

ISLAMIC STATE RECRUITMENT AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE RE-SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE

Aylin ÜNVER NOI*

Abstract

Europe has faced with a huge immigration crisis due to a mass immigration flow from war-torn countries of the Middle East and North Africa recent years. Migration flow from mostly Muslim countries not only led to the discussions on the necessity of a real common migration policy for the EU with appropriate tools to regulate the flow of immigrants among countries including visa quotas distributed among EU states, a willingness to share responsibility for the settlement of refugees, acceptance of refugee claims but also re-opened the debate of the integration of immigrants in their societies. Moreover, recruitment of Islamic State (ISIL) jihadists from among young European Muslims in European states has raised doubts about the re-securitization of migration in Europe. I used the term “re-securitization” because migration was already securitized after the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States (2001) and the following Al-Qaeda bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). This article evaluates the perceived image of Muslim immigrants by examining three different eras: the post-Cold War era, the post 9/11 era and the post-Arab Spring era and its evolution from “cultural threat” to “terror threat”. It analyzes the far-right parties’ discourse and speech acts in Europe, which have affected mainstream parties’ construction of the Muslim immigrants as an existential threat and legitimized their extraordinary measures to contain it. Finally, it focuses on the possible impact of the ISIL threat on the re-securitization of migration in Europe.

Keywords: *Islamic State-ISIL, securitization, perception, migration*

* Asst. Prof., Director of European Union Application and Research Center, Istanbul Gedik University and non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, e-mail: aylin.unvernoi@gedik.edu.tr

(IRAK VE ŞAM) İSLAM DEVLETİNİN GÖNÜLLÜ ASKER TOPLAMASI VE BUNUN GÖÇÜN AVRUPA'DA TEKRAR GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİNE ETKİSİ

Öz

Son yıllarda Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'daki savaşın parçaladığı ülkelerden gelen kitlesel göç akımı ile Avrupa büyük bir göç krizi ile yüz yüze kalmıştır. Çoğu Müslüman ülkelerden gerçekleşen bu göç akımı AB üye devletleri arasında sadece vize kotaları ile dağıtımın sağlanması, mültecilerin yerleşmesi için sorumluluk paylaşılması konusunda isteklilik, mültecilerin iddialarının kabul edilmesi gibi ülkelerarası göç akımını uygun araçlarla düzenleyecek gerçek bir göç politikası gerekliliği üzerine tartışmaya neden olmamış, göçmenlerin topluma entegrasyonu konusunu da tekrardan tartışmaya açmıştır. Dahası, Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti jihatçılarının Avrupa Birliği üye devletlerindeki genç Müslüman Avrupalılardan asker toplaması Avrupa'da göçün tekrar güvenikleştirilmesi olasılığı üzerindeki şüpheleri arttırmıştır. Makalede bu dönemdeki güvenikleştirme anlatılırken "tekrar-Güvenikleştirme" (re-securitization) terimi kullanılmıştır çünkü ABD'de gerçekleştirilen 11 Eylül 2001 terör saldırıları ve sonrasındaki Madrid (2004) ve Londra (2005) El Kaide saldırıları ile göç zaten güvenikleştirilmişti. Makale, Müslüman göçmenlerin algılanan imajını "kültürel tehditten" "terör tehdidine" evrimini Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem, 11 Eylül sonrası dönem ve Arap Baharı sonrası dönem olarak ele alıp üç dönem altında değerlendirmektedir. Avrupa'da Müslüman göçmenlerin mevcut tehdit olarak inşa edilmesinde ve bu durumun normal dışı yöntemlerle kontrol altına alınmasını meşrulaştıran ve merkez partileri etkileyen aşırı sağ partilerin söylemlerini ve söz edimini (speech act) incelemektedir. Sonunda da İŞİD tehditinin Avrupa'da göçü tekrar güvenikleştirme üzerindeki olası etkisine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Irak ve Şam İslam devleti (İŞİD), Avrupa Birliği, güvenikleştirme, algılama, göç*

Securitization Theory and Migration

Traditional concepts of security are being challenged by the new realities of the international system. The need to widen the scope of security studies to include new issues emerged in the 1990s and paved the way for the emergence of new approaches to the analysis of international politics. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) of the Copenhagen School developed securitization theory, which contributes to the debate over the social construction of security (Williams 2003: 511).

According to securitization theory, which is a synthesis of realism and constructivism, security is a social and intersubjective construction and therefore emerges only in communication between subjects. Securitization theory examines security in five sectors: the military, politics, economics, the environment and society. It rejects the traditionalist case for restricting security to one sector, which was state-centric and identified with the military power of nation-states. Securitization theory “offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization- for understanding who can securitize what and under what conditions” (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: vii).

Constructivism has introduced a new dimension to the European security debate through the term “speech act”. Drawing from constructivist conceptual tools, Waever introduced the concept of “securitization” (see Karacasulu and Ozgoren, 2012: 43) using language theory. He regards security as a *speech act*, arguing that “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (Waever, 1995: 55). Constructivist scholars, Onuf (1998: 59) formulates this as “saying is doing”. He argues that talking is the primary way that we go about making the world what it is (Onuf, 1998: 59). However, within the framework of securitization, everything could not become an issue of security. Accordingly, threat arguments justifying extraordinary measures must establish that there is a threat, that the threat is potentially existential, and that security handling has advantages over non-securitized handling (Waever, 2011: 473).

