göran Therborn (for instance, cf Therborn 2007, 2006, and 1995; also Olsson & Therborn 1992 & 1970), introduced me to the mental topography of the London-based, but cosmopolitan journal, New Left Review. (Since a few years back NLR also publishes a Turkish edition.) Thereby, I came across the works of Tom Nairn, one of the main, if not the only acknowledged, spirits behind Benedict Anderson and his theory of “imagined communities”, which is nowadays so prevalent in nationalism studies. Nairn’s way of looking at nations and nationalism, and the possibility of alternative institutions and organizations, such as super- and supra-nations, at
a time when nation-states were sacrosanct – during the first Cold
War and its immediate aftermath – was an important insight that
has guided further research (cf Olsson 1989). The Break-up of
Britain (1977) as well as The Left against Europe (1973) are works to
admire (cf also Nairn and James 2005). These works had a great
impact on Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983/1991), which
is a book that has travelled the world from North to South, from
West to East: as of 2006 it has been published in thirty countries and
translated into twenty-seven languages. Among these countries –
and languages – are Sweden and Turkey, Swedish and Turkish. In
1993, the Istanbul publisher Metis translated it into Turkish. This
very successful publisher is known among other things as an
ardent supporter of Turkey’s drive for EU membership (Anderson
2006). The same year, a Swedish publisher known for its serious-
ness, Daidalos, translated and printed a Swedish edition.

In 2007, almost all of us have our imagined communities made
visible through the social existence and practices of everyday life in
state and civil society. According to Anderson “aside from the
advantages of brevity, IC restfully occludes a pair of words from
which the vampires of banality have by now sucked almost all the
blood” (2006:207). To my mind, IC still has something more than
banalities to say about “nationalism’s undivorceable marriage to
internationalism” (2006:207), thus, something to tell about the links
in the social landscape between Euro-Turk, Euro-Türks, Sweden,
Turkey, and the outer world, between media, print-capitalism,
human associations or organized interests of human beings, such as
nation-states, and the latter’s “international community”. It is in the
context of imagined communities in state and civil society that
Euroturk becomes a part of everyday life in Sweden and outside, a
real dimension of the social lives of young people living in the
Swedish socio-political landscape, yet nevertheless a global or
trans-national social event.
Searching for Euro-Turks or Euro-Türks: Wikipedia and Google

But we also live in various virtual communities. I have to confess that when I was invited in March 2006 for a second visit to Istanbul, through an e-mail from a person earlier unknown to me, Talip Küçükcan, the organizer of a conference on “Euro-Turks and the Integration of Turkey into the European Union”, dare I say that I was completely unfamiliar, or ignorant, of the concept of Euro-Turk. Immediately, I began to check Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.com), the new encyclopaedia of the web written by whoever dares to write. There were no Euro-Turks in the English or Swedish editions. I was pretty sure that there was an entrance in the Turkish language edition, but that insight could not help me very much. I tried with “Euro-Turk” as well as “Euro-Türks” – in vain, I have to admit. But in the English edition of Wikipedia I found “euro-patriotism”, if anybody wants to continue down that avenue. I abstained (temporarily, perhaps I should add?). The invention of the Euro-Turk is, thus, in dire need of professional philological scrutiny, a project in itself (cf Anderson 2005). In this note, I just want to add another soon vanished source from the virtual landscape.

Through Google in April 2006 I found the works by Talip Küçükcan and his collaborators (Kücükcan & Güngör 2006). They also offered a working definition which seems fairly close to what I, without any previous knowledge of the existence of an academic or vernacular definition of “Euro-Turk”, employed without using this concept as such here in this city slightly more than three years ago talking about at least some of the Turkish communities living in Sweden today, and their social integration, their civil organizations and social capital in Swedish society. On Google I found 31,000 entrances under “Euro-Turk” and 13,200 entrances under “Euro-Türks”. When I added “Sweden” they were fewer, much fewer, between 606 and 232 entrances – a selection of the most important ones of the 31,000 or 13,200 respectively, I am sure. If I
used only Swedish language or Swedish websites, there was almost nothing, somewhere between 270 and 160 (early April 2006). But there was one exception, I found, and as already indicated, I will return to that exception below because it was an important one: the quarterly journal Euroturk. In the meantime, I will try to set out the historical and contemporary coordinates that have governed the social existence of this trans-national social event in the Swedish social landscape.

**Sweden and Ottoman Turkey – historical and geopolitical coordinates**

The geographical area where the present nation-state of Turkey is situated – almost twice the size of contemporary Sweden, but at present more than seven times as populated – belongs to the origins of the world “as we know it”: the world between Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Historically speaking, if it had belonged to this world at all, Sweden was on its periphery. Nevertheless, Swedes have lived in present-day Sweden for at least 5,000 years, the Saami people in the far north not included, longer than nearly any other European people. Archaeologists claim that tribes from Scandinavia played a major role in the disintegration of the Roman Empire, while other Swedes contributed to the creation of the first Russian – Kiev – state in the 9th century along with people from the Black Sea region.

This was the end to the Viking saga. Instead, Sweden, as well as the other Nordic kingdom, became part of Europe during the Middle Ages when the Roman Church reached the Scandinavian Peninsula. With Reformation, a Lutheran or Protestant state church became part of the military nation-state operating on German soil against the German Roman Habsburg Emperor at a time when the Ottoman armies besieged Vienna. Sweden and Ottoman Turkey were both against the continental powers, Russia in particular. Sweden and Russia were neighbours at war and peace for three
centuries, and the Swedish king Charles XII had to take refugee in Ottoman Bender after his defeat in 1709 at Poltava.

Actually, for almost four years he was some kind of prisoner of the Sultan, but in 1713 he escaped and return to Stockholm. Only a few years later his life ended during a border dispute with Denmark-Norway (Wetterberg 2006). For another century Sweden was involved in a set of ever-losing wars, in particular with neighbouring Russia, and engaged in diplomatic intrigues and manoeuvres with the Ottoman Sultans. However, after the Napoleonic wars, Sweden was not involved in any armistice, and thus, less active in Byzantium (Björnsson 2004). The activities of the High Gate in Stockholm are of course the other side of the coin.

As mentioned, the Swedes, together with other Scandinavians, were Christianized from the 11th century. With the early modern era a strong and fairly centralized monarchy developed. Nevertheless, the peasantry remained free landowners represented in a rudimentary Fourth Estate Parliament, and a decentralized form of local power also developed parallel to the power of the Crown in Parliament. The kingdom of Sweden was, population-wise, for a long time known as a rather homogeneous country from the end of the 19th century, being inhabited mainly by secularized North European Evangelical Lutherans.

Before the Second World War, when membership in the state church was more or less compulsory, few outsiders had settled in this western corner of Siberia. Instead, emigration, in particular to North America, was the typical pattern of migration from the mid-19th century well into the early 1930s. Apart from inter-Scandinavian migration, wartime refugees such as Jews and Estonians – from the other side of the Baltic – were the first major settlers from abroad, but labour market immigration on a major scale soon followed. Swedish industry – private big business – benefited tremendously from the build-up of Western Europe after World War II. From this period stems the enduring international
reputation of the universal welfare state (Rothstein 1998; cf also Hansen, Hort & Kuhnle 2007).

In particular during the 1960s, labour was short and the numbers of guest-workers entering Sweden varied from year to year with the number of job vacancies. This movement reached a peak in 1970 with 77,000 persons. Over the years, perhaps some 100,000 persons from Turkey came to Sweden for jobs, family unification or as political refugees. Some have returned, but most have remained and extended their bonding through family formation (Olofsson 2007; cf also Therborn 2004). Not until the early 1990s, with the influx of people from war-ridden former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, was the overall immigration figure topped up. In later years, other areas of the world devastated by war and armed conflicts such as Iraq and Somalia have contributed to making immigration to Sweden a still viable option.

**Contemporary Europe, Sweden and Turkey**

In my abstract for the 2006 Conference in Istanbul I compared two countries - Sweden and Turkey and their relationship to the European Union and talked about both of them as latecomers. Turkey was, of course, no latecomer. I should have known that Turkey in 1959 had already applied for membership in the organization of the European Six. I was on a Swedish Royal Commission evaluating the primarily East and Central European candidate countries of 1997, and in writing up the report I dwelled a lot on the merger between the six and the seven EFTA-countries and the rest of the story, but forgot that Turkey has had a very different relationship to the countries and organizations of the original Treaty of Rome (SOU 1997:153). Had there been a different attitude in and around Brussels and a few other national capitals at an earlier point of time, perhaps Istanbul would again have become another “Eastern Rome” in a geo-politically different Union. Maybe this is also inexcusable to say in this city, for now it is Istanbul, not
Byzantium, but for those of us who still remember Constantinople, it is almost impossible to avoid mentioning.

Although I had been rude and offended people, I should add that in 1959, I was nine, and a year later my family got our first television set. Thus, from that period I remember the Ankara coup in 1960, and the way Prime Minister Adnan Menderes passed away in 1961 together with his ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, the Turkey of my schoolbook youth was also the country where the heroic king Charles XII resided and took refuge when the Russian Tsar had knocked out his armies at Poltava, and crushed what was called the Swedish Great Power Empire (Voltaire 2000/1731; cf Tilly 1992 and Wallerstein 1974). Actually, Turkish (or Moldovian/Romanian) Bender was for a short while the Swedish capital and together with Stockholm the centre of its foreign – and domestic – policy.

The Integration of Sweden and Turkey into the European Union

However, after the Napoleonic wars, when Finland became part of tsarist Russia as a Grand Duchy with the Tsar as the Grand Duke, the kingdom of Sweden has not been directly involved in any war (cf also Alapuro 1988). Nevertheless, Russia has continued to be looked upon as an enemy, not least during the Cold War, and during this period faraway Turkey got a fairly good reputation in several Swedish circles as being “anti-Soviet”. The coastlines of Turkey have also become a popular resort for many northern sun tourists. Thus, it is no coincidence that the Swedish Social Democratic government met no opposition in Parliament when in 2004 it uncompromisingly supported Turkish membership in the EU. The new 2006 Swedish non-socialist government has continued where its predecessor left off (cf also Bildt 1991). Within the Swedish Foreign Service there is also widespread support for Turkish EU membership, and, thus, few signs of dissent (Karlsson 2007). Nevertheless, there is opposition within Sweden to Ankara’s ambitions for EU
membership. In particular, human rights groups in Sweden have articulated their concern about the fate of Kurdish people in Turkey. Moreover, human right activists have been actively supported by several exile Kurdish cultural and political associations working openly in Sweden. Nevertheless, individual Kurds have expressed deep sympathy with the devil and the idea of the integration of Turkey into the European Union as a way of improving the lot of the Kurds in Turkey (cf Baksi 2007).

Despite a fairly pro-Turkish stance by Swedish governments of various colours, continental Europe is at a distance from secular Scandinavia and Sweden. In contrast to the admiration of North America, the new continental Europe that developed out of the ashes of World War Two for many years did not have a particularly good reputation in Sweden (Zetterberg 1967). For more than 30 years, Sweden belonged to EFTA, the European Free Trade Association, created as an alternative by seven member-states (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and United Kingdom) to the mainly Catholic “six” – Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany – that initially signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957. For many years, Sweden continued to be part of EFTA despite the fact that both Great Britain and Denmark disappeared to the EEC, and West Germany had become Sweden’s main trading partner. With the emerging break-up of the Soviet Empire, Sweden had reached a stage of Great Recession, and decided in 1990 to apply for membership in the European Union. At that time the Union consisted of twelve member-states, apart from the original six, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom had joined (Olsson Hort 1994). Together with Austria and Finland, Sweden became a member in 1995.

However, the electorate, that is Swedish citizens, was more or less unprepared for such an initiative from the political elite, and hesitated to subscribe to the idea. After much soul-searching, in a
referendum 51% voted yes to Europe in late 1994, and Sweden entered the Union as of January 1st 1995 (Benner 1997). Furthermore, nine years later, another referendum turned down the single European currency, the euro, and forced the government of Sweden to keep the Swedish currency, the Swedish krona. Moreover, Sweden is consistently among the countries where the population is most sceptical about the European Union, according to various opinion polls including the semi-official Eurobarometer.

Hence, Sweden is a country that slightly more than a decade ago joined the European Union. Since then, the Swedish government has been a strong advocate of European enlargement but not of a “deepening” of the Union. It was during the spring of 2002 that the Swedish chairmanship managed to make the necessary preparations for the entrance of Central and Eastern European candidate countries into the Union, including the dubious Cyprus decision. As mentioned, after the 2004 enlargement of the Union, the Swedish Administration has continued its support for further enlargement, and in particular Turkish membership, not least through extended financing of its Consular-General in Istanbul, its historical Residence, and the adjacent Swedish Research Institute.

**Turks in Sweden – Invisible People within Imagined Communities?**

In the mid 1970s, in the aftermath of the first major influx of labour immigrants and peoples, from in particular Southern Europe, the Swedish Parliament enacted a new immigrant policy which favoured diversity, multiculturalism, mutual cooperation and freedom of choice. This policy replaced an earlier approach characterized by a framework of assimilation. Thus, cultural freedom of choice was encouraged and immigrant associations received financial support from the central state (Emami 2004; Soysal 1994; Hammar 1985). Two decades later this policy was reformulated into an integration policy to tackle the social problem of the social – labour market, housing and school segregation. No domestic pol-
icy-maker would admit it, and social integration is generally interpreted differently. Nevertheless, I would argue after evaluating the “new” Swedish metropolitan policy in Greater Stockholm that the pendulum swung back towards assimilation, (Hort 2007; cf also Kings 2007 and Lindström 2007). In the meantime, ethnic discrimination, racism and social segregation have reached the public agenda (Pred 2000). Thus, it is in this context of a growing awareness of the issues of social exclusion and inclusion that the journal Euroturk operates, and has operated for eight consecutive years.

Migration from Turkey is, as already indicated, a rather late phenomenon (Brochmann 1995; cf also Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006 and Ålund & Schierup 1991). First of all, there has been labour migration from the 1960s, similar to the Turkish migration to Germany, but demographically on a rather different scale. In Sweden, the Turk never became equivalent of the Foreigner, the Other. The main foreigner was for a long time a nearby Finn from the eastern parts of what once was the kingdom of Sweden (from 1809/1918 Finland). Although Turks were competing for the title of the Other when the migration pattern changed, and the Finns gradually abdicated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, labour migration had already stopped. The newcomers came not only from southern Europe – Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and even southern Italy – but also from the dictatorships of Latin America and soon also Khomeini’s Iran (although there were some refugee students also from the period of the Shah). This is the time and space where social organization of trans-nationals took off in the Swedish social landscape and the predominantly ethnic homogeneity was drastically transformed into an altogether different demographic heterogeneity.

Thus, civil society in Sweden increasingly got a trans-national twist with an ethno-religious undertone (cf Goody 2004). In this landscape of imagined communities, Turks living in Sweden have never outnumbered any of the other major immigrant community
competitors – in sharp contrast to the Turks in Germany and the Pakistanis in Norway – and during the 1980s other social categories and groups were constructed and singled out as significant others in Sweden, for instance the Kurds, but soon also other Muslims from other countries in this part of the world. In the 1990s it was at first the Bosnian Muslims, later the Somalian Muslims, and finally the Iraqi Muslims. In the end, the Muslim from the Arab world became the Foreigner in Sweden. Not the Turk (cf also Caldwell 2006).

Summarizing the peoples from Turkey living in Sweden, there are at least four more or less imagined communities of people from Turkey living in Sweden: first of all labour migrants from the rural Kulu region, second the Christian Assyrian-Syrian refugee immigrants from the 1960s onwards, thirdly Turkish or Istanbul urban intellectual and political refugees from the 1970s and 80s, and fourth and finally the Kurdish diaspora. In the early 1980s the Swedish Immigration Authority published two books on the subject: one on Turks and another on Kurds. A third volume on the Assyrian-Syrians was planned, but never materialized.

In 2007, out of almost ten million residents there are roughly two million people with some kind of fairly recent immigrant background living in Sweden (SCB 2007). Thus, almost 20 per cent of the population belongs to this statistical category. Some are recent asylum seekers and refugees; others are rather distant labour immigrants. Then there are all those born in Sweden with some kind of roots in other countries, sometimes called second or third generation immigrants. Most of all these people are Swedish citizens, but some hundred thousands have other or double passports. Hence, this is in no sense a coherent social or ethnic group. A few would probably label themselves Euro-Turks, but this is not part of the everyday parlance. People with a Turkish origin of some kind – including Turkish citizenship or stateless people from Turkey living in Sweden – are at least 50,000 in total (living all over urban
Sweden). Added to this figure are a few thousand stateless people, some of them apparently from Turkey or with some relationship to Turkey. Romanies or Gypsies are a case in point – subjects without nation (Jonsson 2000; cf also Marsh and Strand 2002). From an overall perspective, this is a rather insignificant figure, but related to some of the geographical areas singled out by the “new” urban development policy – or metropolitan development initiative – this figure is not completely irrelevant (Hajighasemi, Hort et al 2006; cf also Axelsson 2004). The places where the Turkish Youth Association has its local clubs are most often the geopolitical suburbs of the three metropolitan areas: Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö (the latter is close to Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark). A few other cities also stand out as strongholds of this association.

**Euroturk – a Swedish-Turkish journal in Sweden**

Euroturk was launched as a non-partisan magazine by an offspring of the National Association of Turks in Sweden, the independent Turkish Youth Association, with some 4,500 members in 1999, and this association is still its publisher and centre of gravitation. At the time of the release of Euroturk, the independence of the Turkish Youth Association in Sweden was only a few years old, and it had 16 local clubs only in six out of 24 counties (regions of Sweden). In 1999, of the local clubs in Greater Stockholm, only one was fully outside the geographical areas of the metropolitan development initiative (in Sollentuna; cf Lilja 2002). The other founding clubs in Greater Stockholm had their homes in Rinkeby, Botkyrka, Alby (also in the municipality of Botkyrka), Skogås, Bredäng (part of the Stockholm township of Skärholmen), Tensta, Jordbro and Haninge. At the national level the association joined not only both the umbrella association of youth immigrant associations (UngSios) and the National Council of Swedish Youth Associations (LSU) but also the ranks of the nationwide Worker’s Educational Association (ABF). Its growth has been impressive in terms of membership at a time when many youth organizations, in particular the heavily
state-financed political ones, have failed to reach an audience. In 2007, the Association has some 8,000 members in 30 local clubs in nine counties or regions. It is still predominantly an urban phenomenon, and as such it has managed to grow as a national social movement/network. Thus, it is an association that has survived its youthfulness and has matured with the maturation of its journal.

Most often the life cycles of journals are scattered and sporadic, but this magazine is now become a regular enterprise, a recurring social event in the everyday life of young Swedish-Turks, for more than eight years thanks to the growth of the membership of the Turkish Youth Association. Each year new readers have arrived while those growing older have left for other, most likely, slightly more mature alternatives. Since 1999 more than 30 issues have seen the light of day (April 2007). Moreover, two additional election supplements have been published, before the general national elections in 2002 and 2006. Its founders were 28-years old Ahmet Önal, publisher and president of the Youth Association, and Anita Teksöz, editor of the journal. Kemen Yasgan was its first layout designer, soon succeeded by Izzo Randhav. From 2001, Önal also become editor-in-chief with Ayda Aksakal as managing editor and with the latter’s husband Jonas Lund responsible for the layout. At that time, Önal declared that the readers of the journal had made their opinions clear, and asked for more youthful articles as well as more articles in Swedish (March 2001). Önal remained president and publisher until 2003 when he at the age of 32 became president of the National Association of Turks living in Sweden, once its parent organization. Afterwards, on and off he has appeared in the pages of Euroturk. Throughout its existence, editors and publishers have come and gone, some more quickly than others, and new writers have continuously succeeded older ones.

Over the years, Euroturk has stuck to its outlook from the time of Ayda and Jonas Lund. The magazine has changed, but not that much. For instance, “The Voice of the Next Generation” has been
added to its front-page replacing an earlier, more combative but untranslatable one (in Swedish: “en tuff tidning från TUF”). In a few lines or pages, it is not possible to give full credit to the content of a magazine like Euroturk. However, it shows the typical variety of a colourful youth magazine: pictures of well-known individual Swedes, Turks and Euro-Turks – one specific Euroturk has been singled out in each issue – as well as group-photos of members of the Association, introductory editorial pieces in both Swedes and Turkish, most often by the editor and the chairman of the Youth Association respectively, news and articles related to both Swedish and Turkish events and personalities, reports from organizational activities such as summer camps and trips to Turkey as well as national gatherings in Sweden, letters to the editors, chronicles and diaries, and, of course, ads.

Music, film and other cultural and sub-cultural expressions are frequently covered, most often suburban Swedish hip-hoppers of sexes, “traditional” singers and movie stars in general. A balance sheet of the pros and cons of participation in Miss Universe contests is drawn by a 16 years old Swedish-Turkish Miss Göteborg (October 2001). Sports, politics and economics are all important themes but social critique is, if not virtually absent from its pages, not particularly outspoken. Animal welfare was early on a concern (1999 No 1). Exchange with other Turkish diasporas in Europe has received coverage as well as activities in various trans-national youth associations at the European level. Successful businessmen, such as Ishak Alaton (October 2006), as well as sportsmen and women with a background in the Swedish-Turkish community are regularly featured. Professional athletes working in Turkey, such as Kennet Anderson in Fenerbahce, have occasionally been highlighted. Sports typical to Sweden such as ice hockey and cross-country skiing have been attended to when pursued by Turkish youngsters living in Sweden. Also cultural figures such as Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk are highlighted. In 2002, the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson (1996-2006) was interviewed, and in that interview
he predicted that a person with a Turkish background would become Swedish PM in 20 years. Turkish membership in the European Union is, of course, a recurrent theme, including a piece on the very young Green MP Gustav Fridolin under the headline “To live in euronationalism” (October 2003; after the Swedish currency referendum). In summary the imagined, trans-national community of Swedish-Turkish youth is broad and multifaceted.

Advertising in the magazine is worth special attention. First out in 1999 was the Stockholm Kebab House with its headquarters in Vällingby, the model suburb of early post-war Stockholm, and its main outlet in downtown Stockholm. During its first years, a restaurant called Istanbul in the rather posh suburb Bromma, Stockholm, also regularly advertised in the journal. Furthermore, among the first advertisers were the travel agencies operating from nearby Rinkeby between Sweden and Turkey. Kulu travel agency is just one example of this kind. Eight years later, the travel agencies are still there, but established advertisers nowadays include central state agencies such as the National Agency for Higher Education, the National Board of Student Aid, the National Institute of Public Health, the Premium Pension Authority (PPM) and the Police Academy. The National Confederation of Salaried Employees advertised four top positions at its headquarters (December 2001). Thus, advertising in Euroturk reflects a growing concern not only in the Swedish establishment but also among the young Turks in Sweden: higher education, job opportunities and a good life. The children of those who have had to do the bad jobs over the last decades are aspiring for better ones in a new transnational imagined community. This is an important aspect of a social event that makes up the everyday social existence in an increasingly globalising world. Euro in this case is not the usual currency but the internationalism of “nationalism’s undivorcable marriage to internationalism”. Apparently, the young Turks of Sweden are well equipped with a European imagination. Self-esteem among these youngsters and within the Turkish Youth
Association has also grown as the National Council of Swedish Youth Organizations has promulgated Euroturk as a role model for similar journals and associations in Sweden (Nasr & Kilic 2007).

Finally, a few words about global partisan politics should be placed here. Euroturk is in no sense a mouthpiece of the Turkish government, but various Turkish ambassadors to Sweden have continuously been interviewed (in Turkish). The boundaries of thought set by both Kemalism-turned-American-Islamism, and the National Party of Sweden, are not absent from its coverage (cf Tugal 2007; also Therborn 1980). Its silence around sensitive issues, the role of the Armenians, the Assyrian-Syrians and the Kurds in Swedish and Turkish society, is a dark streak in its continuity. The “Kurdish Question” was, however, visible from the start with a picture from a demonstration in Göteborg against PKK-leader Öcalan supplemented with text in Turkish (1999 no 1). There are exceptions to this pattern: one was the interview with the first Turkish-born member of the Swedish Government, Ibrahim Baylan, a Social Democrat from the Assyrian-Syrian community in Botkyrka in suburban southern Stockholm, and Minister of Education as of 2004 (March 2005). However, his birthplace and early upbringing in south-eastern Turkey were omitted from the pages of Euroturk. Another exception was when Ahmet Önal invoked the orientalism of Edward Said and wrote about Turkish EU membership and the role of the Armenian genocide in these negotiations (June 2005).

In Swedish politics, the journal is also non-partisan but, of course, within the boundaries of the local political culture. Issues such as school segregation have frequently been exposed. Educational “best practices” have been explored (for instance May 2001). Political appointees with a background in the Swedish-Turkish community have been highlighted. As mentioned, two special appendices of the journal were produced for the 2002 and 2006 general elections in Sweden. Both the Social Democratic Prime Minister as well as his main – moderate – challenger were present-
ed. Candidates from the political parties represented in Parliament have been presented to the Euroturk audience: in some cases candidates with a Turkish background, for instance the Stockholm candidate for the Green Party in the 2006 election Mehmet Kaplan (once chairman of the association Young Muslims in Sweden), in other cases persons of a different cast, such as the domestically well-known liberal-secular hawks Nyamko Sabuni (as of late 2006 Minister of Gender Equality, Social Integration and Urban Development), and Mauricio Rojas. However, in the 2006 supplement the new challenger Feminist Initiative was not allowed into these pages, although its spokeswoman Devrim Mavi had been a contributor to Euroturk two years earlier (December 2004).

