

**RECENT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS  
IN THE  
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS**

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***Abstract***

*The author analyzes the situation in Cyprus upon the background of the Annan plan and the recent parliamentary elections. The article covers the main events and factors that have a bearing on the current situation in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The analysis concerns the Turkish prime minister's pre-election visit to the TRNC, political campaigning for the elections, external and internal factors influencing the elections, its results and Turkey's reactions to the election results and the new government. The author contends that President Denktaş envisages 'a single new state created by the two existing states'. As to the form of the union, he believes that 'a confederal system would have more chance of success than a federal system. If this works well the two sides may decide in future to establish a closer union'.*

The last Cyprus update (Autumn 2003) concluded by noting that a two-state confederal type of solution was that most favoured by Ankara. This chimes in with the aim of the Turkish Cypriot Government. It is sometimes thought that by a 'two-state' solution President Denktaş and the Turkish Cypriot Government advocate two separate states, each going its own way, with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) turning its back

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perhaps on the European Union. On the contrary, President Denktaş envisages 'a single new state created by the two existing states'. As to the form of the union, he believes that 'a confederal system would have more chance of success than a federal system. If this works well the two sides may decide in future to establish a closer union'.<sup>1</sup>

### **The UN Plan**

The UN Plan, commonly known as the 'Annan Plan', last amended in February 2003, but rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, was essentially a federal plan, though it was not created by the two states. Instead, and very oddly, it was to be decided upon in referenda held in the South and the North after submission to the electorates with the authority only of the 'leader' of each community. The states were thus bypassed - presumably to avoid recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

As to the contents of the Plan itself, it will be recalled that the Turkish Cypriots chiefly objected to the political and social disruption it would produce by the reduction of their territory, and by the return of large numbers of Greek Cypriots to the North. Many of these would have the right to reoccupy houses owned before the 1974 Turkish military intervention and since then mostly inhabited by Turkish Cypriots with Turkish Cypriot title deeds. The Turkish Cypriots also believed that the Plan would lead to Greek Cypriot domination of the joint, or 'common', state to be established. They also feared that the operation of EU principles through the *acquis* would expose them to Greek Cypriot economic domination. Whether, under the Plan, they could still be protected by Turkey was another worry.

### **Tayyip Erdoğan's Pre-election Visit to the TRNC**

The various pronouncements of the Turkish Government, if somewhat less than consistent, have generally offered support for the Turkish Cypriot rejection of the UN Plan. In particular, in the course of an important speech in the TRNC on 15 November 2003, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Republic, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, declared as follows:

The strength and solidarity demonstrated by the Turkish people of Cyprus during forty years' long struggle, and the strength and well being of your twenty-

year old Republic, is a source of pride for us. Your Republic has been a basic element of peace and stability in Cyprus. Acknowledgement of this fact would constitute the basis for sustainable consensus on the island.

Later the Prime Minister underlined his call for the acknowledgement of the TRNC:

Today there are two distinct peoples with two distinct religions and two distinct languages who are equal in all respects. There are two separate democratic systems and two separate states in Cyprus. Reconciliation efforts in Cyprus should be based on these realities.

For the Prime Minister, a lasting settlement had to guarantee the security, the equal status, and the political equality of the Turks of Cyprus. Bizonality also had to be ensured. A new settlement had necessarily to be based on a new partnership, 'taking into account the Greco -Turkish balance in, and concerning, Cyprus'. It is not clear what this last remark was meant to indicate.

The Prime Minister did not call explicitly for international recognition of the TRNC, but the expression 'the realities on the island' is always used by Denktaş to mean recognition of the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Also the Prime Minister, it may be noticed, laid stress the 'equal status' of the Turkish Cypriots. In addition, he condemned the 'illegal' embargoes imposed by all states save Turkey on the TRNC consequent on their recognition of the government of the 'Republic of Cyprus' as sovereign over the whole island (excluding the British bases). In the speech there was no reference to the contents of the Plan, favourable or unfavourable. This was judicious, since the opposition parties believe it is a way forward, as against its rejection by the Turkish Cypriot Government. Also, there was a reaffirmation of support for the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General

The speech heartened the supporters of the two government coalition parties, the National Unity Party and the Democratic Party, which claim to be much more loyal supporters of Turkish Cypriot independence than the opposition parties, whose leaders have close contacts with the political parties in the South. The major opposition parties are the Republican Turkish Party under Mehmet Ali Talat and the Peace and Democracy Movement led by Mustafa Akıncı. Both are left-wing. In the nationalist and conservative press the opposition leaders are often dubbed '*mandacılar*', a

reference to those who in post-first world war Turkey called for a foreign mandate for Turkey.