A discourse presenting something as an existential threat to a referent *object* does not by itself lead to a *securitizing act*: the issue is securitized only if and when the *audience* accepts it as such. If no signs of such acceptance exist, the object will not be securitized (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: 25). Onuf argues that rules, which take the form from *speech acts*, are constructed through an interactive process between speakers and the *audiences*. If there is a positive interaction between speakers and *audience*, then the *speech acts* become rules — *statements* that tell people what they should do. *Agents* construct rules through *speech acts* that are repeated constantly (Onuf, 1989: 81).

Securitization focuses on the transformation of an issue into a matter of security by an *actor*. It enables the use of extraordinary measures in the name of security. The securitization act has three components: a *securitizing agent/actor*, an *object* and an *audience*. A *securitizing agent* makes *securitizing statements* that trigger the perception that the referent objects are under threat. In other words, a referent *object* is being threatened and needs to be protected. The *audience* that is the target of the *securitization act* needs to be convinced that the issue presents a security threat. According to securitization theory, anyone can construct something as a security problem through a *speech act*. If a subject is securitized, then it is possible to legitimize extraordinary measures to solve the perceived problems (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998: 25, 26).

Perception also plays an important role in the acceptance of an *issue* as a threat.

The perception that the referent *object* must be protected from the threat facilitates the securitization of the object. In naming a particular development as a security problem, the state can claim a special right. Those in power will always try to use the securitization of an issue to gain control over it (Waever, 1995: 54).

The contributions of Karl Deutsch (1957) and Robert Jervis (1976) to constructivist approach and to securitization theory, through their arguments on image, perception and misperception, are undeniable (Balzacq, 2009). As stated by Jervis (1976: 13) decision makers' perceptions matter. Decision makers perceive others' behavior and form judgments about their intentions (Jervis, 1976: 29). He emphasizes that "the logic permits us to distinguish between the "psychological milieu" (the world as the actor sees it) and the "operational milieu" (the world in which the policy will be carried out) and argues that policies and decisions must be mediated by the goals, calculations, and perceptions of statesmen (Jervis, 1976: 13-29).

This article uses the perceived image of Muslim immigrants in Europe in three different eras — the post-Cold War era, the post 9/11 era and the post-Arab Spring era — to explain its evolution from "cultural threat" to "terror threat." It examines how the three elements of securitization – namely, the *securitizing agent/actor*, the *object* and the *audience*- affect the actions of European governments related to terrorism and the recruitment of ISIL *ihadists* from their countries. For the purpose of this study, *securitizing agents* are considered to be politicians, media, think tanks, and particularly the far-right parties that perform securitization acts through their discourse, or *speech acts*; the *referent object* is Europeans, *securitizing issue* is migration; and the *audience* is Europeans who view and accept migration as a threat to their survival.

Popular support for politicians and far-right parties is the power that makes it possible for them to securitize a subject. The far right parties have constructed their anti-migration discourse by using security themes and framing migration as a threat. They are the leading securitizing actors and directly or indirectly influence a variety of policies and perceptions in Europe. The role of the far-right parties in securitization of the issue is one of the main subjects discussed in this article.

Muslims in Europe in the Post-Cold War Era: "Cultural Threat"?

Islam and Christianity have been living side by side for almost 1400 years, always as neighbors, mostly as rivals, and far too often as enemies (Karlsson, 2003: 11). Their alienation was accelerated by the collapse of Communism because the collapse of Soviet Communism, the perceived cultural distinctiveness of Islam and the emergence of its fundamentalist forms have redirected the confrontational axis from East-West to North-South (Jenkins and Copesey, 1996: 118).

The considerable increase in ethnic and religion-based conflicts as a result of ethnic nationalism and religious radicalism (instead of ideological rivalry) led to a change in how securitizing agents' (political elites, intellectuals, media, think tanks)

defined the “other.” As Kumar (2002: 54) has argued, Muslims have gradually become the new “other” in Europe, replacing the Jews of an earlier era and the Communists of the Cold War. The existential threat is clearly defined in the speech of *securitizing actors*. Terms such as “the red Communist peril” have been replaced by the “green Muslim threat”; these became popular in the discourse and statements of political elites, intellectuals and think tanks (Schlesinger, 1994: 45). For instance, after the collapse of Communism, NATO General Secretary, Willy Claes declared: “Militant Islam is the Western world’s number one menace. This is a view, which has been shared by think tanks and government circles throughout the West” (Vertovec and Peach, 1997: 3-4).

Moreover, some anticipated guerrilla warfare scenarios in the ghetto-suburbs of major cities of Europe in the post-Cold War era (Karlsson, 2003: 12). Esposito described three possible scenarios:

“While Europe has overcome the Cold War...it now risks creating new divisions and conflicts, such as white, wealthy and Christian “Fortress Europe” pitted against a largely poor, Islamic world. That could lead to terrorism and another forty years of small, hot wars.” (Esposito, 1999: 97-98)

In his famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington (2003: 121) argued that the source of conflict in international relations shifted from an ideological and economic perspective to a cultural one because the causes of the renewed conflict between Islam and the West lie in the fundamental question of power and culture. While *securitizing agents* constructed Muslims as an existential threat from outside, they also stigmatized Muslim immigrants as a potential threat to their values and culture: a “cultural threat.” Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the French far-right party Front National, underlined the particular threat posed by Islam by stating that “the language, custom and race of the North African population is not French. Most of all it is their religion, whose beliefs are presented as the antithesis of French Catholic values, which marks them as outsiders.” Le Pen demonized Islam as an intransigent religion whose aim is eventual domination of France (Evans, 1996: 50).

