

EXPLAINING THE ARAB REVOLUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM AN IDENTITY- CENTRED REACTION TO A POSITIVE INVOLVEMENT

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Abstract

This article is a treatise on the Arab revolution from the aspect of globalization as an inconsistent process. It postulates that the inconsistent character of current globalization has exacerbated the conditions of the occurrence of the Arab spring, while explaining why the Middle East in general has not been able to successfully integrate into it, within a core-periphery paradigm. The methodology referred to involves the projection on the level of real politics, of both macro and micro levels analysis of such a paradigm. In this sense, on the level of macro economics, US power politics, in its privileged relationship with the Arab authoritarian states, implies a geopolitical and geo-economic dominance supporting the status quo resulting from its global core situation. From the level of micro economic analysis, on the other hand, the core-periphery paradigm has also remained within the domestic scale of those Arab states, given their unequal distribution of resources and leaving behind the alienated populations from having any input into domestic governance. The analyses of Islamic responses to globalization in the Middle East, promises therefore a long term perspective to explain the Arab revolution, beyond the short term and spontaneous character, as attributed to it. Such long term perspective also explains the importance of this article. On the other hand, as regards Islamic identity affirmation in the light of globalization, as contrary to the preceding pejorative and reactive Islamic stance in relation to those unequal global patterns, the Arab revolution reveals rather an interactive, positive response to them, which underlines again the relevance of this article. Furthermore, as regards Islam and globalization, it is indicated that it is the capacity of Islam's selective accommodation of globalization, which has made possible the Arab revolution. Consequently, the article defends that such original response, which made the Arab revolution possible, has evolved within a doctrinal effort for a new Islamic reinterpretation which would be progressive and democratic, as suits the universal values already found in Islam.

Keywords: Globalization, Arab Spring, Islam, US, Core, Periphery, Culture, Democracy.

JEL Classification: F59, N15, O12

Özet

Bu makalede, Arap devrimi, küreselleşmenin istikrarsız niteliği ile ilişkilendirilmektedir. Genelde Orta Doğu'nun başarılı bir şekilde küreselleşmeyle bütünleşemediği gerçeği, makalede küreselleşmenin merkez-çevre sorunsalı açısından anlatılmaktadır. Arap baharının oluşumunun koşulları da, bu tarz bir merkez-çevre sorunsalı içerisinde incelenmektedir. Başvurulan yöntem böyle bir sorun-

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salın, makro ekonomik ve mikro ekonomik düzlemlerdeki analizini içermekte ve böyle bir ekonomik analizin reel politik alandaki izdüşümlerini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Makro ekonomik açıdan, ABD'nin, küre üzerindeki merkez konumundan kaynaklanan güç siyaseti, bu ülkenin Arap otoriter devletleriyle olan ayrıcalıklı ilişkisinde, statükocu bir jeopolitik ve jeoekonomik hâkimiyeti de beraberinde getirmiştir. Diğer yandan, mikro ekonomik analiz açısından, kaynakların eşitsiz dağılımı ve ulusal hükümette söz hakkından geri bırakılmış yabancılaştırılmış nüfuslar dikkate alındığında, yukarıda belirtilen merkez-çevre sorunsalı, Orta Doğu ülkelerinin genelinde ve Arap devletlerinin ulusal düzleminde de kendini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, Arap Devrimi, Orta Doğu'da küreselleşmenin merkez-çevre sorunsalına yönelik İslami cevaplar açısından ele alındığında, bu devrime yüklenen kısa vadeli ve anlık karakterin ötesinde, uzun vadeli bir perspektif içerisinde işlenmeyi gerektirmektedir. Böyle bir uzun vadeli perspektif, bu makalenin de önemini açıklamaktadır. Diğer yandan, İslami kimlik taleplerinin, bu istikrarsız küresel yapılarla olan ilişkisinde, önceki pejoratif ve tepkili İslami duruşun aksine, Arap devrimi, eskisinden farklı, interaktif ve olumlu bir İslami cevabı içermektedir. Makalenin bir diğer önemi, bu son noktada yatmaktadır. Açıkçası, İslam ve küreselleşmeyle ilgili olarak, böyle bir olumlu etkileşimin, yani İslam'ın küreselleşmenin bazı özelliklerini kendine olumlu olarak çevirebilmesinin, Arap devrimini olanaklı kıldığı belirtmektedir. Sonuç olarak, makale, Arap devriminin; İslam'da zaten var olan evrensel değerlere uygun düşecek, yeni ve ilerlemeci, demokratik bir yorum doğrultusunda, doktrinal bir İslami çaba içerisinde geliştiğini savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: küreselleşme, Arap baharı, İslam, ABD, merkez, çevre, kültür, demokrasi, ekonomik.

JEL Sınıflaması: F59, N15, O12.

1. Introduction

The definition of globalization means free trade, the mobility of capital and people, along with the global integration of world markets, mass communication, and shrinking distances. There remain various sources on globalization, so as to know whether it has a positive or a negative impact as regards its influences on nations and their peoples. From those aspects above, Thomas Larsson (2001),¹ Bhagwati Jagdish (2004)², Marshall McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers (1992)³ take globalization as positive, while the linguist Naom Chomsky⁴, AmartyaSen (1970)⁵, Joseph Stiglitz (2002)⁶, Robert Polin (2003)⁷ and Freidrich Hayek (1960)⁸ are critical about globalization.

In this context of those criticisms, Ivan Ivekovi (2003)⁹ states that the benefits of the quantitative economic growth have been appropriated by privileged elites, because in terms of Mauro

¹ Thomas Larsson, **The Race to the Top: The Real Story of Globalization**, Washington, D.C., Cato Institute, 2001, p.9.

² Jagdish Bhagwati, **In Defense of Globalization**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004.

³ Marshal McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers, **The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Century**, New York, Oxford University Press, September 1992.

⁴ Naom Chomsky – Robert W. McChesney, **Profit over People: Neoliberalism & Global Order**, New York, Toronto, London, Seven Stories Press, 2011.

⁵ Amartya K. Sen, **Collective Choice and Social Welfare**, San Francisco, CA Holden-Day, 1970.

⁶ Joseph Stiglitz, **Globalization and its Discontents**, New York and London, W. W. Norton, 2002.

⁷ Robert Pollin, **Contours of Descent: U.S. Economic Fractures and the Landscape of Global Austerity**, New York, Verso, 2003.

⁸ Friedrich Hayek, **The Constitution of Liberty**, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960.

⁹ Ivan Ivekovi, "Some Notes on Developmental Violence in the Middle East and North Africa", **Globalization and State in the Middle East**, Ed.: AiniLinjakumpu, *yer. TAPRI Net Series*, No.1, 2003, p. 7.

F. Guillen (2001),¹⁰ the competition state which requires productive integration with the global economy is a state that possesses limited capacity to provide social welfare. As analysed in the first section, in terms of Mehran Kamara (2004),¹¹ it follows that by corporatism, clientalism and by rentierism, States in the Middle East in general tied and controlled politically relevant classes to the State. The political legitimacy of those Arab regimes has therefore been undermined, with the consequence of these regimes becoming increasingly authoritarian. In a study made by UNESCO (1994)¹², it was claimed that an increase in “cultures of resistance” has occurred as opposed to those unequal patterns of globalization and, as put forward by H James Piscatory (2003),¹³ social fragmentation within societies have been enhanced. Mehran Kamrava also talks about a political repression, in terms of the State security forces on the one side and the growing pool of the disenchanted and the disillusioned on the other.¹⁴

Those criticisms go especially against the neo-liberal emphasis in current globalization, making the case clear that the neo-liberal economic agenda does not always promote the philosophical sources of liberalism. In this respect, while for instance, S. M. Lipset (1994),¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington (1991)¹⁶ and Edward N. Muller¹⁷ are among the major proponents of the idea that the economic development positively affects democracy, R. W. Cox (1996)¹⁸ and L. Whitehead (1996)¹⁹, affirm on this subject that globalization has a negative effect. On the other hand a more prominent discourse is that such democratic deviation, face with globalization, results from a slow integration to the global economy as a process.

Therefore, for certain other authors such as J.A. Frieden and R. Rogowski (1996),²⁰ globalization affects countries differently and the Middle East does not escape such divergence. In this context, even if certain Arab states have done quite well to cope with the 2010 financial crisis, they have been short in competing with raised expectations, when economic growth has been reduced. However, both promoters and critics of globalization would agree on the fact that globalization has a periphery and a core, as stated by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (1998),²¹ and this applies

¹⁰ Mauro F. Guillen, **Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive of Feeble? A Critique of Six Key Debates in the Social Science Literature**, A Working Paper of the Regional H. Jones Center, commissioned by the Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.27, 2001, pp. 235-260.

¹¹ Mehran Kamara, “Structural Impediments to Economic Globalization in the Middle East”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, Winter 2004, p. 100.

¹² UNESCO (UNITED NATIONS EDUCATION SCIENCE AND CULTURE ORGANIZATION), **The Futures of Cultures**, Paris, 1994.

¹³ H James Piscatory, “Order, Justice and Political Islam”, **Order and Justice in International Relations**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 269.

¹⁴ Kamara, “Structural Impediments...”, *ibid.*, p.102.

¹⁵ S. M. Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited, **American Sociological Review**, No. 59, 1994, pp. 2-13.

¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, **The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century**, Norman and London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

¹⁷ Edward N. Muller, “Economic Determinants of Democracy”, **American Sociological Review**, Vol. 60, No. 6, 1995, pp. 966-982.

¹⁸ R. W. Cox, “Globalization, Multilateralism, and Democracy”, **Approaches to World Order**, Eds: R. W. Cox-T. J. Sinclair, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 524-536.

¹⁹ L. Whitehead, “Three International Dimensions of Democratization”, , **The International Dimensions of Democratization**, Ed.: L. WhiteheadOxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 3-24.

²⁰ J. A. Frieden - R. Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview”, **Internationalization and Domestic Politics**, Eds.: R. O. Keohane - H. V. Milner, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 25-47

²¹ Paul R. Viotti - Mark V. Kauppi, **International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and**

especially to the Middle East. The economic dominance of the core countries goes together with strategic and cultural dominance. Within that context, Hamed El-Said and Jane Harrigan (2006)²² state that “rogue states” are characterized by a strong Islamic slant by the Washington consensus; they were thus to be disciplined and contained, as suits the realist thesis of international relations.

In addition to the failure of the Middle Eastern States to comply with the democratic requirements of a globalized economy, meaning good governance, those administrations, depending on Washington consensus, could only problematically deal with Arabo-Islamic identity. Consequently Mark Levin (2005) asserts that Islam has become the only equally powerful discourse to stand against globalization, especially when it equates “westernization” through homogenization.²³ How globalization applies to the Middle East, brings cultural responses to it, in the case of Arab revolutions, Islam, becomes culturally involved.