### **Elections: Political Campaigning**

Acceptance or rejection of the Plan as a basis for discussion became the major issue in the propaganda campaigns of the parties leading up to the parliamentary elections held on 14 December 2003. They were inevitably linked, however, with the prospect of EU membership. Acceptance of the Plan would mean the road would be open to EU membership, of which nearly all Turkish Cypriots are in favour. It was not clear in the campaign of the two government parties that they too wanted EU membership. Their rejection of the present Plan was seen as denoting a less enthusiastic attitude towards a future in the European Union. This was reinforced by the criticism advanced by the government parties that the EU had interfered in the elections with financial support, and by offers of further support in the event of a settlement. Apart from differences about the content and implications of the UN Plan, there was also a marked difference between the government and opposition parties regarding recognition of the TRNC before making an agreement. The opposition parties tended to avoid this issue rather than come out openly against prior recognition.

On the contents and implications of the UN Plan the opposition parties were also reticent. They rightly perceived that the very large majority of the electorate would find it difficult to understand the complex scheme. Their leaders were challenged to a television debate on the Plan by Fuat Veziroğlu, a former politician and a columnist for the prime nationalist and conservative newspaper, *Volkan*, but no one came forward to take on this formidable debater. The government parties made much of the dangers to the existence of an independent Turkish Cypriot state in the UN Plan. The President, as Head of State, also added his voice to this concern. He pointed out that the existence of the TRNC was guaranteed in the Constitution. It could not be abolished without due process, certainly not by a referendum promoted by some person merely called a 'leader of the community' by the UN Secretary-General and the international community. The government parties declared that the Turkish Cypriots should beware lest they became a minority in a state dominated by the Greek Cypriots. Their cause was also a national cause for Turkey, they proclaimed, anxious to obtain Turkish support.

The Peace and Democracy Movement took a very anti-Turkish line, which probably cost votes. Mehmet Ali Talat was more circumspect and tried to keep Turkey on his side. He also set out to woo the Turkish immigrants. Until he was overthrown, the chairman of their association, Dr Nuri Cevikel, advocated support for the left-wing parties. These 'settlers' have never been as supportive of the government as commentators in the South often assume. Research a number of years ago showed that immigrants' voting patterns were little different from those of other voters.<sup>2</sup> They have often complained that they were not getting their due deserts from the government - delay in the granting of land titles, for instance.

The left-wing opposition parties, and the small Solution and EU Party, criticised the government parties' distrust of the Greek Cypriots. They were accused of looking too much to the past. The present Greek Cypriots, the opposition claimed, were not the Greek Cypriots of 1964: they would respect the Turkish Cypriots. Within the EU the Turkish Cypriots would be safe. The whole philosophy of the EU was based on a reduction of nationalist animosities. These would fade away in Cyprus, as elsewhere. However, the government parties were, not unnaturally, somewhat surprised to hear that President Tassos Papadopoulos was a new and enlightened Turkish Cypriot. Was this not the same Papadopoulos of EOKA fame?

A telling point in the opposition parties campaign was certainly that, without the Plan and EU membership, there was no chance of adequate employment for young Turkish Cypriots, though little was made of the economic blockage for the TRNC economy created by the international embargoes. Once in the EU Turkish Cypriots, it was proclaimed, would have the prospect of employment in the EU open to them. In fact, the lure of a Greek Cypriot passport as Open Sesame to the EU has been a great attraction. Already many in the TRNC have applied for and been granted Greek Cypriot passports: 8,523 were issued between 25 April and 25 November 2003.<sup>3</sup>

### **The Elections**

The results of the parliamentary elections held on 14 December 2003 are shown below. Figures in parentheses are for the 1988 parliamentary elections. Of the country's 140513 registered voters, 86 per cent participated in the poll. The National Assembly has 50 members. The country is divided into five constituencies, the number of members in each constituency being

related to its population. The largest constituency, Lefkoşa, returns 16 members, the smallest, İskele, 5. Parties that obtain fewer than 5 per cent of the vote receive no seats.