Perceptions are also shaped by images of Muslim immigrants. They are portrayed as burdens on the welfare state, particularly in a time of economic stagnation and recession. For far-right parties, priority in housing and employment must be given to nationals over non-nationals (Evans, 1996: 50). The far-right party in Germany has stated that immigration is the root cause of Germany’s problems. In making connections between immigration and economic crisis, the German political party REP (Die Republikaner) advances the notion of *Volksgemeinschaft* (people’s community) for the defense of Germans’ rights (Evans, 1996: 47). Similar connections between immigrants and unemployment were made by the other far-right party leaders at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. For instance, FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) leader, Jörg Haider, announced to his

fellow Austrians that they had to “stop immigration until unemployment reduced under 5 percent” (ADL, 2002).

The tendency to link increasing crime rates with immigrants also emerged in political discourse. The popular perception in most EU member states was that “foreigners” who are recent immigrants or their descendants are involved in crime (Tonry, 1997: 19). According to this perception, the first-generation immigrants are typically more law-abiding than the resident population because they enjoy better living conditions, housing, and medical care than their children and grandchildren who experienced deprivation and economic inequalities; the immigrants’ children and grandchildren who suffer assimilation problems have higher-than-normal offending and imprisonment rates higher than those of either their parents or the resident population (Tonry, 1997: 19; Albrecht, 1997: 55). This perception has been voiced by the far-right parties. Le Pen, for example, described Arab males as “muggers, pimps and drug pushers contaminating French society” (Evans, 1996: 51).

Islamic fundamentalism among immigrants became the last but not the least influential factor affecting the perceived image of Muslim immigrants, which contributed to fear of the future. These perceptions made the second step in the securitization of the migration, which is the acceptance of the issue as a security matter by the *audience*, easier.

These factors shaped the image of Islam in the eyes of many Europeans. Besides these internal factors, external factors that emerged during the Cold War period also were among the roots of the dominant image of a “militant Islam”: the Iranian Revolution, the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, kidnappings and hostage taking in Lebanon, the 1989 *fatwa* against the author Salman Rushdie affairs, Saddam Hussein’s call for a *jihad* against the West in the Gulf War, the World Trade Center bombing, the killing of Coptic Christians in Egypt, and more. The fear of the export of “Islamic fundamentalism and its threat to domestic security have captured the media attention” in Europe (Esposito, 1999: 221) since the rise of political Islam led to the radicalization of certain sectors of the Muslim population living in Europe (Cesari, 1999: 221). In this environment, Islam has been stigmatized by everything contradictory to the essential values of Western civilization and used as an instrument of political mobilization by the far-right parties (Vertovec and Peach, 1997: 4).

Culture, which is the realm of belief and opinion, is also the realm of emotion, of irrationalism, of anarchy and even fanaticism. The process of identity construction, which is particularly apparent during periods of fundamental change (Williams, 2007: 18-69), played a significant role after the collapse of Communism since the bankruptcy of Marxism, the difficulties of finding employment, and the feeling of social relegation and discrimination left belonging to Islam as the best and the last option for immigrants in Europe (Cesari, 1999: 216); at the same time, the perceived image of Muslim immigrants as an economic, cultural, and interior

threat, along with disappearance of a common enemy, contributed to the rise of far-right parties with their anti-immigration and Islamophobic agenda. In other words, both sides redefined their identities as a result of the changing international environment and other developments.

Briefly, an increase in the visibility of the Islamic way of life through the increasing number of Muslim immigrants in 1980s Europe led to the perception that Islam is not compatible with Western values and cannot be integrated into European society; in addition, Islam was perceived as a “cultural threat,” particularly in the slogans of populist parties. Before his assassination, Pim Fortuyn, the leader of the Netherlands’ far-right party Pim Fortuyn List, wrote a book called *Islamification of Our Culture*, which argues that immigrants should embrace Dutch culture and leave their old values behind (IRR, 2003).

The structural and the perceived factors that led to the rise of far-right parties and xenophobia, particularly Islamophobia, in the EU member states since the end of the 1980s, can be listed as follows: the globalization and its effects on the welfare state; the economic problems that emerged with the transformation of the welfare state; a decline in the success of left-wing politics on solving political problems; the rise in multiculturalism through mass immigration flows from the southern neighbors of the EU; the increasing crime rate and its perceived connection with the immigration; Islamic fundamentalism and its repercussions on Muslim immigrants (Unver Noi, 2007). All these developments paved the way to the perception of Muslim immigrants as a threat to public order, the labor market, and European cultural identity.

Muslims in Europe in the Post- 9/11 Era: “Terror Threat”?

External factors are as influential as internal factors on the perceptions of the *audience*. The 9/11 terror attacks were perceived by many in the West as creating an existential threat to political and secular norms of the West and led to the emergence of a new security agenda based on the securitization of Islam. Political discourse, state policies, and institutions were shaped by the perceived Islamist threat, which had an impact on the religious freedom of Muslims in the West (Fox and Akbaba, 2013: 1). The EU member states decided not only to establish FRONTEX in 2004 to strengthen border security and reduce the terrorist threat and to make the migration issue the fourth pillar of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 2005; they also decided to take extraordinary measures. Briefly, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had made Islamic extremism a key security issue. Immigrants, since 2001 in particular, have been characterized as threatening and this choice “seems to justify emergency measures and the suspension of the normal rules of the game” (Fox and Akbaba, 2013).