However, beyond any ideological or religious content, such cultural Islamic implication, especially faced with the global value system of liberalism, also has consequences for cultural Islam to be reinterpreted for an Arabo-Islamic discourse on democracy, which would be rather original. As Fouad Nohra (2010),²⁴ specialist on the Middle East suggests, the major dynamic of the possibility of the Arab revolution, indicates an Islamic agreement over its democratic principles. In this sense, the article warns the reader especially of the dangers of binary logic, within a categorizational language, in between the secularists and the Islamic divisions. Mermier Franck and Gaaaybess Tourya (2003)²⁵, underline the civic formation of the Islamic network to break through the informational iron wall, indicating the authoritarian regimes of the Arab world, especially after the Cold War.

Overall, a non-militant stand of Islamic identity faced with global standardization is the case, making use of it by using the same informational tools. From this aspect, as analysed in the article, within the context of globalization, Islam’s relation to globalization is quite positive, depending on how it could make use of it whether it concerns Arabized broadcast television or social media, or whether it concerns reinterpreting the universality in Islam within democratic values. As put forward throughout the article, Islam, has been mainly involved in a civil society movement, stepping in to deliver development faced with an autocratic liberal economy as stated by K. Jeff Haynes (2001),²⁶ but also, as further treated in the article, as well faced with political autocracy. If we extrapolate the conceptual tools developed two decades earlier by Michel Dorby (2009),²⁷ then the Arab revolution appears as the occurrence of such a collaborative possibility within the relatively autonomous sectors of the civil society, and of political actors, including the Islamist sections.

Beyond, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1998, p.459.

²² Hamed El-Said - Jane Harrigan, “Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in the Arab World”, **The Middle East Journal**, Vol.60, No.3, Summer 2006, p. 450.

²³ See, Mark Levin, “Chaos and Globalization in the Middle East”, *Asian Journal of Social Science*, **Vol.33, No.2**, 2005, pp. 394-411.

²⁴ Fouad Nohra, “La pensée politique arabe moderne et l’exigence démocratique ou l’Europe libérale comme miroir de la référence islamique”, **Vers Un Monde Nouveau, Mélanges, Textes Et Documents Offerts au Professeur Edmond Jouve**, Tome 1, Ch3, Bruxelles, Editions Bruylant, 2010.

²⁵ Mermier Franck - Gaaaybess Tourya, **Mondialisation et Nouveaux Médias Dans L’Espace Arabe**, Paris, Maisons de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003.

²⁶ K. Jeff Haynes, Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics”, **Third World Quarterly**, Vol.22, No.2, p. 155, 2001.

²⁷ Michel Dorby, **Sociologie des Crises Politiques**, 3^{ème} édition, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Science Politique, 2009.

However, many in the West such as Jean-Pierre Filiu (2011)²⁸ consider the Arab democratic claims as purely secular, linked to the universality of liberal democracy, as the right model. However, depending on a variety of evidence, the article examines the paradoxical characteristics of globalization exacerbating the Arab revolutionary claims, promising a useful background and insight into its comprehension.

The article then asks the following question: What is the place of Islam in relation to unequal and inconsistent globalization and how can Islam be related to the Arab revolution? In this sense, although there remain many separate studies, as concerns the Arab spring and globalization critics within the Middle Eastern context, there are quite few studies made, taking Arab revolution, not as a spontaneous movement, but as part of a longer process, which would be positive, as affirmed by Fouad Nohra, in relation to those global patterns. In response, although a pejorative stand of Islamic closure upon it takes place, Islamic identity is worth analyzing from the perspective of opening, which summarizes the main purpose and the importance of this article.

Lastly, the methodology depends on the macro and micro economic analysis, yet there remains an important part explored through the realist thesis of international relations; however rather from the viewpoint of their practical socio-political and cultural consequences, as regards Islamic identity affirmation.

2. Globalization as an inconsistent process within a core-periphery paradigm

The liberal economic notion of specialization is based on comparative advantage. One of the consequences of it is the increasing inequality between regions. It may be asserted that there is on the one side the developing states of the periphery and on the other side the states in the core that are not only economically but also militarily and politically dominant. As relates to globalization, such a capitalist economic model is based on a system which contains a core, a periphery and a semi periphery.²⁹

Globalization is therefore an inconsistent process and can take several paths. Half of the world's people lie outside it. It is striking to observe that the poverty rate on the world level dramatically widens. The polarization between the rich and the poor widens also within countries.³⁰ It is possible to talk about a growing hierarchy, whereby at the top there are those successfully integrated to the global economy and at the bottom those who have not, representing a precarious or superfluity of labor.³¹ Even in the case of economic growth, that growth is appropriated by a privileged group of elites, while on the other side the standards of quality of life of the masses regress.³²

Thus globalization must be managed, for it is not self-perpetuating, self-managed or self-expanding. It is thus not possible to see globalization as good or bad. Rather it is a process with advantages and disadvantages and as a process it must therefore be managed.³³ This is especially

²⁸ Jean Pierre Filiu, *La Révolution Arabe: Dix Leçons Sur Le Soulèvement Démocratique*, Paris, Fayard, 2011.

²⁹ Filiu, *La Révolution Arabe... ibid.*

³⁰ H. James Piscatori, "Order, Justice and Political Islam", *Order and Justice in International Relations*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 277.

³¹ Piscatori, "Order, Justice and Political...", *ibid.*, p. 269.

³² Ivan Ivekovi, "Some Notes on Developmental Violence in the Middle East and North Africa", *Globalization and State in The Middle East*, Ed.: AiniLinjakumpu, TAPRI Net Series, No.1, 2003, p. 7.

³³ ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), "Vulnerability of Developing Countries", Deliberations of 29th Session on the Issues of Globalization and Development, 6-12 May 2002, <http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/globdevtoc.htm> (06.11.2011).

the case for those who are left out from the advantages of such a process. Moreover, there are opponents to globalization with some resistance in between. Equally, the phenomenon which might be associated to the developing world and the Middle East in general such as illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people and laundering are unintended but real consequences of globalization. Even globalized communication has its disadvantages as the levers of information remain under the control of the only ones empowered, while the marginal are further marginalized.³⁴ From this point of view democratization is still not firmly established in many countries, most of them Middle Eastern. The relationship between globalization and democracy is a complex, ambiguous and contradictory one.³⁵ In this sense, economic growth is not always associated with democratization.³⁶

In this context, the Middle East is a region even less integrated to the world economy, compared to East Asia and Latin America; that is especially in its disability to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).³⁷ This region receives the lowest amount of FDI inflows among all the regions of the world after Africa and South Asia. If taken into consideration that today there are only a couple of Middle Eastern states to have joined the World Trade Organization, the dismantling of the patronage and rent seeking mechanisms become a steady necessity for the Middle East.³⁸

By the second half of 2000s, the unemployment rate in the region is above 25 percent,³⁹ which means that the economic growth has not successfully managed unemployment to raise real wages and living standards.⁴⁰ That is as well the case for Egypt and Jordan which achieved economic growth during the last couple of decades, because this growth has not been sustained to address unemployment.⁴¹ In Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Sudan and Algeria too, the social situation has become worse than before.⁴² As regards the Middle East, some national economies have never ameliorated such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chad, Somalia, and Sudan.⁴³ On the other hand, some others such as Libya, Syria and Iran remain outside the globalization process.⁴⁴ Consequently, within a core-periphery problematic, the globalization process which evolves around the Western system, while reinforcing the state structures of the developed states, undermined the state structures of the developing states because of the contradictory consequences that it created.

³⁴ Piscatori, "Order, Justice and Political Islam...", *ibid.*, p. 270.

³⁵ Ziya Öniş, "Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy Paradox: The Turkish General Elections", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 285.

³⁶ Henry H. Gaffney, "Globalization and U.S. Navy Forces", *Center for Strategic Studies*, July 2002, p. 12. http://www.cna.org/newsevents/conferences/conf2_pdfs/crm_d5743.a1.pdf (01/03/2008).

³⁷ See Paul Sullivan, "Globalization: Trade and Investment in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria since 1980", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 35-73.

³⁸ Sullivan, "Globalization: Trade...", *ibid.*, p. 109.

³⁹ Khalil - Surendran, "Globalization and Challenges in...", *ibid.*, p. 299.

⁴⁰ Alan Richards - John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 3rd edition, Waterbury, Westview Press, 2008, pp. 260-261.

⁴¹ Hamed El-Said - Jane Harrigan, "Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in the Arab World", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 3, Summer 2006, p. 456.

⁴² El-Said - Harrigan, "Globalization, International...", *ibid.*

⁴³ Gaffney, "Globalization and U.S. Navy...", *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Gaffney, "Globalization and U.S. Navy...", *ibid.*

3. The Politico-strategic background of Arab revolution: Dominance of the core and US power politics

Paradoxically, rather than enhancing the stability of pro-Western Arab regimes, the U.S. led geo-politically motivated policies of globalization supported by international finance have actually undermined and destabilized the very regimes that US sought to protect. Indeed, be it the UN Security Council or the Washington consensus, Western priority is confirmed in the current international system. Core countries not only try to work on appropriate norms to assure the free flow of capital, but remain their dominance through those global financial institutions such the World Bank. In this perspective, the liberal agenda of such institutions as the International Monetary Foundation (IMF), the World Bank and the WTO, by promoting privatization and free trade; does not in fact foresee a system of equality as those institutions depend on US power.⁴⁵

The globalization process reveals therefore, a liberal economic system, but its ideological sources remain in the core U.S. politico-economic intrusion. Such dominance relies on the cooperation of the local regimes and constitutes the prevailing regional sub-systems that are skewed in favor of a U.S. dominated, interconnected political and economic order. Within this context, the flow of international finance from official organizations has also been determined by geo-political factors, namely Washington's desire to support pro-Western regimes.

Accordingly, in the Middle-East the attribution of an IMF loans depends rather on politico-economic interests than a purely economic mode.⁴⁶ Those interest-based IMF programs are influenced for example by a change in foreign policy stance, such as signing a peace treaty with Israel.⁴⁷ The global economic interests are skewed around the advantages of American capital, as regards its access to markets and resources abroad and the protection of the flow of oil from the region at favorable prices to the US market.⁴⁸ In this framework, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan have politically been categorized as "good" and "friendly" states, with access to international finance, whether it concerns multilateral and bilateral grants, debt rescheduling and write offs, as well as IMF and World Bank – brokered concessionary loans.⁴⁹ Thus, from the aspect of globalization as a paradoxical process, US power politics, especially after the Cold War, could dictate its political will in the Middle East and the globe, through categorizing the Arab world, whether as friends and allies or bad regimes.⁵⁰

Legitimacy for power struggle in terms of real politics in the aftermath of the cold war is provided by a geopolitical thesis of a clash of civilizations,⁵¹ where the Middle East becomes indeed the dividing line of such a clash, on the ground of an East-West confrontation. In this context, Islam constituted a big preoccupation replacing the communism of the Cold war period, as a new threat to Western civilization. But the double language in U.S. approaches, defined certain states as rogues and certain others as allies without any coherent references. More precisely, the obedient conservative regimes, threatened by Islamists were identified as allies, because of serving Western

⁴⁵ Piscatori, "Order, Justice and Political Islam...", *ibid.*, p. 271.