Otherwise feminism, a theme typical for contemporary Scandinavian political culture has, partly indirectly, attracted a lot of attention. With the exception of founder Ahmet Önal, so far most contributors, editors and publishers have been females. In its first issue (1999), for instance, feminist Aysegül Sungur was interviewed by Nurgunden Kut. Sungur was one of the founding members of the Youth section of the National Association of Turks living in Sweden, a political science student and later also a political advisor to a member of the Swedish cabinet. She has been a regular contributor to the journal. The lesbian feminist and DJ, social pedagogic Ipek was interviewed in Turkish in the October 2001 issue. Perhaps, and I stress perhaps, more typical for the early period is the portrait of Selda a few issues earlier (March 2001). She had, without her consent or explicit knowledge, been seated on the board of the youth organization by her father. However, she adjusted to the situation and came to learn practical organizing. After leaving secondary education and a few short-term jobs, she became employed by the association as an organizer. Some of these women have also found their way into associational life at large in Sweden. Ayda Aksakal Lund, for instance, was a civil society representative and member of the Swedish delegation to UN in late 2002, (meanwhile interviewing both the pietist Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg and
Swedish UN ambassador Pierre Schori), and recently the current chairwoman of the Turkish Youth Association became member of the presidium of National Council of Swedish Youth Organizations.

It is probably also worth adding that through the internet an interview with an exceptionally well-known Swedish politician, the then Swedish Minister of Gender Equality, Metropolitan Development, and Social Integration, Mona Sahlin, made Euroturk famous not only in its own circles but also among right-wing populist politicians. In this interview, Sahlin joked about traditional customs in Sweden such as the banalities surrounding the Midsummer Eve Festivals, which annoyed some of her opponents on the Far Right of Swedish politics. On the internet she was severely attacked by ethnic nationalists in Sweden (cf Google above). However, her appearance in this journal has not stopped the career of Sahlin. Nothing seems to stop the ever-returning Sahlin (cf also Stark 1997). Since April 2007 at the age of 50 she became the president of (what used to be) the National Party of Sweden, Social Democracy, and most likely she will be the main contender challenging the present Conservative Prime Minister when national elections are held in September 2010. Most likely, in that year both politicians will be featured in an election supplement to Euroturk.

Thus, there are public issues to confront and debate, and confrontational and polemical content in Euroturk. It has never become dull or outmoded. It belongs to its readership, the children of Turkish Turks who had once immigrated to Sweden, and to north-western Europe as well as Mediterranean Eurasia. This journal as a social event is the closest one comes to Euro-Turkism in the practice of Swedish everyday life. It is probably fair to say that it has become the common memory of the children of Turks coming to and living in Sweden at the end of the second half of the 20th century. While its parent organization, the National Association of Turks in Sweden, only publishes a magazine in Turkish for its
members, most of them in residence in Sweden, the Turkish Youth Association in Sweden has managed to launch a bilingual journal for its cohort(s). While the former journal belongs to a rather closed community of Turkish reading people in Sweden, the latter journal is part of a new emerging (sub-)culture in which the young newcomers and the children of newcomers have found outlets for their customs, imaginations and practices in Sweden and elsewhere. This is their – trans-national – civil society, their imagined community. Some of them have taken a step further, and gathered around other cultural outfits such as Swedish-only journals with more or less visible links to the various immigrant communities in Sweden. Gringo and Shoo are examples of the last-mentioned type, and deserve special attention not possible to deliver at this point in time. Not all of them share a true European outlook, but they are all part of an emerging trans-national civil society and imagined community in Sweden, a civic nationalism instead of an ethnic (cf Nairn 1997).

Conclusions

The appearance of the bilingual Swedish journal Euroturk is an expression of the trend towards the trans-nationalisation of civil society in Europe, in Sweden and in Turkey. Sweden as a state and imagined community is no longer the ethno-homogeneous society it once used to be. These trends are, of course, in need of further investigations. In any case, this magazine reflects the power of the ambitions and aspirations of a group of young people with experience of dual nationhood in a part of the world where peoples and nation-states try to create even larger, super- and/or supra-national entities such as the European Union. These endeavours do not easily go hand in hand, peoples and nation-states march side by side, yet often far from each other. Sometimes they come into collision with one other, and eventually also come into conflict. The protracted negotiations concerning Turkish membership in the European Union is a case in point, the existence of an Eastern bor-
der-zone another (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine). In terms of the trend towards trans-nationalisation of civil society and the growth of an imagined European community there are many impediments: there is no common language in Europe, not one single civil society encompassing the continent, no constitution of the Union, and no European citizenship despite the existence of a European union with 28 member-states as well as a few remaining applicant countries. However, the recurring publication of bilingual Euroturk in Sweden is more than the expression of the global ambitions and aspirations of a single group of “immigrant kids”. It is also a reflection of the larger social integration into a new world, or region of the world, in the making. In that sense, the release of Euroturk and the regularity of its publishing for almost a decade is a social event of historical proportions at least in Sweden, maybe also Turkey and Eurasia.
Image of Turkey and Perception of European Identity among Euro-Turks in Holland

Talip Kucukcan and Veyis Gungor

Introduction

This article analyses the views of Turkish civil society organizations on the image of Turkey in Europe and their perception of European identity drawing upon a field work research and survey findings. Through an interdisciplinary approach, this article also examines views of opinion leaders and politicians of Turkish origin on the image of Turks, Turkish-EU relations and perceived identity of the EU. Turks in Europe have established numerous civil society organizations. These civil society organizations have a great potential power as far as their human resources, financial structures and socio-cultural and economic networks are concerned. In recent years some of these European Turkish civil society organizations started to spend efforts for building a positive public opinion on Turkey, transmitting modern achievements of Turkey to Westerners and establishing a strong bridge between Turkey and Europe. Although there are numerous Turkish civil society organizations and hundreds of activities in many quarters on Europe,
research on the nature and mobilization of this large social capital and its wide networks has only recently began. It is hoped that this article would fill a gap in research on civil aspect of Euro-Turks.

**Turkish Migration to Europe and Holland**

Voluntary and forced international migrations are wide spread human experiences which have been taking place throughout the history causing social, cultural and economic changes. Today, population movements and migration on various scales seem to be unstoppable. Wars, natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and draught; economic reasons such as search for better living conditions and better paid jobs; political reasons such as seeking asylum for freedom of thought and running away from authoritarian regimes for a safe shelter and a democratic society are causing population movements and migrations as happened in the past. (Kritz, Keely & Tomasi 1981; Kritz, Lim & Zlotnik, 1992; Joppke, 1999) Although national borders were established with the emergence of nation states as an expression of sovereignty and independence bringing border crossings and human movements under control, international migration continued either in documented or undocumented forms. Many people migrated from one country to another and they became integral part of the countries they settled in.

European countries and the Unites States of America became the main immigrant receiving centres as developed countries offering employment for job seekers and shelters for political refugees. Turkish migration to Western European countries started in the late 1950s and early 1960s and continued thereafter. Although there has been an interruption in the wave of migration during the 1973 oil crisis, migration from Turkey to Europe continued in the form of family unification. Many labour migrants had plans to return to Turkey after saving enough money in the beginning of the migration. However, only a handful of people returned to Turkey despite
host governments’ incentives to send them back to Turkey. Idea of returning to Turkey turned out to be only a myth and Turkish migrant population in Europe increased year by year through family unions, marriages and undocumented migration. (Abadan-Unat, 1976, Beeley, 1983, Paine, 1974; Martin, 1991). Currently it is estimated that there are more than 4.5 million Turks living in Europe. The majority of Turks in Europe have settled in the countries they reside and either naturalised or increasingly getting citizenship of the receiving countries. They are no longer migrants but an integral part of the society either as citizens or permanent residents (Castles, Booth, & Wallace, 1987).

Turkish migration to Holland has a history of more than forty years since the workforce agreement between Turkey and Holland in 1964. A Dutch Employment Agency was opened in Ankara in the same year to select workers from Turkey. Holland invited workers from various countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Tunis) including Turkey in the process of restructuring its industry and economy. Workforce needed mainly in textile and metal industries during this period.

Geographical distribution and settlement of Turkish workers reflect sectors’ needs and employment patterns. First, immigrant workers from Turkey were employed in textile, construction and ship building etc. industries which concentrated in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Twente - Midden-Brabant regions. Those who came later settled in other towns and cities. As in many other European countries Turks came to Holland to work, save money and prepare a better future for their families with the intention of going back home once they achieved their targets. Yet, against the expectations they settled in Holland and took important roles in various levels in many public and private institutions. The number of Turks in Holland has already reached 400,000 by 2004 and almost half of them acquired the Dutch citizenship.
Turkish Civil Society Organisations in Holland

Turkish civil associations started to emerge almost after ten years of migration of Turks to Holland. Turkish civil organizations have varied according to needs of the community in the process of migration, settlement and post-settlement processes. According to one research the number of civil institutions reached 1125 by 1998 and it is estimated that since then the number has increased considerably especially by the efforts of better educated young generation.

This article is based on a research which is confined to the study Turkish civil society organizations in Holland and to the analysis of well known Turkish opinion leaders in the fields of arts, politics, business, research, education and the media in this country. Although the research was carried in Holland, it is expected that findings will shed light on Turks in other European countries with similar conditions and experiences. Two main methods were used for data collection. First a survey was carried out by administering a questionnaire consisting of sixty five questions on one hundred community organizations. Secondly twenty people form various areas professions and expertises were interviewed in depth. Each interview lasted almost one hour and recorded. Ninety associations out of one hundred responded to the research positively and returned the forms after filling. The return rate indicates that a representative sample was achieved during the research which makes the findings more meaningful and reliable.

Profile of Turkish Civil Associations Participated in Research

Pluralist and democratic societies have a room for a variety of civil initiatives, voluntary work and associational structures which enable various parties and interest groups to participate in the public and political spheres. There are different forms and structures of civil society organizations with various levels of activities which
reflect their priorities, working culture, aims and networking capacity. Our research findings indicate that 16.7 percent of Turkish civil society organizations involved in the survey was established between 1974 and 1984. Research findings suggest that there is a rather slow process of establishing civil associations during this period. Such a state of affairs can be attributed to the fact that the idea or the awareness of the importance of civil associations was not well rooted among the first generation of Turkish immigrants. They neither had sufficient intellectual, economic and educated human resources nor enough experience to establish and run such institutions.

It should be remembered that the Turks started to come to Holland in the early 1960s. They were a generation who grew up under one party system in Turkey where single party dominated the political life in the country until the 1950s. After transition to a multiparty democracy, Turkish political life was interrupted by military interventions several times and democracy was suspended for a while at least for three times. Under such circumstances, Turkish migrants of rural origins could not have been expected of developing deeply rooted civil consciousness and active participation in political life in Holland. Therefore neither in Holland nor in other European countries the first generation were able establish effective civil society organizations with various functions in the early period of their settlement simply because they were not equipped to do so.

Research findings show that 40.7 percent of Turkish civil society organizations in the survey were established between 1985 and 1995. Although migration started in the 1960s, effective emergence of civil associations took almost twenty years. Hopes of return to Turkey and plans to go back caused a sense of temporariness which suppressed the rise of civil society associations in addition to the lack of the awareness of such concepts among the early Turkish immigrants.
What we see from the survey results is that once the settlement started to take place in the host countries, family unifications became a common practice and children started to join the family, new needs have emerged among the Turkish community. In order to meet these needs and face new challenges, Turks started to establish mosques, civil associations, institutions and weekend schools and courses. All of these organizations were the result of civil initiatives not the official policy of either the sending or the receiving countries. Our survey shows that 42.6 percent of Turkish civil associations in Holland were established between 1995 and 2004. Based on these findings one can argue that awareness of the importance of civil society organizations and civil consciousness among Turks increased considerably in recent years which led to the foundation of many civil organizations. What lies behind this transition is the fact that young generation have received a better education and thus became better equipped intellectually, Turkish activists, intellectuals, businessmen and community leaders have also developed a better understanding of civil society organizations and their significance in Holland. When we look at the number of Turkish civil associations and their members as well as their range of activities we can strongly argue that the Turks in Holland have been internalizing the values of civil society and learning to use its mechanisms successfully which can be interpreted as a sign of integration in the Dutch society.

Turkish civil associations in Holland display a variety in relation to their description of foundational objectives, organizational structures and characteristics. 40.7 percent see their status as an association, 50 percent define themselves as a foundation / charity, only 1.9 percent regard themselves as political organizations whereas 3.7 percent see themselves as religious organizations.

When we look at the activity levels of the Turkish civil organizations participated in the survey we observe that there are strong currents among the Turkish community to get integrated in the
larger society. The locus of the activities carried out by the Turkish civil associations is Holland. The majority of these associations organize their activities on local and national levels in Holland. This trend can be interpreted as yet another indication of willingness to integrate in the Dutch society because they see their base as Holland and therefore carry out their activities in this country.

As far as the survey results suggest, Turks in Holland have a tendency to integrate into the Dutch society while preserving their identity instead of getting assimilated. They want to exist with their identity. Therefore Turkish civil associations try to transmit cultural values such as language, music and traditions to the young generations on the one hand and to show that these values don’t contradict the dominant values in the Dutch society on the other hand. It is observed that Turkish civil associations try to prevent cultural assimilation and identity crisis and therefore they put special emphasis on the protection of cultural values and religious beliefs as they are among the important sources of collective identity. There are many associations among other minority ethnic and religious groups with similar objectives.

It is a noteworthy observation that the 9.3 percent of the organizations were established mainly to work for the integration in the Dutch society and fight against any form of discrimination that the Turkish and other communities face. When other foundational objectives are taken into consideration such as working to achieve political rights and representation (3.7 percent), it can be argued that Turkish civil organizations in Holland were established to find solutions to a range of problems that affect the society directly. In light of research data, we can conclude that Turks in Holland are willing to integrate in the Dutch society while preserving their cultural identity. They are also willing to participate in the political life of the country and are prepared to protect fundamental rights and liberties including the rights of women. Research findings also suggest that Turks in Holland don’t want to live in cultural ghettos iso-
lated from the Dutch society and marginalized by the cultural discrimination. Instead, they want to lead a life integrated with the society without conflicts while preserving their own identity.

**Perception of Institutional Identity**

The general picture of Turkish organizations indicates that there is diversity in terms of self definition and identity perception. Perception of institutional identity varies which reflects the non-monolithic nature of Turkish community and the ways in which it engages in the social world. 25.9 percent of Turkish organizations in the survey put more emphasis on Turkish (national/ethnic) collective identity and define themselves as “Turkish” civil society organization whereas 11.1 percent place a primary emphasis on religio-national/ethnic identity describing themselves as “Muslim-Turkish” associations. It appears that for Muslim-Turkish associations both national belonging and religious faith are important basis of their institutional identity.

Research findings indicate that the majority of Turkish organizations define their institutional identity with hyphenated terms. For example, 37 percent of these associations define themselves as Dutch civil society organizations whereas 13 percent perceive themselves as Muslim-Turkish organizations. These findings clearly indicate that Turks are developing hybrid identities in Holland because they not only see themselves as Turks but also as Dutch, harmonizing Turkish and Dutch identities. Half of the Turkish organisations (50 percent) in the sample don’t see any conflict and contradiction between being Turkish and being Dutch and thus internalize values of both communities. This emerging trend among Turks show that they want to preserve their identity on the one hand and add a new dimension to it by seeing themselves as Dutch on the other hand which strongly indicates that Turks in Holland are not against integration but trying to become a part of the dominant society.
Perceived Image of Turks in Holland

Some Turkish organizations (25.9 percent) believe that the Turkish community in Holland has a positive image although the general and majority view see the image of Turks in a negative light. Only a small minority (1.9 percent) of the organizations surveyed think that Turkey and Turks have a positive image in the Dutch society. It is observed that the changes regarding the perception of Turkey from stereotypical images to more realistic one is shared by many Turks. For example, president of an art foundation which organizes events focusing on Turkey made the following statement about the image of Turks in Holland.

“There is a promising development if not fast and sufficient enough in the composition of Turkish community although the number of very successful students, university attendants, and professionals such as doctors and engineers are not enough. New generations are growing up. There are more than twenty thousand Turkish employers. People who came from Anatolia set up these businesses. They came from a village with little or no education years ago but they were very brave. There are four members of Turkish origin in the National Assembly. Turks have sent a representative to the European Parliament. There are tens of council members at the local level. These are the good aspects of recent years indicating that the image is changing in the positive direction.”

Many factors seem to have an impact on the construction of images. Low level of success rate in education and employment on the one hand and unfamiliarity with the cosmopolitan urban life create grounds for the emergence and consolidation of negative images. An administrator of a Turkish civil organization confirms this observation and argues that time to time problem of cultural incompatibility arises which damages the images. He explains negative images and their sources as follows:
“Problem of negative images and cultural incompatibility saddens us quite a lot time to time. It seems that integration of large number of our people in the society difficult. Most of the people who came to Europe for employment did not have a good level of education and many of them are illiterate either in their own language or in Dutch. Therefore it is not easy for hem to contribute to this society. Let me give you one example of incompatibility. People came from rural areas where adults as well as children can stay out until ten or eleven in the evening because of the life style and social mechanism there. There isn’t such a life style or social mechanism in Amsterdam allowing children to be in the streets until that late. However Turks don’t seem to have realized that because they think that their previous mechanisms exist here. In Amsterdam, they live in small houses or flats, children don’t have their own study rooms and the family watches a TV for long hours obstructing the child to study. There is a system of social welfare system in Holland which motivates people not to work. Thousands of Turks are dependent on this system today. They fill papers each month and get paid and thus see no reason to work. When we look at the research data, we see that the third generation still has language problems. Their Dutch is not up to the standards. Unemployment rate among Turks is three or four times higher then the national average. Turkish children are studying at lower level schools and colleges with bad records of achievement. Only 25 percent of Turkish students finish the school with a diploma, the rest drops out at some stage of their education. All these reasons cause a negative perception of Turks on the part of majority society.”

A number of important events seem to play an important role in the construction of images and their changes. Events in the past and the present can offer justifications for reshaping the images in modern societies. Not only historical incidents and deeply rooted prejudices
but also current tide of events have an impact on the nature of images. Global developments seem to damage Turkish image in Holland. One Turkish professional who presided civil society organizations in Holland for many years confirmed these observations with his following statement during an interview with him:

“Unfortunately, the image of Turkey in Holland is shifting towards a negative direction especially in the last four or five years. One of the main reasons behind this negative shift is the perception of Turks as Muslims. Turks are the dominant Muslim community in Holland. There are even some Turkish Jews and they are also perceived as Muslims by mistake. Hostility towards Muslims has increased since 2001 and this rising anti-Islamism affected the image of Turkey as well. The general attitude of the Dutch towards foreigners became tougher. Especially strict policies towards asylum seekers turned out to be hostility to foreigners. In my view, European legacy which lack cultural diversity in large magnitude also play a role in the emergence of intolerance to others. Moreover there are some economic reasons contributing to this process such as the rise of unemployment.”

As the research findings suggest there are many factors that cause and strengthen negative images regarding Turks in Holland. Negative images partly emerge from historical reasons and stereotypes and partly from the fact failure of Turks to present their social and cultural legacy to the Dutch society effectively. Moreover, the current problems such as educational underachievement, social and cultural isolation in ghetto neighbourhoods and inability to establish communications with the larger society can also be mentioned as sources of negative images. These findings suggest that Turks in Holland need to embark upon an image improvement A number of reasons lie behind the emergence of negative images of Turks and Turkey in the West modern times such as the failure of presenting the legacy of Turkey, its modern achievements and val-
ues which are compatible with modernity. One observer who has been looking at these issues for many years made the following remark during an interview:

“As far as I can see, one of the shortcomings of politicians, intellectuals and the media in Turkey is the fact they did not make sufficient investments in communication, campaigning and promotion which are all important in image making today. Effective presentation and informing the public are extremely valuable and important in international relations under the current circumstances. Turkey could not take sufficient steps which when it was supposed to in the last years from the point of dialogue. This problem stems from Turkey despite the fact that it had a very good potential such as many reforms which it could have presented to the western public and policy makers. Turkey could not manage to sell its products and goods effectively. It may have done so in the political circles at high levels bureaucracy. However, as far as the general public and more specifically social democrat organizations, given their influence on public institutions are concerned, there was not enough communication with this sector of society in Western Europe. In my view, unless a close communication is established with this circle, effective steps for the promotion of Turkey and facilitate Turkey-EU relations can’t be taken.”

One of the original observations of the research on the problem of image centres on initiating a project of “branding” in Europe to present Turkey’s modern achievements to a wide range of circles effectively. As one sociologist who was interviewed for his research suggest, if Turkey becomes a “brand”, this project will prepare grounds and mechanisms for working more effectively to improve the image of Turks and Turkey in a shorter time. This observer also confirms the view that Turkey was not very successful in disseminating its achievements in the fields of economic
progress, political reform and social transformations of the country to the outside world. This researcher urges that achievements of Turkey should be communicated to the world more effectively and more convincingly and shares his following observations:

“Turkey occupies the third rank among the countries that sends students abroad. It follows a policy of reform that is open to change and progress. Reports on Turkey also confirm this view that Turkey is no longer what it was like hundred years ago. Turkey has significant achievements which she can share with the world as an example country which tries to create a synthesis. For example, There are more women professors in Turkish universities than in European ones. Turkish society has a wide vision and dynamic energy with a rationalist approach to the world. However, without a proper image-maker one can’t introduce these things to the world. Turks in Europe and Holland can play a crucial role in the process of promoting Turkey and its achievements. Here, Turks are trying to introduce art and culture of Turkey through organized events. Yet they have a certain status here. They came here as workers. People see that Turks are living in poor neighbourhoods, and the new generation can’t speak proper Dutch. All these facts weaken our influence. However, there are some promising developments raising our hopes. For example, more than six thousand students are at higher schools and universities today.”

Drawing upon his earlier research, the same observer asserts that Turkey should take steps to become as a “brand” to introduce its achievements and disseminate a better image in Europe and beyond. He makes the following suggestions:

“If we want to change our image and improve it, first we have to accept that Turkey has an image problem that we need to address, then we should communicate Turkey’s legacy and achievement to the world effectively. If we want to
change our image, we need to look at how Westerns perceive Turkey and Turkish people. This requires an extensive research. Without understanding the sources and current perception among the European public, it will be futile to expect any changes in our image. This is a common mistake we make. The West started to know us centuries ago. Then they devised policies in their own interests. Turkey needs to know who it is dealing with and analyse the thoughts of its counterparts while presenting its own achievements. Turkey needs a poetical project of promotion and image making. You need to know whom you are addressing to if you want to get a good result, you need to have a mind set up and feelings of people before you launch an image making project. You should learn what worries, frightens and what kind of things may have a better impact on them, what they may like more while designing your campaign. Turkey needs to develop a sense of empathy to understand Westerners. At this point, Turks living in Europe for years such as authors, artists, intellectuals, researchers and civil society workers who developed a closer understanding may benefit Turkey.”

Research findings suggest that Turks in Europe and Holland constitute a potential source of influence on improving Turkey’s image in the West. The following statement of a researcher during an in-depth interview confirms this observation.

“There is prejudice towards Turkey and people’s knowledge of this country is very superficial whatever the reasons and sources of such perceptions may be. In my view, Turkish communities across Europe may have an important role in the elimination of false images and in the promotion of positive ones. This potential should be used more effectively in the coming periods. While making use of this potential however, certain concerns and sensibilities should be taken into account. Domestic political realities of each country should
be carefully studied so that Turks in Europe should not fall in conflict with the interests of the dominant society. We should accept the fact that Turks living in Europe are one of the most effective actors to promote Turkey in Europe and to facilitate its integration with the EU.”

Two processes of image construction or image making are observed as far as the image of Turks in Holland is concerned. Turks themselves create an image about their culture and society on the one hand and the Dutch people construct an image of Turks on the other hand. This means that both internal factors such as attitudes, behaviours and life styles and external factors such as seeing Turks as “others” by the larger society in the construction of a Dutch collective identity play a role in the making of images pertaining Turkish community. In what follows, representative of a Turkish civil society organizations in Holland articulates sources, actors and forces of image making as far as the Turks are concerned:

“We should look at the issue of Turkish image from two standpoints. First, the image that is created by Turks and the second the image which is constructed by the Dutch people. The image created by Turks has both a negative and a positive side. For example, Turkey is constructed as a secular and democratic country by the majority of Turks who defend these ideals and argue that Turkey adopted Western values. This creates a positive image. However, there is a section of the Turkish community who gives the image that they live in a world of isolation closed both to other sections of the Turkish community and to the larger society in Holland. This creates a negative image. Although a small minority gives such an image, it is ascribed to the whole Turkish community.”

As mentioned earlier, in addition to images created by Turks themselves, there is also an image and identity constructed by the Dutch
society and institutions and ascribed to Turks without taking the diversity in the community into consideration. Historical events and reasons play a role in this process as well as the position of Turkish community and debates surrounding Turkey’s EU membership. Representative of a Turkish civil organization made the following observation about the image of Turks among the Dutch and how they develop it during an interview:

“The Dutch people construct images for Turks and these images have two aspects. One aspect of these images is negative and the other aspect is positive. The number of those who are familiar with positive aspects of Turks are a lot but these things are not discussed before the public. It is observed by the Dutch people that, compared to the other ethnic minority communities Turks tend to be keener to adopt modern western values and they try to lead a western life style. However, images rooted in Turkey overshadow these facts. The old image of Turkey in the minds of people is not a very nice because Turks are seen traditionalist, violent against women and committing acts of torture. These exist since the time of Crusaders. Moreover, there are many insulting references and claims for Turks in school textbooks used today. For example, history books claim that Turks killed 1.5 million Armenians. It claims that Turks annihilated a race. Although these claims are unfounded and not based on archival evidence, students who read such claims think that Turks have eliminated a nation. Those who take these classes are growing up with a negative image of Turkey and when they graduate some of them are becoming diplomats, some are journalist and some are politicians. They keep the image of Turkey in their minds. Another historical example of prejudice and construction of negative images is the general perception in the Dutch cultural discourse. That is Turks came up to Vienna and Europeans lived in fear. In fact, some of the Dutch people used to scare their children by saying that if
they “are not disciplined and don’t stop crying, Turk would come”. Many of our Dutch colleagues say the following: “Our mothers used to scare us with the coming of Turks but we see that they are not bad people.” That is how prejudice emerged. However, Turks did not do whatever they were supposed to do enough to eliminate these attitudes.”