In this context, “migration is increasingly interpreted as a security problem” (Bigo, 2002: 63). Migration became a subject of high politics due to the perceived link between migration and terrorism. This also escalated the tension between nationalists and Muslim immigrants in Europe and strengthened the existing

perception of Islamic culture as unmeltable ethnies. This mentality was used by the populist far-right parties against the Muslim immigrants living in their countries in order to gain votes from citizens who already feared for their future.

By securitizing and labeling migration, particularly by Muslims, as a security issue, the *securitizing agent* (politicians, state officials) has legitimized the use of extreme measures to handle it. Precautions - extraordinary measures - were to be taken to contain the threat. Accordingly, many countries revised their laws to facilitate the deportation of radical *imams*. For example, France proposed laws in 2005 to ease the *imam* deportation process. Spain proposed government monitoring of religious sermons in 2004. Imam deportation also occurred in the United Kingdom and Italy (Fox and Akbaba, 2013). Imams in the Netherlands are made to attend compulsory language classes to learn Flemish in the mosques; the lessons include teaching the Dutch approaches to homosexuality, women's rights, and euthanasia. The Ministry of Migration also announced that those who refused to take this training would be denied the residence (Radikal, 2002). According to these precautionary rules, all Muslims are closely observed in order to identify the Radical Islamists among them. Moreover, the income of the mosques and the education of imams are investigated (NTVMSNBC, 2002).

European governments limited the practices of religion in public places and the opening of new institutions of Islam in Europe. All religious symbols in public spaces was banned in France. Muslim girls are prohibited from wearing headscarves (*hijab*) in schools. A 2004 law in France restricted the wearing of religious symbols in schools (Fox and Akbaba, 2013). The *hijab* issue exemplifies the widening gulf between French society and its Muslim minority. According to French people, Arab girls who insist on wearing *chuddars* and *hijab* in their schools are not French and do not want to be (Radikal, 2003:10). The German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg banned Muslim teachers from wearing Islamic headscarves in 2004. By the end of 2008, at least eight of Germany's states had enacted such a ban (Fox and Akbaba, 2013).

Immigration laws targeting migrants from Muslim countries tightened as a part of "war on terror" due to the association of Muslim immigrants and terrorism in Europe after the 9/11 terror attacks to the US and the following Al-Qaeda bombings in London and Madrid (Cesari, 2013: 2). Many European countries enacted changes in their immigration policies. The French Parliament passed an immigration bill requiring immigrants to pass tests of French values and language in 2007. The Dutch government proposed important changes in immigration policies under the title "Integration Policy New Style," which mostly focused on cultural adaptation of immigrants in order to increase compatibility of Muslim groups than ever with the lifestyles of host countries (Fox and Akbaba, 2013).

Cesari (2013: 1) described the perception of Islam in the West as both an internal and an external enemy: It is described as an internal enemy because "Muslims cannot or will not integrate; Islam is incompatible with Western values

(freedom/equality); Islam is incompatible with national values (history/customs/language)". It is described as an external enemy because "Islam is the main cause of international terrorism; Muslims maintain external allegiances that endanger national security." Hence, following 9/11, the perceived image of Muslim immigrants evolved from "cultural threat" to "terror threat." Migrants, who earlier were only perceived to be connected with ordinary crimes, were connected with terror after 9/11. Immigration was thus linked to terrorism and security threats.

Muslims in Europe in the Post-Arab Spring Era: "Terror Threat" again?

The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia with the self-immolation of street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi in 2011, ignited the light of a series of uprisings of people seeking dignity, prosperity, and democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. Following longstanding dictators stepped down, power struggles erupted within the countries; lack of consensus in the societies later led to polarization; and rivalries between regional powers to export their own models have contributed to chaos, political instability, terrorism, civil war, and even failed states instead of transition to democracy.

ISIL emerged in Iraq, a state with ethnic and sectarian divisions that is incapable of adequately representing the needs of its population due to the lack of power-sharing provisions between Shiites and Sunnis in the post-Saddam era. Moreover, the political vacuum that emerged as a result of civil war in Syria also created an opportunity for ISIL to use the territory of Syria as a base to recruit foreign fighters (*jihadists*).

Increasing instability, violence, and radicalization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in the post-Arab Spring era and the geographical proximity of MENA countries made the EU member states more vulnerable to new mass immigration from the South. The increase in illegal immigration from the southern neighbors to Europe has enforced the EU to take further steps to secure the EU's external border, such as the new European program FRONTEX Plus, which is designed to reinforce border control and tackle the migration crisis.

The immigration issue was already an issue of high politics, but the beheading of American and British journalists, Steven Sotloff, James Wright Foley, and French tourist, Herve Gourdel by the ISIL and its affiliated group in Algeria, refreshed the memory of militant Islam images and the fear of the West. The emergence of ISIL throughout the MENA region and beyond, particularly in Syria and Iraq, and its increasing popularity among the young Muslims in Europe, reinforced the securitization of migration. Socio-economic issues popularized ISIL among young Muslims. All these developments, both internal and external, make de-securitization of the issue difficult. Table 1.1 shows the number of *jihadists* recruited by ISIL from countries around the world, including European states.