⁴⁶ El-Said - Harrigan, "Globalization, International...", *ibid.*, p. 455.

⁴⁷ El-Said - Harrigan, "Globalization, International...", *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Stephen. Hubbell, "The Containment Myth: US Middle East Policy in Theory and Practice1, **Middle East Report**, Vol. 28, No. 208, Fall 1998, p. 9.

⁴⁹ El-Said - Harrigan, "Globalization, International...", *ibid.*, pp. 450-451.

⁵⁰ Volker Perthes, "Points of Differences and Cases for Cooperation: European Critique of US Middle East Policy", **Middle East Report**, Fall 1998, p. 30.

⁵¹ G. John Ikenberry, "Just like the Rest", **Foreign Affairs**, March-April 1997, p. 163. Also see, Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, "Challenging Huntington", **Foreign Policy**, No. 96, Fall 1994, p. 117.

interests.⁵² The fact that Islamic movements have in practice been the only real forces of opposition has been ignored.⁵³

As a consequence, U.S. power politics in the region, contributed to the failure of unequal globalization, creating in turn a new wave of Islamic recruits to extremist causes and fanning anti-Americanism.⁵⁴ In this development, the breaking up of Iraq's unity for a new configuration based on ethnicity and religion created a mass reaction, as this war aimed at Israel's protection and the creation of strategic bases in Iraq, for the control of the whole region. China too needs to be taken into consideration in its need for energy resources so that the objective of crushing Arab nationalism. In the end, the Iraqi war generated a gap even amongst the U.S. allies. Similarly, the war in Afghanistan initiated by an Islamic threat perception, led the West to the strategic control of the Middle East through occasional alliances and the geopolitical containment of the heartland being Russia after the end of the cold war.⁵⁵ In regard to this development, Middle Eastern governments have not succeeded in managing the process, which will be examined in the following section.

4. The politico-economic background of the Arab revolution: The Middle East in the periphery

4.1. Failure of the Middle East: An overall outlook

Although economic liberalization is not impossible without political liberalization, political liberalization underlines economic liberalization.⁵⁶ In this framework, apart from Turkey and Israel, Middle Eastern states lack political legitimacy to allow significant structural adjustments to their economic systems⁵⁷ because the very nature of these reforms would require democratic reforms. In other words, the Middle East remains on the periphery, not only because of such a structural character on the macro economic level, but also as regards their lack of being able to manage the process on the micro economic level. Political elites and interests continued to resist political reforms and economic adjustment policies, because they were perceived against the status quo.⁵⁸ As such, the Middle Eastern states referred to rent-seeking mechanisms in the name of the promotion of their clients. Among those, the urban middle classes served especially to maintain status quo, as their passive compliance were assured.⁵⁹ The pervasiveness of authoritarian practices and political structures in the Middle East remained, significantly undermining prospects for greater levels of integration to the core international economy.

Ironically, the structural adjustments that took place have been selective, strengthening the state to bring it new sources of rent.⁶⁰ Taken all together, clientalism, rentierism and for "progressive" regimes populism, served only the state apparatus in the region.⁶¹

⁵² S. Niva, "Between Clash and Cooptation: US Foreign Policy and the Spectre of Islam", **Middle East Report**, Vol. 28, No. 208, Fall 1998, p. 27.

⁵³ Aini Linjakumpu, "The Challenge of Islamism to Middle Eastern Statehood", **Globalization and State in the Middle East**, Ed.: Aini Linjakumpu, TAPRI Net Series, No. 1, 2003, p. 29.

⁵⁴ Robert Looney, "Political Economy of the Middle East", **Middle East Policy**, Vol. 15, No. 3, Fall 2008, p. 166.

⁵⁵ Gerard Dussoy, **Les Théories Géopolitique – Traité de Relations Internationales (1)**, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2006, p.270.

⁵⁶ Kamrava, "Structural Impediments...", **ibid.**, p. 109.

⁵⁷ Kamrava, "Structural Impediments...", **ibid.**

⁵⁸ Linjakumpu, "The Challenge of Islamism...", **ibid.**, p. 41.

⁵⁹ Kamrava, "Structural Impediments...", **ibid.**, pp. 100-101.

⁶⁰ Kamrava, "Structural Impediments...", **ibid.**, p. 103.

⁶¹ Nazih Ayubi, **Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East**, London, I. B. Tauris,

In fact, the promotion of the free market has more than often been limited. This is because the state authorities feared the explosion of social and political discontent that they may have difficulty in controlling,⁶² as regards what the state defines as negative behavior, resulting from the Western content, whether it concerns information, entertainment, services or consumer goods.⁶³ The characteristics of Western content, especially as regards the intrusion of the core value system into Muslim Middle Eastern societies, as perceived, represented for those administrations, an even more dangerous form of imperialism, as regards globalization. Consequently, the authoritarian states of the Middle East either tried to control or to resist the social, political and cultural effects of this process against the social and political unrest that they may have had difficulty controlling. On the other hand, it follows that the public had to rely on government services, where the individual enterprises functioned informally or at best semi formally.⁶⁴ As a result, a structurally and politically fragmented private sector remained largely dependent on the state.⁶⁵

In this context, apart from the oil industry sector the Middle East could not fully integrate into emerging globalization.⁶⁶ The economies of those states depend largely on the flow of energy as a major transaction flow within the larger process of globalization. However, oil revenues contributed as well to the state's military expenditure in the region. As such, the various states including Iran and Saudi Arabia made use of the oil revenues to implement aggressive foreign policies, in the name of political, diplomatic and religious goals, which were not easy to separate.⁶⁷ The dependence on oil wealth while reinforcing the authoritarian regimes, also explained unproductive investments and unsustainable expenditure.⁶⁸

The region devotes a considerable proportion of its gross domestic product to arms purchases, and underlines the Middle Eastern countries politico-economic failure.⁶⁹ The intra-arab disputes and arab-Iranian rivalries contribute to the huge military expenditure of the Arab Gulf States.⁷⁰ Arab-Israeli conflict has also been instrumentalized for the militarization of Arab politics which continues today.⁷¹ But, the purchase of arms and equipment is a highly specialized, narrow form of trade and it does not help the integration of the various sectors of the domestic economy into international markets.⁷² On the other hand, because of its export structures, which have not changed from primary products to manufactured goods and services, the peripheral situation of the Middle East in relation to the global economy has remained.⁷³

1999, p. 199.

⁶² Ivekovi, "Some Notes on Developmental...", *ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶³ Gaffney, "Globalization and U.S. Navy...", *ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶⁴ Gaffney, "Globalization and U.S. Navy...", *ibid.*, p. 103.

⁶⁵ Volker Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of Democratization: The Case of Syria and Some other Arab Countries", **Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World**, Ed.: Ghassan Salame, London, I. B. Tauris, 1994, p. 258.

⁶⁶ Ivekovi, "Some Notes on Developmental...", *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁶⁷ K. Jeff Haynes, "Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 154.

⁶⁸ Clement Henry, "A Clash of Civilizations", **Harvard International Review**, Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 61.

⁶⁹ Henry, "A Clash of Civilizations"..., *ibid.*

⁷⁰ Henry, "A Clash of Civilizations"..., *ibid.*

⁷¹ Henry, "A Clash of Civilizations"..., *ibid.*, p. 60.

⁷² Kamrava, "Structural Impediments...", *ibid.* p. 106.

⁷³ World Bank, **Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy**, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. x.

In this context, in a Zogby poll of Arab attitudes, Saudi males stood out as uniquely dissatisfied and pessimistic about their children's future and 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers were Saudi males.⁷⁴ Following this incident, many economies of the Middle East have become victims of terrorist activities if we only look the statistics for the tourism industry in Egypt, Jordan, West Bank Syria and Morocco in the 2000s, in comparison to the late 1980s and the early 1990s and on the direct foreign investment in the region.⁷⁵ Following September 11, the continuance of terrorism undermined prospects of a healthy democracy and good governance necessary for economic reform. Within that situation of the prevailing status quo, the democratic participation of Islamic groups deliberately viewed through the lens of terrorism and the problem of political participation has been masked.⁷⁶ By the year 2001, the trend towards political liberalization cautiously attempted since 1980s, has reversed in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as in Algeria.⁷⁷

In the perspective of the core-periphery relationship of the globalization as a paradoxical process, globalization overall, has been perceived as a continuation of the basic dynamics of relationship between the East and West, where the West represented hegemonic intentions mindful of its colonizing past. Given globalization's cultural/ideological foundations, an Islamic response has occurred, as this was the case as regards the revolutionary reactions against Western imperialism before it. In this context, especially, the Iraqi war has been associated to the Palestinian's cause for existence and became the strongest evidence of the clash of civilizations between Judaic Christian and the Islamic worlds.

4.2. The vulnerability of the Arab economies: More empirical data

At the economic level, most Arab macroeconomics suffered from deficiencies and imbalances and could not accommodate itself to the constraints of globalization. The key reforms proposed by the international economic and financial organizations came very late. For instance, privatization of key sectors was mainly undertaken during the last decade⁷⁸, and the reform of government procurement, remains unachieved in many former state led economies.

Given their reluctance to adjust to the new economic constraints, the Arab economies displayed a very high level of dependency on the global market. This dependency is due to the relevance of the rental economy, resulting from energy resources, tourism and other non-productive activities⁷⁹. Such dependency is a result of the lack of productive industries and of the low level of performance of the food security programs,⁸⁰ but also a result of the high level of dependency of the gulf economies on the global financial market.

⁷⁴ Zogby International is an international market research firm, founded in 1984 by James Zogby. James J. Zogby, **What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs and Concerns**, Report of Zogby International, commissioned by the Arab Thought Foundation, New York, Utica, 2002.

⁷⁵ Khalil - Surendran, "Globalization and Challenges in..." *ibid.*, pp. 295-296.

⁷⁶ Linjakumpu, "The Challenge of Islamism..." *ibid.*, p. 42.

⁷⁷ Henry, "A Clash of Civilizations"..., *ibid.*, p. 62.

⁷⁸ For instance, in Egypt the most significant wave of privatization started in 2002, and despite the legislative reforms of 1992-93, monitored by the IMF structural adjustment program, few state enterprises were privatized because the state did not allow it.

See, Privatization Coordination Support Unit, **Privatization in Egypt, Quarterly Review**, Carana Corporation, Report provided in April-June 2002, for the United States Agency for International Development.