Research findings indicate that educational levels and socio-economic status of Turks who migrated and settled in Holland played an important role in the construction of these images. The Dutch people perceive Turkey and Turkish culture by means of making observation on Turks living with them side by side in Holland. A Dutch member of the parliament with Turkish origin who participated in an interview during the research argues that Turks living in Holland don’t represent all Turks but a section of it. Therefore building images based on observations and experiences with Turks living in this country is very misleading. The following statement explores this argument in more detail:

“Turks who came from Turkey and settled here come from a certain section of society. They generally came from farming communities and rural areas. The first generation has such a background who came here just for jobs. Life style of the fist generation and mode of thinking represent only limited number people in Turkish society. There are workers, farmers, doctors, engineers and other professionals with varying degree of education in Turkey. In Holland however, there is a dominantly working class among Turks. If an individual becomes a respectful and successful one and climbs the social ladder, s/he is not very much noticed by the Dutch people. They only notice the working class because their external appearances, life style and modes of behaviour are different and noticeable. They are noticeable because they can’t speak Dutch properly or they get more attention if one of them involves in an illegal action. It should be underlined that
whenever Turks are noticed and get attention it usually contributes to negative images.”

Images are not fixed and static but dynamic and constantly changing constructions from a sociological perspective, which change and transform depending on time and space. Contextual and situational factors, observable events and information conveyed to the public shapes and change images on the one hand and transform stereotypes and contribute to building new images. Although research findings suggest that Turkey and Turks in Europe have largely a negative image, it doesn’t mean that this image is fixed and will not change forever. One member of the Dutch Parliament with Turkish origin argues for example that presentation of Turkey’s legacy more effectively will eliminate negative images to a large extent. It is suggested that a process of institutionalisation should be launched to organize a series of events and implement projects:

“I would like to make the following concrete suggestion for the introduction of Turkey’s modern achievements. Many developed countries have cultural, literary and linguistic institutes in large cities around the world such the Goethe Institute of Germany, the French Institute of France and the British Council of England. Turkey doesn't have an institution that can disseminate its cultural, literary and linguistic heritage. There are many people here in Holland who are interested in Turkish language and culture. For example we have a literary group with which we read and discuss books. We especially read Turkish literature. In my view, Turkish government can lead such activities through a cultural institution. Establishment of Turkish cultural institutions which can organize literary activities, lead extensive research on Turkish culture and disseminate the outcome among the public will destroy current negative images. This is the responsibility of Turkey. Establishment of an institution to
provide information on Turkish culture will deeply influence especially those who are interested in Turkish literature and change their negative images of Turks.”

It seems that there is consensus among the Turks living in Holland about the presentation of cultural and civilizational legacies and modern achievements of Turkey more effectively to the Dutch people. It is expected that such a strategy will facilitate Turkey-EU relations positively and eliminate some of the obstacles before membership.

Defining and Perceiving the Identity of European Union

Turkey’s membership negotiations in the EU with a predominantly Muslim population have triggered numerous discussions focusing on issues of identity. The EU identity is frequently discussed in the European public square, the media and political circles in relation to Turkey’s membership because Turkey is usually portrayed as a county which doesn’t belong to the European family. France seems to have started discussions on the cultural identity of the EU and some other countries followed the suit reducing the identity of Europe to cultural codes only. This approach tends to essentialize EU identity by references to cultural dimensions on the one hand and polarize EU and Turkey on civilizational dimension on the other hand. Our research findings indicate that Turkish civil associations participated in the study don’t describe EU identity on cultural terms. This means that their approach to the EU identity is not one dimensional as seen in the French discourse but multidimensional taking various elements into consideration in perceiving the EU identity. Almost 80 percent of Turkish associations in Holland don’t ascribe a cultural or religious identity to EU but see it as a political and economic union. When EU leaders and politicians emphasize the cultural dimension of EU identity, Turks react to this reductionism in construction of identity which leaves out various processes and dimensions of collective belonging. Turks in Europe
assert that opposition to Turkey’s EU membership on cultural and religious grounds is unacceptable. Therefore Turkish organizations follow meetings and seminars and analyse reports and other publications pertaining identity discussions.

Given the history and cultural heterogeneity of Europe, it seems to be very difficult to define what European identity means. No consensus has been reached on the definition and meaning of European identity until now (Wintle, 1996; Leveau, 2002; Joyce, 2002) The following statement of an interviewee confirms these observations and suggests adopting a multidimensional approach to the EU identity.

“Defining the identity of EU is difficult. The EU has diverse identities within itself. It is at the same a political and economic union based on common interests and a partnership. It doesn’t have a single monolithic identity. Therefore it is not easy to understand why primarily its cultural character is emphasized on and on again. As far as the membership of many other countries is concerned, the issue of cultural identity was not raised at all. Problems surrounding human rights issues were raised concerning the membership of other countries as well. However, for the first time cultural identity of a country, that of Turkey, is raised in EU history. This is a strange approach. However, we should try to understand it because history if full of such mistakes.

According to our survey results, 11.1 percent of Turkish organizations share the views of those Europeans who describe the identity of EU in culturalist terms and see it as a Christian union. Moreover 5.6 percent of Turkish organization define the EU as a security and military union while only a small portion (1.9 percent) see Europe as a colonial power. Turkey’s identity, its cultural and religious dimensions, whether Turkey has a place in the EU despite its differences are all popular topics of in Europe and will remain so throughout the negotiation process. However, the majority of
Turkish civil organizations in Holland perceive the EU as an economic and political union as oppose some Europeans who consider culture as the basic and dominant determinant of the EU identity. A representative of a Turkish civil organization for example articulates the identity of Europe as follows:

“For us, the EU is a union of democratic values. Of course there are some political groups and circles who try to impose their views, ideological preferences and values on this union. As Social Democrats we describe the EU as a union of democratic values and try to explain it to others who have different views on this issue. Christian Democrats in the EU time to time describe it in religious terms. As a Dutch-Turkish civil association we definitely don’t share this description.”

Opponents to Turkey’s membership in the EU not only mention population size and unemployment rate in Turkey but also argue that the majority of Turks are Muslims and this composition contradicts cultural norms of the EU. Public opinion surveys in some EU countries provide findings which suggest that dominant religious faith in Turkey is Islam and this could be an obstacle for membership. Turkish civil associations participated in the study also state that they can observe the existence of such a trend in some EU countries where they come in contact with various sections of the community.

Persistent description of the EU in culturalist terms and constant portrayal of Turkish society’s identity as Muslims is regarded as a problem for membership by some European leaders who influence the perception of EU identity as far as the Turks are concerned. Such discourses also influence Turkish civil associations in Holland to a degree. As a result of culturalist discourses, 37 percent Turkish organizations participated in the research agree with this definition of Europe as a Christian Club although almost half (48,1 percent) doesn’t agree with such a description.
Conclusions

This article has three main conclusions as far the establishment of Turkish civil society organizations and their views on image of Turks/Turkey in Europe and European identity are concerned.

First, this article shows that the importance of civil society institutions became more widespread after 1985 among Turks in Holland. Membership volume of Turkish civil organizations, their areas of activities and relations with other institutions suggest that Turks internalized values of civil society and are increasingly getting integrated in the Dutch society. Interests of Turks in civil society organizations and civil values as well as focus of their political preferences are an indication of social integration.

Second, it is indicated that Turks and Turkey have more negative images than the positive one. This may be attributed to the fact that modern, moderate and constructive perception of religion which emerged in Turkey under the influence of diverse cultural and intellectual factors throughout the centuries is not explained to the Western audience. Modern and democratic image of Turkey did not take root in the minds of Westerners. Failure or insufficient promotion of Turkey’s modern achievements is also a factor which hampers Turkey’s EU membership.

Third, there is an ongoing debate on the nature of EU identity, its sources, elements, factors and determinants which have an impact on the construction EU identity. Although there is no consensus regarding the definition of the EU identity and its dominant characteristics, cultural and religious arguments enter into debate when Turkey is at the centre of discussion. Identity of the European Union became an issue of frequent discussion and debate when full the membership of Turkey emerged as a strong possibility among the public, the media and political circles both in Turkey and Europe. Discussions which are especially led by France and some other EU countries started reducing the EU identity to a cultural dimension. Despite such trends, Turkish civil society organizations
in Europe don’t define EU on the basis of cultural values. This means that emphasis on cultural identity of the EU is not taken seriously by the large sections of Turkish community. They strongly oppose the idea that Turkey should be rejected on the basis of cultural values and differences.

As far as those who have some doubts on Turkey’s membership are concerned, it is observed that these people put emphasis on the Christian roots of European civilization legacy while they argue that the majority of population in Turkey is Muslims and thus should not be part of the EU. However, widely held perception of the EU identity among Turks in Holland emphasises democratic values and economic cooperation rather than religious dimensions. Turks in Holland think that the EU is not a Christian Club as described by a minority group who oppose Turkey’s membership. The widespread perception of the EU identity among Turks in Holland is not based on religious and cultural factors. Turks mostly see EU identity on the grounds of democracy, economic cooperation, political and regional partnership.
Turkish Organizations in Germany and the European Union

*Yusuf Adigüzel*

**Introduction**

Based on an agreement reached in 1961, the immigration of a workforce from Turkey to Germany began. Despite the fact that more workers were not taken after 1973, the size of the Turkish population in Germany has continued to rise through marriages and births. The yearning and desire to “return to one’s family roots” have been replaced by the desire to “settle permanently.” The idea of “permanence” has caused the Turks to establish various organizations and to institute societies with diverse aims; the mosque societies are the best representative of such.

In this article, I would like to examine the approach of certain federations to the European Union. The federations in question are those that have been formed by various Turkish societies established in Germany. These federations are not wealthy in terms of their economic or intellectual capacities. Nevertheless, these federations bring together, under one roof, societies that are very important in reaching out to Turkish society with their very comprehen-
sive social basis and their ability to contact each and every member of the Turkish community.

There are 9 federations. According to the data supplied by them, there are 292,000 registered members and 3,861 societies. In this paper, their approach to the European Union, their definition of Turks living in Germany with regard to identity and the perception of these as to whether Turks should become German (EU) citizens or not will be examined.

The federations that I contacted concerning these issues were: the European Alevite Unions Federation (Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu) (AABF), the European Federation of Atatürkist Thought Societies (Avrupa Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri Federasyonu) (AADDF), the European Ehl-i Beyt Alevite Federation (Avrupa Ehl-i Beyt Alevi Federasyonu) (ABAF), the European Turkish-Islamic Union (Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği) (ATIB), the Religious Affairs Turkish-Islamic Union (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği) (DITIB), the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği) (Süleyman Efendi Community) (IKMB), the Islamic Society National View (İslam Toplumu Milli Görüş) (IGMG), Union of the Turkish-Islamic Culture Associations (Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği) (Nizam-ı Alem -ATB), European Federation of Democratic Nationalist Turkish Societies (Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu) (Turkish Federation-ADÜTDF).

These associations, which primarily satisfy the religious, social and/or cultural needs of Turkish citizens living in Europe, are now making efforts to lead and guide the Turkish society in Germany in all aspects of life, such as economics, education, matters connected with the European Union and citizenship and politics.

According to the data provided by the Federal Republic of Germany’s Office of Statistics in 2002, there were 3.8 million people of Turkish origin living in European countries. 1.3 million of these, 35%, were full Turkish citizens, have adopted the citizenship of the
country in which they are living. Of the Turkish population that has taken out European citizenship, 56%, i.e. 730 thousand people, live in Germany.

The fact that the migration of the workforce was a move directed towards Germany and the fact that in this country the number of people from Turkey was greater than anywhere else in Europe explains why the Turkish organizations were first established in this country. Thus, not only the organizations in Germany, but also the majority of Turkish federations which have member societies in Europe as well as in other countries around the world, are based in Germany, and specifically in the city of Cologne. From among the 9 federations which will be examined here, the centers of 7 federations are found in Cologne and the centers of the other 2 were established in Frankfurt.

**The Rise of Turkish Organizations in Germany**

According to the report, “Integration and Islam”, prepared by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the first Muslim organizations in Germany can be traced back to the 1920’s. In 1922, Muslims from 41 countries established the Berlin Islamic Society. In 1924, they established a mosque in Berlin-Wilmersdorf, and they became one of the first Islamic communities (cemaat). They then established two organizations, the Berlin Islamic Institute, (Berlin İslâm Enstitüsü) (1927) and a branch of the Islamic World Congress, (İslam Dünya Kongresi) (1932), neither of which lasted long. The Islamic World Congress functioned as a federation representing approximately one thousand Muslims within the German Empire. All Islamic institutions stopped their activities during World War II, and many of them were closed down after the war. After the 1950’s, Islamic organizations began to reappear.

Based on information received from the Central Institute of Islamic Archives, the report “Integration and Islam” states that 10% of Muslims living in Germany is affiliated with an organization.
Turkey began regularly sending workers abroad after an agreement co-signed by Turkey and Germany in October 30, 1961. At the end of the same year, 7 thousand workers were sent to Germany. The number of workers sent to Germany reached to 27,500 in 1963; in 1973 this number went up to 615,827. In 2002, the number of people of Turkish origin living in Germany reached 2,637,000. As the immigration of the mass workforce began, and as German society became more closely acquainted with Turks and Turkish culture, the Turks took the first steps to establish organizations in the dormitories where they were staying in an effort to fulfill their common needs and to solve their common problems.

Unlike immigrants from Greece and Italy, Turks could not find existing places of worship. They had to search for places in which to fulfill their religious duties in daily life. Thus they began to establish organizations, especially in order to carry out the Religious Festival prayers and Friday prayers as a community and to create places where they would be able to worship.

TABLE 1: Date of Establishment of the Federations and the number of societies and individual members affiliated with them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federations</th>
<th>Date of Establishment</th>
<th>Number of Societies</th>
<th>Individual Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alevite Unions</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atatürkist Thinking</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHL-I BEYT</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATİB</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİTİB</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Efendi C.</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Görüş</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,137</td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizam-ı Alem</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Federation</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,861</strong></td>
<td><strong>292,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the early years of immigration to Germany, Turkish workers lived in dormitories which were called heim. These were located either within the factories or in nearby areas. According to Nermin
the first generation of immigrant Turks requested that some special rooms be designated for performing prayers in the dormitories. The foundations of the early mosque societies were established in these rooms in the dormitories which had been designated for prayers. These rooms were called “backyard mosques” (Abadan-Unat 2002: 229).

Abdurrahman Şahin, the head of the Darmstad Turkish-Islamic Society, whose father came to Germany in 1963, states their reasons for establishing this society as follows:

“We established this society with the aim of holding together our people who had come from Turkey to this foreign country, and for the education of our children according to our own cultural values. The state sent workers abroad, but then it did not take care of their needs. The Turkish State did not provide support to satisfy the cultural or social needs of our people. They did not send an imam or a religious official. As a result the people living here tried to take care of themselves by establishing societies. Personally, I have been trying my best to educate my children according to the Turkish-Islamic culture. This is why I send my children to Turkey during the holidays. For the same reason I sent my son on pilgrimage when he was 20.”

Harun Cereci, who went to Germany in 1974 intending to pursue education in architecture, considers the issue somewhat different from Abadan. He states that “The Germans designated special areas for the performance of prayer in dormitories for the first groups of Turkish workers. However, these workers who came from rural areas preferred to place tables there and play card games.” According to Cereci, until the 1970’s Germans behaved respectfully to the traditions of the countries from which they had imported the workforce. Similarly, they perceived the first Turkish people coming to Germany as ones who were faithful to their traditions and religions. Cereci says that the first generation of immi-
grant Turkish workers exclaimed “I left the religion, the prayer and the fasting when I crossed the Kapikule.” But later on, “it came up in their minds” and they returned to their usages, customs and religion. Since the 1970’s the Turks have reclaimed their religion in an organized manner. Aslan Erdem, who also belongs to the first generation, speaks in a similar way Cereci: “When we came here, at first we used to pray once in a while. But after the performance of prayer we used to go to the pub to drink alcohol. We used to spend the weekends in the pubs. In fact, we did not have much to do with religion and faith. After the age of forty, we sobered up and learned about the mosque and society.”

Ismail Tetik, who came to Germany in 1972 as a heating engineer after graduating from a trade school in Turkey, considers the emergence of mosques as follows:

“Greek immigrant workers came to Germany with their priests. They opened their churches and started worshipping. We were alone here. We did not have an imam to lead our prayers. Jehovah’s Witnesses came to me. They sent the Bible to my house three times. Although I did not have much to do with religion back then, thank God, I had not lost my ties to Islam. After having earned our livelihood, we gradually became aware of things. We pondered upon the fact that in Turkey we used to hear the sound of the adhan five times a day. Here there is nothing like it. Then we started opening mosques and masjids. If there are now hundreds of mosques, we established them with our own money. Whenever we opened a new mosque, we brought an imam for it from Turkey. The state did not send an imam or anything. We also kept paying the salary of the imams.”

Ali Yüksel, who led the Milli Görüş group between 1995 and 1999, and who came to Germany with the Department of Religious Affairs, summarizes the emergence of Turkish non-governmental organizations in Germany as follows:
“Turkey has totally neglected the workers here while the German Government even checked the state of the teeth and urine of the workers before employing them. They were so careful about the workers; unfortunately Turkey abandoned the people it sent to Germany. They were not educated even briefly about the country to which they were going to be sent. Turkish workers were sent to a country that they did not know anything about; it was as if Turkey wanted to get rid of them. The religion, culture and identity of this country were very different. The offices of the attachés and consulates did not do anything to help these workers. Turkish workers, without any protector, attempted to institute associations to satisfy their social and cultural needs with great difficulty. They established mosques, societies, sport clubs etc. none on which are well-equipped.”

Yüksel says that social and cultural societies began with “tea conversations in dormitories”, while the societies instituted for the building of mosques and masjids and for the administration of religious affairs emerged “because of the difficulties encountered when performing Religious Festival prayers and Friday prayers.” According to Yüksel, “During those years people encountered difficulties in finding proper places to perform Religious Festival prayers. To solve the problem for a while they rented places, such as churches, indoor sport halls and unused factory buildings. Later on, a similar difficulty was encountered for performing Friday prayers. They had to find a place and also let people know about the place and the time of the prayer. The Turks used to call each other for prayer either by visiting or by phoning. Thus, the early societies emerged in order to regulate these things.”

According to Aslan Erdem, who came to Cologne in 1972, “Until 1974, in Cologne there was only the Barbaros Mosque. In 1974, the Süleyman Efendi Community, the Milli Görüş and the Cemalettin Kaplan Community opened up new mosques. Then
there were many mosques and masjids. Now in Cologne and its vicinity, there are at least 60-70 mosques and masjids."

Erdem states, "At first in Cologne there was not many Turks. There was a beerhouse and a grocery store owned by Turks. Even those who did not drink beer used to go to the beerhouse in order to meet each other. We used to perform Friday prayers in the mosques at Barbarosplatz."

Aslan Erdem says that in 1974 he became a member of the Barbaros Mosque. During those years he was working at the Ford factory. With ten other friends, he went to Niemeier, the chief of the unit where they worked, and asked for a place to perform prayers. Immediately a place was designated for them. He further adds: "There were 10-12 thousand Turkish workers at the Ford factory. There were 12 "halle" (large halls). After our request, the Germans built a masjid next to each hall. They arranged all breaks according to prayer times. However, from among thousands of workers, at most only 50 people used to come to prayers."

November 23, 1973 was a crucial date both for Germany and for Turkish immigrants. On this date, the Federal government was to stop taking any more workers, and this rule applied to all parties who were sending workers to Germany. Turkish workers who were planning to save some money and return to Turkey before this time began to think that any future family unification might be impossible after this date; thus they began bringing their wives and children, who had been staying in Turkey, with them to Germany.

As the family unifications increased, the composition of Turkish immigrants underwent a structural change. The Turkish population in Germany soon reached 2 million. Before this time, the Turkish population consisted only of men and displayed a homogeneous structure; since that time it became a heterogeneous structure comprised of different family members, i.e., women, children and the elderly. After family unification, the protection of religious and other cultural elements became especially pressing for the
Turkish workers. Parents felt the need to pay special attention so that their children would not be lost within German society, something which was unfamiliar, and to prevent the loss of cultural values and identities. Thus, wives and children were the most important factors in triggering the establishment of societies.

**Turkish Civil Organizations in Germany**

Early Turkish immigrant organizations started in 1962. At this date The Turkish Workers’ Society of Greater Cologne (Köln ve Çevresi Türk İşçileri Derneği) was established (Karagöz 2001: 20). Along with the workers’ societies, which were established one after another, and which included social activities in their programs, one can also discern that the wind of socialism, which was blowing into Europe, was extremely influential in the early organizations.

In 1962, the “Turk-Danish” (Turkish-Consult) organizations, which were part of the Arbeiterwohlfart (AWO), undertook consultation services for the social and political problems of Turkish workers. These organizations were established to eliminate the gap in independent social services which emerged when workers from various countries started to immigrate to Germany. They were established with funding provided by various ministries of the Federal German government and with funding supplied by the parliaments of principalities to institutions that provided social services, such as the Arbeiterwohlfart, Caritas and Diakoni. Since Caritas and Diakoni were subsidiaries of the Catholic and Protestant churches respectively, in many cases these two embraced the immigrants coming from countries where the majority of population was of the same religious orientation. In contrast, the Arbeiterwohlfart, which had nothing to do with religion and which emerged from the movement of workers, provided social services to Turkish workers who came to Germany from a country in which the majority of the population was Muslim, and to people coming from the former Yugoslavia, some of whose population were Muslims, while the others were atheists.
In 1965, when the Turks performed the first religious festival prayer in the Dom church in Cologne (Karagöz 2001: 21), the Turks who gathered in the Kreuzberg instituted Türkspor, the first football team in Germany.

The community known as the Süleymancilar, but who prefer to call themselves the Süleyman Efendi Community, established the Türk Federasyonu (Türkische Union), the first federation in Germany, in 1967. The name of this institution was replaced with “Islam Kültür Merkezi” (Islamic Cultural Center) in October 15, 1973, and since 1980 it has been called the Islam Kültür Merkezleri Federasyonu (Federation of Islamic Cultural Centers) (VIKZ).

Since 1970, the number of Turkish societies with political wings has visibly increased. Turks living in Germany did not have the right to vote in elections, but they had the right to establish societies, to organize demonstrations and to establish their own media. Some political parties and organizations in Turkey “indeed abused these rights for their own interests.” As an extension of political movements in Turkey, many societies were established in Germany. These societies, which had certain religious or political agendas, were ideologically fed from Turkey. Nermin Abadan-Unat states that particularly after the Memorandum of 12 March 1971, many people from Turkey took shelter in Germany as political defectors and Turkish societies embraced them wholeheartedly (Abadan-Unat 2002: 232).

In 1972 the Councils of Foreigners began to be formed with the intention to solve the problems of foreigners who had come to Germany as guest workers.

The German economy stopped employing any more foreign workers after the petroleum crisis. In November 23, 1973 the Federal Government demanded that guest workers decide “whether they want to return to their homeland or stay in Germany permanently” (Piest 2000: 26). This date formed a turning point for Germany as well as for the immigrants from Turkey. With this decision, people
seriously took up the idea of “staying permanently”. In 1974, when they were given permission to take their family members with them, thinking that this might be more difficult in the future, Turkish workers did so immediately and began bringing their wives and children to Germany. Although after this date new workers rarely came from Turkey, the increase in the Turkish population in Germany kept rising rapidly because of family unifications and new births.

When Germany changed the laws and made new arrangements concerning payments for children in January 31, 1975, the Turkish immigrants brought their children who were living in Turkey to Germany and the number of newborn babies also increased. The number of organizations established by Turks as followed:

The Islamic society Milli Görüş, which is known shortly IGMG, was established as the European Milli Görüş Organization (AMGT) in 1975. In 1978, the European Federation of Democratic Ülkücü Turkish Societies was established. In 1978 The Office of the Federal Government for the Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families, known as Consulting Services for Foreigners, was established to facilitate and encourage the integration of foreigners into German society (ATIB 1992: 20).

After 1980, organizations known as the Union of Turkish Patriots began to appear. In these organizations it was the Alevites who were mainly active. After 1988, the members of this organization broke up (Interview with Koparan). In 1981, the Berlin Islamic Federation was established. Among the founders of this federation were Derduh Marashde of Jordan, Ikram A. Ghouri of Pakistan, and Nail Dura, Eşref Avcı, Yahya Tel, Yakup Taşçı and Zekeriya Bina of Turkey (Çetinkaya 2002: 207). When representatives of 15 mosques came together in 1982, they took the first steps to establish the DITIB as a federation.
In 1983, supporters of Cemalettin Kaplan wanted to distribute a manifesto entitled “Devlete Gidiş Yolu Parti Mi, Tebliğ Mi?” (“Is the Way to Establish the State via a Political Party or by Conveying the Message?”) They held debates with supporters of the Milli Görüş. This movement, known as the “Movement of Barbaros”, was the pioneer of the beginning of the independence of the ICCB, under the leadership of Cemalettin Kaplan from the Milli Görüş, and its development as an independent group. The ICCB was officially instituted in 1985 and Cemalettin Kaplan was elected as the emir (leader) of the movement (Atacan 1993: 39).

In 1983, the law of the Encouragement to Return was passed. In this law, those who left Germany, agreeing never to return, were given 10,500 DM on certain conditions, in addition to their insurance premiums. On the conditions provided by this law, 360,000 Turkish citizens returned, 120,000 of them with insurance.

The DITIB was legally established on July 5, 1984, made official on February 25, 1985, and started operating on May 12, 1985, when a ceremony in the Sporthalle in Cologne was organized which was attended by 20,000 people. In 1986, the German Federal Government officially acknowledged Islam as a religion. But since they could not find any interlocutors to teach courses concerning the Islamic religion, the Islamic Council of Germany (ISLAMRAT der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) was established under the leadership of the Milli Görüş Organizations (Ekin 2000: 13).

A group that declared independence from the Turkish Federation, the European Turkish-Islamic Union (Avrupa Türk İslam Birliği) (ATIB), was established in 1987 (ATIB 11th Major Congregation, Report of Activities, 1999: 6).

In 1991 in Mainz Alevite societies gathered and became united under the European Alevite Unions Federation (Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu) (AABF) in order to “claim the rights of Alevite people, to support Alevism and to sponsor Alevite people”.