<i>Political Party</i>	<i>Per cent of Vote</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyet Türk Partisi)	35.17 (13,35)	19 (6)
National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi)	32.91 (40.33)	18 (24)
Peace and Democracy Movement (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi)	13.19 (15.36) <sup>1</sup>	6 (7)
Democratic Party (Demokrat Partisi)	12.94 (22.1)	7 (13)
National Peace Party <sup>2</sup> (Milliyetçi Barış Partisi)	3.21	
Solution and EU Party <sup>2</sup> (Çözüm ve AB Partisi)	1.98	
Cyprus Justice Party <sup>2</sup> (Kıbrıs Adalet Partisi)	0.6	

<sup>1</sup> The near equivalent in 1998 was the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumsal Kurtuluş Partisi) under the same leader, Mustafa Akıncı.

<sup>2</sup> These parties were new for the 2003 election.

Source: *Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, 16 December 2003.

Clearly, the Democratic Party and the National Unity Party, in that order, lost considerable support. The former even lost the former Economy Minister, Salih Coşar, and the latter the former National Education and Culture Minister, İlkey Kamil.

The vote for the government parties was significantly reduced by the appearance on the political scene of the Nationalist Peace Party, and to a lesser degree by the Cyprus Justice Party. They were of the same general persuasion as the two government parties, but were critical of their

leadership. Attempts were made to persuade them to withdraw, but to no avail. If the votes given to these two parties had gone instead to the government parties, it is probable that they would have had one, or even two extra seats, thus allowing them to form a government. Also if the Solution and EU Party had not contested the election, many of its wasted votes must also surely have gone to the government parties. This bourgeois party's voters, led by the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Ali Erel, were unlikely to have voted for the left-wing opposition parties. On the other hand, taking into account the effective votes actually given to the government and opposition parties, the opposition left-wing parties had a 2.5 per cent majority.

However, another factor enters into the evaluation of the voting figures. A study carried out by a group in the Eastern Mediterranean University correctly pointed out that as each constituency returned a different number of members, voters in some constituencies had more votes than those in others. If all voters had an equal number of votes, then the government parties, it was calculated, would have 51.2 per cent of the vote. The chief significance of this, it is claimed, is that in a referendum, when each voter would have just one vote, it could be expected that over half the population would reject the UN Plan. This is argued on the grounds that the election was essentially about acceptance, or rejection, of the UN Plan. However, it is arguable that the vote for the opposition owed much not so much to a liking for the Plan, but to a very general and marked desire to enter the EU, which seemed to follow more certainly from acceptance, than from rejection, of the UN Plan. As mentioned above, the government parties also claimed to want to enter the EU, but their route seemed appeared much less certain.

### **Were the Elections Fair?**

#### *External pressures*

The opposition parties complained that Turkey influenced the elections in favour of the government parties, particularly by the visit of the Prime Minister on the twentieth anniversary of the Republic (15 November 2003), but the rather wavering attitude of the Turkish Government makes this hard to sustain. The military in Turkey was clearly seen to be supportive of the government parties, as was the opposition Republican People's Party, but the Turkish press was very divided. The Turkish Industrialists and

Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) was insistent in its demand for the UN Plan, as too was a former Foreign Minister prominent in the press, İler Türkmen, whose positive views were warmly welcomed by Mehmet Ali Talat, and severely criticised by Denктаş. The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) has produced and distributed to the press a booklet on the Cyprus issue supportive of the Annan Plan. The Director of the Foundation is reported as asserting 'that the plan is the main basis for a solution'.<sup>4</sup>