TABLE 1.1. Number of Foreign ISIL *Jihadists*

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	MUSLIM POPULATION	NUMBER OF JIHADISTS	% OF MUSLIMS WHO HAVE JOINED TO FIGHT
ALGERIA	34,780,000	200	0,000575
AUSTRALIA	399,000	250	0,06
BELGIUM	638,000	250	0,039
CANADA	940,000	30	0,0032
DENMARK	226,000	100	0,044
FINLAND	42,000	30+	0,071
FRANCE	4,704,000	700+	0,015
GERMANY	4,119,000	about 300	0,007
INDONESIA	204,847,000	30-60	0,00003
IRELAND	43,000	25-30	0,07
KOSOVA	2,104,000	100-120	0,006
KYRGZSTAN	4,927,000	10+	0,0002
MOROCCO	32,381,000	about 1500	0,005
NETHERLANDS	914,000	120	0,013
NORWAY	144,000	40-50	0,035
RUSSIA	16,379,000	over 800	0,005
SAUDI ARABIA	25,493,000	about 2500	0,01
SINGAPORE	721,000	1	0,0001
SPAIN	1,021,000	51	0,005
SWEDEN	451,000	about 30	0,007
SWITZERLAND	433,000	about 10	0,002
TUNISIA	10,349,000	about 3000	0,03
TURKEY	74,660,000	about 400	0,0005
UNITED KINGDOM	2,869,000	500	0,017
UNITED STATES	2,595,000	100+	0,004

Source: (CNN 2014).

Among the EU countries the largest number of fighters, approximately 700, comes from France. The United Kingdom follows with 500 *jihadists*. Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, all of which have considerable Muslim populations, are next.

Only a small number of fighters are from Indonesia, which has the world's largest Muslim population. Other Muslim countries closer to the conflicts such as Turkey, Algeria, and Morocco, also have relatively few fighters (CNN, 2014). Given the extraordinary measures taken after the 9/11 terror attacks and following the Al-Qaeda bombings in Madrid and London, the number of foreign *jihadists* joined from the EU member states in comparison to Muslim countries is thought-provoking. Those measures seem not to have contributed to the security of Europe. Furthermore, *speech acts* and the following extraordinary measures that curb democratic rights of immigrants might have negative impact on integration of the Muslim population in Europe. This discriminatory policy towards the immigrants causes their further alienation from the society they were born and raised in. The number of *jihadists*, who have joined the ISIL, can be interpreted partly as a validation of this argument. I am saying partly because some of these foreign

fighters are teenagers who have no prior connection to Syria and are new to Islam (Ibetimes 2014).

ISIL recruitment from the EU provides a framework for developing the *speech act* interpretation of security. The social construction of migration as a security question reflects the perceived societal danger/threat. The emergence of the ISIL threat put the “terror threat” and securitization of migration onto the top of agenda again. I used the term “re-securitization” to explain “increased securitization” of the issue following the ISIL recruitments through *speech acts* and extraordinary measures.

Recruitment of ISIL *jihadists* from EU member states has led to the fear of possible terror attacks by these *jihadists* when they return to Europe. The terrorist attack on the Paris office of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* in January 2015 (and other thwarted attacks) supports this argument. Terrorists that are French citizens affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Yemen claimed responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack. Other thwarted attacks in France were planned by terrorists that wish to join *jihadist* in Syria and have in contact with someone affiliated ISIS in Syria (Aljazeera, 2015; The Guardian, 2015).

These attacks also led to the discourse that later opened the way for some EU member states to take extraordinary measures to prevent such threats. Speaking about the approximately 3,000 Europeans who have joined *jihadi* movements and the *Charlie Hebdo* terrorist attack, Spanish interior minister Jorge Fernandez Diaz said in an interview, “There are hundreds of them in Europe and they could activate themselves at any time as solitary actors, integrated in cells or in loosely structured groups, and could produce very tragic events like we have seen in Paris” (New York Times, 2015).

The *Charlie Hebdo* attack worsened the societal perception of Muslim immigrants and strengthened the far-right parties’ arguments against Muslim immigrants and immigration. The National Observatory Against Islamophobia has identified more than 50 attacks against Islamic symbols since the *Charlie Hebdo* incident; it has called for a doubling of the surveillance on mosques and Islamic centers. The UK Independence Party, for example, which supports tougher controls on immigration, has benefited from seething resentments. The UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, told Channel 4 news that there is a strong argument that the attacks are a product of multiculturalism, and claimed there is now a “fifth column” in Britain (The Telegraph, 2015). Germany's Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) used the attack in France to rally an estimated 18,000 marchers in Dresden (Los Angeles Times, 2015).

The *Charlie Hebdo* attack, which raised tensions between citizens and immigrants, also made possible the extraordinary measures taken to protect the *referent object*- the people of the EU member states. France has sought to tighten procedures for entry to and exit from France and also European partners, where immigrants will be the most affected. France’s interior minister, Bernard

Cazeneuve, has said that he is willing to facilitate police access to information about airplane passengers on the European level, under what is known as the “record of passengers names” (Echoroukonline, 2015).