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In 1994, the Nizam-i Alem Federation was established in Berlin. This federation changed its official name to the Union of Turkish-Islamic Culture Associations (Avrupa Türk Kültür Dernekleri Birliği ATB) in its general meeting in 2002 (Interview with Yıldırım). In 1994, the Atatürkist Thought Society was established in Cologne (Interview with Atilgan). In 1994, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany was established (Zentralrats der Muslime in Deutschland ZMD) (Ekin 2000: 35). In 1994, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany was established by bringing together 17 societies that were dedicated to administration of religious affairs. These societies belonged to groups from different national origins (Ekin 2000: 13).

Functions of Turkish Organizations

During the decade that stretched from 1970 to 1980, the idea that “there was no return, their future was in Europe” was firmly established in the minds of Muslim immigrants. With this idea, the immigrants began to organize in order to protect their identity. They started establishing masjids and Islamic organizations that could perform religious rituals, educate their children and carry out other various activities (Ramadan 1999: 20).

Parallel with the increase in family unifications that took place, particularly after 1973, the number of Turkish non-governmental organizations also increased and became effective for Turks and Muslims to influence public opinion. These centers were at first used as meeting places for immigrants where they were able to discuss their problems and seek the help of others. Later on, these centers became places where people attended courses and seminars that were helping people protect their culture and facilitate adaptation to the society in which they lived, although these courses and seminars were not always systematic.

Understanding that with individual efforts it was impossible to secure a place within the country or the society and that it was
not possible to benefit from job opportunities or to preserve cultural identities, the immigrant Turks opted for supporting each other as a community through such organizations. The result was that the immigrants became organized through non-governmental organizations such as societies, sport clubs, and so on.

Those who frequently visit the Turkish societies and spend much time there, in particular, the first generation, discuss problems concerning Turkey. They feel themselves to be at home in these societies. Those who feel excluded from German social values—to which they are foreigners - the German language being the most important of these, and German social life, frequently visit Turkish societies in which they feel at home and comfortable. It is as if they are seeking refuge in such places, running away from the German society from which they feel excluded. The first generation of Turks mostly spends their time in places that are attached to the mosque societies, drinking tea and coffee, and speaking of Turkey, their memories and expectations.

Non-governmental organizations that serve the immigrants are buffer institutions that were established according to the understanding of the lifestyle, value system and behavioral patterns of traditional individuals, the majority of whom came from rural areas in Turkey.

These institutions, on the one hand, make it possible for the members to participate in German society effectively and to have a say in social affairs. They also allow for the cultural values be passed on to the younger generations and to be kept alive.

When the duality of “us” (the immigrant Turks) and the “others” (Germans) is presented and compared, the non-governmental organizations which represent the “us” make the “us” stronger as far as relations with the “other” are concerned. In addition to the power drawn from being organized, activities that enhance the quality of life and the seminars and courses offered by these institutions to educate their members provide the latter with confidence and strength.
Immigrants develop mechanisms to protect their selfhood, personality and identity against any oppression they might be subjected to by the modern German social order. Individuals stop acting according to their emotions and begin to act according to behavioral patterns that have been formed in accordance with certain criteria provided by the intellect. Thus, there emerges a new form of socialization. At this point, Turkish non-governmental organizations help the individuals to understand the values of modern society and its patterns of behavior so that they are able to compare these values to their own values, examine them and decide whether to accept or reject them.

According to Wolfgang Heckmann, “kinship” is quite important “in transmitting relations and their solutions.” Additionally, one may take into account “societies, religious communities, political organizations, informal social relations, meeting places, authentic ethnic media and finally an ethnic economy” (Tılıç 1996: 566) as additional building blocks. Immigrants abandon their values and life and behavior patterns, which have been trampled in an environment of distrust created by the immigration. When it becomes impossible to solve their spiritual-cultural problems in the ways they used to follow, the immigrants feel a need to create new institutions. These new institutions have emerged as various Turkish non-governmental organizations. After the first generation of Turks, whose behavior in Turkey was primarily directed by their emotions and who lived in networks of informal relations, joined German society they had to live in a network of formal relations. Consequently, they became individuals that contest, consume more, and who are strongly interested in material revenues. For the Turkish immigrants who desire to benefit more from material possibilities, the non-governmental organizations have provided strength and support.

Because of the fact that immigrant Turks move together under the leadership of non-governmental organizations, they have
become a political power and this has provided them with the ability to bargain on political issues. Now Turks who are living in Germany have representatives in the German parliament. Even if they do not have an opportunity to send a representative to the parliament, they are aware of the fact that in either general or local elections they can support people who will pay attention to their problems. The Turkish population numbers 2.5 million, making up 29% of the foreign population in Germany and also constituting 9% of the entire German population. This large number of people constitutes an important section of society that cannot be neglected by any political party. In particular, the fact that the percentage of votes received by various competing parties in the 2002 elections was very close to one another made the Turkish vote very important. By acting collectively, the Turkish voters were able to benefit from this situation.

The Approach of Turkish Federations to the European Union

I have examined how the Turkish Federations in Europe identify the Turks who are living in Europe, what they think about the membership of Turkey to EU, and what they think about whether Turks should adopt German citizenship through individual interviews with senior officers in the Turkish Federations in Europe.

TABLE 2: Identification of Turks Living in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federations</th>
<th>Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alevite Unions (AABF)</td>
<td>Alevite Turks and Sunnite Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atatürkist Thinking (AADDF)</td>
<td>Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehl-i Beyt (ABAF)</td>
<td>European Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATİB</td>
<td>European Turkish Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİTİB</td>
<td>Turkish Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Efendi C. (IKMB)</td>
<td>Turkish Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Görüş (IGMG)</td>
<td>European Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizam-ı Alem (ATB)</td>
<td>West European Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Federation (ADÜTDF)</td>
<td>European Turks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows, federations other than that of the Milli Görüş and the Ehl-i Beyt Alevites underline “Turkish ethnicity” in their
definition of identity. These two federations, however, describe their identity as “European Muslims.”

“Being European” is underlined in definitions of identity provided by administrators of the following Federations: Ehl-i Beyt, ATIB, Milli Görüş, Nizam-i Alem and the Turkish Federation.

“Being Muslim” is a definition of identity from administrators of the following federations: Ehl-i Beyt, ATIB, DITIB, Süleyman Efendi Community, Milli Görüş and Nizam-i Alem.

One comes across the following slogan on the web site of The Platform of European Turks, which was established with the aim of contributing to the process of Turkey’s entrance into the EU and carrying out lobbying activities in this regard: “Our names are different, but our future is the same. We are new Germans”.

Ozan Ceyhun, who was a member of Turkey-EU joint Committee of Parliamentarians with a Turkish ethnic origin, left the Turkey in 1980 for political reasons and became a German citizen in 1992. He is one of 7 parliamentarians who was elected into the German Parliament in the 1998 elections from The Green Party. In an interview published in a newspaper in Germany, Ceyhun states:

“I am a German citizen of Adana. To put it more exactly, I am a European from Adana. I went abroad, and lived “one year, expecting to return to Turkey.” After that, I decided to be a German from Adana, like an American from Sicily. I had to get rid of fantasies like “one day I will go back; my true homeland is Turkey,” and return to the real world.”

The report, “Avrupa Türkleri: Türkiye ve AB İlişkilerinde Köprü mü, Engel mi?” (“European Turks: Are they a Bridge for the Relations between Turkey and EU or a Barrier?”), printed by Istanbul Bilgi University, Center for Immigration Researches, confirms the following result. 50% of Turks living in Germany answered the question “do you feel that you are a Turk or a
European?” by saying, “I am first a Turk and then a European.” Those who only identified with the “Turkish” identity made up 36%.

TABLE 3: Approaches to Turkey’s Membership of EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alevite Unions (AABF)</td>
<td>Totally supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atatürkist Thinking (AADDF)</td>
<td>Totally supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehl-i Beyt (ABAF)</td>
<td>Supports, but nevertheless maintains that Turkey should not be submissive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATIB</td>
<td>Does not believe that Turkey will be given membership. No clear idea/no support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DITIB</td>
<td>Totally supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Efendi C. (IKMB)</td>
<td>Supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Görüş (IGMG)</td>
<td>Totally supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizam-ı Alem (ATB)</td>
<td>Does not believe that Turkey will be given membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Federation (ADÜTDF)</td>
<td>Supports, nevertheless maintains that Turkey should not be submissive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the important factors that brings together the Turkish federations in general is the EU. To a great extent federations are able to act together on this issue. All federations, with the exception of ATIB and Nizam-ı Alem, support Turkey’s membership to the EU. Although these two federations do not publicly support it, they are not actively opposed to it either.

Considering the approach of federations to the EU in general terms, nationalist-oriented organizations do not outright support the EU, but they do not declare this support publicly either. The Ehl-i Beyt and Turkish Federation support membership, but they maintain that Turkey should not be submissive in the cause of the EU.

Another noteworthy issue is that the position of the Saadet Party and the position of the Milli Görüş in Europe, which is an extension of Saadet Party, are quite different with regard to the EU. Y. Çelik Karahan, the president of the European Islamic Society Milli Görüş, states that as a society they support Turkey’s member-
ship to the EU, and they inform their members on this issue. In Turkey, however, the Saadet Party, which is considered to have the same political position, included in its party manifesto at the last general assembly of the party that it is opposed to membership to the EU.

By the end of 2002, 730,000 Turks living in Germany became European citizens. From among 3.8 million Turks who live within the borders of the EU 33.7% adopted citizenship of the country in which they were living. The number of Turks who became EU citizens is more than 1.3 million (TAM, February 2004: 8).

Again, according to the report, “Avrupa Türkleri: Türkiye ve AB İlişkilerinde Köprü mü, Engel mi?” (European Turks: A Bridge or a Barrier to Relations between Turkey and the EU?) 40% of Turks who were living in Germany, who may be considered to be “bridges”, supported Turkey’s membership to EU. According to Ayhan Kaya, who is one of the authors of the report, these groups which are at the extremes of nationalism, Islamism and laicism, do not support Turkey’s membership to the EU.

TABLE 4: Opinions of Turks Regarding the Adoption of German Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Citizenship Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alevite Unions (AABF)</td>
<td>Totally supports, and informs their members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atatürkist Thinking (AADDUF)</td>
<td>Supports on the condition that they should not loose Turkish citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehl-i Beyt (ABAF)</td>
<td>Supports, although defending dual citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATİB</td>
<td>Supports, on the condition that they should not loose Turkish citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİTİB</td>
<td>Supports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Efendi C. (IKMB)</td>
<td>Supports, although defending dual citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milli Görüş (IGMG)</td>
<td>Supports totally, and informs their members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizam-ı Alem (ATB)</td>
<td>Neutral, supports dual citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Federation (ADÜTDF)</td>
<td>Supports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
None of the federations reject adoption of German citizenship. However, Atatürkist Thought, Ehl-i Beyt, ATIB, the Süleyman Efendi Community and Nizam-ı Alem federations say that “if people adopt German citizenship, they must also keep their Turkish citizenship active,” i.e., they say that it is proper to have dual citizenship.

The Milli Görüş is the most actively working federation towards the adoption of EU citizenship. It informs its members about the adoption of German citizenship and it encourages them to do so. In the same manner, the Ehl-i Beyt Alevite Federation also advises its members to adopt German citizenship.

According to the data provided by TAM, 80% of those who adopt German citizenship are under 35 years (TAM, 9 January, 2002). This shows that the majority of those who have adopted German citizenship belong to the second generation. The number of those who adopt German citizenship is 730,000.

Conclusions

As a country Turkey has been quite late to devise policies concerning the workers it sent abroad and the countries those workers were sent to. While the immigration of the workforce to Germany began in 1961, Turkey officially began to take care of the social, cultural and religious needs of these people only after 1985. The most visible aspect of this tendency in the Turkish state policy is that the organizations of the DITIB in Europe began at this date.

One of the essential causes of Turkey’s being so late in this regard is that they did not think that Turkish workers would remain permanently in the new country. Both Germans and Turks considered the immigrant workers to be guests, and called them “guest-workers/gastarbeiteurs.” But when Germany stopped taking more workers into Germany in 1973, the idea of staying permanently began firmly established. An institutional service provided by the Turkish state began ten years after this date. During the past 25
years, people of Turkish origin have tried to satisfy their social, religious and cultural needs through non-governmental organizations.

As, in one part of their minds, people of Turkish origin constantly entertained the idea of “going back”, for three decades they were unable to settle either in Germany or in Turkey. They could not make a choice regarding their true homeland. The first generation of Turks who went to Germany still strongly reject the adoption of German citizenship because of a fear of losing their Turkish citizenship. This confusion is applicable not only to citizens, but also to official state policies. Recently, Turkey devised a policy that encouraged Turkish workers in Europe to adopt the citizenship of the countries in which they live. This decision—which is certainly better than remaining without any decision—will facilitate the integration, a matter that is frequently discussed. It also makes possible a stronger Turkish lobby in the EU with the help of EU citizens of Turkish origin.

The strongest thesis defended by those who oppose Turkey’s membership to the EU is that “a Muslim country cannot be a member of the Union, since the entire population of the Union is Christian.” Those who defend this thesis maintain that it is difficult for Muslims and Christians to live together. Leaving political and emotional approaches aside, there is a good example in the history of the Ottoman Empire, as well as in contemporary Europe, that shows that Muslims and Christians can live together peacefully. Most importantly, one should not ignore the fact that currently among the members of the EU there are 15 millions Muslims, 4 million of them being people from Turkey. It is clear that Muslims living in Europe are ready to live together in harmony and are keen for integration, and that the problems Muslims encounter from the dominant culture do not only consist of problems of belief or religion.

People of Turkish origin—the descendants of the Ottomans, a multinational state which only ceased to exist a few generations
ago—lived for centuries peacefully on land that is today the territory of 40 states. In the memory of Turkey there is an understanding, tolerance and culture of living together. Although daily life occasionally provokes people of Turkish origin, they have features of hospitality, understanding, and tolerance in their genes and can make themselves accepted as Muslims in the EU. If the Turkish Republic as a state joins the EU fears of a Muslim-Christian cultural conflict at the individual level are fearless.

The most efficient factor that determines the image of Turks and Turkey in EU countries are the people from Turkey who are living in these countries. The native population of EU countries forms the images of Turks, Turkey and the people from Turkey, and this is based on their residence, their attitude and behavior in daily life, their approach to work and to their employers, their positions regarding democracy, human rights, and the rights of women and children. How can a German who is disturbed by his Turkish neighbor everyday, seeing this Turkish neighbor polluting the streets he walks along, a German who suffers injustice at the hands of a Turkish neighbor, have a positive idea about Turks? Even if you suggest to this German citizen that “People in Turkey are quite different from this guy; such men are quite rare among Turks,” to what extent would that be effective? The importance of organizations which connect with the grassroots becomes greater in such contexts, as such organizations teach our people abroad how they should behave in situations that are determined by the dominant culture and help people by providing guidance for their life in harmony with others. Thus, societies are extremely important in the socialization of people.

Throughout the EU the proportion of those who want Turkey as a member state is 35%, while those who do not want Turkey in is 45%. The rest consists of people who have not yet made up their minds (Ülgen 2005: 110). I should add that the decision as to whether Turkey is accepted into the EU as a member or not shall be
made not by the citizens of European countries but by the governments and politicians of respective countries. However, it is unrealistic to expect that governments and politicians will ignore the opinions of the citizens of their countries. (For example, the French government made a change in the constitution to take an extension of the EU to referendum). What is important here is that the government authorities of the Turkish Republic, those who are in charge of governing the EU negotiation process, should convince government and state officers in the EU member countries by carrying out the required lobbying and information providing activities. Again, the powerful NGO’s in European countries have a great responsibility in this regard. As can be seen in the former elections in Germany and the latest elections in Italy, a tiny proportion of votes may cause a change in the political spectrum and government. Thus, the political weight of Turks who are EU citizens in the countries where they live may greatly contribute to lobbying activities.

There is a concern that if Turkey enters the EU as member-state there will be heavy immigration into EU countries from Turkey. This fear is groundless. When Spain and Portugal became EU members their citizens who had gone to EU countries before membership returned to their homeland. In fact, in order for a country to become a member of EU, it must meet certain economic, political and social standards. When the standards in question are met in Turkey, there will be no reason for Turks to head towards EU countries. It is understood that the main reason why retired Turks prefer to live in EU countries is the difference in healthcare between Turkey and EU countries. If Turkey meets the social security standards of EU countries, the majority of Turkish citizens living in the EU will prefer to live in their country.

People of Turkish origin who live in Europe are reflections of Turkey. In the eyes of the EU countries, they represent the Turks. Europeans form images of Turkey and Turkish people by looking
at them. In order to have a good image in the eyes of Europeans, those societies, which address the grassroots, must orient the people affiliated with them well.

One of the policies that Turkey must pursue in the EU negotiation process is the education of the leaders of the administrations of the Turkish federations and non-governmental organizations. These latter should be oriented about the formation of a positive image of Turkey.

NOTES
1 The report of Integration and Islam prepared by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the response, with the reference number 14/2301, to the "Great Inquiry Request" which contained 135 questions. The latter was made during the 14th sitting of the German government, on December 14, 1999, by Dr. Jürgen Rütters, Erwin Maschewski, Wolfgang Zeitlmann and 43 other members of the Parliament on behalf of Christian Unionists (CDU/CSU) group in the parliament.
2 www.vikz.de
3 http://www.diyanet.org/tr/kurulusteskilatyapisi/
4 Interview with Koparan.
5 http://www.ab.tgd.de
6 Güncel Haber, no: 10, June 2000.
7 Interview with Karahan.
Introduction

Turkey has a long and complex relationship with the rest of Europe. Although Turkey has been struggling to enter the European Union (EU) for 42 years, the total population of Turkish people living in the EU is larger than the population of many EU countries (Enneli, Modood and Bradley, 2005). According to the Turkish sources officially three million (unofficially five million) Turkish people live in various countries in the EU (Uras, 2002). Turkish speaking population in Britain is not homogenous. It consists of three distinct groups: Turkish-Cypriots, Turks from mainland Turkey and Turkish-speaking Kurds (Issa, 2005).

The ethnic minority population of Britain is 4.6 million, which forms 7.9 per cent of the population according to the 2001 census (National Statistics Online, 2006). Turkish and Turkish Cypriots are categorised under ‘the other’ category among other minority ethnic groups of, which they make up four per cent of Britain’s total minority ethnic population, and 0.2 per cent of Britain’s total pop-
ulation (National Statistics Online, 2006). Based on the 2001 census in Britain 47,149 people stated that they were of Turkish ethnicity and 13,556 that they were Turkish Cypriots, reportedly. It is difficult to gather accurate and comprehensive statistical data about Turkish people living in Britain as many people tick the option of 'white other' in ethnicity section of forms. However, according to estimations, there are 80,000 Turkish people living in Britain of whom 60,000 live in London (Enneli, Modood and Bradley, 2005). Additionally, it is estimated that there are 120,000 Turkish Cypriots living in Britain (Onal, 2003). The exact number of Turkish Cypriots, who live in Britain, is unknown, as no distinction was made between Greek and Turkish Cypriots initially at the census, and later on they were subsumed under the categories of Turkish speaking and other minorities (Mehmet Ali, 1989).

There are small Turkish communities scattered around the UK, for example in Manchester, Edinburgh, and the Midlands, but the majority live in or around London (Issa, 2005). The initial Cypriot communities were established around Camden, Finsbury Park, Angel, Islington, Stoke Newington, Deptford and Camberwell in London. Currently, most Turkish Cypriots live in Haringey, Enfield and other outer London boroughs. The Turkish Cypriot community is considered to be well-integrated with the economic life in London. They are involved in a number of businesses including kebab shops, supermarkets, bakeries, boutiques, video shops, estate agencies, insurance agencies, dry cleaners, cafes and restaurants (Issa, 2004). In addition to these, they established large successful businesses in import and export and the clothing industry. In this paper, we look at one of these traditional sectors (restaurants) in which Turkish Cypriots operate in large numbers and another sector which remains the preserve of the native British (legal services). Bringing two sectors at each end of the skills spectrum, we hope to reveal the interplay between skill, ethnicity, and business start up in a developed European economy.
This article is concerned with the business set up reasons of Turkish Cypriots in Britain, mainly in London, highlighting the multiple impact of on their business set up reasons and choices in the restaurant and legal sectors. We examine four key reasons that account for the experiences of Turkish Cypriots in founding businesses in Britain. The first three reasons are examined, drawing on a thematic review of the extant literature, whilst the fourth reason is informed by a field study. First, we explain the significance of history in shaping the experiences of Turkish Cypriots’ entry into business sectors in Britain. Second, migration is explored in terms of its impact on choices and constraints of business formation for the Turkish Cypriots in Britain. Third, we reveal how intergenerational change marks their business set up patterns and routes. Fourth, we examine the significance of lived experience through a field study conducted among Turkish Cypriot solicitors and restaurateurs in Britain (İnal, 2007). Finally, the article draws out key conclusions reflecting on business set up patterns of Turkish Cypriot community in Britain.

**Significance of history: Origins of Turkish Cypriots in Britain**

Although the island of Cyprus was hired to Britain by the Ottoman Empire in 1878 (Erim, 1975) in return for a guarantee to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression, the sovereignty of the island was supposed to stay on paper with the Ottoman Empire (Erim, 1975). However, later in 1914, Britain unilaterally annexed the island when the Ottoman Empire entered into First World War against Britain. Although this annexation was not recognised at that time, with the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1925, Turkey recognised Britain’s 1914 annexation decision. Consequently, Cyprus was declared a British Colony in 1925 (Persianis, 2003: 355). The Treaty of Lausanne gave the option to Turkish Cypriots to choose either Turkish or British citizenship. This was the beginning of the Turkish Cypriot interest and immigration to Britain (Erim, 1975), and Turkey.
The identification of small group of Cypriot migrants in Britain dates from the late 1920s (Küçükcan, 1999, 2004; Mehmet Ali, 2001). However, early migrants from Cyprus were entirely Greek Cypriots (Oakley, 1987). There was a significant Turkish Cypriot migration from the island between 1950 and 1974 in which Britain was one of the destinations (Alicik, 1997: 23; Manisali, 2000: 10). Nowadays Turkish Cypriot migration to Britain continues, but with a fluctuating pace. The main reasons for migration to Britain were pursuit of economic wellbeing and security (Oakley, 1970; Ladbury, 1984; Basu and Altnay, 2000). Turkish Cypriots migrated to Britain for better financial prospects and to save themselves from inter communal unrest and terrorist actions which started in Cyprus in 1955 and continues now in different forms (Issa, 2004).

Under the terms of the Lausanne Agreement of 1923, the Turkish Cypriots who chose Turkish citizenship began to immigrate to Turkey. This emigration took many years. As a result of this, in 2000, there were 253,000 Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey, 120,000 in Great Britain, 40,000 in Australia and 17,000 in the United States and Canada (Manisali, 2000: 10). When Cyprus was under British rule, a mass immigration has taken place, Cypriots seeking to take advantage of employment opportunities, migrated to Britain in the late 1950s and the early 1960s (Oakley, 1979: 15). Turkish Cypriots choose Britain due to their status as colonial subjects of the British Empire. Historical connections with Turkey and Britain have shaped Turkish Cypriots choices of migration. Supply and demand for labour has allowed them initially to take up jobs in the restaurant sector, which had relatively porous boundaries for business set up.

Significance of the migration experience: Turkish Cypriots’ migration experiences to Britain

Various sources and researchers have presented different historical milestones for Turkish Cypriot migration to Britain (Issa, 2004;
Similarly, their reasons for migration to Britain have also been debated (Basu and Altınay 2000; 2002, Berk, 1972; King and Bridal, 1982; Oakley, 1970; 1979). The migration of Cypriots to Britain may be seen as part of the wider movement of immigration from the New Commonwealth countries to Britain that has occurred during the post-war period (Oakley 1979: 14). As stated by Oakley (1979), the roots of the migration must be seen in the island’s colonial past. The lack of separate data on Turkish Cypriot migration in some studies is due to the assumed similarity between migration experiences of Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Issa, 2004; Oakley, 1979).

Cypriot migration to Britain started to increase in the 1940s and increased steadily through the 1950s to a peak in 1960 (Oakley, 1970). The number of Cypriots increased to 10,343 by 1951 (Mehmet Ali, 2001). This was due to both Turkish and Greek Cypriots migrating to Britain. According to Ladbury (1984), Turkish Cypriots started migrating to Britain in larger number in 1955. Another reason for the striking increase in migration in the late 1950s is directly related to the active recruitment of labour by the British government and the conflict between the communities in Cyprus promoted by colonial politics of divide and rule (Mehmet Ali, 2001; Robins and Aksoy, 2001). From 1955 until the enactment of the 1962 Immigration Act, approximately 12,000 Turkish Cypriots migrated to Britain, the majority arriving in 1960 and 1961 (Ladbury, 1984: 107). A large number of Cypriots came to Britain in the 1960s after the island became independent. Many Turkish Cypriot people in particular had been loyal to the colonial administration, serving as officers, policemen, commandos, and auxiliary policemen and were rewarded with British passports, paid passage to Britain and a lump sum to settle. The 1962 and 1968 Commonwealth Immigration legislation was a further drive for families to settle in Britain. As a result of the 1974 War in Cyprus there had been mass population exchanges between north and south of the island and some of these resettled people migrated to
Britain. Since 1974, some 40,000 to 50,000 people are estimated to have left the island (Mehmet Ali, 2001).

Based on another source, 1966 and 1974 Statistical Abstracts, 12,223 Turkish Cypriots migrated to Britain between 1955 and 1974 (Basu and Altınay, 2000). The actual inflow of migrants is believed to be much greater, since by 1980 the Turkish Cypriot population in Britain was estimated 40,000 (Bhatti, 1981). It has substantially increased since then to 130,000 in 1999 (Basu and Altınay, 2000).