In the TRNC the government parties complained bitterly about outside interference. They resented that the American Ambassador to Cyprus, Michael Klosson, spoke in favour of the UN Plan, as did the American Special Representative, Thomas Weston, who, in Ankara, said that acceptance of the Annan Plan, as a framework, was essential for a solution. A US Government spokesman at the same time urged all parties to resume negotiations under the UN Plan, as indeed did the British Government. In the House of Commons, Mr Denis MacShane, the British Minister for Europe, routinely declared that the Annan Plan was 'balanced, practicable and compatible with the EU *acquis*'. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Günther Verheugen, did also not refrain from declaring that, the elections 'could possibly have some value if the Turkish Cypriot opposition would win, as the opposition parties wanted a solution based on the Annan Plan and EU accession'.<sup>5</sup> EU financial aid to the municipalities led by left-wing mayors, and to the Chamber of Commerce, was mentioned in the last update, together with promises of further substantial aid for the Turkish Cypriots after a settlement. Lest there should be any way out for the TRNC through recognition by the Arab states, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, revealed on 7 November 2003 that in September the American Government had sent letters to all the foreign ministers of states belonging to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference urging them not to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.<sup>6</sup> All these developments and statements of support cannot help but have boosted the confidence of the opposition parties.

### *Internal factors*

In an interview with the Turkish newspaper, *Zaman* (4.12. 2003), Günther Verheugen is reported as claiming that the register of voters for the elections had been tampered with, noting that there were now 20,000 more voters than in 1998, and that the numbers of voters had increased by 4000

since September. He claimed that this did not stem from the birth rate and that 'everyone knows that Denktaş gave citizenship to how many Turks'. In response the Turkish Foreign Minister insisted that the elections would be fair. The allegations stem, it appears from a report in the opposition newspaper, *Yeni Düzen* (26.11.2003) which calls for some examination.

It is true that the rate of increase in the numbers of voters between 1993 and 1998 was 11.17 per cent, as compared with a 17.15 per cent in the rate of increase between 1998 and 2003. The extra 6 per cent in the rate of increase is not so remarkable. It must partly reflect population growth, but no doubt is partly accounted for by an increase in the number of citizens, or, to be more precise, an increase in the number of citizens who proceeded to take the necessary administrative measures to ensure they were included in the electoral register. Yet, it is surprising to find that almost a fifth of the increase in the number of some 20,000 voters over the five-year period certainly occurred between August and November 2003

It is the case that over the years there has been an increase in the numbers of persons granted citizenship, whether by the Ministry of the Interior or by the Council of Ministers. According to the Minister of the Interior, in these two ways since 1974 some 54,000 persons have been granted citizenship. Of these just over 17,000 were granted in the last ten years, between January 1993 and October 2003. The recent increase in the number of voters must mainly relate to very late grants of citizenship, or to applications to be inscribed in the voting register from those persons made earlier.

It was suspected, and reported abroad, that these newly granted citizenships were given to 'Turkish immigrants (or 'settlers' in Greek Cypriot terminology) by the Council of Ministers for political reasons, i.e. on the grounds that were expected to vote for the government parties, though this is not a reliable assumption, as noted earlier. More probably, this recent growth has arisen from the desire of immigrants to be counted as citizens in the new Cyprus envisaged in the UN Plan. In recent months the administrative offices were almost overwhelmed by the numbers of applications for citizenship. Immigrants cannot become citizens unless they apply, and to encourage them to apply would not necessarily produce pro-government voters.<sup>7</sup>

## The Media

Three weeks before the elections a group from Oslo University led by Professor Aunund Hylland went to Northern Cyprus to study the role of state broadcasting and its impact on the electoral process, in the light of the criteria accepted by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (OSCE). The opposition parties frequently accuse state radio and television of bias, as, too, has the Democratic Party! It is possible that the report of the Oslo group, rightly or wrongly, will come out in support of the opposition's contention of bias.<sup>8</sup> However, the group had apparently not studied the media generally and its effects on the elections. Any thoroughgoing study would, of course, also have to take into account the private television and radio stations, backed by research into how many watched and listened to state and private television and radio. Of the five private television outlets three are generally regarded as supportive of the government parties, and two of the opposition. Those in support of the Annan Plan were Genç TV and Kıbrıs TV, the latter of the Kıbrıs Media Group owned by Asil Nadir. Both stations seem to be popular. Of the private radio stations the pro-opposition Kıbrıs FM, again of the Kıbrıs media group, is said to be among those with higher ratings First FM is also anti-government and belongs to the Birinci Media group, to which Genç TV belongs.