⁷⁹ In the case of Egypt, the reliance on tourism, oil exports, immigrant's remittances and Suez Canal are seen as the evidence of a relative decline of the productive activities. See, Muhammad Duwîdâr, **Al-Ittijâh Al-Ray'î li Al-Iqtisâd Al-Misri**, Alexandria, 1982.

⁸⁰ Between 2000 and 2006 the deficit in international food trade reached 110 billion \$ for the entire Arab world,

Yet, the above observations point only to an overall portrait of the high level of vulnerability of the Arab economies. A more detailed analysis displays, on the other hand, different levels of dependency and of exposure, especially to the effect of the 2008 financial crisis. For instance United Arab Emirates and Tunisia reacted dissimilarly to the crisis. While the former saw their private and sovereign funds devalued and the value of real estate⁸¹, the latter suffered from a decrease in its manufactured exports to Europe, as well as from a decrease in direct foreign investments⁸².

At the same time, as regards the poorer Arab countries, the global financial crisis led to a decrease in the inflow of foreign and domestic capitals within.⁸³The share of Arab capital had increased significantly in the aftermath of 9/11, as it had reached in 2006 ten times of its volume in 2001.

However, after the sudden unbalance provoked by the late financial crisis, came next, a decade of economic improving and recovery. The growth rate of most of the Arab economies was above the world average⁸⁴. It did not go beyond the double digit growth in China and in some other developing countries, but it has reversed the trend of stagnation, begun two decades earlier.

Still to be able to explain the economic vulnerability behind the Arab revolution, a classical theory may be referred to. This is as regards the political effects of economic imbalance, in a context of a growing GDP. Therefore, Davies “J curve” explains the Arab upsurge, not as a result of poverty and stagnation, but as the result of a sudden decrease in the growth trend⁸⁵. According to Davies’ explanation, while an economic growth leads to a proportional increase in the level of the needs and expectations of the society, a sudden decrease in the resources provided by the system, increases rapidly the gap in between those resources available and their actual satisfaction.

At the same time, the social “demand” is not only expressed in terms of economic quantitative goods and services provided, but qualitative as well, within the social and cultural patterns. On social grounds, the authoritarian regimes in most countries displayed their ability to interact positively with the Washington consensus requirements, as regards good governance, however, putting aside the democratic aspect in good governance. In fact, in many cases, an authoritarian economic transition represented only the integration of the technocratic aspects. Therefore governments, based on expertise, appeared in many countries. Those governments undertook administrative reforms, as regards liberalization within from partial to total withdrawal of the state from the management of the main strategic sectors.

and still the share of food imports represent more than 18% of the total amount of imports in Egypt.

See, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), **Development Challenges for the Arab Region 2- Food Security and Agriculture**, UNDP, 2009.

⁸¹ 2009 witnessed a decrease in GDP from 261 billion \$ in 2008 to 248 billion \$ in 2009. At the same time, the growth of the banking sector slowed down to 3.1% in 2009 after a double digit growth throughout the decade.

See, KAMKO Research , **United Arab Emirates Brief and Outlook**, 2011, in <http://www.menafin.com> (12.09.2012).

⁸² In the case of Tunisia more than 90% of the exports were directed to the European market that was affected by the global financial crisis, thus explaining the decrease of more than 25%, by 2010.

⁸³ Between 2008 and 2010 the direct foreign investments for the countries of North Africa alone fell from more than 23bn\$ in 2008 to about 15.7bn\$ in 2010.

See, United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), **2012 World Investment Report, Toward A New Generation of Investment Policies**, United Nations, 2012.

⁸⁴ For instance, the growth rate of Egypt was oscillating between 6,8 % and 7,2 % by 2004, up until 2008 financial crisis. See, www.indexmundi.com (25.08.2012).

⁸⁵ James Davies, “Towards a Theory of Revolution”, **American Sociological Review**, Vol. 27, 1962, pp. 5-18.

However, this kind of liberalization, supposed to bring in more efficiency and a higher level of growth, has deepened instead the social and regional inequalities.

- Privatization benefited the inner circle of the leading political elite, and allowed individuals from those close circles – both in the sense of proximity and closeness (through family ties etc) – to establish a monopoly on those economic sectors.
- The growing place occupied by market mechanisms resulted in an accelerating social and geographical scale of inequalities. Moreover, the growing middle classes were concentrated in the main cities, at the same time as the marginalization of peripheral towns and rural areas which became more and more important in the dynamics of the Arab revolutionary process. In Tunisia as well as Libya and Syria, the uprising started far from the capital (Sidi Bouzid, Benghazi, Deraa etc.) before reaching the latter⁸⁶.
- Social selection was fundamentally unfair, as it prevented the cultivated and higher academic young people from social upgrading, while restricting the benefits of integration and upgrading in the main economic sectors and in public administration to a limited circle of the privileged who came from those circles, close to the political leading elite⁸⁷.

The above observations explain the rapid growth of social inequalities as well as regional imbalances given the way the leading political elite interpreted and implemented the requirements of an emerging economy in global terms, within the criteria of “Washington consensus”⁸⁸. The authoritarian and repressive nature of those regimes accelerated the social imbalance, preventing and therefore neutralizing, any social claims of the marginalized social actors. In these conditions, in most of the cases, the main trade union actors were deprived from their elementary rights of collective action through strikes and demonstrations, when not handled by the regime⁸⁹.

⁸⁶ The report published by the African Bank of Development for 2011 stated the poverty rate for some peripheral cities in Tunisia, like Sidi Bouzid and Kasserine. The poverty rate in those areas increased significantly to reach currently more than 39% and to 45% during the last decade.

See, African Bank of Development, **Poverty and inequalities in Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania, Economic Briefs**, 2011, in www.afb.org, (18.08.2012).

⁸⁷ In a former research, the two obviously unfair criteria to select and promote the social elite by using the educational institution combined, is explained. In the case of Arab societies, the two radically unfair criteria for selection, the economic standard of life and the “amount of political influence” remained overwhelming. See, **Politiques Educatives, Emancipation Humaine et Inégalités Sociales Dans Les Pays En Développement**, Dir: Fouad Nohra, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2010.

⁸⁸ The privatization processes in Syria were beneficial for the new private capitalists, considered as very close to the political power, especially from the ten ruling families. It was approximately the case for Egypt, where an alliance between the ruling bureaucracy, high ranking army officers and a class of a private growing bourgeoisie, took advantage of the privatization process that had enlarged suddenly by 2003.

⁸⁹ In fact the degree varied according to the kind of political regime. For instance, in Syria and Tunisia the trade unions were totally controlled by the regime while in Egypt and Jordan, the oppositional forces were able to win professional elections, but freedom to strike and demonstrate was considerably limited.

See, Ellen Lust Okar – Saloua Zerhouni, **Political participation in the Middle East**, London, Lynne Boulder, Rienner Publisher, 2008.

See, Fouad Nohra, “Jordanie, Egypte, Yémen, L’Ingénierie Constitutionnelle De L’Elite Au Pouvoir Face A La Dynamique Oppositionnelle”, **Enjeux Diplomatiques et Stratégiques**, Dir: Pascal Chaigneau, Paris, Economica, 2010, pp. 130-146.

5. The socio-cultural background of the Arab revolution: Islamic identity affirmation face to globalization

5.1. Understanding the identity-centred Islamic stand

It is possible to talk about a general consensus among the Arab population, that globalization is identical to Americanization both by those who favor globalization or oppose it.⁹⁰ Americanization indicates not only a political and economic agenda, but also a cultural one. In this respect, globalization is criticized by the UN as a set of economic processes in which all cultures and cultural values are assaulted by powerful forces of standardization which makes it more appropriate to speak of an erosion, rather than globalization of cultures.⁹¹ In fact, the dissemination of American culture as a model for the whole world shapes the Middle Eastern views on Islamic identity.⁹² Precisely, because the means, powers, interests and aims that stem globalization are all American, globalized culture which equates with American culture.⁹³

In this context, because of its ideological sources, it is the cultural globalization which creates the most serious consequences. Culture becomes then a central power in the contemporary globalization process as globalized culture could cause a withdrawal of loyalty from the national identity.⁹⁴ Associated to these patterns of globalization has thus been the emergence of Islamic nationalist and fundamentalist movements of various sorts, in the region.⁹⁵ For them, global cultural intrusion into the borders of states becomes a new form of imperialism where the region's special colonial legacy and the memories of European imperialism color in fact their perceptions.

A culture of resistance has been created by those who could not become part of the dominant global processes or by those trying to break away from it.⁹⁶ This cultural resistance is widely represented by Islamists for whom the reference made to Islam as an identity affirmation, and a clear focus on cultural and community oriented responses, becomes a way of resisting modern institutions and the destructivity of Western dominated globalization.

On the other hand, the Islamic movement is not homogenous and is made up of a large number of diverse groups that vary in scope and nature. Among those, although the radical Islamic groups' intention is to change predominant political structures using violence if necessary, there are also moderate groups with very conformist and non-radical political programs.⁹⁷ A threat perception according to which Islamic identity is under threat and that Muslim communities in the Middle East are discomfited by the ongoing social change shapes in fact the attitudes of the radicalism of the first group.⁹⁸ According to them, *'globalization of the Muslim world means the separation of religion and life, which aims at 'replacing Islam with a pragmatic and materialistic European and American thought'*.⁹⁹ The globalization of the Muslim world would [then] mean the removal of Islam from thought and action, so that Muslims become subservient to the West.¹⁰⁰ It follows that

⁹⁰ Fauzi Najar, "The Arabs, Islam and Globalization", **Middle East Policy**, Vol. 12, No. 3, Fall 2005, p. 92.

⁹¹ UNESCO, **The Futures of Cultures**, Paris, 1994, p. 10.

⁹² Fauzi Najar, "The Arabs, Islam...", **ibid.**

⁹³ Fauzi Najar, "The Arabs, Islam...", **ibid.**

⁹⁴ Levin, "Chaos and Globalization...", **ibid.**, p. 154.

⁹⁵ Öniş, "Neoliberal Globalization...", **ibid.**, p. 286.

⁹⁶ UNESCO, **The Futures...**, **ibid.**, p. 10.

⁹⁷ Linjakumpu, "The Challenge of Islamism...", **ibid.**, p. 36.

⁹⁸ See Marcus Noland - Howard Pack, "Islam Globalization and Economic Performance in the Middle East", **SAIS Review**, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2004, p. 110.

⁹⁹ Fauzi Najar, "The Arabs, Islam...", **ibid.**, p. 94.