After the 1974 war in Cyprus, the consequent partition of the island into Greek and Turkish controlled areas, Turkish Cypriots did not rush back to rebuild businesses left by Greeks as they were encouraged to do by the Turkish Cypriot Administration (Ladbury, 1979: 57). The economic security achieved in Britain was weighted against the possibly lucrative – but nonetheless uncertain-political and economic situation in Cyprus (Ladbury, 1979). Therefore, following the 1974 war between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities there was a surge of migration of refugees from North Cyprus to Britain (Issa, 2004).

Cypriots migrated to Britain primarily for economic reasons; they hoped to obtain stable jobs and better wages, and improve their standards of living (Ladbury, 1979; Oakley, 1970; Alicik, 1997). Ladbury (1979) stated that Turkish Cypriots came to Britain due to economic reasons, having accepted as normal a standard of living which was impossible to achieve in Cyprus, even if employment could be found which paid an equivalent wage to that earned in Britain. This was also confirmed with a detailed study conducted by Oakley (1972: 22, 144) who found that Turkish Cypriots migrated principally for economic reasons to improve their financial prospects. Following independence in 1960, there was lack of economic opportunities in Cyprus. At that time, 64 per cent of the island’s population were villagers, and population growth had outstripped the country’s capacity to produce jobs and reduced the desired standard of living (Oakley, 1971: 130).
The people who tended to migrate were the service and white collar workers, those who had received a primary education but who came from rural areas where employment opportunities, other than farming were absent (Oakley, 1972). According to other researchers such as Solomos and Woodhams (1995: 233) the Cypriot migrant was presented as a young single male, unskilled, poorly educated, of suspect morality and prone to petty crime. In the beginning only young adult men under the age of 30 would migrate, find a job and accommodation and then send money to family members. As the Cypriot community took root in later years whole families came, many joined relatives already in Britain. In this way networks of kinsfolk and even whole section of villages reconstructed themselves in Britain over a period of time. In addition old people migrated too, joining children already settled in Britain. In the meantime in Britain there was a demand for labour and those in Cyprus were without question encouraged by reports received from relatives in London about employment prospects there.

In addition to economic reasons of migration, Turkish Cypriots also migrated from Cyprus largely as a consequence of the bitter ‘inter communal’ conflicts of the 1950s and 1960, and then political and economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s, following the partition of the island. Britain was their favoured destination because, as former colonial subjects, they had, or felt that had, a ‘special’ historical relationship within the colonial heartland (Robins and Aksoy, 2001). Therefore, most Cypriot migration has been to Britain because of the previous colonial link and because many Cypriots speak some English and this could help their integration (King and Bridal, 1982). After the Second World War, Britain derived benefit from full employment and immigrants were actively sought mainly from the Commonwealth countries in order to fill vacant jobs in certain sectors of the labour market. In 1954, the system of affidavits was lifted, which meant that a potential migrant no longer needed a guarantor in Britain to find him or her accommodation and employment.
The roots of the migration to Britain must be seen in the island’s colonial past (Oakley, 1979). Cypriot and hence Turkish Cypriot migration to Britain started to increase during the 1940s. People who have migrated to Britain in different time periods have settled mainly in London, but also in other cities outside London. Ladbury (1979; 1984) on the basis of the 1971 Census states that, the areas of most concentrated Turkish Cypriot settlement in North London was Haringey, Newington Green and Stoke Newington, Islington and Elephant and Castle, New Cross and Peckham, in South London. Also, a small community established in Birmingham, Manchester and home counties around London (Alicik, 1997; Canefe, 2002; Issa, 2005). Robins and Aksoy (2001) explained that the population in Britain makes up the greatest concentration of Turkish Cypriots outside North Cyprus; nevertheless it remains a small cultural grouping in the broad contexts of migrant populations of the country. However, Turkish Cypriot migrants have managed to establish themselves successfully in this new urban location, coming from what were predominantly rural and village backgrounds (Sonyel, 1988). During the 1980s the Turkish Cypriot population became more scattered in terms of its settlement pattern (Canefe, 2002: 66). They have moved to suburban areas where housing was better, and the dispersion was also visible in terms of organisational, communication and kin-based networks.

Although there are cultural and entertainment centres across north London that cater for a Turkish Cypriot clientele, at present there is no single residential or business district in London that can be recognized as primarily Turkish Cypriot (Canefe, 2002). Whilst migration is a key influence on business set up patterns of Turkish Cypriots in Britain, Turkish Cypriots’ settlement in Britain is now widely dispersed. The dispersed nature of Turkish Cypriot settlement in London means that Turkish Cypriots have access to both the mainstream economic spaces in the city and the ethnic enclaves which house more recent migrants from Turkey and Cyprus. One
of the marked attributes of Turkish Cypriots in Britain as a minority ethnic group has been their assimilation into mainstream and formal sectors of work. This is due to their longer history of migration, which dates back now almost three generations.

**Significance of generational change: Three generations of Turkish Cypriots in Britain**

In areas where Turkish or Greek Cypriots have settled in considerable numbers, they tend to be a visible minority not because of their skin colour or style of dress; in these respects they look like English, but on account of their business activities (Ladbury, 1984). A relatively large proportion of Cyprus born working men were self employed, 20 per cent in 1966 (Oakley, 1970: 100). Later on, Osman (1999) stated that around 10 to 15 per cent of Turkish Cypriots were self employed, and attributed their choice of self employment decision to the nature of work they are engaged in. Cypriot businesses set up in the diaspora flourished in sectors like tailoring, dressmaking, catering such as restaurant and cafes including kebab houses, wholesale, retail, groceries, hairdressing, shoemaking, mini-cabbing, dry cleaners and the like (Ladbury, 1979; King and Bridal, 1982). Furthermore, the Cypriot community established a wide network of relations and contacts that made it possible for new immigrants to find a safe entry to the job market in a short time. By the end of the late 1970s, both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities had already established themselves in Britain and carved their own niches in the job market (Ladbury, 1979; King and Bridal, 1982). The work experience, expectations and socio-economic aspirations of the migrants themselves channel them towards certain types of work within the range of opportunities open to them while defining other types as less appropriate or agreeable.

Cypriots were highly involved in business ownership in the service sector, especially the catering business. This was also confirmed by Osman (1999), who argued that Turkish Cypriots as one
of the Turkish speaking communities worked in catering, clothing trade and manual jobs initially then went on to setting up their own businesses. In the service sector it was usually a case of providing services for the immediate Cypriot community and, at the same time, trying to create a demand for the service amongst the non-Cypriot general public (Ladbury, 1984). Interestingly, the involvement in catering has no direct roots in Cypriot culture. It is instead a response to the opportunities available in Inner London in the post war period. These family businesses do lend themselves, however, to Cypriot enterprise, since the Cypriots themselves are a strong family-centred people and new arrivals could simply be absorbed in the business structure which corresponds with the kin network (King and Bridal, 1982: 99). Many Cypriots had aspirations of owning their own businesses, and the catering trade is a relatively easy sphere to break into as an entrepreneur (King and Bridal, 1982). Cypriots and therefore Turkish Cypriots as many ethnic practitioners as mentioned by Mars and Ward (1984) were prepared to work, long and unsocial hours, which characterises work in the sectors which they entered.

In the service sector it was usually a case of providing services for the immediate Cypriot community and, at the same time, trying to create a demand for the service amongst the non-Cypriot general public (Ladbury, 1984). Ladbury (1984) stated that even though they had no previous experience of the catering industry, Cypriots quickly responded to the English demand for inexpensive eating-places in the 1950s, and their clientele were English, Cypriots and also other nationals. As the number of Cypriots looking for work increased, they were forced to look outside catering and Cypriot economic activities as a result diversified. Hairdressing and tailoring were some of the traditional occupations entered by Cypriots in the 1960s. Their entry into retail shop keeping or mini-cabbing had been the outcome of the readiness of both Greeks and Turks to fill perceived employment niches.
It is interesting to note that the Italians in London were highly involved in the restaurant sector (Palmer, 1984 in Bossevian, 1984). More than half the Italian households, which Palmer (1977: 251) traced in London, were associated with private business (cited in Bossevian 1984: 34). Greeks to a lesser degree, Turkish Cypriots demonstrated a similar interest in self employment (Constantinides, 1977 cited in Bossevain, 1984:34). As stated by Enneli, Modood and Bradley (2005), prior to World War II, early settlers worked in the hotel and restaurant trades, usually in premises owned by Italians. However, after Italy declared war against Britain, most of the Italians went back to Italy and Greek Cypriots and later on Turkish Cypriots filled their places in this trade. Subsequently, the number of Cypriot cafes and restaurants in London rose from 29 to around 200 in 1945 (Oakley, 1989).

The textile sector also presented opportunities for self employment for some of the migrants and therefore Cypriots (Strüder, 2003; Ladbury, 1984). Many of the migrants who migrated between 1950 and 1970 worked in factories, principally in the textile industry, where poor command of English language was not a barrier to obtain a job (Strüder, 2003).

Traditional village skills of tailoring and dressmaking have been put on direct use in the textile sector. In 1971, 50 per cent of Cypriot women in employment in Britain worked in textiles and clothing, and many others took on undeclared work on their own machines at home (King and Bridal, 1982: 100). Most Cypriot women in Britain are economically active; home machining and Cypriot factory work provided ‘safe’ environments for wives and daughters to earn supplementary incomes. Turkish Cypriots migrating to Britain could easily access clothing industry. As discussed by Ladbury (1984) particularly English girls had given up this and had been drawn to better pay and conditions offered by office jobs. Vacancies were available especially for women, who made up 85 per cent of the workforce in the industry. The other rea-
son for Cypriot involvement in the clothing industry was in demand for cheap labour, due to the increasing cost competition from abroad. Immigrants have been the most obvious source as they usually lacked formal qualifications and the bargaining power.

Both Turkish and Greek Cypriots were attracted into clothing industry. This is because both groups were excluded from more congenial and high status employment by their lack of knowledge of the language, their lack of formal qualifications and white majority prejudice (Ladbury, 1984). In addition, there were both structural and cultural reasons for Turkish Cypriots employment in the clothing industry. Firstly, tailoring and dressmaking were traditional Turkish Cypriot occupations. Oakley noted that 80 per cent of women who migrated and who were economically active in Cyprus worked as dressmakers, either on their own account or in small manufacturing firms (1971:85). As discussed by Ladbury (1984) at the time of Turkish Cypriot arrival, women had not been used to wage-earning in Cyprus, unless this was a family business or a shop. Indeed many women spoke of the opposition they encountered from their husbands and families to the idea of working when they first arrived. But, the financial convenience of women working soon became apparent. The current study considers the importance of Turkish Cypriot female family labour in the findings chapter.

The long hours and poor conditions in the clothing industry were at first offset by two factors. First, the possibility existed for earning a ‘reasonable’ income, and secondly, self employment was an attainable goal. The fact that the units of production are small, and relatively little basic equipment is initially required to start a business, means that the cutter or even the machinist can see him or herself as a potential employer. In addition, there was no language requirement. In the clothing industry Turkish Cypriots filled a niche which already existed. They have first started working as
employees in these firms, and later had taken over the businesses in the clothing and textile industry which was originally owned by Asians and Jews (Issa, 2004). The collapse of the former Soviet Union opened up labour markets with cheap skilled labourers in the textile industry in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Strüder, 2003: 23; Özaktanlar, 2003: 9), textile companies moved their production to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. As mentioned later on in the discussion on findings of the study, when the textile sector collapsed towards the end of 1990s, various other trades in restaurant and catering businesses have taken over its place in providing sources of work for Turkish Cypriot migrants (London Media Guide, 2003; Özaktanlar, 1993).

In spite of the concentration in the service and clothing sector, a significant number of Turkish Cypriots have moved to employment in the open labour market consisting of local factories, light industry and professional jobs. The reason for the gradual increase in movement from traditional occupations to open labour market could be explained by intergenerational shifts with those second generation Turkish Cypriots who were born and educated in Britain joining the labour market as well as the decline of the textile sector (Ladbury, 1984). However, there was a similar change in the British labour market from manufacturing to services.

Previous research suggests that there are two categories of migrant people or immigrants employed on the open labour market. The first category is the small group of qualified men and women and students in higher education who are, or will be, employed either in welfare, management and business jobs, or in professions as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and so on. Although they participate in the labour market, they frequently continue to have close links with the lower income groups, to whom they may provide a professional service. Therefore, they look like the small ethnic businesses which receive the patronage of an ethnic clientele while providing a service for the wider community. A Turkish
Cypriot will look for the assistance of another Turkish Cypriot qualified in these spheres if advice or help of a particular nature is needed whatever the professional service offered – legal advice, medical help, experience in export and shipping. Turkish Cypriots may contact a Turkish solicitor if they have a problem which they feel might be dealt with more sympathetically by a Turk—divorce, for example, or a matter concerning immigration (Ladbury, 1984). This is not to suggest that the Turkish Cypriots in professional or welfare jobs have a specifically ethnic clientele, but rather that their services are sometimes sought, and their positions would be better respected, by members of their own ethnic group (Ladbury, 1984: 115). On the other hand, the second category is the ‘ordinary’ immigrants who have found employment outside the ethnic business sphere. Ordinary migrants came from villages with little capital, but have done well in business and then associated socially both with the educated Turkish professional group and with the English middle class (Ladbury, 1984).

Overall, as discussed by Ladbury (1984), for the first generation, the successful entrepreneurs were those who responded incisively to existing opportunities, worked hard and gathered enough money to set up their businesses for themselves and their families. When we come to second generation migrants, those who were born or who have received all or most of their schooling in Britain (Ladbury, 1984), they have grown up in the atmosphere of struggle with their parents, with great emphasis put on survival first, and then on achievement and success (Ladbury, 1984). They had also experienced the English educational system, where being successful has meant passing exams and going on to further training courses or, at least, getting a job with ‘prospects’.

Recent studies have reported that the younger second and third generation of Turkish Cypriots have moved out from the traditional niches and industries such as the clothing industry, cafes and restaurants, dry cleaners to pursue careers in other areas
(Mehmet Ali, 1991; Issa, 2004). The most widely chosen careers in other areas include professions in accountancy, solicitorship, and many of the caring professions (Osman, 1999). These mentioned younger generations were also joined with a small group of settlers who came to Britain for educational purposes, with the intention of going back to Cyprus after some years in Britain (Strüder, 2003). Some of these then settled, and became ‘ overstayers’ and took professional posts (Osman, 1999:4).

As we outlined above, history, migration, and intergenerational changes account for why and how Turkish Cypriots have moved into business ownership in Britain. However, we contend that these reasons remain partial as the lived experience provides a more textured context in which individual choices are shaped. Therefore, the next section explores the significance of the individual experiences of business ownership among Turkish Cypriots through a qualitative study in London.

**Significance of experience: business set-up experiences of Turkish Cypriots Restaurateurs and Lawyers in Britain**

Drawing on a qualitative empirical research conducted by Inal (2007), self-employment and business start-up experiences of Turkish Cypriots have been examined in two different sectors: restaurant and legal sector. Interviews were conducted with 14 participants of whom 13 were restaurant owners or part-owners and one was a restaurant manager in Britain. All were born in Cyprus except one. Eight of these respondents were first generation migrants, who migrated to Britain any time between 1966 and 1979, but highly concentrated during the year 1974. Three respondents were second generation migrants, who migrated to Britain during 1957, 1972, and 1974 respectively with their mothers and brothers or sisters to accompany their fathers who came earlier. Also, there were three third generation respondents. The following Table 1 illustrates distributive attributes of Turkish Cypriots in Britain:
Table 1: Distributive attributes of Turkish Cypriot restaurateurs in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Type of Business</th>
<th>Father and Mother’s Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Ercan</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Hakan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>University - Hotel and catering</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Restaurateur and housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Ahmet</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>University – Law</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Accounts inspector and housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Barış</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Policeman and housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Fatih</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Butcher and housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Erínç</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>University-Mechanical engineering</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Chef and housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Kamil</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Coffee shop owner and housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Burak</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>University-Hotel and catering</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Caterer and housewife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Emre</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Policeman, factory business and house-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Nevzat</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Butcher and kebab shop owner, and house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Fevzi</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>University-Economics</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Farmer and helper to husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Ozay</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Bus driver and worker in the hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Bülent</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Sole proprietorship</td>
<td>Garden worker and helper to husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Ali</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>University-Hotel and catering</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Professional manager</td>
<td>Post master general and art teacher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A striking fact is that all 14 interviewees in the study in Britain were men; this was due to the fact that Turkish Cypriot restaurateurs in Britain thus were predominantly men. The age of the interviewees ranged between 30 and 65, with an average age of 48 years old. In total, 12 of 14 restaurateurs in the study were married, one was single and the other was divorced. In terms of education, six of the respondents were university graduates with degree level qualifications in hotel management and catering, economics and tourism, mechanical engineering, and law. When compared to the UK population and the restaurant sector in general in the country, Turkish Cypriots appear as a highly educated and skilled group of business owners. Six were high school graduates and the remaining two had secondary school education, as their highest educational attainment. It is also common for individuals with lower level degree qualifications to engage in restaurant and catering businesses in the migrant country. Only four of the interviewees had fathers who previously owned catering business, implying that parents’ occupation was not strongly influential factor in restaurant business ownership. Eight restaurants are solely owned, five restaurants are partnership owned usually with other family members and friends.

As pertains to the lawyers, the study was carried out with 16 participants who owned private practice law businesses or who worked for other firms as solicitors, trainees, councillors or as academic. Two main groups of lawyers were identified in the study: five were from the first generation and 11 were from the second generation. The Table 2 depicts the distributive characteristics of Turkish Cypriot lawyers in Britain:
### Table 2: Distributive attributes of lawyer participants in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Father and Mother Occupation</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location of the business</th>
<th>Year of ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-Onur</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Restaurant manager and machinist</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Palmers Green</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Kemal</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Farmer and housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Three</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Mahmut</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Labourer and involved in rug trade</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Solicitor employee</td>
<td>Turnpike Lane</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Ediz</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Retired manager from the government and retired teacher</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Eralp</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Shopkeeper and retired hairdresser</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Solicitor employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Ersan</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Lawyer and housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>Academician</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Nilay</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asst. manager in restaurant and office manager in a school office</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Ayse</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Restaurant-business owner and helper to husband</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Newingto n Green</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Fatma</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Train driver and machinist</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Newingto n Green</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Emel</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Security Officer for the British basis and machinist</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Pinar</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Lawyer and teacher</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Aykut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Mechanic-business owner and Worker</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Evrim</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Mechanic and housewife</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Trainee solicitor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Gönül</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Civil servant and teacher</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Legal councilor in municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Sinem</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Interpreter and housewife</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Tayfun</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Originally a professional soldier, then dealer in property, now owns a shop, and retired hairdresser</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>St. Paul's</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The age range of the Turkish Cypriot lawyer participants varied between 35 and 56, with an average age of 37. Equally, there were eight female and eight male participants in the study. The distributive attributes Turkish Cypriot lawyers in Britain implies that women are equally active as men in the legal profession. This provides a contrast to the restaurant sector, where women are underrepresented.

Many of the second and third generation Turkish Cypriots are making their choices to move towards professions (Özaktanlar, 2003), and this trend is confirmed with the second generation lawyers in this study. On the other hand, four of the Turkish Cypriot lawyers in this study came to Britain for educational purposes and stayed and took professional posts. They came from families with university educated parents in North Cyprus.

In terms of marital status, nine were married, two were divorced and the rest three were single. 10 participants had no children at all, three had one child, two had two children, and one had three children. As legal profession is not a labour intensive, unlike the restaurateur participants, reliance on the labour support of parents, spouses and children was less evident in the study.

Explicating lived experience: Family, economy and choice in setting up a business

Three main reasons emerged upon analysing the lived experiences of business start up reasons of 13 restaurateurs and 16 lawyers of Turkish Cypriot origin in Britain. These were the family related reasons; the economic reasons, the individual choice.

Family

One of the most important reasons which led restaurateurs to set up their own businesses was highly related with familial factors. Eight out 13 participants in the study have cited the influence of their families in decisions for self employment in the restaurant sec-
It is important to note that there is a life-cycle of familial influences, and immediate or extended family members’ role in business ownership decisions of participants varied greatly: some provided the experience, skills and guidance, the others financial capital, and the established restaurants.

Being born into a family involved in restaurant trade, early childhood work experience was quite common among the participants. Nevzat’s (45 years old male) experience in term of early childhood experiences in the business reflected the overall general experience of the other participants. Nevzat’s father was involved in butchery and kebab business; he started working with him and transferred the business with his brother in North Cyprus. After he migrated to Britain towards the end of 1999, he opened a restaurant business on his own. He stated:

My father was a butcher and he also had a kebab shop. We developed the skills of catering sector by working with him starting from our childhood, and then we developed the business further. When I migrated to Britain, eventually I set up my own restaurant business by deploying some of the skills learned in my childhood (Nevzat, 45 years old, male).

Some of the participants developed themselves further in this trade with schooling in hotel and catering management. Experiences and career trajectories of Burak (53 years old, male) and Hakan (30 years old male) were similar in the sense that they both had family members, who were restaurateurs, and who presented them with the opportunity to gain business experience and practical aspects of the job. They both trained themselves through formal education. Furthermore, upon the completion of the university degrees, both were provided with financial capital and support in setting up their businesses. Interestingly, these participants were successful in business and have established various restaurants in the mainstream market. Hakan’s quote provides a better understanding of the experiences of both participants:
“I was working with my father from the age of nine; I was helping out in his fast food restaurant that specialised in döner kebab and hamburgers. I liked the restaurant style like this one (the current restaurant). Then I went to university and studied hotel and catering management, and after one year I decided that I knew everything and therefore I opened a restaurant style Italian café, which works very well. Then I opened this restaurant, and we have another café ready to be open next month” (Hakan, 30 years old, male).

There was no uniform influence of extended family members in this study. In some cases, they provided skills and experience, and in others moral support (c.f. Dhaliwal and Kangis, 2006). An example of the impact of familial context in terms of broader family is what Özay experienced at later life. Özay, 30 year old male, part owner of a restaurant with his uncle, comes from a working class family background in North Cyprus. His father was a bus driver and his mother was a hospital worker. His uncle who migrated to London in 1956 lived on his own, he was divorced and he had no children. He was one of the successful entrepreneurs in London. He owned a number of businesses including restaurants. Özay came to Britain to work with his uncle in summer holidays starting towards the end of secondary school. He learned various aspects of the restaurant business from his uncle. After completing high school and military service in North Cyprus he joined his uncle in London and became the part owner of the restaurant in 1994. This is an example of strong, albeit extended, family relations in Turkish Cypriot culture.

The influence of extended family members was not only in terms of already created businesses, but also in terms of financial and moral support at the start up, as experienced by Emre (44 year old, male). Also, his uncle provided him with free labour such as providing help in carrying, assembling, and preparing the machinery in the takeaway shop) when initiating his take away type
restaurant. Emre, a second generation migrant, 44 years old, married with three sons, migrated to Britain in 1972 at the age of 12, with his mother and brother following their father due to economic reasons. He worked in the textile factory when he first came, but his uncle who was in fish and chips business encouraged him to buy this business in 1986, and for 16 years he has been in his business. He picked up the trade in the restaurant where his uncle was employed.

The family also had a significant influence on career choice decision of the lawyers in the study. The effect of family in terms of business start up reasons was twofold; firstly, as the pressure that came from families for participants to initiate own businesses and secondly as the work life balance and gender related issues that shaped business set up decisions.

Turkish Cypriot families who have migrated to Britain in this study had a great desire for their children to become professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and engineers. Furthermore, after qualifying as a lawyer, expectations were in terms of seeing their children in legal practice in their own businesses, more than being employed in legal careers in other firms or businesses. Tayfun’s experience was a particularly interesting example. He is a 35 year old male, who owns his own city high street firm in London. He was previously a salaried partner in one of the top ten prestigious criminal west end firms which has been in operation for about 155 years in London. After working for other businesses for about nine years, Tayfun has established his own legal firm specialising in criminal law in 2005. He remarked that one of the reasons of setting up his own business had been the pressure which came from his immediate family, mainly his parents:

“….. my family, they’ve put some pressure on me as well, they hmm you know how Turkish people are like, you can work for a top west end law firm which is why I was able to stand on my feet without relying on Turkish community….
So you know nevertheless working for a west end firm does not mean very much for Turkish community, and your family wants to see the great step up. For them from, in a sense more traditional background, they see it as when you have your own firm, that’s when you succeeded. So, perhaps because I had some pressure from them I’ve decided to do that.”

The influence of family was not of course in the same way for the other participants. The work life balance emerged as a significant reason in shaping business setting start up decisions. The desire to keep one’s family life in control was a critical reason. Ayşe’s case exemplified this situation. Ayşe, 56 years old, married female, worked as a barrister for 10 years before setting up her small high street law firm. Although she was happy working as a barrister, she had to switch to solicitorship, as she wanted to balance her work and family commitments after getting married and also having a baby. It was getting difficult for her to continue practising as a barrister due to nature of the profession: it entailed a lot of travelling to various locations around the country, long hours of work and inconvenient hours of work. This is in line with research findings that women have the liberty to pursue careers as long as it does not interfere with the fulfilment of their marital roles (Blair, 1993). Creating a solicitor’s firm meant flexible working conditions including an office set up close to home and running the practice and the family together. Ayşe’s quote followed as:

I got married and established a family, and it was difficult to work as a barrister, you have to commute to wherever a case is presented to you. When I set up my solicitor work, this was my office as well as my home; I had my home upstairs and my son was born. We would live upstairs, that’s why I wanted an office where I could run a family as well as a practice (Ayşe, 56 years old, married female).
Although families played a key role in encouraging both restaurateurs and lawyers in entering their respective sectors and establishing their own businesses, the familial influences among the restaurateurs were in the form of individual labour and financial supports. The lawyers however predominantly received verbal encouragement and moral support along with an investment in their education towards professional qualifications from their families.

\textit{Economy}

The second reason for the business founding experiences of Turkish Cypriots in Britain is economic in nature including pursuit of financial prosperity and safeguarding against the negative effects of recession and structural changes in the local economy. Cantillon (1755) and Knight (1921) espoused that pursuit of financial betterment is a major motivation for restaurant business ownership. Eight participants presented financial betterment as a motivating factor in their business ownership. Basu and Altınay (2000) also found that Turkish Cypriot and Turkish businessmen in Britain have set up their businesses because they believed that the quickest way to become rich was to work for themselves, since working for others often led to exploitation or low wages. The desire for financial betterment for Turkish Cypriot business owners in Britain was also confirmed in a comparative study conducted with six immigrant groups by Basu and Altınay (2002) in which Turkish Cypriots are one of them.