Of the newspapers *Kıbrıs*, of the Kıbrıs media group, is the most important, with a circulation of 8000 to 10000. It suddenly became markedly anti-government in December 20002, after having long been supportive of the governmental parties. The other newspapers, which represent a variety of political views, some being party mouthpieces, each have a daily circulation of about 1000. Generally the most impartial paper is *Halkın Sesi*, but during the election it supported the new Nationalist Peace Party. The most pronounced opposition paper is *Afrika*, which is also very anti-Turkish. The most prominent paper on the nationalist right is *Volkan*. The pre-election polls produced by newspapers were invariably optimistic about the chances of the political parties they supported. Even if state radio and television are shown to have been biased to some degree, there is no doubt that the voters in the December election had access to a very wide range of opinion.<sup>9</sup>

## Turkey and the Cyprus Problem

It has been noted that the Turkish Prime Minister on his visit to the TRNC on 15 November 2003 provided some encouragement and support for the government parties. After the election, which showed the government parties less strong than had generally been thought, the Turkish Government's attitude hardened a little. There now seemed rather more chance of inducing the Turkish Cypriots to return to the negotiating table to reconsider the Annan Plan. This had undoubtedly become more pressing after the EU Commission's annual report (5 November, 2003) on Turkey's progress towards EU membership. In that report the Commission stated that 'the absence of a settlement [of the Cyprus issue] could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations'. The Turkish reaction was to point out that Cyprus was not included in the Copenhagen Criteria, and was now being mentioned specifically for the first time. Whilst stressing that Cyprus was not just a Turkish concern, the Turkish Government could not help accept that, with the Cyprus issue unresolved, the reality was that Turkey's chances of accession looked slim. The Turkish Government had also weakened its case on Cyprus by finally accepting the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights that required Turkey to give full satisfaction to Mrs Loizidou, who sought to regain possession of her property in Northern Cyprus.<sup>10</sup>

International comment on the need for a solution of the Cyprus conflict if Turkey was to make progress towards the EU was not that Turkey was required to provide a solution, but that non-solution would in reality be a serious impediment. There was no indication in all this that the Greek side also had responsibility for a solution: consequently many Turks seemed to accept that it was Turkey that had to solve the Cyprus problem.

After the elections the frustration felt by the Turkish Government was revealed when Erdoğan in a press conference in Uzbekistan said that Denktaş ought to change his advisers. He also made it clear that Turkey has never expressed the view that the Annan Plan should be rejected, but that it could be discussed. By contrast, Denktaş essentially believes that the Annan Plan cannot be substantially changed through negotiations. 'We do not believe it could be amended in a way that it would save us, for its philosophy is wrong. Therefore, the Prime Minister's idea of finding a solution on the basis of the realities cannot be fitted into the philosophy of the Annan Plan, unless all aspects of the Annan Plan, including its

philosophy are exposed to discussion. But the Secretary-General is saying that you cannot step outside the framework of the plan, you can only change those points on which you agree with the Greek Cypriots'.<sup>11</sup> Denktaş wants proximity talks to clear away the hurdles before further negotiations. Essentially, by recognition of the present realities he means that the TRNC should be recognised before entering into negotiations for a settlement.

### *A New Government*

Since the Republican Turkish Party had most deputies in the Assembly, its leader, Talat, was asked by the President to try to form a government. This he eventually achieved on 11 January 2004, in coalition with the Democratic Party led by the President's son, Serdar Denktaş. A more natural coalition with the Peace and Democracy Movement was not possible since the latter only had six seats. It was not included in the coalition formed since the pronounced anti-Turkish stance of its leader, Mustafa Akıncı was, presumably, not acceptable to Serdar Denktaş.