¹⁰⁰ Fauzi Najar, "The Arabs, Islam...", **ibid.**

globalization is a steadfast effort to Christianize the world by imposing a religious imperialism by military, economic, political and other means.¹⁰¹

In many cases though, the political dimension of Islamic identity is not demonstrably based on the religious content of Islamic groups. Islamists may have an ideological message but the issues they address are more specific and practical.¹⁰² This is because when international financial institutions forced governments to retreat from welfare provision, the resulting increase in poverty and inequality has prompted Islamists groups with political aspirations to fill the welfare gap left by the state's diminution.¹⁰³ The reality is that in the Middle East the corrupt politicians and their incompetency to overcome increasing segmentation by class, gender, and ethnicity, failed to provide effective social services.¹⁰⁴ To put it more precisely, the economic reform conditions attached to this finance have often resulted in a decline in state provision of social welfare, with increased poverty and inequality. This form of globalization then has been increasingly challenged by Islamist groups, given their efforts to provide social capital and to fill the welfare gap created by the state's gradual withdrawal from economic affairs, such as education and health care.¹⁰⁵

More specifically, those Islamist groups constituted non-governmental voluntary organizations and an important segment of civil society¹⁰⁶ yet they remained as clandestine or quasi-clandestine formations, because they have also been politically active, but suppressed by the government.¹⁰⁷ The confrontation between the Islamist opposition groups and the state forces turned into an armed clash in a few countries; while in most others, state authorities were able to take them under control or to force them underground.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, as mentioned above, Islamist movement around identity affirmation is essentially a nationalist movement against the American cultural intrusion but it also has a developmental dimension. This is because they are deprived from the privileged positions and dissent arises from becoming marginalized because of their lack of access to those state resources.¹⁰⁹

However, even those who are not resistant, are critical about Western intentions in the Middle East and around the globe, especially when it comes to United States using double standards, one for the Muslims and one for the rest of the World. Western nations and the U.S. in particular then make use of human rights and democracy discourses to serve their interests, those discourses becoming rationalizations of power.¹¹⁰ The argument for example that the U.S. objection to Islamic Pakistan possessing a nuclear weapon is not fair, because U.S. power remains silent in relation to Hindu India, Buddhist China, Catholic France, Orthodox Russia, Protestant Britain and Jewish Israel possessing it.¹¹¹ It may thus be observed in the case of Islamic identity that a sense of victimization has taken a concrete meaning,¹¹² especially because for many, the Christian West, which

¹⁰¹ Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Al-Muslimunwa al-Awlamah*, Cairo, Dar-al al-Misriyya, 2000, p. 79.

¹⁰² Kamrava, "Structural Impediments...", *ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁰³ El-Said - Harrigan, "Globalization, International...", *ibid.*, p. 460.

¹⁰⁴ Piscatori, "Order, Justice and Political Islam...", *ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁰⁵ El-Said - Harrigan, "Globalization, International...", *ibid.*, pp. 446-447.

¹⁰⁶ Jacqueline S. Ismael - Tareq Y. Ismael, "Globalization and the Arab World in the Middle East Politics: Regional Dynamics in Historical Perspective", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Summer 1999, p. 143.

¹⁰⁷ Ismael - Ismael, "Globalization and the Arab...", *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Ivekovi, "Some Notes on Developmental...", *ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁰⁹ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 2nd edition, Waterbury, Westview Press, 1996, pp. 348-349.

¹¹⁰ Fauzi Najjar, "The Arabs, Islam...", *ibid.*, p. 94.

¹¹¹ Qaradawi, *Al-Muslimunwa...*, *ibid.*, pp. 21-25.

¹¹² Piscatori, "Order, Justice and Political Islam...", *ibid.*, p. 285.

acts in the name of the defense of human rights and democracy, does nothing when Muslims are under attack, as has been the case, in the Islamic Republic of Chechnya.

In fact, the shrinking distances across the Muslim world, as a result of the global communication tools such as newspapers, journals, satellite broadcasting, fax machines, CD-ROMs, mobile telephones and web sites made for example the situation of Muslims in Kosovo or Somalia a local concern for Muslims elsewhere.¹¹³ Thus, Islamism is not a separate or an isolated Middle Eastern phenomenon, but an expression of the politics of identities beyond any specific or limited geographical manifestation.¹¹⁴ In this context, Islamic identity affirmation represents a local manifestation of a universal vision found in Islam, to provide for an alternative way of interpreting and illustrating the world.¹¹⁵ Briefly, Islamism has a global presence within a local activism.¹¹⁶

It is to mention that faced with the cultural westernization of the Muslim world, the demographic Islamization of the western world is also taking place regarding transnational Islam, due to the large number of Muslim minorities, settled in the West.¹¹⁷ Those Muslim minorities living in Europe, North America and Australia now demand a participatory society,¹¹⁸ proposing an intellectual Islamic discourse for a liberal version. Notably, “second generation” immigrants have been engaged in a transnationally inspired reformulation of Islamic identity, a process termed “personalization”, “secularization”, or “individuation”.¹¹⁹

5.2. The multiple senses of Islam as regards Arab revolution within the process of globalization

In this process, the main question to answer is what Islam has to do with the Arab revolution. Here, some conceptual distinctions are to be made because Islam refers to multiple realities, given the social sciences literature.

First as it refers to a religion, Islam is defined as a doctrine, based on the combination of fundamental and secondary sources. At this level, a plurality of “Islams” may be found, resulting from a doctrinal pluralism. Indeed, Islam is not limited to the four Sunni doctrines, given the multiple Shi’i ones. In this respect, many Sufi and heterodox schools are widespread in Africa, Central Asia and other parts of the world, in order to raise consciousness against any simplistic typification.

Secondly, Islam represents, as well a set of different civilizational patterns, as linked to different historical paths, whether Arab, Persian or Turkish, deeply influenced by Islam as a religion. In each civilization, the way religious doctrine was applied, depended on interpretation and has even been perverted by their historical evolutions. This evidence makes the heterogeneous Islamic civilization a quite different object to Islamic doctrine.

To make this distinction clear, it is to see, how far the historical evolution of Islamic societies has led to a widening gap within some of the doctrinal sources. A reason for this, results from the

¹¹³ Piscatori, “Order, Justice and Political Islam...”, *ibid.*, p. 275.

¹¹⁴ Linjakumpu, “The Challenge of Islamism...”, *ibid.*, p. 44.

¹¹⁵ Linjakumpu, “The Challenge of Islamism...”, *ibid.*, p. 44.

¹¹⁶ Linjakumpu, “The Challenge of Islamism...”, *ibid.*, p. 32.

¹¹⁷ Piscatori, “Order, Justice and Political Islam...”, *ibid.*, p. 273.

¹¹⁸ Piscatori, “Order, Justice and Political Islam...”, *ibid.*, p. 284.

¹¹⁹ Jacques Waardenberg, “Normative Islam in Europe”, *Paroles d’Islam*, Ed. :F.Dassetto, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000, pp. 49-68.

deliberative decision making, as the main principle of the Islamic political organization. Therefore, most of the doctrinal interpretations become similar to those known in modern democracy. On the other hand, it is to remember that the historical course during most of the fourteen centuries had been consolidated by dynastic rule though favoring autocratic trends. The principle of obedience to the ruler was doctrinally justified at the expense of the right to overthrow the unfair ruler that is also based on a Koranic verse¹²⁰.

This distinction is relevant to be able to explain how the “Islamic” movement has stepped down from a reactive opposition to globalization based identity affirmation, to a clear contribution to the present democratic process. The starting point of our reasoning is MuhamadAbduh’s aphorism, when he said, referring to his last trip in Paris at the end of the nineteenth century: “I went to France where I saw Islam without Muslims and I came back (to Egypt) where I saw Muslims without Islam”¹²¹. The crucial point to understand from this statement is the impossibility of simplifying the Islamic involvement faced with globalization within a binary opposition between globalization and/or westernization versus the Islamic civilizational identity. To put it another way, Islam does not have to be contrary to globalization; rather, it has to be reformed in order to perform ethical principles of justice against an established order, instrumentalizing the religious institution for its consolidation.

This means, on the other hand, so many ways of referring to Islam may exist, in order to deal with the global world system, but also in order to deal with the vested regimes. For instance, considering the link between Islamic doctrinal interpretations and economic liberalism, three opposite schools occurred during the seventies of the twentieth century. While a growing number of Muslim scholars were encouraged to shift to a religious justification of socialism, in the wake of the expansion of Marxist doctrine in the Middle East¹²², others relied strictly on private property and market economy through interpreting the doctrinal sources. Ironically, the so called “Sunni fundamentalist movement”, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, that is today looked at as the main opponent to western lead globalization, stood in favor of the anti-socialist stances¹²³. In the middle, standing above both political trends, stood the doctrinal interpretation in favor of an economy that would put human needs and values at the core of the economic system rather than the market or collectivity¹²⁴.

Islamic legitimization was in fact used on a scattered chessboard that could start at the extreme pro-capitalist free market and end at a radical anti-globalization discourse. Unlike secular states who endorsed liberalism and western modernity with no need to justify it religiously and who faced a religious led opposition, most of the Arab states referred indeed to religious justification, even to justify rallying to the western block. It was obviously the case during the Cold War that lasted about half a century. It remained partly the case up until 9/11, when US foreign policy,

¹²⁰ This issue is developed in two former studies.

See, Fouad Nohra, “La pensée politique arabe moderne et l’exigence démocratique ou l’Europe libérale comme miroir de la référence islamique”, **Vers Un Monde Nouveau, Mélanges, Textes Et Documents Offerts Au Professeur Edmond Jouve**, Tome 1, Ch3, Bruxelles, Editions Bruylant, 2010. And see, Fouad Nohra, “L’islam est-il totalitaire ?”, **Panoramiques**, 2001, No. 50, pp. 165-172.

¹²¹ See, Muhammad Abduh, **Al A’mal Al-Kâmila (Complete Works)**, Beyrouth, Al Mu’assasa Al-‘Arabiyya li Al-Nashr, 1980.

¹²² For the socialist trend, see, Ali Shariati, **Marxism and Other Western Fallacies**, Berkley, Mirzan Press, 1980.

¹²³ See, SayyidQutb, **Al-‘Adâla al-Ijtîmâ’iyya fi al-Islâm (Social Justice in Islam)**, Le Caire, Dâr al-Shurûq, 1986.

¹²⁴ See, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, **Iqtisâduna, (Our Economy)**, Beirut, Dar al-Ta’âruf li al-Matbû’ât, date of last publication unknown.

dictated by the ultra conservative Christians, most of them issued from the Christian Coalition of America, shifted to a worldwide anti-Muslim militancy¹²⁵.

In this context, on cultural grounds, the Arab revolution has also been a result of cultural globalization. However, cultural globalization does not necessarily mean a process of homogenization. It fosters rather standardization through common learnt patterns of management and transmits “universally accredited” knowledge, including consumption patterns. But at the same time, globalization may lead to cultural resistance in search of cultural and civilizational specificities as they relate to an identity affirmation. Here below, it is asserted that the Arab revolutionary process is paradoxically the result of both the opposite inclinations.

The globalized patterns of action, may present more advantages to the subjects who claim them, therefore exerting an attraction in favor of the globalized, as relates standardization¹²⁶. In fact, this is especially the case for more efficiency in private and public management, given the opposition of the young intellectuals, graduates and middle classes, who oppose the opacity and inefficiency in the national structures.