Further to economic reasons, in a number of cases, participants have established their own businesses as a response to the structural changes in the local economy. Three participants in the study; Ercan, Erinç and Barış who were previously involved in trade and business all owned textile businesses; however with the collapse of the sector towards the end of 1990s their businesses came to an end. Structural changes such as economic displacements, concern with the economic instability caused by recession and displacements, as
argued by Ronstadt (in Kuratko and Hodgetts, 2001: 36), have inspired the participants to consider setting up businesses in the restaurant sector.

Turkish Cypriots, in the case of many of the migrants in Britain worked particularly in the textile factories, where poor skills in English did not present major problems. (Ladbury, 1984; Strüder, 2003). Some of these migrants including the participants in the study have set up textile businesses. As Strüder (2003) argued, during the 1970s and 1980s the textile industry employed over 90 percent of the Turkish speaking community. Other sources (London Media Guide 2003; Özaktanlar 1993) argued that, until the beginning of 1990s, the textile industry was the third largest sector, which employed 95 percent of the combined Turkish population. The textile sector collapsed towards the end of the 1990s, and various other trades have taken such as restaurant and catering businesses. Many companies moved their production facilities to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, as the collapse of the former Soviet Union opened up new labour markets with cheap skilled labourers in the textile industry in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Strüder, 2003: 23; Özaktanlar, 2003: 9).

Economic factors were also responsible for Turkish Cypriot lawyers to set up legal practices. Practising lawyers within the English legal system is divided into two branches as barristers and solicitors (McGlynn, 2003). The barrister appears at the highest courts. As explained by Callaghan (2004) barristers are generally self employed and work from chambers, where they share the chambers and the resources. They have two sorts of clients; the professional client who is the solicitor, and the lay client who is the individual being represented. Barristers cannot be directly approached by lay clients. Traditionally, barristers have had an exclusive right of audience in higher courts and have not normally been instructed by law clients (McGlynn, 2003: 140). On the other hand, solicitors tend to work as a group in firms and lay clients can
approach them directly. They are the front line and must decide the most appropriate action, if any. Therefore, as it is easier for them to be contacted by individual clients, earning money rather becomes less difficult when compared as working as a barrister. Barristers are also self-employed professionals working in chambers, but they have to create their own business and bring their own clients. In chambers they only share the resources and administrative staff.

Another economic reason of setting up businesses was the recognised business opportunities in the legal sector that created niches. In identifying the opportunities they have taken the advantage of Turkish-speaking community’s legal needs. As discussed by Özaktanlar (2003), the size of the Turkish-speaking communities in Britain is very crucial for the entrepreneurs, and mainly for new start-ups, for a number of reasons even though there is no straightforward correlation between the size of the ethnic minority populations and number of businesses in the community. Ram and Jones (1998), Jones, Barret and McEvoy (1992; 1994), and Ram and Hillin (1994) explained that community size determines the availability of opportunities to establish niche businesses, or, in due course, in situations of over-competition, the necessity to diversify and break-out of the ethnic niche.

Turkish Cypriot lawyers have taken the advantage of opportunity structures as discussed by Aldrich and Waldinger’s (1990). Turkish Cypriot lawyers highly benefited from their knowledge of their community, culture and language exploitation and have set up their businesses where Turkish-speaking communities were densely populated, and also there have been situations in which a wider, non-ethnic is served. Five of six business owners have set up their businesses in these areas. They have mainly established their businesses in areas highly settled by the Turkish-speaking community in North London and also one in south London. Their main aim has not been to support the community needs but to exploit an opportunity away from the mainstream competitive markets. They
have exploited their ethnic resources, ethnic networks and ethnic customer base. In other words, this is a kind of niche market exploitation since many Turkish speakers have English language problem; the lawyers are exploiting this opportunity by offering this unique service to the Turkish speaking community. They are entering into this market of Turkish speaking community and protected from the mainstream competition. It emerged that the participants in the study who have set up their businesses in areas with a high concentration of Turkish speaking people such as Turkish Cypriots, Turkish and Kurdish. They also had British and other minority ethnic clients. The reasons for setting up their businesses in the centre of the community were spelt out in the words of Mahmut and Ayşen which represented others in this category:

I was thinking I needed to set myself up with an office of my own. I wanted to go into a Turkish area because I knew there was a market for Turkish speaking lawyers, due to the sizeable Turkish speaking community. So, I saw this place and it seemed to present a good opportunity, hence the reason as to why I set my office up here. I knew that I could find and specialise in a market with just Turkish people. So, as it turned out most of my client base ended up being comprised of Kurdish people, as for them if they speak Turkish it’s a livelihood advantage (Mahmut, 37 years old male, owner of a private practice).

And, Ayşen’s statement was as following:

“...I thought, and saw there was a lot of demand for Turkish speaking solicitors and I thought that this was an ideal base to be where all the Turkish community was at that time. And still this is a focal point, people may not live here, but still come here. (Ayşen, 56 years old female, part owner of a private practice)”

It also appeared that the clients attracted were not only the Turkish Cypriots but also Turkish and Kurdish people. Therefore, they
have mostly exploited their advantage of the Turkish language more than the community networks. They relied on Turkish community because of language, culture and familiarity. It was also interesting to note that participants have explained that it was in a great majority the first generation Turkish Cypriots, or Turkish speaking communities who preferred to do work with the Turkish speaking solicitors. The second and third generation were more educated and did not have the language problem. Onur, 35 years old, male who is the part owner a small high street legal business supports this by the following statement:

“I think the younger generations, because they speak English, they don’t necessarily need a Turkish speaking solicitor. With the older generations, they need to have a Turkish speaking solicitor, because of the language barrier and it’s always the language, it’s always the culture. Somebody may come to me with particular problems which may seem as strange and difficult to somebody that is not familiar with the, say, Turkish culture. Whereas to me,... I would understand their problem better, particularly with family matters and it is a matter of understanding the culture better” (Onur, 35 years old, male).

On the other hand, as opposed to business start up in locations densely populated by the Turkish speaking people, there was a second generation participant in the study who preferred to set up his business in city centre away from his community. Normally as it is the case in this study, ethnic minorities establish their businesses at places convenient to their coethnics. However, as the number of these firms increase, the need to break-out to mainstream markets arises (Ram and Hillin, 1994):

“..you can work for a top west end law firm which is I was able to; stand on my feet without relying on Turkish community. I’ve really used that as a card, a lot of Turkish people play, if you look at most Turkish Cypriot or Turkish lawyers
in this country they rely on Turkish community because of language, culture, familiarity I think. I’ve never done that. I have chosen to actually stand on my own merit, and I get clients because of my ability, not because of anything else. But, Turkish clients yes they’re very comfortable with us because we’re able to provide the language, but that’s not what we reckon them on. For instance I don’t advertise in any Turkish newspapers, which most firms do. If I did I probably would have many more Turkish clients. I am not about to do that, my view is to do my work and do it well, and also if I wanted Turkish clients I wouldn’t be based here. I would be based somewhere locally. Most Turkish people find it difficult to travel here, but it’s all recommendation at the moment. Once the firm is sufficiently set up and everyone is trained up I will probably then do some advertising and increase the Turkish percentage of clients, but at the moment it’s minimum (Tayfun, 35 years old, male).”

Pursuit of economic wellbeing is more prominent a factor for Turkish Cypriot restaurateurs than lawyers, who pursued business set up as a natural progression in their professional career. Therefore the reasons that motivate lawyers are more related to individual choices than simple pursuit of financial gain which characterise the motivations of restaurateurs who operate within a denser web of familial and social relationships of interdependence in contrast to their lawyer compatriots.

Individual choice

The third reason that is identified as pertinent in this study for business set up was informed by individual choices, such as the need for achievement (McClelland, 1961; Chell, 2002), desire for independence or autonomy (Basu, 1998; Blais and Toulouse, 1990; Birley and Westhead, 1993; Scase and Goffee, 1982; Kolvereid, 1996; Feldman and Bolino 2000; Carter et al., 2003; Dyer, 1992; Gelderen
and Jansen, 2006; Uneke, 1996) and due to the the special interest towards restaurant and food businesses. Three participants in the study have cited the importance of satisfying their need to achieve by setting up their own restaurants. Fatih’s experience was quite common between participants, which epitomizes the overall experience of restaurateurs who were inspired by achievement motivation:

“I was either going to lose everything or succeed, so I succeeded because I was determined. I started from scratch and step by step I got to the stage where I am now. I could say that determination and hunger for success were my reasons for starting up the business.” (Fatih, 44 year old, male, restaurant owner).

Further to personal reasons of business ownership, two restaurateurs in the study explicitly spelled out in their own words that one of the many other reasons of setting up their own restaurants is the desire to become independent (Chell, 2000; 2001, Currrran, Blackburn and Woods, 1991; Dyer, 1992; Basu, 1998). Their independence motive was closely linked to managerial freedom or autonomy. Such an autonomy gives the liberty of taking and implementing decisions for oneself. Barış’s quote who has been the owner of two restaurants since 1990, and is part owner of his current restaurant exemplifies the theme for ‘independence’:

“In addition my other reason of setting up my restaurants, and especially this (current) restaurant, one of the most important motives was to be my own boss, and not to receive any commands from others “(Barış, 50 year old, male)

Individual choices frame the reasons of legal business start up in terms of natural progression in their careers. As the nature of the legal profession, an individual pursuing a practising career in law first of all has to complete a compulsory training in a private practice firm after his or her law degree. Many newly-qualified solici-
tors prefer to stay on with the firm at which they trained and where they are familiar with both the practice and the members of the staff. Often the competitive employers are prepared to provide a permanent place for these individuals as they have invested time and resources in training them.

It is also important to note that, some of the newly qualified solicitors might prefer to move firms with higher salaries, practice specialisation or location. After qualifying they start working under the title of assistant solicitor as an employee of the firm for a fixed salary and they are under the supervision of a partner of a senior assistant solicitor. Solicitors normally work towards increased seniority in the firm; assistants can become senior assistants; followed by salaried partners; and ultimately full equity partners. The final career ambition for most solicitors working in private practice law firms is to become a partner (LawCareers.Net, 2007; McGlynn, 2003). Salaried partners have similar status to full partners, but do not have a share in the company. However, on rare occasions it also possible to progress from an assistant to an equity partner. Progressing into an equity partnership also depends on the firm and the abilities of the individual. This trend of starting employment as a trainee solicitor and progressing to partnership was widely prevalent by the participants in the study as a natural progression in their career advancement and professional development.

Two participants have started working as a trainee solicitor in private practice law firm, following other stages as assistant solicitor; salaried partner became an equity partner. Participants’ success has firms benefiting from their abilities which motivated the business owners to take them as equity partners to the businesses. Onur, 35 years old, male started to work as a trainee solicitor and ultimately became a part owner of the business, and a branch office of the business was set up under his management. His experience was as follows:
“I joined the firm as a trainee solicitor. After two years of my training I qualified and became an assistant solicitor within the firm. Then within a year I became a salaried partner. Shortly after that, I would imagine, they saw my skills and I became an equity partner. Originally there were three partners. One retired, so that leaves me and my other partner. He is in the other office. We have two offices. We have this office here (Palmers Green) and I am in charge of it, and we have the other office in Borehamwood. The office in Borehamwood is usually the main office and this is a satellite office” (Onur 35 years old, male).

Fatma, 35 years old female, also had similar experience to Onur in her career advancement; though she became an equity partner of the office she has completed her training in 1999, and unlike Onur who continued to work in the same business rather than moving to a branch office. Her quote reflects her experience:

“I started to work in this firm as a trainee solicitor. After qualifying I became an assistant solicitor and then eventually a partner. After being sole owner of the business for 19 years, the owner decided that she needed more time for herself and wanted to share her responsibilities by having a partner. So, that’s how I became a partner of this business“(Fatma, 35 years old, female).

There were also exceptions to the normal career progression of the participants. An exception to the career development stages experienced by great majority of participants was the case of Tayfun, 35 years old male. He has previously been trained in a law business, then worked in another law firm in civil law, afterwards was employed in a big west end criminal law firm as an assistant solicitor, and progressed to a salaried partner within nine months. As he did not have the aspiration of becoming an equity partner of that business, after working for about five years in this business, he has established his own private practice in the city:
“I think in a sense I have reached plateau with my career in my previous firm. When I joined it, it was one of the top ten firms with criminal defence work. It has probably slipped in through the rating slightly over the years. The person who was my boss when I joined John Z...became a district judge, once he left, in a sense I went my tribunal side ways when he left because we were left to stay off on our own merit, and although I’ve got a very strong high quality I didn’t feel it was challenging me anymore in terms of what I was doing, so, you know I was good at the job but wasn’t particularly anything new” (Tayfun, 35 years old male).

Finally, another reason for setting up businesses was the desire for independence and the need for control, and challenge (Birley and Westhead, 1994; Scase and Goffee, 1982; Goffee and Scase, 1995). This theme was repeated by one of the participants in the study, who has worked in a big high street law business for about 9 year prior to setting up his own business.

I was not an equity partner. I was a salaried partner where you could propose suggestions but it is very difficult to put those into practice, and to some extent you are relying upon other people to make decent decisions for the practice and that can become frustrating after a while. You know you see yourself working hard or practising well and your colleagues not necessarily following with you (Tayfun, 35 years old, male).

In summary, the business start up reasons for restaurateurs and lawyers was divergent and multifaceted. Whilst the desire to become one’s own boss featured as a common theme in both groups, some of the individual choices among lawyers were in interplay with their professional identity, in that the setting up of a legal profession was a marker for their professional progression as a part of their developmental trajectory. Individual choice was more marked and textured in the case of lawyers. Their business
start up reasons included interrelated factors such as family related factors, monetary factors, reasons emerging from natural progression in their careers, opportunities in serving to own community and the desire to be independent from managerial control.

Conclusions

In this article we have examined the business set up reasons of Turkish Cypriots in Britain, mainly in London, highlighting the multiplicity of their business set up reasons and choices in the restaurant and legal sectors. First, we have explained the significance of history in shaping the experiences of Turkish Cypriots’ entry into business sectors in Britain, exploring how historical connections between Turkey and Britain have influenced the Turkish Cypriots to set up small businesses in the restaurant and legal sectors. Second, we examined the impact of migration influence on business set-up patterns of Turkish Cypriots in these two sectors in Britain. Turkish Cypriots in Britain, as a minority ethnic group, have achieved assimilation into mainstream and formal sectors of work because of their longer history of migration, which dates back now almost three generations. Their settlement in London is quite dispersed and this has brought about easier access to both the mainstream economic spaces in the city and the ethnic enclaves which house more recent migrants from Turkey and Cyprus. Finally, drawing on a field study conducted with Turkish Cypriot solicitors and restaurateurs in Britain (Inal, 2007), we illustrate the significance of the lived experience of work and family in shaping individual drives for setting up a small business. In particular, we report three key reasons which account for business set up patterns of the Turkish Cypriots in our study: family related reasons, economic reasons and individual choice.

We have concluded that the business start up reasons for restaurateurs and lawyers are divergent and multifaceted. Our findings present a challenge to single level conceptions of business set up reasons which focus either structural conditions or agentic
explanations. We demonstrated that business and social logics intersect with individual choice in shaping up business set up drives of Turkish Cypriots in Britain. The multi-dimensional nature of the reasons behind business ownership is not unique to Turkish Cypriot community in Britain. Indeed, the same pattern may apply to the mainstream population of business in Britain. What may differentiate Turkish Cypriots from the majority ethnic population in Britain, however, would be the idiosyncrasies of their collective history and their experiences of migration and cultures of social and economic order as reflected in their experiences and choices of business ownership.

However, the reasons for business set up among Turkish Cypriot restaurateurs and lawyers are far homogenous. Business ownership reasons and motivations diverge among members of this small community across fault lines of gender, migration experience, and level of skill. What drives Turkish Cypriots in Britain to set up their own businesses varies across occupational lines. Whilst women are under-represented in the restaurant sector, they are relatively better represented in the legal profession. This is similar to the polarisation of women’s experience across skilled and unskilled professions in Turkey, where women enjoy better representation across skilled professions and face under-representation in low skilled segments of service sector work (Özbilgin and Woodward 2003). The restaurant sector offers more access to recent migrants than the legal sector. However, the second generation and third generation migrants are encouraged to take up employment and business ownership in the legal sector by their families which see this as marker of their integration to the British society and as prestigious choices for their children. The desire to become independent and become one’s own boss is a recurrent and common theme among both restaurateurs and lawyers in relation to their experiences of business foundation. However, this desire is associated more with financial independence in the former group, whist the latter group is driven by professional autonomy and development.
NOTES

1 Family for the purpose of this study refers to both immediate and extended family members.
The Portrayal of Turkey in the British Media in the Context of Turkey-EU Relations

Yusuf Devran

The aim of this article is to analyze how Turkey is portrayed by the British media. This study uses discourse analysis to examine Turkey’s portrayal in two British daily newspapers, namely the Guardian and Daily Telegraph, and takes a detailed look at news items published between September 2004 and December 2005.

The portrayal of Turkey in the western media helps us comprehend the stereotypes and images at work in the types of cognition European countries have about Turkey. Understanding this portrayal contributes to the development of new projects, strategies and tactics to remove negative images and mental obstacles in the minds of Europeans who remain less than enthusiastic about accepting Turkey’s inclusion in the European Union. The deeply rooted conceptions and historical concerns held by European societies regarding Turkey – a country which has been trying to join the EU since 1963 – will be the main emphasis of our examination in this article.
Introduction

There are various definitions of the concept of discourse, such as the use or practice of language, style of speech, arguments, ideology, etc., as well as a process of exchanging power by means of language use (Bell & Garet 1988). Every discourse is characterized by the standpoint of its speaker; for example, the discourses of scientists, politicians, diplomats, etc., are characterized by the use of particular concepts, signs, and styles of speech (Sözen 1999). While actors play crucial roles in giving meaning to a discourse and making it more comprehensible, discourse in turn constructs the identity of its actors. Discourse is also accepted as a construction of reality, as every discourse has its own depiction of reality. Furthermore, the media are neither neutral nor rational mediators of events, but in fact, function to reproduce pre-formulated ideologies (Hall et al. 1980). Despite this fact, the “reality” created by Western discourse, including the discourse of western media, is seen as an absolute reality by others. According to Edward Saïd, whose contribution to the understanding of the importance of discourse cannot be denied, discourse is of particularly great significance because of its depiction of “object” and “subject”. Saïd emphasizes that the subject of colonial discourse, which is based on Western values, is the “we”, which is presented as being superior to members of eastern cultures, and the object is “you” or “the other”, which is mainly passive and negative, as determined by Western values. Such Orientalism is a style of thought based on an epistemological and ontological separation of “East” and “West.” It aims to keep the East under the control of the West for economical and cultural reasons (Said 1979).

Our analysis of the Western media, aimed at comprehending the imaginary place of Turkey in the minds of Western people, proposes a critical and competent explanation of the issue at hand by use of the intellectual tools provided by the postcolonial theories of Western discourse. In this respect, rather than acclaiming and re-
narrating the depiction of Turkey in Western media, this research will shed light on the invisible reasons, fears and anxieties that appear to be shared by European people. In the analysis that follows, the implicit meaning of the news items will be examined in order to explain the mindset presented by and reflected in the British media. This method of analysis is expected to contribute to an understanding of the difficulties that EU leaders face while making decisions regarding Turkey, and to shed light on the development of EU policies with respect to Turkey’s relations with Europe.

Attractive and Effective Headlines

The news items relating to Turkey, published in the Guardian and Daily Telegraph between September 2004 and December 2005, covered various events. Among them were the relationship between Turkey and the EU, various suicide attacks organized by terrorists, the PKK issue, the Cyprus problem, the Armenian genocide claims, rising nationalism in Turkey, the pipeline project from Russia to Turkey, Mehmet Ali Agca, bird flu, the retrial of Orhan Pamuk, the condition of Turkish prisons, the adoption of new penal codes, educational issues, blood feuds, British tourists killed by bomb attacks while visiting Turkish tourist sites, honor crimes, Gallipoli ceremonies, and Lloyd George’s attempt to bribe Enver Pasha. As is evident from a glance at the topics alone, news items likely to create a negative image of Turkey were prevalently covered by the British media during this time.

The main question that should be raised regarding the discourse of the headlines is whether or not they summarize the meaning of the related texts clearly and completely. As seen in these headlines “EU criticizes Turkey on human rights”, “Turkish criminal folly”, “EU support for Turkey ‘genocide’ writer”, “France tells Turkey: accept Cyprus or no EU”, “Turks need cultural revolution if to join EU”, “Chaos at Turkish Journalists’ trial”, readers can easily comprehend, without reading the entire text, that
Turkey is not fulfilling EU requirements. Not only did the headlines explain the news events; they also strikingly emphasized Turkey as a place subject to furious criticism because of its failure to meet EU requirements and, more generally, as an underdeveloped country in regard to its economy, its respect for human rights, and its status as a democracy.

**Negative Coverage of Turkey**

In the news stories from this period, the background information regarding Turkey is depicted from the viewpoint of countries that may be considered hostile toward Turkey, such as Greece, Austria, and France, from the perspective of people who have negative feelings toward Turkey. Looking specifically at the historical information used by the media regarding the Cyprus issue, the Armenian genocide claims, the PKK issue, etc., it can be seen that European newspapers have tried to instill a negative image of Turkish history in the minds of EU citizens.

Some news coverage dealt with stories about how Turkish people live in appalling housing, and how Turkish children study in primitive schools which have no separate lavatories, a condition used as an excuse by fathers to prevent their children from continuing their education. Quoting from a statement made by the education minister, one news item mainly focuses on the numbers of schools without toilets in the eastern part of Turkey, using numerical information to persuade the readers of Turkey’s backwardness.

The British media has also claimed that the Turkish government pays money to families in order to encourage them to send their girls to school. As seen in this paragraph from the Guardian, education in Turkey is described as being highly authoritarian and ideological: “Turkish textbooks, like the country’s national curriculum, are viewed as among the most authoritarian and ideological in the world. Recently, schoolchildren began being "taught" democracy in an effort to promote critical thinking in a system that has long
favoured learning by rote.” Using very detailed quotations from the qualitative surveys conducted by the UN, the British media avoids naming its sources by using passive sentences which shadow the objectiveness of the journalism and which could be interpreted as a sign of bias and prejudice.

Regarding the allegations of Armenian genocide, the British media uses dramatic and striking phrases and terms, such as “slaughter,” “massacre,” etc. and asserts that there was an international consensus regarding the accuracy of the claims. Proceeding as if all countries in the world have accepted the Armenian allegations, Turkey is advised to recognize the massacre of more than one million Armenians as genocide during the First World War in 1915. The phrase “slaughtering people” contributes to the construction of an intensely negative meaning for the country, implying that the Turkish people employ this kind of killing method. Whoever reads this kind of news item, which portrays Turkish history prejudicially, will most likely have a very negative image of the country as being one full of barbarians. While exaggerating the Armenian allegations, the British media omitted publication of Turkey’s point of view. Its use of the phrase “Christian Armenian Community” clarifies the reason; this discourse attracts the attention of all Christians to the news event. Furthermore, statements made by Orhan Pamuk, a Turkish novelist, who was sentenced due to his baseless press declaration that “one million Armenians and 30,000 Kurds were killed in Turkey”, were used in particular by the British media to back up their own rehashing of such allegations.

Whoever reads the British newspapers will face various descriptions of Turkey as a poor, predominantly Muslim, culturally alien, over-crowded country with a population of 72 million; a country with a shaky democracy and economy that lies geographically outside the boundaries of Europe.

According to the comments in the news items, Turkey has not proved that it had absorbed the core principles of Western democ-
racy, including civil liberties, human rights, secularism, etc., even though there have been obvious developments. As the Daily Telegraph opines, “Absorbing a poor country of some 70 million will not be easy. But the negotiations and the transition period thereafter are expected to be protracted, giving Turkey ample time to pass further reforms and European leaders to prepare their electorates for the integration of a vibrant democracy that straddles the great cultural divide of our age.” It is highly difficult for the EU to absorb a country which is claimed to be poor and over-crowded with a population of 70 million. For this reason, according to the media, enough time should be given for Turkey to pass further reforms and make fundamental changes in its system.

The other phrase commonly used to describe Turkey is “Muslim democracy”. In fact, the British media emphasizes the separation, rather than the affinity, between democratic Muslims and Christians by using the phrase “Muslim Democracy”. This approach shows that the British media is rearticulating the discourse of the Orientalist approach, namely the distinction between “us” and the “others”, as far as the West and East are concerned. Moreover, the media’s “positive” presentation of the fact that there are some Europeans who want Turkey to be given a chance -- within at least 10 to 15 -- years to be a member of what has been called “the modern world” is, in fact, hardly positive. The reason why the media mentions the time duration of the democratization process at all is to point out that even those who are open to Turkey’s membership share, at least in part, the opinion of those who are skeptical about Turkey’s entrance to the EU.

Emphasizing that the EU is a union of civilizations based on Christianity, some journalists do not avoid describing Turkey as a predominantly Muslim country, as observed in this statement: “The decision ended a week of crisis with Brussels over Turkey’s efforts to become the EU’s first predominantly Muslim member.” European attitudes toward Turkey’s Muslim majority seem to
explain why Turkey has been subjected to the toughest terms ever imposed on any EU applicant.

The other interesting point is that in the quotations from Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister of Turkey, the phrase “iṣṣallah” –meaning God willing - is always placed in the sentences with inverted commas to indicate that Gul and his government are highly pro-Islamic. Even though the Turkish foreign minister does use the term “iṣṣallah”, the journalist could have translated it into English as “hopefully”, which is essentially what it has come to mean in Turkey today. But they preferred not to use the term ‘hopefully’. Such journalistic choices reinforce the discourse constructed by the British media which depicts Turkey as a predominantly Muslim country with a religious government.