Also in France, former minister Valerie Pécresse has proposed interning young *jihadists* returning from Syria in specialized centers to counter the indoctrination they received there. In response, Jean-Marie Le Pen voiced support for reintroducing the death penalty for those found guilty of plotting against France (Herald Tribune, 2014).

The UK, home of numerous *jihadists* who have joined ISIL, is one EU state that took extraordinary measures before the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. In 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron warned that the return of hundreds of extremists poses a greater threat to the security of the UK than Al-Qaeda itself. He announced that more armed police would patrol Britain’s streets to counter the threat. Proposals to invalidate the passports of extremists who have already gone abroad are also being examined. The prime minister said in a press conference that ISIL was unlike any previous terrorist threat because it had effectively established a state from which it could eventually mount attacks on the West. Cameron also said that “in Afghanistan the Taliban were prepared to play host to Al Qaeda, the terrorist organization. With ISIL we are facing a terrorist organization not being hosted in a country but seeking to establish and then violently expand its own terrorist state. With designs on expanding up to the Turkish border, we could be facing a terrorist state on the shores of the Mediterranean and bordering a NATO member” (Huffington Post 2014).

ISIL recruitment of young people from European countries has even prompted government discussions about restricting travel to Syria and its neighboring countries (NTVMSNBC, 2014). Moreover, the 1995 Schengen Agreement, which ensures the free circulation of people among 26 of the EU’s 28 countries, faces criticism in the EU member states with the rise of populist anti-immigrant far-right parties (Haddad, 2015).

After the terrorist attacks in Paris, which increased tensions between French citizens and immigrants, the far-right party National Front printed a poster that showing *jihadist* fighters and a map of France with the words: “Islamist Peril: Let’s Protect the French” (VOA, 2015). The shift in the public mood seems most likely to further push mainstream parties to embrace more restrictive policies on integration, immigration and asylum. For instance, under pressure from anti-immigration Independence Party, Britain’s coalition government announced in October 2014 that it would no longer support the Italian Navy’s Operation Mare Nostrum, seeks to rescue imperiled African immigrants from international waters who have fled their home countries by boat for Europe. The conservatives claim that these operations encourage immigrants to make the dangerous journey (Foreign Affairs, 2015). Some EU member states, including Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, have traditionally endorsed a multicultural approach to immigration;

now they are placing new demands on immigrants to learn the language and customs of their new countries. In Germany, the conservative party the Christian Social Union (CSU), an ally of chancellor Angela Merkel's government, proposed a law that would have forced immigrant families to speak German at home (Washington Post, 2014).

Briefly, the recruitment of ISIL *jihadists* and increasing immigration flow from the South have put securitization of migration onto the agenda in Europe, and have also lead to new measures on migration and visa-liberalization policies. For example, concerns about the free movement of terrorists and criminals led the European Commission to link its report on Turkey's fulfillment of the visa-liberalization road map to Turkey's efforts to fight terrorism and organized crime through better border security. It emphasized Turkey's improvement of border controls before the establishment of a visa-free regime (European Commission Report, 2014).

Increasing perception of (uncontrolled) immigration from the EU's southern neighbors as a potential security threat has contributed to a migration approach that is driven by principles of defense and deterrence. The EU and its member states have increased their border protection spending (Völkel, 2014: 151), although its contribution to both the EU's security and the socio-economic integration of the Muslim population of Europe is questionable.

Conclusion

In times of uncertainty, which tend to appear when an existing international political system or a status quo changes, the search for a new 'other' often resurfaces (Helbling, 1997: 245). The stigmatization of Muslim immigrants as a "cultural threat" and the new "other" in Europe by the far-right parties' discourse and *speech acts* in the post-Cold War era is an example of this argument. Through these *speech acts*, the far right parties such as Front National has increasingly gained support over the last years.

Bigo (2002: 65) argues, "the securitization of immigration is not only an affect of, even if it contributes to, the propaganda of the far-right parties, the rise of racism, a new and more efficient rhetoric convincing the population of a danger, or successful *speech acts* performed by actors coming from the state or from the society." For him, "the securitization of migration is used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage if it does not yet exists, so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures" (Bigo, 2002: 65).

Whatever the other reasons behind the securitization of migration, but the reality is that *Securitizing actors* (politicians, intellectuals, media, think tanks) and their *speech acts* (presenting a problem as a menace that threatens the survival of particular group) have contributed to the securitization of Islam and migration in Europe and led to its evolution from "cultural threat" to "terror threat" after the 9/11

terror attacks in the United States and the Al-Qaeda bombings in Madrid and London. The use of excessive measures has become normalized among the ordinary citizens of the EU member states. Despite pre-existing concerns about Muslims, the events of 9/11 escalated and perhaps catalyzed this securitization trend (Fox and Akbaba, 2013). The securitization of Islam has led to increased restrictions on the religious freedoms of Muslims in Europe, even though these restrictions were not likely to increase security (Fox and Akbaba, 2013).

Changes in the status quo, and internal and external developments, such as the chaotic situations and political vacuums in the Middle East and North Africa region following the Arab Spring, led to the rise of *jihadists* movements. Migration has once again become a significant issue, and the possibility of re-securitization of migration creates a dilemma for Europe today. European states are searching for ways to facilitate the socio-economic integration of the considerable number of Muslim immigrants. However, anti-terrorism and security concerns restrict Islam from the public space and have led those states to take extraordinary measures to contain it (Cesari, 2013: 83). The president of the Committee Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), Samy Debah has argued that “there is a link between the political discourse and the rise of violent acts and discrimination against the Muslim community” (Reuters, 2013).