In the coalition protocol the prime target was said to be to reach a settlement before May 2004 through talks on the basis of the Annan Plan, a departure from the President's approach. It was also agreed that the settlement plan should be submitted to referenda on both sides. However the protocol also envisaged a partnership settlement. It looked forward to the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot peoples and the founding states. The protocol also looked to a shared sovereignty in Cyprus as a whole, and to 'our own sovereignty in our constituent state'. There is no mention of pre-recognition of the TRNC, but the emphasis on the states could be important. As has been noted, they were largely bypassed in the Annan Plan.<sup>12</sup>

### *Turkish Reactions*

Meanwhile the Turkish Government was going through the process of drafting its own proposals for tackling the Cyprus issue. These were delayed by the opposition stemming from the military and the Republican People's Party. Eventually, it was decided that the proposals would be finalised at the meeting of the 'National Security Council to be held on 23 January 2004, thus ensuring that they would have military support. The Turkish Government also declared that Denktaş should continue to be the negotiator

for Northern Cyprus, a considerable setback for Talat, who nevertheless put a brave face on it.

In his new-year message, the President of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, threw in his plea that the international community should recognise the 'realities on the ground', ie, the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. On 11 January 2004 President Denktaş was invited to Ankara, following a meeting the previous day between Erdoğan and the Turkish Cypriot party leaders. On his return Denktaş appeared to have softened his stance a little. He affirmed that the Annan Plan was on the table, and that efforts were under way to make it acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community, but he also pointed out that the real work lay in preliminary efforts to make the plan acceptable. This reflected his basic view that the philosophy of the Plan was wrong.

The final shape of Turkish proposals for a settlement waits upon the National Security Council meeting. For this meeting the President, the General Staff and the Foreign Office will all present their views on the issue. This result will be important for Erdoğan's meeting later in the month with President Bush. In the meantime, on 7 January 2004, after a meeting of senior government and military leaders chaired by the President, it was announced that Turkey backed the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General, and the need for a rapid result through negotiations. However, the statement significantly stated that the negotiations should acknowledge 'the realities on the island' noting that Turkey's position has always been that there are two independent states on the island. If the Turkish side refuses to give way on this crucial issue, can pressure be put on the Greek Cypriot side to accept that any negotiations are between two states? Admittedly, given Greek Cypriot attitudes, that would seem almost impossible to achieve, but it would seem to be the real obstacle to successful negotiation.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Quotations are from a policy statement by the Turkish Cypriot Presidency. <trncpresidency.org>.
- <sup>2</sup> Jonathan Warner: 'Importing voters. Does it work?', *New Cyprus* (Sep/Oct.,1990)
- <sup>3</sup> According to the Permanent Secretary of the Greek Cypriot Ministry of the Interior, as reported in the *Cyprus Mail*, 27.11. 2003. During the same period, 23,236 identity cards and 68,594 birth certificates were issued.
- <sup>4</sup> *Turkish Daily News*, 5.12.2003
- <sup>5</sup> Speech to the Belgian Senate, 2 December, 2003, as reported in *Turkish Daily News*, 4.12.2003.
- <sup>6</sup> As reported in *Turkish Daily News*, 14.11.2003
- <sup>7</sup> It is a subject that clearly needs more research.
- <sup>8</sup> The author was present at a meeting in December, 2003, when the group made a verbal report to the Chairman of the Supreme Electoral Board.
- <sup>9</sup> The Turkish Cypriot weekly, *Haberci*, (25.11.2003) included an informative article on the media.
- <sup>10</sup> Turkey's stance had always previously been that any claims should be addressed to the TRNC since Turkey was not responsible for its affairs. It seems that Ankara took this decision so as not to be in conflict with the prestigious Court of the Council of Europe whilst seeking membership of the European Union. Ankara also insisted that the case could not form a precedent, but that is always difficult to prevent.
- <sup>11</sup> From a broadcast by President Denktaş on state television (19.12.2003).
- <sup>12</sup> The text is in *Kıbrıs*, and other newspapers papers, 13.01.2004.