On a brighter note, while the statement which portrays Turkey as a Muslim country with a population of 70 million is accepted as a negative discourse by France, Austria and the Netherlands, which are strongly opposed to Turkey, Britain appreciates Turkey’s diversity as a form of cultural richness and an advantage for a multicultural Europe. For this reason, Tony Blair and his ministers stress that Turkey’s presence will help relations with millions of Muslims in today’s EU, and accentuate the point that accepting a country which has very different religious understandings, democratic traditions and points of view would serve to indicate that the EU is a place of a harmony of differences.

It has been claimed in some news items that the European people are worried about the Euro-Turks who have emigrated to Europe from the underdeveloped regions of Anatolia and are therefore concerned about Turkey’s presence in the EU. Because the Turkish immigrants in question came from underdeveloped areas, these undereducated people faced serious difficulties in learning the language of the countries in which they settled. Consequently, Turko-Swedes or Turko-German dialects are emerging which are linguistic reflections of identity. In addition to such media claims
regarding the detrimental effects of Turkish presence in Europe, the immigration of Turkish people into Europe is described using the term “pour”, which connotes that Turkish people are steadily streaming into Europe in undifferentiated crowds. Emphasizing the unpredictable results of Turkish migration, this metaphor implies that these uneducated and peasant Turks experienced serious difficulties in adapting to Western values and integrating into a foreign civilization. Taking these concerns to an extreme, it has been claimed, with a quotation from Bernard Lewis, the pre-eminent British scholar of Islam, that with the immigration of millions of Muslims from abroad, causing an increase in the Muslim population, Europe will become dominated by Muslims.

In contrast to what the Western media claims, Jack Straw, the former British foreign minister, described Turkey in the following statement “I’m in absolutely no doubt that the benefits will follow from this enlargement and bring a strong secular state, which happens to have a Muslim majority, into the European Union” to an attempt to rid negative opinions and fears promulgated by the media all over the EU.

The Media Coverage of EU-Turkey Relations

Since relations between the EU and Turkey had the most coverage during the period under analysis, news items regarding Turkey’s entry into the EU will now be examined in detail to reveal the main reasons why some EU leaders have fears and anxieties regarding Turkey. Not only are the sources used in the texts important, but the connotative meanings of the terms used also play a very significant role in disclosing the intention of the journalists and the media.

The Long Duration of the EU Membership Process

As seen in the changing discourse of the paragraphs regarding the membership process, which started with the Ankara treaty in 1963,
the duration of Turkey’s membership process to the EU has been depicted in different manners. With phrases like, “No country other than Turkey has had to wait 42 years at Europe’s door. With each new condition the European Union places on Turkey’s joining the EU, anger has raised and now the country is engulfed by anti-EU feelings” the situation of Turkey is emphasized in order to show that Turkey has faced different and exceptional conditions and procedures since 1963. The phrase “Europe’s door” is a very clear metaphor depicting Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the European Union. Keeping someone waiting at the door of an office connotes that the outsider has a demand which the person in the office is reluctant to meet.

Similar to the phrase “Europe’s door”, the phrase “the waiting room of Europe” in the following sentence, “After 42 years in the waiting room of Europe, Turkey generated one last day of tension and brinkmanship” shows how Turkey has been kept waiting in front of the EU and how it has been humiliated with unequal treatment during the membership process. Keeping someone in the waiting room implies that the person who is keeping people waiting has power, superiority, authority and the initiative to accept or reject the person waiting to see him. In addition to expressing of a power differential, the word order in particular sentences clarifies the tedium of membership talks, as in the case of the phrase, “After 42 years of waiting”, which is positioned at the beginning of the sentence. Furthermore, Turkey’s lengthy EU journey has also been depicted with the phrase, “Knocking on the door of the European Union for 40 years”, again emphasizing the long lasting process of membership and depicting Turkey’s relative weakness.

According to the discourse of the news items, the EU is so skeptical about Turkey that it will “scrutinize” every aspect of Turkey’s adoption of its regulations, regarding, in particular, its track record in respect to human rights and civil liberties. The reason why the word “scrutinize” is preferred in news texts has to do
with the EU’s anxiety about the judiciary system in Turkey. Additionally, this word implies that the EU has the absolute power and moral superiority with which to question and correct the system of a candidate country which has an unsuitable or improper administrative system.

Unlike the Daily Telegraph, The Guardian depicted Turkey’s application process as a 40-year ‘dream’ of joining the European Union, and described the EU as a ‘family’ which shares the same values and has a very strong relationship among its members. Additionally, the Guardian preferred not to use metaphors or phrases like “waiting room”, and “knocking on Europe’s door”, etc. to exaggerate the fact that Turkey has been kept away from the negotiation table deliberately or to emphasize that Turkey has been placed in a humiliating position in the process. While the Daily Telegraph describes the EU as a club, The Guardian defines it as a family. The difference between these two sociological concepts is that while the members of clubs are tied to each other by official rules, the relationships between family members are based mainly on unofficial and highly intimate principles. Furthermore, the phrase “European family” is important in terms of emphasizing blood ties and kinship among the members of the EU nations, nations that are highly compatible with each other; it implies that Turkey should be in perfect harmony with the other members if it wants to join the EU without raising serious doubts.

Based on exhausting and interminable discussions, the EU’s decision about launching the process of talks with Turkey was described as a historic decision for Europe and for the international community as a whole by some European authorities, in particular, Tony Blair, the British prime minister, and his foreign secretary, Jack Straw. This discourse projects two significant meanings, one of which emphasizes the importance of the decision as a turning point for both sides, with the other one emphasizing the difficulty of reaching a consensus.
Turkey as a Country Warned and Criticized by the EU

When the media’s output is analyzed in detail, it becomes clear that Turkey is constantly under scrutiny by the European Union, which warns, criticizes and threatens Turkish practices so that they meet its requirements, which amount to eighty thousands pages of regulations. Additionally, EU authorities make it clear that if Turkey does not obey its EU obligations and instead violates Europe’s core values, the membership process will face a very serious threat and may be halted. Being chastised with what has been called a “blunt warning” from Brussels, Turkey is portrayed as a country that has no power or initiative to resist EU regulations which are further presented as unalterable, and as an ultimate series of rules. Moreover, the word ‘warn’ is mainly used as a response when a person or institution resists the tasks it has to implement. As seen in this statement “…EU leaders warned [R. Tayyip Erdogan] against the proposal, saying it suggested that he was seeking to lead Turkey towards Islamic rule. Mr. Erdogan then withdrew the proposal”, it seems that Turkey is so strictly under the control of the EU authorities that it is impossible for a law to be passed in the Turkish National Assembly without their consent. Thus, it is made clear that the EU regulations should be taken as a measure before adopting new codes; otherwise, warnings from Brussels will reach Ankara as soon as the newspapers cover the event. Not only do the EU authorities send a message of warning to Ankara but they have also accused the Turkish Government, and sometimes the prime minister, of not meeting its EU commitments and of diverting Turkey towards the Islamic side. In other words, passing over the EU boundaries is perceived as moving towards Islam, which is described as the opposite or wrong direction.

The intention of the Turkish government in putting Europe’s requests into practice is emphasized with the word “bow” which has a negative association and depicts the pressure of the European Union and the inability of Turkey to stand firm. Being a term which
is mainly used in religious texts, “bow” indicates the weakness of a man in front of an unbearable power, such as, God. Use of the term “bow” in such news briefs as the following, “Turkey’s parliament last night bowed to European Union demands and passed a liberalizing penal code which should open the way to talks with Ankara on EU membership” implies that the authority of the EU is superior to that of the Turkish National Assembly, which is the highest institution representing the sovereignty of Turkish society.

The rhetorical dimensions of the news items that cover the warnings by EU ministers are so strong that readers can easily be convinced that Turkey deserves such treatment. Since Turkey signed agreements with the EU, it has promised full cooperation and obedience to EU regulations, without any exception. For instance, Turkey is expected to apply the Ankara protocol, signed by Turkey and EU members, which allows all 25 EU countries - including the Greek Cypriots - to trade with Turkey in 2005, and now it is expected that Turkey will lift the embargo it had applied to Greek Cypriots.

Conditional Clauses and the Atmosphere of Fear and Anxiety

The statements of authorized people from the European Union include various conjunctions, such as “if,” “unless,” “although,” “even though,” “even if,” etc., to imply that Turkey’s entrance to the ‘European family’ is bound by certain regulations which have to be obeyed without exception, as implied in this paragraph: “Turkey’s hard line stance is destabilizing lengthy membership talks. Mr. Rehn made clear last week Turkey could be in trouble unless it changes its ways by the time the commission publishes its annual progress report in the autumn. ‘We may face a period of political tension in EU-Turkey relations,’ he told Reuters. ‘The commission is working to avoid a train crash at the end of the year’ The European Commission fears the membership talks could unravel unless Turkey abides by its commitments.” Instead of confirming
that Turkey will be a member of the EU if it meets the requirements, the sentences stress the negative side of the membership process by focusing on improbable, negative developments and emphasizes that Turkey will face serious obstacles causing the loss of its chance to be part of the European family. Thus, fear and anxiety is spread not only among the members of the EU but also in the realm of Turkish public opinion, planting the idea that Turkey will not be subjected to an objective evaluation process by EU authorities.

Additionally, as clearly stated in the following sentence, “Turkey must undergo a ‘major cultural revolution’ if it is ever to join the European Union, France’s President Jacques Chirac insisted yesterday”, Turkey either must experience a major cultural revolution or its membership process will be cancelled automatically. In fact, this is the way in which the leaders of some European countries, such as France or Austria, attempt to douse the aspirations of opposition leaders regarding Turkey in their countries. As seen in the quotation above, Jacques Chirac, the French president, insists that Turkey bring about a cultural revolution by using phrases like “must”, “insistent” and “ever”, which emphasize the authority of his determination of the subject. Needless to say, Turkey is described as a country that is not only economically but also culturally different and underdeveloped; that is, it is seen as the ‘other’ in Europe. In other words, Turkey, being culturally the other, can be a member country only if it transforms its eastern culture to ‘the’ Western one.

The reason why some EU officials prefer to use conditional sentences with ifs, even ifs, etc. is because they are trying to stress that the latest decision will be made by taking the public opinion of the EU countries into consideration; this is done in order not to lose political support and also because they want to hint that Turkey will never join the EU family as a Muslim country. As stated by Ursula Plassnik, the Austrian foreign minister, “... entry would depend on the EU’s ability to "absorb" new nations.” As Turkey’s
membership bid continues, EU authorities repeatedly put forward new concepts that are unfamiliar, and which are subject to discussions and debate. So, Turkey is compared to a marathon runner who is struggling to reach an end point which is continuously extended by the authorities, preventing him from finishing the race.

**Turkey as an Obedient Country before the EU**

Discourse is defined as the exchange of ideas between those who communicate with each other, and implies which party is relatively more powerful. In Turkey the phrase müzakere is used most often to describe the talks between the Turkey and the EU. With an Arabic root, the word müzakere denotes that two equal sides are exchanging views about related issues. The term denotes respect and common understanding and the idea that neither side has the right to get the other to do something without his/her consent. Contrary to this, EU officials prefer to use various phrases such as “talks” or “discussions”, which do not carry the same positive meaning as müzakere.

It can be clearly observed that Turkey’s statements towards the EU have been depicted in the western media through the use of various words such as “pleas,” or “talks,” etc., all of which connote that Turkey is powerless and asking for the mercy of the EU. Contrary to this, Europe’s explanations are expressed in terms like “request,” “putting pressure,” “pressing,” “warning,” etc., which connote that the EU has superiority and a right over Turkey to keep it on track during the membership process. As can be seen clearly in this sentence, “Turkey’s plea splits Brussels hierarchy,” Turkey has no power of initiative, but the EU is in a position to do it a favor. Furthermore, with the above-mentioned phrases, like press, warn or push, it is implied that Turkey does not want to do its homework, so the EU is forcing it to do whatever is needed by means of blackmail or threats. The phrase “push” implies that
someone is not willingly moving, but rather is being forced. The discourse regarding the position of Turkey depicts the approaches of an upper class country towards a lower class one. This is how the West describes its culture and identity, because, as Derrida states, an identity’s constitution is always based on excluding something and establishing a violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles – man/woman, etc. (Hall 1996).

Unlike the discourse of the British media and the EU officials, the discourse of R. Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, implies that Turkey has equal rights similar to other EU candidate countries and should be treated fairly. Even though the discourse of the EU officials connotes that the EU’s is the superior side, Erdogan insists on emphasizing that Turkey has some sort of power to accept or reject its requests. Similar phrases and terms which indicate that Turkey is able to correct the errors of the EU are used in this statement by R. Tayyip Erdogan “Mr Erdogan warned yesterday that the EU would have passed up an opportunity to bridge a "clash of civilizations" between the Christian and Muslim worlds if it scuppered Turkey's dream of joining the European mainstream... "Either [the EU] will show political maturity and become a global power, or it will end up a Christian club,” this is to say, Erdogan is struggling to locate Turkey on an equal footing with the EU at the level of discourse. While The Guardian gives place to the discourse of the Turkish prime minister, the Daily Telegraph often constructs the news items regarding Turkey from the viewpoint and discourse of the EU authorities. For instance, it prefers not to use phrases like “request” or “warn” when delivering the statement of the Turkish authorities; instead, the most frequent phrases are “Turkey told the EU” or “Turkey said to the EU”

How Can an Enemy be Transformed into a Family Member?

The relationships between Turkey and the European countries are depicted in various ways. While Greece, Greek Cyprus and Austria
are depicted as enemies of Turkey, other countries, including France and the Netherlands, are portrayed as opposing countries. Turkish “enemies” Greece and Austria have undergone unforgettable historical experiences with Turkey, which can be found in textbooks; this helps to create stereotypes in the minds of their citizens against Turkey. For instance, for Austrian society, the siege of Vienna has a symbolic meaning that creates indelible negative stereotypes about Turkey. Greece has similar memories dating back to the Ottoman Empire and both the Turks and Greeks have negative images about each other dating from this time. Now, the most difficult question is how these stereotypes can be cleansed from the memory in the West and replaced with another one, creating a positive image of Turkey.

Because of its combination of modern-day fears about Muslim immigration and historical suspicion, Austria comes to the fore in the matter of Turkey’s EU accession, unlike the other 25 members of the EU. The subconscious attitude of the Austrian voters determines the main policies of the political parties regarding Turkey. Schussel, the Austrian prime minister, runs two-faced policies giving two different messages about Turkey, one of which is given behind closed doors at the EU and the other delivered in front of public opinion. Furthermore, Austria abuses Turkish membership for the sake of Croatia, which is described as a fellow Christian country, in its bid to become a member of the European family. The following quotations clarify the inconsistent position of the Austrian prime minister: “Mr Schussel, whose fragile conservative coalition faces tricky provincial elections on Sunday, said he was only listening to public opinion. EU diplomats expressed deep cynicism, noting that he had personally endorsed the existing wording of Turkey’s accession agreement, not once but twice, at successive summits of all 25 EU heads of state and government.” “Turkey will today face a new setback to its EU ambition when Austria declares that it is wrong to open membership talks with Ankara
while blocking Austria’s near neighbor - and fellow Christian country - Croatia.” The difference between the Daily Telegraph and The Guardian in terms of covering Austria’s two-faced attitude towards Turkey is that while the Guardian defines it as hostility, the Daily Telegraph prefers to explain the situation by using the phrase “Turko-phobic”

The policies executed by France, another opposing country, are depicted as an “Asterix complex” by the German ambassador to Paris. Like Austrian Prime Minister Schussel, French President Jacques Chirac always follows a hypocritical policy regarding Turkey, giving positive messages to the Turkish authorities and the opposite to the French public opinion, owing to fears of losing public support.

In fact, looking beyond contemporary media coverage, there is a great deal of material that creates negative images and stereotypes against the Turks in history books, plays, movies, etc. in Western countries. For example, some parts of Shakespeare’s Othello are very good examples of a Western source depicting a negative Turkish image. Othello presents a colonial picture of the “Moor” lost in a superior culture. Othello is admirably proud, but also not that bright. The same implication that a potential invader combines danger with amusement value is there in the explicitly Turkish sexual politics of Mozart’s Entführung and particularly in its central character Osmin, a comical figure, but also a menacing presence.

**Rhetorical Devices Used in News Items**

News rhetoric is a term that encompasses the persuasive dimensions of texts by focusing on the devices used to convince readers; there are many devices, such as alliteration, encomium, exemplification, showing evidence, comparison, using attribution and numerical information, etc. that can be used to persuade readers in the course of constructing a news story. Various rhetorical devices
are used in the Turkish news items published in the British media. The narrative dimensions of the texts are very strong and, in addition, it appears as if they are structured specifically to create a negative image of Turkey. In particular, numerical information, attributions from credible sources, historical information, quotations from various opinion polls, comparisons, etc. are among those devices which are applied most. For instance, the following quotation cites public opinion research: “France and Austria have both promised their citizens referendums on Turkish entry. A recent European Commission opinion poll showed 70 per cent of French voters opposed to Turkish entry, and 80 per cent of Austrians.” Taking advantage of quotations from various leaders of EU countries is another tactic of constructing more persuasive texts. For instance, Silvio Berlusconi’s statement is quoted to emphasize Turkey’s possible position if the EU refuses to launch talks with it. According to Berlusconi, the former Italian prime minister, if rejected Turkey would feel like a spurned lover and if love is rejected, it can turn to hate.

Regarding the EU, reputable sources are EU officials, European leaders, ministers, the EU commission, EU experts, etc., and journalists very often quote from them to strengthen the rhetorical dimension of their news texts. Furthermore, they prefer statements from sources that are consistent with what they really believe, and they do not avoid giving more coverage to radical politicians who are furious about accepting a Muslim country as a member of what they call the “Christian club”.

Exemplifying is one of the most frequently used rhetorical devices in news items. It is preferred in particular to support and justify the policies of leaders who oppose Turkey’s entry. This is why opinion polls are the most frequent type of examples applied in this regard. As seen in the following quotation there are many examples quoted from surveys conducted by various institution in order to measure opinions regarding the enlargement policies of
the EU. As in the case of the following quotation, emphasizing a poll that indicates 40% of EU citizens want Turkey to be a member of the EU family, with the figure falling to 20% and 10% in France and Austria, the news items aims to deliver a message to the EU authorities who have promised that the citizens will have the last say, letting them know that they should not make any decisions without taking public opinion into consideration: “Surveys suggest less than 40% of EU citizens want Turkey to join, with the figure falling to around 20% and 10% in France and Austria respectively. Both countries have said they intend to hold referendums on whether Turkey should be allowed to join the EU”

Irony is another rhetorical device that is used in news items. In this sentence, “Turkey, which in its earlier, Ottoman form occupied much of the Balkans, and therefore cut them off from what was then the Christian club of Europe, is now the European door-opener for its former colonies.” One of the probable missions of Turkey in the EU is ironically delivered by means of a comparison with what the Ottoman Empire did, conquering the Balkans up to Austria and cutting them off from Europe. Appealing to emotions, namely using pathos is also an effective way of convincing and motivating readers. Even though it is rarely the preferred way of delivering a message, pathos is used when mothers’ feelings regarding EU enlargement are expressed. 69

The Cyprus Issue and the Portrayal of Turkey

In the discourse of the British media, Turkey is portrayed as an invader in Cyprus and a country that is keeping its soldiers illegally on the island. Regarding the Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is mainly depicted as “Turkish-controlled North Cyprus,” or “the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” or Turkish Cypress, etc., the discourse used by both newspapers is similarly negative. Since Turkey is portrayed as an invader on the island, with its army being kept there illegally, according to this discourse
the invaded island belongs to another country, namely Greek Cyprus, rather than Turkey. Turkey is also portrayed as doing something wrong in rejecting the recognition of Greek Cyprus, which is recognized internationally. So, in keeping with international consensus, Turkey should withdraw its soldiers from the island. In short, the discourse of the British newspapers is parallel to that constructed by Western countries against Turkey.

There is a bombardment of information by the newspapers that contradicts the thesis put forward by Turkey. As can be clearly understood from the following comments made by the journalist at the end of news items from both papers, readers may justify the demands of the Greek side: “Turkey has steadfastly refused to have diplomatic relations with Greek-dominated Cyprus since Turkey invaded the island in the wake of an Athens-inspired coup in 1974. Ankara claims recognition can only come when the two feuding sides agree to sign a UN peace settlement.” “Turkish troops invaded the Turkish-controlled north of the island in 1974 after Greek-Cypriot nationalists sought to join Cyprus with Greece. Turkey’s refusal to co-operate with United Nations efforts to reunite the island, and its record on human rights, were long cited by the EU as the chief reasons for refusing to give it membership.” To state this more clearly, in every comment the phrase “invasion” is used by the newspapers to emphasize that the 1974 operation by the Turkish army was illegal and unjustifiable. Furthermore, the name Turkey is particularly emphasized with active sentences when a negative event is attributed to it. As in the case of these two sentences: “Turkey has steadily refused … or Turkish troops invaded...” In both papers, Turkey is characterized as a country which steadily makes negative steps and which does not cooperate with the United Nations. In short, the perception of both the Daily Telegraph and the Guardian, regarding the Cyprus issue is so similar that sentence patterns, phrases and background information are almost identical.
Portrayal of the PKK

The PKK is one of the issues that takes up the most coverage in the British media. Although the organization is responsible for killing more than thirty thousand soldiers and innocent citizens in Turkey, it is depicted as a Kurdish separatist and freedom organization. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, is portrayed as a guerilla leader and its members are defined as insurgent Kurdish people, paramilitary groups, guerilla groups, separatists or freedom fighters. Even though the PKK has been officially recognized as a terrorist organization by the EU, British newspapers avoid using the same attribution. Giving very detailed information about the PKK problem in Turkey, these newspapers somehow never mention how Turkey, and particularly the army, has suffered heavy losses because of its terrorist attacks since 1984.

Describing the PKK assaults and massacres that took place in the 1980’s and the 1990’s as “insurrections,” the newspapers, as can be seen in the quotation below, criticize the Turkish army for its brutal reprisals to PKK actions: “Across the country’s troubled south-east, which bore the brunt of the Kurdish insurrection of the Eighties and Nineties and the state’s brutal response to it, security forces are on high alert. Kongra-Gel, the Kurdish paramilitary group once called the PKK, has renounced its five-year ceasefire. Human rights groups say more than 400 people have died since the summer”.

It should be pointed out that this kind of discourse is so problematic that the agent of the event is not mentioned in the news items and consequently the reason why the people lost their lives is unknown. The following quotation is similarly misleading: “Guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, have battled government forces in a conflict that has killed more than 37,000 people in south eastern Turkey since 1984.” It has been claimed that the reason why people lost their lives is because of the conflict between the armed forces and what are called the Kurdish gueril-
The Guardian puts it thus: “Last year, rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) resumed a long armed insurrection, which had petered out five years earlier. More than 35,000 people were killed in the first bout of bloodshed, and at least 100 Turkish soldiers have died in the past year.” Describing the Kurdish people as a minority, Diyarbakır as a Kurdish rather than a Turkish city, and terrorist attacks as a freedom struggle, the British media uses passive sentences in order not to create a negative image of the PKK, thus disguising its roles and responsibilities.

Taking an active role in international politics, the British media claimed that international public opinion was not convinced that Öcalan was judged in an objective way according to the laws. Consequently, the Court of Human Rights requested that Turkey retry him. The main question, which should be raised at this moment, is how the newspapers can be so sure about a worldwide opinion that Ocalan was not judged according to legitimate principles.

Conclusions

It has been observed that the relationship between Turkey and Europe dates back to the period of the Ottoman Empire, and that the conflicts experienced then have created stereotypes and images of Turkey in the memory of European nations. The discourse of the British media regarding Turkey is not the reason for, but rather the result of, a deep-rooted Orientalist discourse and it is clear evidence that this discourse is still very effective in shaping texts about Turkey. For this reason, Turkey should find a way to change the stereotypes that the European nations hold about it. The EU media should abandon their habits of covering events from a negative approach which create and sustain a negative image of Turkey in the European mind. European public opinion regarding Turkey will not change unless the media abandons its biases and prejudices. Therefore, the European media must be aware of their
responsibilities before determining how to cover and construct
news events regarding a country which has strong and historical
ties with European countries. In short, the reason why Turkey’s
entry to the EU is relatively more remote is due to the effects of an
Orientalist discourse that describes Turkey as the ‘other’ in terms of
cultural differences.

NOTES
2 The Guardian, February 22, 2005
4 Ibid.
6 The Daily Telegraph, October 04, 2005.
8 The Daily Telegraph, September 27, 2004.
10 Ibid.
12 The Daily Telegraph, September 02, 2005.
15 The Daily Telegraph, October 04, 2005.
19 The Daily Telegraph, October 10, 2005.
22 Ibid.
24 The Daily Telegraph, October 05, 2005.
33 The Daily Telegraph, October 05, 2005.

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Turks in Europe

34 Ibid..
36 The Guardian, October 6, 2005.
37 The Daily Telegraph, June 28, 2005.
40 Ibid.
43 The Guardian, November 26, 2005
Turkey, the European Union and Europe’s Anti-Corruption Discourse

Tim Jacoby

This article aims to get beyond more commonplace descriptions of anti-corruption measures that tend to focus on narrower institutional or technocratic issues of organisational behaviour and change. It attempts to locate the current discourse on Turkey’s allegedly disproportionate corruption problem within a wider context of interaction with European political elites (of which the leaders of the European Union and other major multilateral bodies are key representatives). It looks firstly at the development of corruption as a salient topic in Turkish-European relations over recent years.

The rise of good governance conditionalities are traced and considered alongside Europe’s drive to gain greater economic access to Turkish markets. Here, it is argued that portraying Turkey as endemically corruption serves the purpose of facilitating greater capital penetration in a way similar to methods deployed in other areas of the European periphery. The second section of this article continues by suggesting that such a representation of the Turkish
civil service not only justifies the marketisation of previously pub-
luc services, but also legitimises a broader social transformation
with Europe as the primary agent of change. Here, an emphasis on
Turkey’s cultural features – over more material concerns – is used
to obscure the weakness of corruption data by positioning Europe’s
anti-corruption measures within a moralising discourse based
upon an older account of the Turkish ‘other’.