Recent developments in the MENA region, which affect the perceived image of Islam and Muslim immigrants in Europe, do not help the realization of de-securitization of migration issue in Europe. Muslim immigrants’ efforts to disassociate themselves from ISIL (such as the “Not in my name” campaign by British Muslims) are important initiatives, but their effect on the British society is questionable. This campaign, which was also adopted by French Muslims after the killing of a Frenchman by an ISIL-affiliated group in Algeria, shows that Muslims in Europe do not want to be associated with ISIL. They fear that the securitization of the subject (migration) will be followed by undemocratic restrictions.

A shift from thinking the immigration issue as an issue of human security, which aims to protect people and provide assistance, into a national security issue, which legitimize extraordinary responses, in other words the securitization of immigration seems unlikely to contribute to the integration of Muslim immigrants into the societies where they live. On the contrary, the rising number of European *jihadists* from the EU member states might be interpreted as meaning that hatred and animosity toward the West are growing among the young Muslims of Europe. The result could be heightened suspicion of European societies about all Muslim immigrants in Europe and an increase in the power of the far-rights parties, which already have a xenophobic and Islamophobic agenda. The ascendancy of anti-immigrant parties is more likely to push the mainstream parties in a populist direction. Finding a delicate balance between the immigration issue and the fight against terrorism without harming the Muslim immigrants’ rights will require tough decisions by the leaders of the European countries. The harrowing image of the lifeless body of a little boy, Alan (Aylan) Kurdi, one of at least 12 Syrians who

drowned attempting to reach Greek island of Kos - illustrates not only human costs and seriousness of migration crisis but also an ongoing mass immigration flow from Muslim countries to Europe that will not ended in the short term.

References:

- ADL (Anti-Defamation League) (2002) “Joerg Haider: The Rise of an Austrian Extreme Rightist”, <http://www.adl.org/backgrounders/joerg_hadier .asp>, (13 September 2002).
- Albrecht, H. (1997) “Ethnic Minorities, Crime and Criminal Justice in Germany”, in M. Tonry (Ed.), *Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Aljazeera (2015) “Al-Qaeda in Yemen Claims Charlie Hebdo Attack”, January 14, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/al-qaeda-yemen-charlie-hebdo-paris-attacks-201511410323361511.html>>, 23 April 2015.
- Balzacq, T. (2009) “Constructivism and Securitization Studies”, in V. Mauer and M. Dunn Cavely (Eds.), *Handbook of Security Studies*, (London: Routledge).
- Bigo, D. (2002) “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”, *Alternatives*, (27): 63-92.
- Buzan, B., Waeever, O. and Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- Cesari, J. (1999) “The Re-Islamization of Muslim Immigration in Europe”, in G. M. Munoz (Ed.), *Islam, Modernism and the West: Cultural and Political Relations at the End of the Millennium*, (London & New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers).
- Cesari, J. (2012) “Securitization of Islam in Europe”, *Die Welt des Islam*, (52): 430-449.
- Cesari, J. (2013) *Why the West Fears Islam*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- CNN (2014) “Syria’s Foreign Jihadis: Where Do They Come From?”, September 1, <http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/09/syria-foreign-jihadis/>, (10 November 2014).
- Den Boer, P. (1998) “Europe as an Idea”, in K. Paling and V. Veldheer (Eds.), *The European Challenge: Essays on Culture, Values and Policy in a Changing Continent*, (Gravenhage: Vuga).
- Deutsch, K. W., Burrell, S.A., Kann, R.A. and Maurice Lee, Jr. (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Echoroukonline (2015). “Charlie Hebdo Attack: Algerian Immigrants to Face Extremism”, January 14, <<http://www.echoroukonline.com/ara/articles/229631.html>>, (23 April 2015).
- Esposito, J. L. (1999) “ ‘Clash of Civilizations’? Contemporary Images of Islam in the West”, in G. M. Munoz (Ed.), *Islam, Modernism and the West*, (London & New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers).
- European Commission Report (2014) “Commission Assesses Progress by Turkey in Visa Dialogue”, 20 October, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1173_en.htm>, (2 December 2014).
- Evans, M. (1996) “Languages of Racism within Contemporary Europe”, in B. Jenkins and S. A. Sofos (Eds.), *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*, (London & New York: Routledge).
- Fox, J. and Akbaba, Y. (2013) “Securitization of Islam and Religious Discrimination: Religious Minorities in Western Democracies, 1990-2008”, *Comparative European Politics*, 1-23, <<http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/cep20138a.html>>, (20 November 2014).