On the other hand, the cultural opposition to globalization is no more in favor of the *status quo*. As such, the traditional nationalistic slogans and speeches broadcasted by the authoritarian regimes have quite little effect on public opinion. These regimes, in their inability to oppose to western hegemony, are no longer able to strengthen Arab /Islamic identities, the reason for which they switch in between impotence and complicity with the hegemonic powers.

In combining both trends for and against globalization in a synthetic statement, those trends are to be treated in relation to one another. Furthermore, the resistance expressed by public opinion against global cultural homogenization, rejects the ineffective and dishonest way the regimes deals with the concern of standardization. By so doing, they become even closer to the globalized patterns of management, because those up to date patterns represent the needed tools to strengthen an independent Arab/Islamic civilizational sphere as well. This is because, in the context of cultural globalization, the so called globalization of information arises as well.

The globalization of mass media played, therefore, a crucial role in breaking through the informational iron wall of the authoritarian regimes that had existed for half a century¹²⁷. Consequently, the governmental and the loyalist control of information, broadcast and cultural products were rapidly overturned, especially through the satellite pan Arab mass media (Al Jazeera) but also by the widespread of the use of internet and social networks, thanks to the information revolution¹²⁸. Put together, all this made available, if not to destabilize, a huge amount of information, able to challenge the official informational process inside each informational iron wall. Yet, this informational globalization was not effective until it became Arabized. CNN did much less for this than the more recent Al Jazeera. On the other hand, social informational networks, once adopted by the new generations in the Arab cities, became more and more effective¹²⁹.

¹²⁵ See, Mokhtar Ben Barka, **La Droite Chrétienne Américaine: Les Evangélistes A La Maison Blanche**, Paris, Ed. Privat, 2006.

¹²⁶ The theoretical arguments developed by Wang Ji Si support the case for a “universal civilization”.

See, Wang Ji Si, “Conflicts De Civilisations: Fondement Théorique Et Significations Pratiques”, **Cultures et Conflits**, Vol. 19, No. 20, Automne/Hiver 1995, pp. 73-106.

¹²⁷ See, Franck Mermier - Tourya Guaaybess, **Mondialisation et Nouveaux Medias Dans L’Espace Arabe**, Paris, Maisons de l’Orient et de la Méditerranée /Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003.

¹²⁸ See, Bassam Tayara, **Le Printemps Arabe Décodé : La Face Cachée des Révoltes**, Paris, Al Bouraq, 2011.

¹²⁹ According to a survey published by The Economist in 2009, Al Jazeera’s audience remains the highest among the world wide information televisions with 60 million spectators, far beyond CNN that doesn’t exceed 40 million. For

Therefore; while on the one hand ghettoization of Islam occurs as a result of non-integration in the globalization process, on the other hand globalization provides new networks and multiple identities, as regards the Muslim communities abroad and within the Arabo-Islamic world. In a sense, true globalization of Islam, is now possible because, the infrastructure of the new global economy especially as regards global communication tools, permits those Muslims to construct and to mobilize their own network of resources.¹³⁰ In other words, as the new technologies construct new mechanisms of social life that are independent of state control,¹³¹ the de facto diversity that those new technologies represent, helps develop a Muslim civil society,¹³² as a source of international attention. In this framework, contrary to those Islamists who think that democracy is an invention of the West, a great many Muslims now argue that democracy and Islam are compatible.

5.3. The relationship between democracy and religion versus globalization in the Arab revolution: Towards a positive involvement

A binary typology between Islamists and secularist is still present in a most of the western political analysis. However to understand the Arab revolution, such binary opposition has to be overcome in dealing with the political dynamics in Arab political society. For instance, a great deal of the French political analysts tried to answer to the question whether the Arab revolution represents a product of the “islamists”, within such a binary opposition. In response, to those who supported the democratic claims, the “islamists” have far been excluded from any revolutionary process. According to this interpretation, the symbols and slogans of the Arab revolution tend to exclude any religious Islamic dimension. The Arab democratic claims were considered as purely secular, linked to the universality of liberal democracy, as the right model.¹³³ Consequently, the Arab revolution was to be considered as additional evidence of the universality of the liberal political model qualified by the relativists as purely western.

On the other hand, some empirical statements were posited, in support of such interpretation. In Tunisia, for example, the religious Al-Nahda movement, eradicated under the former regime, was marginal, if not absent, from the first uprisings of December 2010. However, in Egypt, the first standpoints of the Muslim Brotherhood were moderate and reformist. The movement called for a quick and radical political reform in order to save the country from political turmoil. Yet, again some religious ultraconservative clerics condemned the revolution and reminded the believers about the principle of obedience to the ruler as had been the case, during the whole of the previous century and included the continuance of the vested regimes, instrumentalizing religion.

In fact, the Arab movement has been quite spontaneous, expressing the intrinsic needs of civil society above all the partisan, ideological and sectarian kinds of obedience. By its nature, it is attributed on the other hand, to a transversal category of Arab youth. This argument is as obvious as it is simplistic. More precisely, young people in the 15 to 25 years age group, constitute more than 53% of the Arab population¹³⁴. Their level of education has risen significantly. However, dispropo-

what concerns exploitation of these data see, Sami Kekhida, **The Impact of News Television on Arab Opinion and Politics : Al Jazeera and its Effects, Weapon of Mass Democratization or Weapon of Mass Destruction**, Ph.D dissertation submitted in 2006, Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques, Paris, 2006.

¹³⁰ Levin, “Chaos and Globalization...”, *ibid.*, p. 156.

¹³¹ Linjakumpu, “The Challenge of Islamism...”, *ibid.*, p. 30.

¹³² Piscatori, “Order, Justice and Political Islam...”, *ibid.*, p. 284.

¹³³ Cf. Jean-Pierre Filiu, **La Révolution Arabe : Dix Leçons sur le Soulèvement Démocratique**, Paris, Fayard, 2011.

¹³⁴ See, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), **Development Challenges...**, *ibid.*

portionately, as the rate of exclusion from the institutional structures became more and more dramatic, young people from the middle classes did not differ much from the poorest young graduates, excluded from the workplaces¹³⁵. Both feel excluded from participating in the state apparatus, as well as from the qualified jobs in the most influential companies, therefore their genuine participation to the key political decisions have been prevented. They are called the “facebook democrats”, and by their nature, they are far distant from the paradigm of “Islamist militant”.

The above interpretation however faces opposition by those less sympathetic to the revolutionaries. Instead, they consider the movements as a plot coming from the Wahhabi monarchies alongside US diplomacy involved in reshaping the Middle East¹³⁶. Inside this scenario, the “Islamists” are considered a shadow power, ready to take over political power once it is abandoned by the vested authoritarian regimes.

In both those two cases, the place of the so called “Islamists” is misunderstood. In the first case, which is about “the intrinsic needs of the civil society above all the partisan, ideological and sectarian kinds of obedience” led by the Arab middle class and graduated youth, we are unable to understand why the Muslim Brotherhood have gained a landslide victory in the parliamentary election, and why did their candidate Muhammad Mursi¹³⁷ win the presidential election, despite the many divisions and difficulties met during the process? In the second case, which takes the Arab revolution as a US project, although the main statement made after the outcome of the general elections in Egypt as well as in Tunisia, is reflective of the famous “I warned you”, here as well, the dynamics of observation is misleading.

Indeed, both sides of the mix seem to miss the very dynamics of the so called “Islamist” movements within the Arab revolutionary process. In fact, the binary classification in between the “islamists” and the “secularists” doesn’t work. The more adequate explanation of the place of Islam in such a movement, can only result from an in depth analysis of the dynamics that have continued for more than a decade.

In this context, a comparison between the two situations of democratic transition may help understand the dynamics of a long lasting background of the Arab revolution. Between 1987 and 1989, three countries witnessed popular upsurges leading to democratic transitions. Therefore, Algeria, Tunisia and Jordan, and one another country Yemen, proceeded to such a transition, following its unification.

The transition toward a steady pluralistic democracy faced, however many obstacles. The vested elite still handled the key decision making institutions, so as to allow them to regain the political control they partially had lost, following the first step of the transition¹³⁸. On the other hand, the

¹³⁵ See, International Labor Organization, **Tunisia: Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations**, 2011.

If we consider Annie Vinokur’s periodical, most of the Arab educational systems are still at the secondary school stage and the increasing flow of graduated students exceeds the needs of the labor market thus leading to a devaluation of the grades obtained and to a downgrading of the young applicants.

See, Annie Vinokur, “De la Scolarisation De Masse A La Formation Tout Au Long De La Vie: Essai Sur Les Doctrines Educatives Des Organisations Internationales”, **Education Et Sociétés**, 2003, No. 12, pp. 91-104.

¹³⁶ See, Michel Raimbaud, “Dynamique et Bilan de l’Insurrection Libyenne”, **Enjeux Diplomatiques Et Stratégiques**, Dir : Pascal Chaigneau, Paris, Economica, 2012, pp. 210-225.

¹³⁷ In order to prevent any lack resulting from a probable invalidation of Khayrat al-Shâtir, the Muslim Brethren invested a first candidate, but at the same time it invested Muhammad Mursi as a second candidate who was to replace the former whose candidature was indeed invalidated by the Constitutional Court.

¹³⁸ For instance, in the case of Jordan, since the free elections of 1989, the King still handled the key executive prerogatives and the right to appoint most of the senators.

oppositional forces were divided and immature, which prevented them from gathering around a common “political contract” for a sustainable “democratic rules of the game” needed for political transition¹³⁹.

The most trustworthy types identified four political sets of doctrines among the opposition forces; the liberals, the Arab nationalists, the Marxists and the “Islamists”¹⁴⁰. The political and ideological evolution of those political trends leads us to the following statements: A controversy persisted around the legitimacy of a “liberal democracy”, explaining, because of the skepticism around its principles, why most of the overwhelming political forces and leading doctrines, strategically favored, either a socialist style of “popular democracy” or a state, implementing Shari’a. Those concerns were above the rules of the democratic game, especially when Shari’a occupied the first place, as regards the broader political ideals.

Indeed, the stability of a liberal democracy needs a consensus around the rules of the game which seemed to be lacking during the former democratic wave (1987 – 1989). Therefore, some of the “islamists” sought a restriction of the game to the political parties complying with the fundamentals of the Islamic law, excluding for instance the Marxists, whom nevertheless could convert to the liberal democratic fundamentals since the collapse of the soviet bloc. The Marxists, on the other hand, were ready to stop the game in case the Islamists were to win the elections and start ruling the country¹⁴¹. The ruling elites were able to play on this hostility in between the “islamists” and the “progressives”.