Corruption Claims in Turkey

In the past, the verb corrupere (to corrupt) has been used specifical-
ly ‘to describe the evil act of paying a judge to decide unjustly in
one’s favour’ (Noonan 1984: 38). Today, though, it is more com-
monly applied in a general sense to characterise a state, society or
individual ‘that has lapsed from a standard of goodness’ (Kurer
2005: 224). For the most part, demonstrably corrupt acts have
attracted considerable moral opprobrium – particularly from inter-
national donors and their agential elites. In 1996, for instance, then
World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, urged donors ‘to deal
with the cancer of corruption’ (quoted in Marquette 2004: 3), while
former Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, used his inaugura-
tion speech to place himself ‘at the service of the nation for a deci-
sive struggle against corruption’ (quoted in Baran 2000: 146).
During the Cold War, however, the imperatives of maintaining
bloc unity and the receptiveness of client states overrode, in most
cases, concerns about the integrity of recipient public sectors. As
Heather Marquette notes, until the 1990s, ‘donors rarely spoke out
against the rampant corruption within borrowing countries or wide
misuse of donor funds. Additionally, no projects or programs dealt
specifically with corruption’ (2004: 3). Indeed, many writers
believed that corruption was an inevitable corollary of modernisa-
tion which could, in some instances, assist in social integration and
economic development by overcoming bureaucratic inertia (Leff
1964; Ben-Dor 1974).
Within the relationship between the EU and Turkey, concerns over corruption in Turkey have only recently emerged with any significant political importance. Previously, Turkey’s credentials as the only Muslim member of NATO and a key element in John Foster Dulles’ northern tier of defence against the Eastern bloc, meant that conditionalities tied to the aid it received from its Western allies were generally more focused on regime stability than public accountability (American support for the 1980 military coup and the retrogressive content of subsequent constitutional reforms is a case in point) (Jacoby 2003). Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s first application to join what was then the European Economic Community in 1959 was immediately succeeded by a bloody takeover by Chief-of-Staff General Cemal Gürsel (including the hanging of three cabinet members) did not obstruct the signing of the 1963 Ankara Agreement which envisaged the progressive establishment of a customs union. Neither this, nor an additional protocol signed in 1970 (also briefly predating a military intervention) setting out a timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EEC, made any mention of corruption.

While concerns were raised over public sector accountability during the gross violations of human rights which followed the 1980 coup, ultimately the European Commission did not obstruct an application for full membership submitted in 1987 and it went on to confirm Turkey’s eligibility in 1990. Even with the establishment of the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, which set out the way in which full membership could be achieved, issues of accountability and corruption were mainly referred to obliquely within catch-all phrases such as the requirement to maintain ‘institutions guaranteeing the democracy [and] the rule of law’ and a ‘functioning market economy’. This was despite the Turkish state being embroiled in a devastating conflict with activists from the country’s Kurdish minority which significantly eroded the public’s faith in the civil service. By then, though, the end of the Cold War had begun to
move European priorities away from military deterrence and towards cultural and economic factors. As Meltem Müftüler-Bac puts it, ‘the disappearance of the Soviet enemy eroded Turkey’s position in the Europe [sic]. It no longer served a clear function and was shunted to the back of the line of candidates for EU membership’ (2000: 29).

Corruption and issues of public sector accountability emerged as key elements in Turkey’s demotion. This was part of a growing emphasis on governance concerns beginning in the early 1990s and continuing to today. While contemporary anti-corruption policy and rhetoric continues to be abbreviated by the imperatives of Great Power politics (the strategic importance of Kazakhstan and oil wealth of Equatorial Guinea have, for instance, largely shielded both states from international scrutiny), a greater focus has generally been placed on issues of fiscal scrutiny and reform within aid-recipient states. International analysts argue that unearned income, or rents, act as a corrosive influence on a state’s revenue base and, therefore, on its social legitimacy. A “rentier mentality”, it is suggested, might arise which, in breaking the labour-remuneration determinant of economic behaviour, could reduce the incentive to work harder for greater reward and lead to less productivity and an unattractive investment environment (Luciani 1990; Moore 2004). Influenced by the work of World Bank economic consultants such as Robert Klitgaard (1988) and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999) (who earlier wrote that ‘corrupt incentives are the nearly inevitable consequences of all government attempts to control market forces’ (1978: 9 original emphasis)), donors now equate anti-corruption endeavours with the promotion of free markets and economic liberalisation. The result has been a significant increase in the size of the anticorruption industry to an estimated global value of $100 million today (Michael 2004a).

This is particularly apparent in the so-called ‘transitional’ economies of the European periphery. Under pressure from
donors, these are moving away from state-controlled enterprise and import substitution towards open access for foreign capital. Here, anti-corruption measures are said to play an important part in lowering transaction costs and public spending which may then help to maintain currency values and prevent inflation, thereby reducing volatility and making foreign direct investment more attractive. To achieve this, it is argued that state-owned interests should be taken out of the hands of politically powerful interest groups and privatised to increase competition and reduce market-unfriendly regulation (Cammack 2002). The lucrative nature of such reforms has led to considerable corporate interest in countries such as Albania, Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic where, in pursuing what The White House calls ‘a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise’ (2002: ix), corruption has, as Bryane Michael notes, ‘been increasingly mentioned as one of the main problems Central and Eastern Europe has faced’ (2004b: 17). The global media’s coverage of corruption in the region increased, Michael continues, from 800 mentions in 1991 to over 1200 in 2002, while references to anticorruption measures rose from approximately 20 to more than 120 over the same period.

A similar focus is apparent in analyses of Turkey where corruption is frequently described as ‘endemic’ or ‘a huge problem’. In political terms, there is, apparently, ‘no institution into which corruption has not entered’, while ‘procurement practices lack transparency so much so that before the bidding is started the result is already fixed’. In Nuray Aydinoğlu’s view, public investment at all levels ‘ultimately depends on local authorities and municipalities and most are corrupt’ (quoted in Green 2005: 532). Indeed, it is certainly true that opaque clientelistic links have emerged between the civil service and private sector corporate capital, especially during Turkey’s ambitious privatisation programme of the 1990s. The sale of the state’s majority holdings in both Petrol Ofisi, the country’s largest hydrocarbon supply network, and
Türkbank were, for instance, plagued by allegations of financial and procedural irregularities, ultimately leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Yılmaz’s ‘main aid’ and Minister of State, Eyüp Aşık, in September 1998. For Michael Blackman, the perception of Turkey as endemically corrupt ‘helps to explain why foreign direct investment is so low’ – Turkey is placed 109th in the United Nations’ Conference on Trade and Development’s performance index.

This perception is accompanied by the widespread belief that the array of vested interests which surround the country’s corrupt forms of patronage are so impenetrable as to represent a problem too great for Ankara to resolve. Zeyno Baran, for instance, notes that, while many Turkish ‘governments [have] vowed to fight it [corruption], none have [sic] adequately addressed the problem’ (Baran 2000: 129). The OECD points to the contents of a 2000 national report on public sector ethics and integrity which highlighted problems of civil service politicisation, a lack of recruitment impartiality, falling public sector wages, corrupt personnel management and the misapplication of career advancement and disciplinary procedures (OECD 2000: 307-11). Regardless of the fact that the Turkish government had, since the (partial) end of the Kurdish conflict in 1999, made a number of important regulatory changes (including the restructuring the banking system under a new supervisory agency, the computerisation of the taxation system and the revision of public procurement legislation) an EU-OECD follow-up visit in July 2004 reported that ‘all of these issues [those recounted in the 2000 document] were [still] identified as continuing issues’ (SIGMA 2004: 4). As a result, Turkey has, despite recently founding a conglomeration of corruption-monitoring civil, legal and labour organisations supported by new judicial processes intended to expedite corporate fraud investigations (leading to the imprisonment of over 100 private sector executives), remained broadly stationary (at around 77th in the world) within Transparency International’s index of corruption over recent years (Şenatalar 2002: 71).
Consequently, despite significant improvements in public sector scrutiny and accountability, Turkey continues to be portrayed as a comparatively high risk for foreign investors. In 2000, The Economist’s Intelligence Unit, for instance, estimated that, on a scale of one to 100, Turkey represents an exposure of over 50 – higher than India, Iran, Argentina and Brazil (cited in Şenatalar 2002: 67). Estimated growth of over 4 per cent (higher than Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea) over the next 10 to 15 years, however, has maintained considerable international interest from Western capital. In particular, opportunities have been identified in the discrepancy between existing risk (and thus investment disincentives for competitors) and future political and economic improvements. Here, a sense pervades that Turkey, left to its own devices, is immutably obscurantist. As Bruce Kuniholm notes, ‘the only really successful reforms in Turkish history have been in the context of a response to outside pressure’. In political terms, this means that, in Kuniholm’s view, ‘the question of accession to the EU is an opportunity to get done what the Turks cannot do on their own (2001: 46)’. This is also the opinion of Markus Jaeger from Deutsche Bank who writes that the impact of accession will ‘be unambiguously positive as Turkey will benefit from continued EU-supervised reforms, increased economic stability and higher foreign investment flows’.

Indeed, it is this growing awareness of Turkey’s economic promise which underpins the ‘highlighting of Turkey’s “distinctiveness” in the “new Europe”’ (Larabee and Lesser 2003: 47). The European Union’s share in Turkey’s foreign trade has, for instance, continued to enlarge significantly, to the extent that Turkey is now the EU’s 7th biggest trading partner (up from 9th in 1990). Concurrently, the proportion of Turkey’s imports from the EU has risen to over 50 per cent, amounting to over 4 per cent of the EU’s total exports. ‘Mutual trade between Turkey and the EU is [thus] a key factor in EU-Turkey relations’ (EU 2005). To ensure this relationship is not disrupted by increased transaction costs or exclu-
sionary clientelism, the EU, in keeping with other major multilaterals, has gradually moved away from the comparatively passive corruption awareness-raising schemes (derived from the World Bank’s Africa model) of the mid-1990s, to more proactive capacity-building measures now called “anti-corruption programming” (Marquette 2003; Bailey 2000). Unlike its less vigorous predecessor, this does not consist of the dissemination of blueprint policies written in Geneva or Brussels. Instead, anti-corruption programmes take the form of heterogeneous, bespoke measures increasingly focused on quantifiable development and governance indicators to be used as a basis for international comparison. As a consequence, corruption has become more and more ‘correlated with civil liberties, civil service professionalism, rule of law, regulatory direction, unofficial economy, press freedom, and indicators of transition’ (Michael 2004b: 21).

In the case of Turkey, these types of anti-corruption programme have made up a growing part of its relationship with the EU. As a signatory to the 1995 Convention on the Protection of the European Community’s Financial Interests, the 1997 Convention on the Fight Against Corruption, the 1998 Joint Action on Corruption in the Private Sector and the OECD’s 2000 Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, Turkey’s civil service, customs service, police force and judiciary have received extensive training funded by an overall EU pre-accession assistance package of around 1.15 billion Euros (1996-2004 inclusive (the current budgetary allocation is 300 million Euros for 2005 and 500 million Euros for 2006)) (Michael 2004c: 21-3). Such initiatives have sought to correlate administrative capacity with improved human rights which are, in turn, assumed to lead to greater public sector legitimacy and thus improved effectiveness. As the EU Council makes clear, Turkey must ‘adopt and implement’ the EU’s wishes in areas as diverse as ‘the field of corruption, fight against drugs, organised crime, money laundering and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil
matters [and] further intensify international cooperation in those fields’ (EU 2001: 18). Changes in these areas will, the EU believes, do much to reduce overall economic volatility. The official explanation for the 2001 financial crash was, for instance, explicitly grounded on an apparent ‘failure of the Turkish bureaucracy to implement the necessary structural adjustment reforms on time’ (Turkish Under-Secretariat of the Treasury quoted in Yeldan 2002: 3).

Despite the strength and sanguinity of the EU’s belief that anti-corruption programming in general, and the current policy of reform in Turkey in particular, will produce outcomes of self-evident value, its basically teleological approach generates a number of fundamental problems. By concentrating purely on the perceived benefits of a lessened incidence of corruption, for instance, the EU has failed to address fully the difficulties of establishing precisely what constitutes corruption, its measurement and its social determinants. In place of explicit substantiation is, the next section will argue, an emphasis, both subliminal and overt, on Turkey’s cultural heritage as the key influence on social practice and public accountability. This, it will be suggested, offers an elastic and efficacious means for the EU to homogenise Turkish societal values and present them as incommensurate with a similarly undifferentiated notion of European culture. The discourse of a corrupt Turkey thus serves the dual purpose of improving market access for European capital and, as the growing profitability of the customs union demonstrates, obstructing the increasingly problematic (in terms of domestic public opinion) and economically superfluous political marriage.

Culture and Corruption

The EU’s equivocation over stating precisely why it regards Turkish public sector accountability to be persistently delinquent is exemplified in its (and the OECD’s) current operational definition of corruption as ‘any act or practice which could be characterised as
“abuse of public office for (illegitimate) private advantage” either by an official or a private citizen’ (SIGMA 2004: 3). This seeks to combine two of the most common definitions of corruption – those based on public interest and those that emphasize the duties of public office (Heidenheimer 1970). The first tends to see corruption as manifest ‘whenever a power-holder is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interest’ (Friedrich 1966: 74). This is acutely ambiguous since it both presupposes agreement on what constitutes damage to the public interest and fails to identify a supervisory authority. It is, as the EU and other international donors found during the corruption awareness-raising initiatives of the early 1990s, difficult to objectify and operationalise in a way which finds widespread support (Scott 1972). The second definitional strand apparent in the EU and OECD’s approach is the idea that actions motivated by personal objectives violate the rules of public office (Nye 1967). While this has the potential to be quantified (so long as adequate mechanisms of scrutiny exist) by comparing observable behaviour with legislation, its emphasis on statute tends to ignore the social context in which the supposed corrupt act occurs (Gardiner 1993: 116). This renders such a definition vulnerable to the accusation that the reification of regulatory regimes is culturally specific and therefore impossible to generalise without making a great number of normative assumptions. Consequently, to classify the behaviour of individuals and groups outside the observer’s own cultural framework as “corrupt” may be, at best, epistemologically weak and, at worst, imperialistic (Bayley 1966).

Unsurprisingly, then, the EU’s attempts to implement studies of corruption through an inviolate notion of public office (reinforced by relentless anti-corruption programmes over the last ten years), have consistently attracted accusations of cultural imperialism. In Turkey, for instance, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the nationalist Milliyet Hareket Partisi, pointed out, in a speech of 2001, ‘that
states which claim to be friendly to Turkey should not try to pressure it into compromises on issues that the country considers fundamental and on which no concessions are possible’ (paraphrased in Dunér 2002: 146); a sentiment later supported by the Secretary General of the powerful National Security Council, Tuncer Kılınç, who described EU accession as a ‘neo-colonial force determined to divide Turkey’ (quoted in Eurasia Insight 13 March 2002). Moreover, despite political elites in Turkey and Europe spending many years attempting to associate the EU accession process with progressive social reform, a recent survey found that only 12 per cent of Turks expect it to bring a deepening and strengthening of democracy and only 8 per cent stated that they believe it will reduce corruption (Yılmaz cited in Hughes 2004: 60).

Indeed, the ability of such surveys to undermine or validate accession-related policies in Turkey has led the EU to turn to a third definition of corruption, public opinion. While extrapolating from the reported views of some of the public is inherently problematic, basing policy on the measurable preferences of local people has the advantage of offsetting accusations of cultural imperialism. In order to use such data to legitimise the development of policy, however, ‘users must’, Oskar Kurur notes ‘believe that there is sufficient common understanding of what constitutes corruption in the public sector to warrant the adoption of such a procedure’ (2005: 224). For this reason, the EU/OECD definition of corruption is augmented with data from a World Bank survey of 2000 showing that almost 100 per cent of business respondents ‘routinely paid bribes of up to 15 per cent of the contract value’, thereby supporting the thesis that Turkey suffers from an endemic culture of corruption and is thus needful of EU-led reform. Moreover, the fact that the same survey goes on to note that only around 20 per cent of respondents felt that ‘their interests had been adversely affected by [the] bribery of officials’ further reinforces the idea that there exists a widespread tacit acceptance of corruption in Turkey (SIGMA 2004. 4).
In this way, the EU’s use of public opinion data serves the dual purpose of permitting evaluations of corruption to be based on self-assessments of cultural proclivity and of legitimising external intervention aimed at institutionalising remedial cultural reforms. After all, Pranab Bardhan suggests, ‘what is regarded in one culture as corrupt may be considered a part of routine transaction in another… [I]n developing countries[, for instance,] gift-exchange is a major social norm in business transactions… [and] often takes precedence over public duties even for salaried public officials’ (1997: 1330). Such a situation is frequently ascribed to the Turkish context despite the very obvious fact that a long-term collapse in real public sector wages levels of around 70 per cent between 1978 and 1997 might well represent a far superior explanation of corrupt business practices (Cam 2002: 94, 103). There, writers such as Uğur Ömürğönülşen and M. Kemal Öktem, claim that there is ‘a lack of democracy culture [sic]’ which continues to necessitate the ‘indoctrination (education and training) of public servants about public service ethics’ (2005: 8). ‘The EU’s “soft power” is, in other words, held to be an important requisite in dealing with the cultural origins of corruption and consolidating ‘the “mentality revolution” needed for the full implementation of democratic reforms’ (Şahin Alpay cited in Wood and Quaisser 2005: 158).

 Particularly obstructive is, apparently, the continuing social importance of Islam. As Daniel Treisman notes, ‘religious traditions have often been thought to condition cultural attitudes to social hierarchy’. Despite Islam sharing neither a doctrine of vicarious atonement nor an intercessional priesthood, Treisman continues by suggesting that ‘where more “hierarchical religions” – Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam – dominate, challenges to office-holders might be rarer than in cultures shaped by more egalitarian or individualistic religions, such as Protestantism’ (2000: 403). For some, this is born out in Turkey where, owing to the influence of ‘traditionalists… infused with Islamic values’, many ‘organizations have centralized-decision making, a personalized leader-
ship style that is both autocratic and paternalistic, emphasis on hierarchy, and a patronage relationship between the leader and subordinate’ (Gopalan and Kavas 2005: 16). Such a caricature of Turkishness fits well with the widespread myth – long-existent, but popularised since the attacks on the United States in September 2001 – that ‘religion tends to produce a mind-set hostile to democracy among ordinary Muslims’ (Tessler and Altinoğolu 2004: 26). As Ellie Kedourie puts it the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of representation, or elections, of popular parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the idea of the secularity of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating groups and associations – all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition (1993: 5-6).

Although such a view cannot be empirically sustained in Turkey (Tessler and Altinoğolu 2004), it resonates well with the EU’s vague, yet pernicious, ‘qualms about a culture which is regarded as alien’ (Karlsson 2004: 14). Indeed, the image of the corrupt and undemocratic Turkish ‘other’, as part of an ‘insurmountable particularity’, has profound European antecedents (Neumann 1999: 59; Robbins 1996: 66). As F. Stephen Larabee and Ian Lesser observe, the ‘perception of Turks as “other” in Europe is deeply embedded in European’s collective memory and colors European views of Turkey today’. Consequently, they contend, many Europeans continue to ‘question the degree to which Turkey’s Islamic religious and cultural traditions are compatible with “European” values’ (2003: 46, 60). For instance, the former European Parliament President (1999-2002), Nicole Fontaine commented that, within debates over Turkey’s accession, it is ‘not possible to evade the problem of cultural integration’ (quoted in Müftüler-Bac 2000: 25). For many, this “problem” lies in what they understand to be Islam’s immutable incompatibility with the Western “way of life”. As former Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van Mierlo, puts it ‘there is a problem of a large Muslim state. Do we
want that in Europe?’ In reply, Helmut Kohl commented that, in his view, the EU represents a ‘civilisational project’ in which ‘Turkey has no place’ – a sentiment reiterated by the former French President, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who prophesised that Turkish accession would constitute ‘the end of Europe’.

With the arrival of the Justice and Development Party in government in 2002, which, according to Edgar Lenski, ‘is seen as proof of Turkey’s non-European culture [and] …may reasonably be considered to be alarming’ (2003: 91), accession analyses have continued to move ‘towards essentialist, primordial, cultural arguments highlighting the differences between Turkey and Europe based on questions of identity’ (Erensü and Adanlı 2004: 59). The party is described by Paul Kubicek as having ‘Islamist roots but a decidedly pro-EU agenda’ (emphasis added). Their decision to ‘ban discrimination against homosexuals’ and introduce ‘harsh punishment for “honor killings”’ were, he continues, ‘surprising’ given the party’s origins (2004: 19, 25). Such associations of Islamically-informed politics with anti-Western views, homophobia and misogyny have, since the attacks on the United States of 2001, been accompanied by widespread concerns over European Muslim minorities in general and closer ties with Turkey in particular. According to Timothy Garton Ash, for instance,

‘the most acute tension comes at the edges where they [Islam and the West] meet. It arises, in particular, from the direct, personal encounter of young, first- or second-generation Muslim immigrants with western, and especially European, secular modernity…. It threatens to make Europe a less civilised, less comfortable place to live over the next 10 years’

(The Guardian 15 September 2005).

Such concerns are high in France and Germany where a recent poll found 73 per cent and 78 per cent of respondents (respectively) felt worried about ‘Islamic extremism’. The same poll revealed that respondents in these two countries were amongst the least support-
ive of Turkish accession with 66 per cent and 65 per cent (respectively) stating that they oppose Ankara’s efforts to gain full EU membership (Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2005: 18).

Table 1: Complaints about Corruption (adapted from Michael 2004c: 21).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Institution</th>
<th>Perceived Corruption (10 = high)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Hospitals</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So perhaps, then, it is in the context of domestic popular concern that the EU’s focus on Turkish corruption should be seen. Its true efficacy, as a means to promote European economic development while keeping Turkey politically distanced, is revealed through a comparison with other EU accession states. As Table One illustrates, the perception of corruption within a wide range of public sector institutions is, in most cases, not markedly different from other EU accession countries – despite the fact that Turkey is still recovering from 20 years of civil war and the catastrophic earthquake of 1999 (both of which led to a marked increase in the public’s awareness of institutional failings). Slovakia and Romania, for example, were adjudged to have met the political criteria for accession as early as 1998 and permitted to begin formal candidature negotiations in 2000 (with Slovakia actually joining the EU in 2004) despite widespread concerns over their economic fragility and democratic capacity (Fişne 2003: 59). The former, for instance, was famously described as becoming ‘a hole in the map of Europe’ by American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1998 while Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar (1992-8) was regularly accused of undertaking ‘systematic efforts to dismantle externally imposed restraints on the power of [his] government’ (Krause 2003a: 66;
Krause 2003b: 57). In economic terms, Slovakia’s drive to increase foreign direct investment by cutting wage costs has led to considerable social instability including a general strike in 2003. Romania also spent much of the 1990s in a political ‘grey zone of stagnancy and irresolution’ under the widely criticised government of Ion Iliescu who, in 2000, returned to power in an election marked by a turn towards the extreme right (Craiu?u 2000: 169). The fact that both counties were forgiven such obvious shortcomings ‘suggests that there must be another variable, aside from politics and economics, that accounts for Turkey’s perpetual outsider status. That variable is’, Meltem Müftüler-Bac continues, ‘identity[, particularly the growing] ... redefinition of Europe’s identity along ethnonational and cultural lines’ (2000: 24, 32).

Conclusions

The Turk is Europe’s perennial “other”. Since the Middle Ages, the spectre of the hooded hoards just beyond Vienna has had a significant influence on European thought. One has, for instance, only to look up the definition of ‘Turk’ in the current edition of the Oxford English Dictionary to see the continuing association of Turkey with ‘a cruel, rigorous, or tyrannical man; a ... barbarian or savage; one who treats his wife hardly; a bad-tempered or unmanageable man. ... an unmanageable or violent child or youth... [a] human figure at which to practise shooting... [and a] hideous image to frighten children’. It is argued in this article that, within debates over Turkey’s relationship with Europe, there is evidence that such a view remains an important factor today. The value of ‘rediscovering culture’ (Novak 2004: 168) is part of a broader return to viewing non-Western society in non-material and apolitical terms. In many ways, an overarching notion of separateness or incompatibility has emerged in which an implied cultural superiority based on ill-informed generalisation is apparent. Promoted and radicalised by the attacks on Washington, New York, Madrid and London, Muslim society now bears the brunt of Western insecurity.
Although Turkey remains, for many, the acceptable face of Islam, its proximity, recent electoral turn towards religiosity, aspirations to join the EU and emigrant workforce maintains its place within European discourses of “the other”. While the expression of this takes many forms, amongst its principal elements is corruption. The use of this discourse by European elites, of which the leaders of the European Union are important representatives, serves, it has been argued here, the purpose of reducing hindrances to the capital penetration of the continent’s periphery by providing evidence of the need for external guidance and acculturation.

In this sense, this article has attempted to locate Europe’s discourse on Turkish corruption within a broader cultural and historical context. It has suggested that, in order to understand such a disproportionate emphasis, it is vital to comprehend both the nature of European capital penetration and the reasons behind Turkey’s perennial marginality. The fact that continental cooperation has long been seen as ‘a combination of the nations within Europe plus the formation of an overarching civilizational identity’ is a significantly divisive factor in EU-Turkey relations while the lucrative nature of European capital expansion into Turkey and its potential for the future represent important incentives in the development of closer ties (Buzan et al 1990: 51, emphasis added). This contradictory situation accounts both for much of the EU’s vacillation and for the paradoxical use of Turkey’s perceived corruption problem. As Erkan Erdoğdu explains, while the criterion ‘which explains Turkey’s perpetual place in the waiting room... [is] the perception of Turkey as culturally different’, the fact that, ‘as a large and rapidly expanding market, Turkey offers lots of business opportunities for EU companies’ means that ‘the EU has some indispensable interests in keeping Turkey close to itself’ (2002: 47-8).
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3 Turkish Daily News 8 January 1999.
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6 Deutsche Bank Research, 12 January 2005.
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