- Haddad, B. (2015) "Europe Passes the Buck While Thousands Die", 23 April, <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/23/europes-gray-suits-give-refugees-a-cold-shoulder-shipwreck-migrants-mediterranean/>>, (28 April 2015).
- Helbling, J. (1997) "The Nationalist Game: State Dominance and Ethnic Nationalism", in H. R. Wicker (Ed.), *Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity: The Struggle for Meaning and Order in Europe*, (Oxford & New York: Berg).
- Herald Tribune (2014) "Jean Marie Le Pen Wants French Jihadists Executed by Guillotine", 2 December, <<http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=2362244&CategoryId=12395>>, (2 December 2014).
- Huffington Post (2014) "David Cameron Announces New Powers to Revoke Passports as Terror Threat Level Raised", 29 August, <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/08/29/david-cameron-terrorism-passports_n_5736490.html>, (23 October 2014).
- Huntington, S. P. (2003) *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking the World*, (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks).
- Ibtimes (2014) "ISIS Recruitment Reach "Unprecedented Scale" with 15,000 Foreign Jihadists Joining Militant Fighters", 30 October, <http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-recruitment-reaches-unprecedented-scale-15000-foreign-jihadists-joining-militant-1716684>, (10 November 2014).
- IRR (Race and Refugee News Network) (2003) "Netherlands: List of Pim Fortuyn, Centrumdemocraten (CD)", *Netherlands Bloc*, <<http://www.irr.org.uk/europe/netherlands.htm>>, (16 March 2003).
- Jenkins, B. and Copsy, N. (1996) "Nation, Nationalism and National Identity in France", in B. Jenkins and S. A. Sofos (Eds.), *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*, (London & New York: Routledge).
- Jervis, R. (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Karlsson, I. (2003) "The Muslim Immigrants: A Bridge Between Two Cultures?", in E. Zeybekoğlu and B. Johansson (Eds.), *Migration and Labour in Europe: Views from Turkey and Sweden*, (Istanbul: Sefik Matbaası).
- Kumar, K. (2002) "The Nation-State, the European Union and Transnational Identities". In N. Al Sayyad and M. Castells (Eds.), *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books).
- Los Angeles Times (2015). "After Charlie Hebdo Attack in France, Backlash Against Muslims Feared", January 8, <<http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-82494924/>>, (23 April 2015).
- New York Times (2015) "French PM Acknowledges 'Failings' in Preventing Attack", January 9, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/09/world/europe/ap-eu-france-attack-missed-opportunities.html?_r=0>, (24 April 2015).
- Onuf, N. (1989) *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press).
- Onuf, N. (1998) "Constructivism: A User's Manual", in V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf and P. Kowert (Eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe).

- NTVMSNBC (2002) "Hollanda Radikal İslamcılarının Pesinde", <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/183614.asp?0m=2DF>>, (22 October 2002).
- NTVMSNBC (2014) "Alman Bakandan Türkiye Örneği", <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25545766/>>, (23 October 2014).
- Radikal, Volume: 2181, Year: 6, October 2, 2002, p. 12
- Radikal, Volume: 2627, Year: 8, December 22, 2003, p. 10
- Reuters (2013) "Anti-Muslim Acts Rising in France, Rights Group Says", <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/03/us-france-islam-idUSBRE9620Z420130703>>, (2 December 2014).
- Schlesinger, P. (1994) " "Europeanness"- A New Cultural Battlefield?", in R. J. Pohorgles *et al.* (Eds.) *European Transformations: Five Decisive Years at the Turn of the Century*, (Aldershot, UK: Avesuny).
- The Guardian (2015). "France has Foiled Five Terror Plots since Charlie Hebdo Attack, says French PM", 23 April, <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/23/france-foils-five-terror-attacks-says-prime-minister>>, (23 April 2015).
- The Wall Street Journal (2015) "Europe's Anti-Immigrant Parties to Gain Ground in Wake of Paris Attacks: Paris Attacks Stir European Political Waters", January 16, <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-anti-immigrant-parties-stand-to-gain-ground-in-wake-of-paris-attacks-1421371307>>, (28 April 2015).
- The Washington Post (2014) "What's Behind the Astonishing Rise of an Anti-Islam Movement in Germany?", 16 December, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/16/whats-behind-the-astonishing-rise-of-an-anti-islam-movement-in-germany/>>, (28 April 2015).
- The Telegraph (2015) "Paris Charlie Hebdo Attack: David Cameron Condemns Nigel Farage over 'Fifth Column' Remarks", January 8, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/11333491/Paris-Charlie-Hebdo-attack-David-Cameron-condemns-Nigel-Farage-over-fifth-column-remarks.html>>, (6 May 2015).
- Tonry, M. (1997) "Crime and Justice: A Review of Research", in M. Tonry (Ed.), *Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Unver Noi, A. (2007) *Avrupa'da Yükselen Milliyetçilik (The Rising Nationalism in Europe)*, (Istanbul: IQ Publishing).
- Vertovec, S. and Peach, C. (1997). "Introduction: Islam in Europe and the Politics of Religion and Community", in S. Vertovec and C. Peach (Eds.) *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*, (Houndmills, UK: McMiller).
- VOA (2015) "Anti-immigration Party Gains Strength in France", 12 February, <<http://learningenglish.voanews.com/content/anti-immigration-gain-in-france/2639098.html>>, (28 April 2015).
- Völkel, J. C. (2014) "Money for Nothing, the Cricks for Free: Five Paradoxes in EU Migration Policy", *Comparative Migration Studie*, 2(2).
- Wæver, O. (1995) "Securitization and Desecuritization", in R. D. Lipschutz (Ed.), *On Security*, (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Wæver, O. (2011) "Politics, Security, Theory", *Security Dialogue*, 42 (4-5): 465-480.

-
- Williams, M. C. (2003) "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (4): 511-531.
- Williams, M. C. (2007) *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security*, (London & New York: Routledge).