The radical shift from the dynamics of the mainstream “islamist” forces started in the aftermath of the Algerian crisis and similar effects were to be witnessed across the Arab world. A break off with the radical political forces, has consequently led to a strategic alliance with the so called “progressive” forces. Such an alliance has led to another condition which was about the setting up for a political consensus as the very basis of a new political system. The agreement on the idea of a Civil State (DawlaMadaniya) as the ground for the democratic rules of the political game, corresponded on the other hand to a shift on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islah party in Yemen and of other similar movements. The priority given to the respect of the democratic rules has weighed over all the other considerations, leading consequently to a new binary opposition in between the “democratic oppositional forces” on one side and the “authoritarian regimes” on the other¹⁴².

What is most important is that, this new consensus, arrived at less than two decades ago, allowed a conquest of civil society in countries like Egypt and Jordan, both led by authoritarian rulers yet benefiting from a relative openness, thus allowing a limited amount of free expression and non-partisan association, Arab civil society was able to grow.

Briefly, the maturity of the mainstream “islamist” forces in withering away from radical salafis and in building up a consensus with the “progressive” forces, allowed the mobilization of trade unions and advocacy associations, using slogans dedicated to freedom, transparency, regime change etc.

¹³⁹ See, Ghassan Salamé, **Démocraties Sans Démocrates, Les Expériences D’Ouverture Dans Le Monde Arabe Et Musulman**, Paris, Fayard, 1994.

¹⁴⁰ See, Fahime Charafeddine, **Idéologies Et Culture Dans Le Monde Arabe Et Musulman**, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1993.

¹⁴¹ In fact, the communist support for the formal democratic principles and rules of the game were prior to the collapse of the Soviet block. A particular consensus was experienced during the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990 when the Marxist forces joined all the other “progressive” and “democratic” forces who opposed the Christian extreme right and set for a joint program of democratic reforms.

¹⁴² This evolution is explained in our former paper. See, Nohra, “Jordanie, Egypte, Yémen... », **ibid**.

Although this evolution is not the only factor of the Arab democratic transition, it is crucial to the understanding of how it could be made possible. If we extrapolate the conceptual framework set by Michel Dobry, then we can make the following statement: the Arab opposition movement to the authoritarian regimes was possible, because the opposition forces have moved during the last two decades, from a relatively sectorial character to an inter-sectorial mobilization, involving an increasing amount of the relatively autonomous sectors of the civil society and of political actors¹⁴³.

6. Conclusion

For a long time, the western specialists of the Arab world explained the Arab will to break off from the values of the present global system, by an Islamic reaction to the globalization process, as regards their identity claims. The Arab revolutionary process induces a new interpretation that emphasizes a rather positive Islamic approach to globalization. In fact, resulting from another reading of the universal values of Islam, it can be asserted that the Islamic approaches could agree on certain common values, necessary to lay the ground for a radical reform of the political system. Such a common ground is essentially about setting up the “democratic rules of the game”, that instead of deepening the gap between religious and secular movements instead reproach them. Consequently, the vested regimes can no more claim themselves as legitimate, by using identity claims in order to maintain the status-quo.

The Arab revolution that started in January 2011 in Tunisia represented thus a new positive challenge for the relationship between Islamic components of Arab society and the global world system. The high degree of exposure of the Arab societies to globalization, the effect of Arab mass media and culture as well as economics, and points to an Islamic accommodation, in relation to such a process.

However, the above assertions indicate a long path to be able to explain the Arab revolution, claiming that it was prepared at least a decade ago. The transformation of most of the political ideologies, during this time paved the way for the occurrence of the Arab revolution. But, whatever the political and doctrinal work achieved in the echelons of oppositional forces, as relates to an ideological transformation, nothing would have happened if Arab societies and economies had not been so exposed to the effects of globalization. Globalization imposed itself on Arab societies, not only as an economic process, but also as a cultural and informational one. While economically the Arab societies have remained at the core, they could catch up with the information revolution.

Precisely, the neoliberal agenda of current globalization, geo-economically and geopolitically supports the core. The overall Arabo-Islamic identity faced with the dominance of the core, as regards its unsuccessful integration into the global economy, exacerbated the socio-economic conditions of the Arab revolution.

In this development, the US power politics, including the Washington consensus, have long tried to preserve the status quo, within the prevalence of the Arab authoritarian regimes. Therefore, both as regards cultural Islam and the practical needs of the disillusioned groups in the face of those unequal global patterns, the Arab revolution, instead of being a spontaneous movement indeed found its' roots decades ago.

As regards, the oppositional stance of the Arab revolution to the present course of globalization, is fostered, not only against the Arab dictators, serving the global designs of the hegemonic superpowers, but as well through the fact that the “secular” oppositional forces have never given

¹⁴³ Michel Dobry, **Sociologie des Crises Politiques**, 3^{ème} édition, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Science Politique, 2009.

up on the main national causes (concerning Palestine, Arab regional integration and political independence), thus providing a broad consensus not only on regime issues, but also on the Arab national matrix.

On the other hand, as regards the Arab revolution, the political evolution of the oppositional, progressive forces seems to change radically the kind of antagonistic relationship between the globalization process and “Islamic responses”. While, at the first stage, Islam appears rather as a reactive response, which consists in protecting and defending the Islamic civilizational particularity in the face of a worldwide homogenization process, at the next stage, it works rather as an interactive response, which would suit the universal values found in Islam, within a selective parameter, for a positive proposition of democratic reform. Indeed, while during the last decades the political discourse on Islamic identity affirmation, advocated relative introversion, in the political and cultural fields justifying the status quo, it is now emphasizing the need for a radical change.

Therefore, thanks to the mainstream oppositional movement, the universal values that the Islamic doctrine shares with the liberal rationalists, such as democracy, transparency and the rule of law have been reborn. In this respect, there is clearly a doctrinal effort, involving many scholars who demonstrated that the Islamic doctrine could go far, advocating democracy through the rule of law, given the already existing deliberative system (Shura). Especially, the Islamic principle of the compulsory submission of the ruler to legality, protecting individual rights and freedom, along with the principle of distinction between public and private wealth, have provided for an Islamic democratic reform.

Lastly, the political opposition to the global system, is undertaken again rather in an interactive way, as well on social and economic grounds. Consequently, a consensus has occurred against unrestrained liberalism, against the price of scarifying social justice, but yet, without detailed systemic doctrines, which if provided, could be similar to those of the Marxist theories three decades earlier.

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T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İKTİSADİ VE İDARİ BİLİMLER DERGİSİ
MAKALE YAZIM KURALLARI

1. Teslim ve Gönderim

- Makale 3 çıktı ve bir CD halinde, dergi yazışma adresine posta ile gönderilmelidir. E-posta yoluyla gönderilen makaleler değerlendirmeye alınmayacaktır.

2. Makale: Genel Özellikler

- Makale başlığı sayfa ortalanarak yazılacaktır,
- Yazar adı, yazara ait kişisel bilgilere yer verilmeksizin makalenin başlığı altına sağa yaslatılarak yazılacaktır,
- Yazara ait kişisel bilgiler ve yazarın elektronik posta adresi, ilk sayfada sayfa altı dipnot olarak verilecektir,
- Makale başlığı ve yazar adından sonra makalenin amacını, kullanılan yöntemleri ve çalışmada yer alan hususları kısaca belirten 50 ilâ 300 kelime arası Türkçe özet metni yer alacaktır. Özet metninin hemen altında makaleye ilişkin anahtar kelimeler yer alacaktır. Ardından makalenin konusunun dâhil olduğu üç karakterli “JEL Sınıflaması” yer alacaktır. Bir makale birden çok JEL sınıfına ilişkin olabilir. Ardından 50 ilâ 300 kelime arası İngilizce özet metni (“Abstract” başlığı ile), altında makaleye ilişkin İngilizce anahtar kelimeler yer alacaktır, ardından da üç karakterli “JEL Sınıflaması”¹ (“JEL Classification:” ifadesi ile) belirtilecektir.
- Makalede Giriş bölümü yer alacak ve bu bölümde çalışmanın yapılmasındaki önem ve konu hakkındaki literatür çalışmalarının genel bir değerlendirmesi yapılacaktır.
- Dergimize gönderilen makalelerin 25 sayfayı aşmayacak şekilde tasarlanması beklenmektedir.

3. Makalenin Bölümleri

- Makalenin bölümlerinin çalışma içeriği dikkate alınarak konu başlıklarına göre bölüm ve alt-başlıklara ayrılarak ondalık sisteme göre düzenlenmesi gerekmektedir,
- Giriş’i takip eden bölümlerde çalışmanın teorik ve/veya ampirik dayanağı, araştırma yöntemi, veri toplama yöntemi sistematik bir sıra izlendikten sonra, elde edilen bulgular ışığında genel olarak değerlendirilecektir.
- İfade edilmesi gerekli görülmekle birlikte konunun gelişimini kesintiye uğratacağı düşünülen ya da belirtilen bir hususu daha detaylı açıklayan bilgilerin dipnotta ya da ekte gösterilmesi uygundur.
- Makalenin sonucu, “Sonuç” başlığı altında yer almalıdır,

¹ *Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) Classification System.* JEL Kategori kodlarını fakülte dergisi web sayfamızda yer alan “JEL sınıflaması” dosyasında görebilirsiniz (Örnek gösterim: Üretim yönetimi ile ilgili bir makale için; “JEL Sınıflaması: M11”, JEL “Classification: M11” yazılacaktır.)

- Makalede kullanılan kaynaklar “Kaynakça” başlığı altında yer alacaktır,

4. Dipnot ve Kaynak Gösterme

- Dipnotlar sayfa altında yer alacaktır,
- Dipnotta yer alacak kaynaklar aşağıda verilen örneklerdeki gibi olacaktır,

Dipnot Örnekleri

Kitap: Dipnot numarası, yazar adı ve soyadı, kitap adı (**BOLD**), baskı sayısı, basıldığı şehir, varsa yayınlayan kuruluş, yayın tarihi, referans alınan sayfa numarası.

Türkçe hazırlanan çalışmalarda, yabancı dilde yayınlanmış kaynakların baskı sayılarının dipnotlarda ve kaynakçada gösterimi orijinalinde kullanıldığı şekilde (SAYFA NUMARASI HARİÇ) yazılacaktır.

Korkut Boratav, **Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002**, Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2003, s.46

Korkut Boratav **Türkiye’de Devletçilik**, Ankara, Savaş Yayınları, 1982, s.74

Aynı Kaynağa Yeniden Başvurma: Aynı kişiye, daha önce atıfta bulunulmuş ve eser kitap ise (yazar soyadı, **a.g.k.**), makale ise (**a.g.m.**) v.b., aynı yazarın birden fazla yayınına atıfta bulunuluyorsa (yazar soyadı, kullanılan yayının **ilk birkaç kelimesi, a.g.k.**) v.b. biçiminde verilecektir.

Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002, Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2003, s. 46

Korkut Boratav Türkiye’de Devletçilik, Ankara, Savaş Yayınları, 1982, s.74 Boratav, **Türkiye...a.g.k.**, s.22

Kurum Adına Hazırlanmış Eser: Kurumun açık adı, eserin adı (**BOLD**), basıldığı yer, basım yılı, atıfta bulunulan sayfalar.

T.C. Başbakanlık Hazine ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, **1980-1990 Döneminde Türkiye’de Ekonomik Politika ve Uygulamalar**, Ankara, 1991, s. 1-7.

Makale: Yazar adı ve soyadı, makalenin adı (tırnak içinde), yayımlandığı süreli yayının adı (**BOLD**), cilt no, sayı veya yayın no, yayın tarihi (ay ve yıl) ya da dönemi (kapsadığı aylar ve yıl), atıfta bulunulan sayfa numarası,

T. Fischer, “Universal Hedging: Optimizing Currency Risk and Reward in International Equity Portfolios”, **Financial Analysts Journal**, July-August 1991, s. 32-38.

İki Yazarlı Eser: Kaynakta yer alan sıra ile birinci yazarın adı ve soyadı, ikinci yazarın adı ve soyadı, eserin adı (**BOLD**), basım yeri, yayınlayan kurum, varsa yayın no, basım tarihi, atıfta bulunulan sayfa numarası,.

Ziya Öniş- Süleyman Özmucur, **Türkiye’de Enflasyon**, İstanbul Ticaret Odası, Yayın No:1987-5, İstanbul, 1987, s. 53.

İkiden Fazla Yazarlı Eser: Kaynakta yer alan sıraya göre birinci yazarın adı ve soyadı “ve diğerleri” ifadesi, eserin adı (**BOLD**), basım yeri, yayınlayan kurum, varsa yayın no, basım tarihi, atıfta bulunulan sayfa numarası.

W. Mendenhall ve diğerleri, **Statistics for Management and Economics**, Sixth Edition, London, WPS-Kent Publishing Company, 1989, s. 54.

Akademik Tezler: Tez yazarının adı ve soyadı, tezin adı (tırnak içerisinde), eğitim kurumunun bulunduğu şehir, tezin onaylandığı eğitim kurumu, tarih, sayfa numarası ve tezin akademik statüsü (parantez içerisinde),

Gülay Akgül Yılmaz, “Yeraltı Ekonomisi ve Vergi Kaybı”, İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1996, s.115, (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi)

Seminer veya Konferans Notları: Konuşmacının adı ve soyadı, tebliğ konusu (tırnak içerisinde), toplantının adı (**BOLD**), toplantı yeri, toplantı tarihi.

Arslan Sonat, “KKFA ve Dış Denge”, **X. Türkiye Maliye Sempozyumu**, Kemer, Antalya, 14-18 Mayıs 1994.

Periyodik Bültenler: Bülteni yayınlayan kurumun adı, yayının adı (**BOLD**), yayın tarihi (ay ve yıl olarak), alıntının yapıldığı sayfa numarası.

Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, **Temel Ekonomik Göstergeler**, Haziran 1994, s. 17.

Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu, **Aylık Bülten, Haziran 1994**, s. 5-7.

Meslekî ve Bilimsel Raporlar: Raporu çıkartan kurumun adı (**BOLD**), raporun adı (tırnak içerisinde), yayın numarası, alıntı yapılan sayfa numarası.

TÜSİAD, “İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası / Genel Durum ve Öneriler”, Yayın No: TÜSİAD-T/93, ss. 11-164.

Mevzuat: Kanun, Kanun Hükmünde Kararname, Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı, Bakanlar Kurulu Kararına Ek Karar, tebliğ, sirkü gibi mevzuata ilişkin bilgiler; resmi gazete tarihi ve sayısı ile ilgili mevzuatın kendi numaraları ve T.C. Resmi Gazete (**BOLD**) belirtilerek dipnotta yer alacaktır.

6224 Nolu Yabancı Sermayeyi Teşvik Kanunu (23.01.1954 tarih, 8615 sayılı **T.C. Resmi Gazete**).

Görüşme: Görüşme yapılan kişinin adı ve soyadı, mülakat tarihi.

Hüseyin Çakır, 17 Eylül 1994 tarihli görüşme.

İnternet Kaynağı: Yazar adı ve soyadı, kaynağın adı, web adresi (**BOLD**), erişim tarihi (parantez içinde),

David Yaffe, The Politics and Economics of Globalisation, <http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~rcgoföfö/marxism/article/glob137.htm>, Erişim Tarihi (11.04.2001),

Gazeteden Alıntı – Gazete Haberleri: Gazetenin adı, tarihi ve sayfası

Radikal, 30 Eylül 2004, s.11

Başkasının Derlediği Bir Kitapta, Yazarlardan Birisinin Yazısına Atıf: Atıfta bulunulan yazarın adı ve soyadı, makalenin adı (tırnak içinde), yayınlanan eserin adı (**BOLD**), “Der. : ” ifadesi ile eseri derleyeninin adı ve soyadı, basıldığı şehir, varsa yayın kuruluşu, yayın tarihi, referans alınan sayfa numarası.

V.O. Key, “Politics and Administration” **Public Administration : Reading and**

Documents, Der: Felix A. Nigro, New York, Rinehart, 1951, s.15-21

Kaynakça: Yazar soyadı (büyük harfle), adı ve eser, dipnot kuralları olarak belirtilen hususlar geçerli olmak kaydıyla alfabetik sıraya göre yazılacaktır. Makalelerin dergilerin hangi sayfaları arasında olduğu gösterilmelidir.

THYGESEN, Niels **The Role of the European Monetary Institute**, Copenhagen, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1996.

FISCHER, T., “Universal Hedging: Optimizing Currency Risk and Reward in International Equity Portfolios”, **Financial Analysts Journal**, July-August 1991, s. 32-38.

5. Tablo, Grafik ve Şekiller


Tablo, grafik ve şekiller her bölümde ve eklerde ayrı ayrı numaralandırılır. Tablo, grafik ve şekil adları numarasının hemen yanına yazılır. Adların yazıldığı satır ile alttaki gösterim arasında yarım satır boşluk bırakılır. Adın bir satırdan uzun olması halinde tek satır arasında boşluk olmayacaktır. Tablo, grafik ve şekillerin alt sınırından sonra boşluk bırakılmadan kaynak gösterim yazısı verilir.

Kaynak gösterimi tablo, grafik veya şekil altında **Kaynak:** gösterimi ile yapılır. Genel olarak ince çizgi kullanılması uygundur (3/4 pt). Tabloların ilk satır ve sütunları ile grafiklerin eksenlerinde yer alan değişkenlerin adları koyu yazılmalıdır. Bütün tablo, grafik ve şekiller, metinde ilk sözü edilen yere mümkün olduğunca yakın olmalıdır.

Tablo 1.1 GSYİH Kaynak Dağılım Yapısı (1980–1994 %)

	1980	1985	1991	1992	1993	1994
Endüstri	6,8	6,4	5,7	6,0	6,7	5,3
Endüstri	63,4	61,5	60,1	53,8	47,6	49,7
Hizmetler	29,9	32	34,2	40,2	45,8	44,9

Kaynak: EIU, **Country Report**, 2nd Quarter, 1996; DEİK, **Slovakya Ekonomisi ve Türkiye ile İlişkiler**, Aralık 1995, s.7



Kaynak: EIU, **Country Report**, 2nd Quarter, 1996, s.12

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İKTİSADİ VE İDARİ BİLİMLER DERGİSİ
TEKNİK ÖZELLİKLERİ

Sayfa Yapısı

Kenar Boşlukları: Alt, Üst, Sağ, Sol: **2 cm**

Cilt payı: Cilt payı: **0,5 cm** Cilt payı yeri: Sol

Kağıt Boyutu: Özel boyut; Genişlik: **16 cm** Yükseklik: **24 cm**

Düzen: √ Tek ve çift sayfalarda farklı
Üstbilgi: **1,2 cm** Altbilgi: **1,2 cm**

Yazı Karakteri

Ana Başlık: Tamamı BÜYÜK harf.
Times New Roman, 12 punto, **Kalın**(Bold), **ortalanmış**.
Paragraf aralıkları; **Önce:** 6 nk, **Sonra:** 6 nk.
Satır aralığı; **1,5 satır** Girinti; **yok**.

Diğer Başlıklar: Sadece ilk harfi BÜYÜK karakter.
Times New Roman, 11 punto, **Kalın**(Bold), **sola dayalı**.
Paragraf aralıkları; **Önce:** 3 nk, **Sonra:** 3 nk.
Satır aralığı; **1,5 satır** Girinti; **yok**.

Yazar Bilgisi: Soyadı BÜYÜK harf.
Times New Roman, 11 punto, **Kalın**(Bold), **sağa dayalı**.
Paragraf aralıkları; **Önce:** 0 nk, **Sonra:** 0 nk.
Satır aralığı; **Tek** Girinti; **yok**.

Özet metni:

Türkçe ve İngilizce (Abstract başlığı ile)

Times New Roman, 10 punto, *İtalik*, İki yana yaslanmış.

Paragraf aralıkları; Önce: 0 nk, **Sonra:** 6 nk.

Satır aralığı; **Tek** Girinti; Özel; **İlk satır;** 1,25 cm.

Anahtar kelimeler:

Türkçe özet metninin altına Türkçe “Anahtar Kelimeler” başlığı ile İngilizce özet metninin altına İngilizce “Key Words” başlığı ile.

Times New Roman, 10 punto, *İtalik*, İki yana yaslanmış.

Paragraf aralıkları; Önce: 0 nk, **Sonra:** 6 nk.

Satır aralığı; **Tek** Girinti; Özel; **İlk satır;** 1,25 cm.

JEL Sınıflaması:

Anahtar kelimelerin altına “JEL Sınıflaması” başlığı ile İngilizce anahtar kelimelerin altına “JEL Classification” başlığı ile.

Times New Roman, 10 punto, *İtalik*.

Paragraf aralıkları; Önce: 0 nk, **Sonra:** 6 nk.

Satır aralığı; **Tek** Girinti; Özel; **İlk satır;** 1,25 cm.

Asıl metin:

Times New Roman, 10 punto, İki yana yaslanmış.

Paragraf aralıkları; Önce: 0 nk, **Sonra:** 6 nk.

Satır aralığı; **Tek** Girinti; Özel; **İlk satır;** 1,25 cm.

Dipnot:

Times New Roman, 9 punto, Sola yaslanmış.

Paragraf aralıkları; Önce: 0 nk, **Sonra:** 3 nk.

Satır aralığı; **Tek** Girinti; yok.

Kaynakça:

Times New Roman, 10 punto, İki yana yaslanmış.

Paragraf aralıkları; Önce: 0 nk, **Sonra:** 6 nk.

Satır aralığı; **Tek** Girinti; Özel; **Asılı;** 1,25 cm.